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GENERATION X refers to people who were born in the 1960s and 
1970s and came of age in the final decades of the twentieth century.1 
Uneasily placed after the postwar Baby Boomers and before contempo-
rary Millennials, X is a cohort that eludes definition. Growing up, Xers 
witnessed the formation of the EU and NAFTA and the resilience of eth-
nic conflict worldwide. They registered the rise of postmodern culture 
and the entrenchment of corporate Empire. They were lured by upward 
mobility and stalked by financial crises. They donned Ray-Bans and 
checked out. As Tyler Durden, the anarchist hero of the cult film Fight 
Club, puts it: “We’re the middle children of history, man. No purpose or 
place. We have no Great War. No Great Depression. Our Great War’s a 
spiritual war . . . our Great Depression is our lives.”
 1. The range of birthyears offered for “Generation X” varies from the narrow 1965–
1976 (Hornblower) to the inclusive 1960–1980 (Henseler, Global). Douglas Rushkoff 
sets 1964 as the starting birthyear; Philip Jenkins includes Americans born between 1963 
and 1979; Neil Howe and Bill Strauss’s 13thGEN: Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail?, widely 
cited in scholarship on Generation X, defines the “13th Generation” birthyear range 
as 1961–1981. I adopt Christine Henseler’s 1960–1980 range for this study, in part to 
affirm the global perspective of her work, and in part to affirm Daniel Grassian’s early 
point (with which Henseler agrees) that Generation X is best defined not by dates but by 
media events and cultural products (Grassian 14; see also Henseler, Global 27 n.4).
1
The Middle Children of History
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 In Fight Club, Tyler organizes underground combat groups that 
draw on this underlying disaffection and resentment and transfigure 
it into violence. But the local fight clubs coalesce into a conglomerate, 
Project Mayhem, a highly structured terror organization. The twin tow-
ers that collapse in the film’s final scenes are the culmination of this 
process, and attest to violence’s eruption from the gap between image 
and experience, a lacuna that Xers chronically inhabit. “We’ve all been 
raised on television to believe that one day we’d all be millionaires, and 
movie gods, and rock stars. But we won’t,” Tyler tells his fight club 
members. “We’re slowly learning that fact. And we’re very, very pissed 
off.”
 Disappear Here asks what Generation X has to teach us about vio-
lence onscreen, online, and in a literary text. Like Tyler, I argue that 
their historical situation puts Xers in a unique position. Formed and 
fashioned by media events, schooled by consumer capitalism and its 
relentless dialectic of complicity and co-option, Generation X saw the 
epistemic certainty of violence—its quality as real or documentable—
disappear, and found no reliable cause or ism to replace it. Conse-
quently, Xers approach violence not from a sense of opposition to the 
culture from which they feel excluded, but by awareness of their com-
plicity in it, a position that cancels out any moral or political convic-
tion—hence the GenX catchword “whatever.” But X is not merely a 
generational appellation. The letter marks the cultural experience that 
defines this group: varied, uncertain; stuck in an empty area, its value as 
yet to be determined; a shifting target, informed by the media, detached 
from or rejecting commitment. And X marks the spot from which a new 
approach to violence, the real, and “real violence” can be formulated 
today: after Generation X.
 It is common for champions of Generation X to counter their repu-
tation as disaffected and affirm, “We Care.” Such an attitude, claim-
ing solidarity with traditional activism, is nostalgic and inaccurate. It 
elides the implications of the X itself, its association with specificity 
and negation, multiplicity and menace. Xers were dismissed as slack-
ers, hackers, and losers, and derided as volatile and apathetic. But even 
though they had no Great War or Depression to define them, Xers’ lives 
were tinged with violence. They were haunted by AIDS and hunted by 
the demons of crack and meth. They played increasingly graphic video 
games. Many of them experienced the devastating, accretive violence 
of divorce and downward mobility. All lived the slow transformative 
violence of revolution. Xers witnessed the rise of the home computer, 
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the fall of the USSR, and the establishment of Empire—both capitalist 
and fundamentalist. As the planes struck the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, Xers entered middle age. 
 But their reputation for chronic disaffection persists. A Time maga-
zine profile rehearsed the stereotype: “Net surfing, nihilistic nipple pierc-
ers whining about McJobs; latchkey legacies, fearful of commitment. 
Passive and powerless, they were content, it seemed, to party on in a 
Wayne’s Nether-world, one with more antiheroes—Kurt Cobain, Dennis 
Rodman, the Menendez brothers—than role models” (Hornblower). 
The music critic Touré recalls “the rise of a mysterious sexual plague 
and a powerful drug ruining society and harbingers of the end of Ameri-
can global dominance: All of that had the feel of the beginning of the 
end of days. [. . .] This was not something we could march to change. 
This was something from which we could do nothing but unplug” (64–
65). Even today, “Generation X” is generally evoked—if at all—to sig-
nify an empty area, a value yet to be determined. “The label itself has 
been somewhat of an enigma, a question mark, a blank, an identity [. . .] 
twisted into a demographic that seems to contribute little, disregarded 
as dark matter lost in disillusioned space,” writes Generation X scholar 
Christine Henseler (“What’s in the Label?”).
 What would we learn by affirming X’s persistent reputation as the 
alienated generation, the ones with nothing to believe in? What if we 
FIGURE 1. Fight Club (1999). Screen grab. Edward Norton and Helena Bonham Carter, their silhou-
ettes almost identical, face a pair of exploding skyscrapers. This image (which departs from the novel, 
in which just one skyscraper collapses) propelled a number of critics to read Fight Club as presaging the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001. © Fincher/Fox.
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took seriously their anthem, “Nevermind”? Disappear Here argues 
that X’s association with negation, ambivalence, and multiplicity lends 
it philosophical and critical heft, resurrecting the investment in the 
aporetic that lent ethical weight to the discourses of poststructuralism 
and deconstruction, and reclaiming the hermeneutics of suspicion that 
powered the important critical work of the previous century. Xers, 
the latecomers to that century, heirs to unparalleled technological 
advances and witness to technology’s destructive capacity, initiated a 
move away from traditional approaches to violence, a move that is 
discernable in the fiction and film that Xers create. Disappear Here 
traces this move, and addresses its implications for judgment, critique, 
and action today, as Xers assume key positions in culture and society.
 My first chapter, “Why X Now? Crossing Out and Marking the 
Spot,” sets forth the stakes of this study and situates it within existing 
scholarship on Generation X. Important work has been done by John 
M. Ulrich, Christine Henseler, Daniel Grassian, and Martine Delvaux; 
together with Douglas Coupland’s writing in the 1990s, Douglas Rush-
koff’s edited GenX Reader, and Neil Howe and Bill Strauss’s seminal 
13thGen: Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail?, this work sets the stage for my 
project of determining how Generation X thinks about violence, and 
how we—Boomers, Xers, Millennials—may think of violence after 
Generation X. I argue that Generation X’s experience of violence is 
defined by paralysis, menace, and complicity; that Xers, raised on TV, 
accustomed to video games and to remote control over the image, and 
attuned to the prevalence of entrenched racism, invisible violence, 
and corruption, are uniquely poised to rewrite the relation of violence 
to the real. Novels by Bret Easton Ellis, Douglas Coupland, Colson 
Whitehead, and Jay McInerney help me define this X attitude.
 Xers stress the formative impact of media on their development. In 
chapter 2, “Nevermind: An X Critique of Violence,” I trace how, with 
the rise of home media, CNN, reality TV, and the censorship of images 
during the Gulf War, Generation X witnessed a revision of how the real-
ity of “real violence” is traditionally signaled or signified. In the course 
of this revision, violence’s epistemic validity, and its reliability as a way 
to demarcate reality and distinguish reality from fiction, vanished— 
with crucial implications for judgment, affect, and ethics. Turning to 
a history of violence in twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century phi-
losophy (Walter Benjamin, Georges Bataille, Hannah Arendt, Michel 
Foucault, Elaine Scarry, Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben), I articu-
late the specific questions that Generation X poses to representation and 
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critique, drawing on theories of media, the image, state power, and pain, 
and articulating a concept of fidelity with which to think about the inter-
relation of image, violence, and truth after (that is, according to) Gen-
eration X.
 “Fidelity” means faith: historically, possibly the most creative and 
destructive of human capacities. Fidelity to a god, a nation, a law, an 
ideal, or any ism can take the credit for most, if not all, major episodes 
of human violence. Though I note evocations of “fidelity” in the 1980s 
and 1990s in economics, postmodernism, and religion, my approach 
to this concept is best captured by the alternative rock band Eve 6’s hit 
song “Inside Out”: evacuated by lack, entranced by oblivion, X finds 
“nothing but faith in nothing.” To extract the implications of this atti-
tude I turn to Alain Badiou’s work with “fidelity” in Being and Event 
and Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. Returning to Gen-
eration X, I reposition their notoriously affectless worldview, defining 
an approach to violence as a moving target, using, in chapter 3, the 
novels of Bret Easton Ellis, who coined the phrase “Disappear Here” in 
1985.
 Chapter 3, “The Game That Moves,” focuses on the novels Ellis pub-
lished between 1985 and 2010, a crucial quarter century that spans the 
turn of the millennium. Ellis, a poster boy for Generation X and a touch-
stone for popular culture, produced fiction that has been taken for real 
by readers, activists, and critics. My discussion of six of his novels—Less 
Than Zero, The Rules of Attraction, American Psycho, Glamorama, 
Lunar Park, and Imperial Bedrooms—traces a process of subtraction: 
value, values, affect, and volition come into view and disappear. To doc-
ument this process (that extends to the author himself) I set Ellis’s work 
against the background of discourses on literary violence elaborated 
around them: the paradigm of complicity associated with Generation X; 
the literary mode of “blank fiction” described by James Annesley, Eliza-
beth Young, and Graham Caveney in the UK in the 1990s; and “the 
extreme,” articulated more recently by Mario Perniola in the EU and by 
Alain-Philippe Durand and myself in our co-edited Novels of the Con-
temporary Extreme, which documents the phenomenon in fiction from 
North and South America, Europe, and the Middle East (I stress geogra-
phy to underscore that Ellis’s fiction articulates discourses of violence in 
global contexts. Ellis is widely translated and read). For all these schol-
ars, critics, and theorists, Ellis’s novels are foundational: they serve as a 
starting point from which to reflect on violence in literature, film, and 
digital culture.
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 Chapter 4 addresses the spectacular terror attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, widely assumed to be a defining event 
for Generation X. These events were so inextricably tied to their tele-
vised quality that terrorism emerged largely as media spectacle, subject 
to manipulation, dulled by repetition, easy to abandon via the remote 
control though, like a black hole, it continues to exert a powerful gravi-
tational force. “Something Empty in the Sky: 9/11 after X” articulates 
these issues in fiction by and about members of Generation X (the 
chapter’s title is borrowed from Don DeLillo’s influential essay “In the 
Ruins of the Future”). I discuss 9/11 novels by X authors—Frédéric 
Beigbeder’s Windows on the World, Claire Messud’s The Emperor’s 
Children, and Jess Walter’s The Zero—and novels in which Xer charac-
ters respond to the events and aftermath of 9/11: Jay McInerney’s The 
Good Life, Ken Kalfus’s A Disorder Peculiar to the Country, and DeL-
illo’s Falling Man. I pay special attention to lies and infidelities (both 
marital and mimetic), eliciting from these novels an X attitude. This 
attitude refuses the affective charge of trauma theory, patriotic fervor, 
and bellicose rhetoric, even when what’s right and what’s true are, like 
the bodies of the World Trade Center victims in Manhattan, available 
only as dust and scraps and smell, invisible and pervasive, present and 
absent, here and disappeared.
 These six 9/11 novelists, who evince a transnational attitude and 
employ a range of styles, underscore my X approach that refuses tra-
ditional fidelities and alliances and points the way to a future, after X. 
Chapter 5, “Not Yes or No: Fact, Fiction, Fidelity in Jonathan Safran 
Foer,” is the first step in this book’s move to trace Generation X’s after-
effects. The chapter focuses on Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated (set in 
Europe after the Holocaust) and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
(set in New York City after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001). 
Born in 1977, Foer is the youngest author in this study: he is as much 
the product of X culture as he is a practitioner of the attitude associated 
with this demographic. Foer chooses international settings and trans-
national characters and, in keeping with the discourses of fidelity and 
media explored in the previous chapters, he figures violent history as 
available to be reworked, rewound, appropriated, and discarded. His 
novels allow me to pursue the ethical implications of this book’s philo-
sophical gambit: violence, itself real, is also the means by which reality 
is established; reality is inextricable from its constructed quality—that 
is, from fiction. Fidelity to nation, to the past, to trauma, and even to a 
generational cohort, does nothing but draw us apart. But if we turn our 
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gaze from the object of fidelity to the trajectories that fidelity takes, the 
attitude associated with it, and the implications of its eschewal, we can 
begin to outline an ethic that is formed or fashioned from X ambivalence 
and disaffection.
 My last chapter, “I Am Jack’s Revolution: Fight Club, Hacking, Vio-
lence after X,” focuses on the presence in cyberculture of the X text 
Fight Club (specifically, David Fincher’s 1999 film adaptation of Chuck 
Palahniuk’s 1996 novel). Both the film and the novel stage the migration 
of violence from fantasy to reality, from fiction to fact; they have been 
read through discourses of masculinity, terror, capital, and faith. I treat 
Fight Club as a hacker text, one that reflects crucial developments in 
computer science and industry in the 1990s. Adopted by hacker culture 
as early as 2002, Fight Club is formative of the “47 rules of the inter-
net” developed on /b/, the birthplace of Anonymous; it figured in Project 
Mayhem 2012, Anonymous’s call for massive corporate, financial, mili-
tary, and state leaks, and in #OpIsrael 2.0, Anonymous’s 2013 cyberwar 
against Israel.
 The conclusion, “X Out,” traces the reverberations of Xers’ uniquely 
creative approach to violence, to reality, and to “real violence” in our 
contemporary global, connected, hypermediated world and reflects on 
the broader implications for my claims about complicity, media, media-
tion, and faith. As Disappear Here moves from text to film, from cyber-
space to global politics, from U.S. slacker culture to the Middle East, 
X sheds its generational specificity. No longer a demographic but an 
attitude—anomic, affectless, extreme—X serves a silent, programming 
function in contemporary culture. Its presence is alternately visible and 
invisible, unlocatable and ubiquitous, a moving target and a promise of 
revolution.
 The association of contemporary revolutionary movements with Gen-
eration X should come as no surprise. Since its inception X has marked 
the spot where the promise of social change and the absence of its real-
ization, the lure and illusion of financial stability, and the urgency and 
futility of ethical action come compellingly into view and disappear. But 
as with all revolutions, reality—what the revolution will erase and vio-
lently bring into being, the values it will establish, the truths it will cre-
ate—has as much to do with what we believe in as with facts on the 
ground. Facts are fickle, faith misplaced, and grounds contingent and 
contested. Follow the ones with faith in nothing on to this shifting 
terrain.
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D ISAPPEAR  HERE
In Bret Easton Ellis’s Less Than Zero, the narrator, Clay, notices a bill-
board: “Disappear Here.” The enigmatic message haunts him as he 
wanders through the glitzy world of the young, rich, and privileged 
in mid-80s L.A. As his Northeast paleness fades in the midwinter sun, 
Clay, like a photographic negative, registers the violence of his world. 
He is present at the screening of a snuff film, invited to participate in 
a gang rape, witnesses one friend’s descent into prostitution and addic-
tion, another’s descent into madness, and notes reports of murder and 
predation. But he does not oppose, critique, or remedy. He is a detached, 
affectless observer, counting down the days until he returns to college 
in New Hampshire. The novel’s concluding pages pursue this alignment 
of disaffection with negativity, of detachment with disappearance: Clay 
recalls a piece of music with “words and images so harsh and bitter that 
the song would reverberate in my mind for days” (207).1 The images, 
he later learns, are unique to him; no one else has seen them. Private, 
 1. Though the song is not identified in the novel, Baelo-Allué suggests that Clay is 
referring to “Los Angeles” from the 1980 album by the punk rock band X (60).
9
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unshared, unbidden, they haunt him, accruing agency and volition, 
becoming “violent and malicious” (208). They are images of “people 
being driven mad by living in the city. Images of parents who were so 
hungry and unfulfilled that they ate their own children. Images of people, 
teenagers my own age, looking up from the asphalt and being blinded 
by the sun” (207–8). These images replace the song, the words, and, in 
the novel’s concluding sentences, they may even replace Clay as the nar-
rative’s focalizer. “These images stayed with me even after I left the city. 
[. . .] They seemed to be my only point of reference for a long time after-
wards. After I left” (208).
 Disappear Here: Violence after Generation X takes as its starting 
point this departure, or detachment, of body from world, image from 
ground, presence from representation, violence from the real. It probes 
the atomism and disaffection that began to be articulated in the 1980s 
and 1990s by young writers commonly associated with Generation X 
and explores the implications of this disaffection for violence today. 
Before Ellis’s American Psycho (1991) made his name synonymous 
with extreme, gratuitous violence that bursts the bounds of fiction, 
Less Than Zero was touted as a defining novel for the MTV genera-
tion, its author described as the poster boy or spokesperson for Gen-
eration X. He shares this role with fellow Brat Packers Jay McInerney 
and Tama Janowitz (though Ellis is the only Xer in the group) and with 
Xer Douglas Coupland, author of Generation X: Tales for an Accel-
erated Culture (1991). Coupland’s book, like Ellis’s, is grounded in 
ambivalence toward presence, perception, and parrhesia. The book, 
typeset in such a way as to interrupt immersion and comment ironi-
cally on its self-avowed contemporaneity, opens with an account of 
a complete solar eclipse in Canada, and elaborates a “mood of dark-
ness and inevitability and fascination” among young people, as they 
“crooked their necks, stared at the heavens, and watched their sky go 
out” (3–4).
 What can such a generation teach us about violence? This ques-
tion has not yet been asked of Generation X, though, in the 1980s and 
1990s, callous, careless young people were taken to task by pundits and 
sociologists for their casual attitude toward drug use and sex, and their 
notorious youthful disaffection was the subject of much vexed chat-
ter. Xers were scolded for being apathetic and for listening to heavy 
metal, policed by NEA legislation and rap lyric warnings. This censure 
was understandable. To adults at that time, haunted by the horrors of 
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the mid-twentieth century (two world wars; the atom bomb; genocide; 
apartheid; partition) the GenX catchword “whatever” seemed disturb-
ingly dismissive of real, traumatic violence. Boomers, who claimed the 
great social revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, were left uneasy by the 
nihilistic refrain “Nevermind” from the grunge band Nirvana’s anthem 
“Smells Like Teen Spirit” (1991). But “Gen X” is no longer a buzzword 
for youth culture. Xers are now entering middle age and assuming key 
positions as parents, teachers, politicians, authors, filmmakers, and arbi-
ters of culture and society. Have Xers shed their apathy, their groundless 
antagonism, and learned to properly care? Or have they revised the val-
ues in which those judgments were invested, and changed the terms in 
which these debates are couched? (Yes, this is a leading question.)
 Disappear Here measures the impact of Generation X’s notorious 
youthful disaffection, an impact that reverberates globally today. It 
reverberates in the images and narratives that are the means by which 
the vast majority of people on this planet experience violence, as drone 
warfare, media ubiquity, and online activism scrim or screen long-stand-
ing antagonisms and loyalties and trouble what we mean by percep-
tion. In what follows I argue that with the rise of home media, personal 
computing, and reality TV, and with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
USSR, the relation between violence and the real—violence’s premise of 
reality and violence’s utility as a means by which reality is established—
began to be revised. Consequently, Generation X initiated a move away 
from the twentieth-century approach to violence as a founding trauma 
that fiction, film, and media images reflect and respond to. But this book 
is not a generational study, an empirical survey, or a sociological work. 
It is instead a form of theft: one that acknowledges and erases origin, 
affirms and disavows or denies it. Generation X and its Xers, 1980s 
and 1990s fiction, film, and popular culture, are the ground and scope 
of this work. But I take X in all its permutations—opposition, erasure, 
multiplicity, precision, intersection, and a variable (an unknown value, a 
moving target)—for my own, broader purposes: to articulate the nature 
of violence, the real, and “real violence” today. Violence after Genera-
tion X looks at representations of real and fictional violence after—both 
subsequent and according to—the decades Xers came of age. What’s 
real, and the role of violence in defining it, looks different after Genera-
tion X, and X marks the spot where “real violence” presents, appears, 
is represented and disappears here, in the world that Xers have brought 
into being.
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A  BR I E F  H I STORY  OF  X
In his seminal “Generation X: A (Sub)Cultural Genealogy,” John M. 
Ulrich traces the origin of “Generation X” from its first appearance in 
Hungarian-born Robert Capa’s photographic project on the lives of 
young people after World War II to its contemporary association with 
white, middle-class, generally male subculture. Generation X, as Ulrich 
points out, was also the title of Charles Hamblett and Jane Deverson’s 
collection of interviews with young people published in the UK in 1964 
and the name of Billy Idol’s 1970s punk rock band. The term’s contem-
porary appellation is generally aligned with Coupland’s 1991 novel (Cou-
pland, who is Canadian, took the term from Paul Fussell’s sociological 
study, Class). For Ulrich, Generation X takes much of its oppositional 
ethos from its status as a subculture or youth culture, derived from the 
Beats in the 1960s and from punk in the 1970s. “Generation X” received 
quite a bit of media attention in the 1990s and was quickly made vogu-
ish, mainstream, and discarded.2
 With the new millennium, as Xers turned forty, “Generation X” 
received renewed attention. Serious scholarship like Ulrich and Andrea 
L. Harris’s edited GenXegesis: Essays on Alternative Youth (Sub)Cul-
ture (2003), Daniel Grassian’s Hybrid Fictions: American Literature 
and Generation X (2003), Christine Henseler’s volumes on Generation 
X (Generation X Rocks, co-edited with Randolph Pope, 2007; Spanish 
Fiction in the Digital Age, 2011), and her edited collection and digital 
project, Generation X Goes Global (2013), joined publications designed 
for the mass market like Jeff Gordinier’s X Saves the World: How Gen-
eration X Got the Shaft but Can Still Keep Everything from Sucking 
(2006), and Touré’s I Would Die 4 U: Why Prince Became an Icon 
(2013), which claims the “gen X meme” for black culture. Recent demo-
graphic studies like The Generation X Report (published by the Univer-
 2. Ulrich gives an overview of the books and articles, mostly mass-marketed, de-
voted to Generation X since the term came into vogue in 1991: “Cover stories in 
Time, Newsweek, Atlantic Monthly, New Republic, Business Week, and Fortune; de-
mographic histories (13th Generation); anthologies of fiction and personal essays by 
Xers (Next and Voices of the Xiled); articles and books for advertisers on how to 
capture the Generation X demographic (Marketing to Generation X); political hand-
books (Revolution X); satires (Generation Ecch!); personal memoirs (Prozac Nation); 
religious studies (GenX Religion); sociological studies (Masks and Mirrors: Genera-
tion X and the Chameleon Personality); film criticism (The Cinema of Generation X: 
A Critical Study of Films and Directors), television criticism (Gen X TV: The Brady 
Bunch to Melrose Place), the requisite anthology of excerpts from articles, books, and 
interviews (The GenX Reader)” (4; see also 32 notes 3 and 4).
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sity of Michigan’s Longitudinal Study of American Youth) and reports 
by Pew Institute for Research portray Xers as all grown up: peaceable, 
hardworking, dedicated parents and caring, responsible citizens: “active, 
balanced, and happy” (Dawson); confident in their ability to achieve the 
American Dream (Pew).
 X has, it seems, been exonerated from its youthful alienation. It has 
also begun to shed its association with the white middle class: as Touré 
puts it, “Tupac and Snoop are just as good at expressing the gen X sense 
of dystopia and dislocation as Nirvana and REM. The gen X psycho-
graphic is larger than racial or class boundaries, even if the media por-
trayals are not” (63).3 Henseler, writing “Short-Changed,” agrees; she 
also stresses the centrality of Generation X for online culture. Claim-
ing U.S. President Barack Obama for this globalized, media-savvy 
demographic, she describes Xers as parents of Millennials, as media 
entrepreneurs, and as literal and philosophical nomads whose worldview 
is a definitive, but neglected, aspect of the present moment. “We were 
the generation of change,” writes Xer Henseler, “changing the dynamics 
between the self, society and technology, between the fixed and the fluid, 
the local and global as determined by the fall of walls (the Berlin Wall) 
and political powers (Communism), and the erasure of (technological) 
borders. We became some of the greatest agents of change on individual, 
cultural, social, political, and economic levels. We were at the center of 
the technological ®evolution” (“Short-Changed”).
 But change and revolution, the rise and fall of walls and empires, 
the emptying and crowding of neighborhoods, are unsettling as well as 
liberating. They are always accompanied by violence, and violence—as 
 3. X, of course, has origins in African American tradition. It aligns political resis-
tance with a demarcation of language’s limits. The X marks the loss of a name, lan-
guage, culture, heritage, and social and familial structures, all violently wrested away 
by slavery; it also, and simultaneously, articulates presence and survival through a 
vexed relation to the language designed to erase and oppress. Ulrich notes this simi-
larity, describing parallels between Generation X and the Nation of Islam’s use of X. 
He hints that Generation X’s origins in punk culture may attest to punk’s assertion of 
alterity, an assertion that took racial otherness as its model (33n20). Here, Ulrich’s 
approach to Generation X as a subculture limits his otherwise excellent analysis. 
Ulrich is strongly influenced by Dick Hebdige’s work on subculture, and Hebdige’s 
model is 1960s UK. In the United States, the limits of language and the ambivalence 
around naming emerge from a different tradition, one colored by the Middle Pas-
sage, slavery, and Jim Crow and defined, in the 1990s, by scholars and artists like 
Toni Morrison (“Unspeakable Things Unspoken”) and Henry Louis Gates (Black Lit-
erature and Literary Theory). Articulating identity through language’s limits was the 
topic of much discussion in African American studies in the 1990s—precisely when 
“Generation X” was becoming mainstream.
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brutal manifestation or as subtle, insidious creep—is always accompa-
nied by claims for the real, and by statements about the truth. These 
claims and statements take various forms: broken buildings, open bodies, 
updated maps, blood test results, revised history books, facts on the page 
and facts on the ground. As that grim list indicates, real violence and its 
mediated image perform similar truth-making functions. Xers were not 
the first to confront images of violence. But they were the first with the 
power to surf toward or away from them, to seek them out or to screen 
them. Further: Xers, attuned to the curricular debates of the 1980s and 
the discourses of postmodernism and poststructuralism (mainstream by 
the 1990s), were schooled in the power of representation and taught to 
dwell on the resonance of silence, absence, and omission. Consequently 
Xers were given to reflect on media, to think creatively about the suscep-
tibility of reality to manipulation, censorship, silence, and control, even 
as adults worried about their disaffected, dispassionate, apathetic atti-
tude. Turning to the future, after X, we will need to consider the forma-
tive role of that attitude to X culture, and the role of X culture for young 
people today. But before we can do so, we need to rewind, and under-
stand what brought us to this point.
GROWING UP  X
Though precise birthyears vary, Generation X, most broadly defined, 
refers to the generation born between 1960 and 1980. Also called 
the Blank Generation, the Thirteenth Generation, the post-Boomers, 
the Baby Busts, Xers came of age in the 1980s and 1990s, in a West 
marked by the ascendency of the New Right, defined by the Prime Min-
istry of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan’s presidency 
in the United States. In France, François Mitterrand’s economic poli-
cies caused widespread disenchantment with socialism in the 1980s, 
and led to the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the far right; China, under 
Deng Xiaoping, had begun to move toward capitalism in 1979. As the 
economic function and social significance of the commodity replaced 
the commitment to liberal causes that characterized the ’60s and ’70s, 
Xers witnessed the vanishing of ’80 glitz with the Black Monday stock-
market crash of 1987, the collapse of the last great ideology with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. The 1990s ushered in the Lost Decade in Japan, after the 
strong economic growth that characterized the 1980s vanished and the 
asset price bubble collapsed.
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 This revision and evacuation of value was not lost on the young 
people. In contrast to their predecessors, the Baby Boomers, Xers are 
unswayed by the political values of the 1960s and notoriously unwill-
ing to enlist on behalf of a cause or ism. Boomers are presumed to pos-
sess resources, material and ideological, denied to Xers, who, as Howe 
and Strauss put it in their seminal study 13thGen: Abort, Retry, Ignore, 
Fail?, are reportedly “consumed with violence, selfishness, greed, bad 
work habits, and civic apathy” (17). A whiney mood, a pervasive sense 
of disenfranchisement, of defiance, underscores articulations of X iden-
tity; theirs is a register of dissatisfaction, of complaint. Assets, ideals, 
interests have disappeared; “We Don’t Even Have a Name” is the title of 
the first chapter of Howe and Strauss’s book.
 This interstitial quality has been X’s from the start. “‘Generation X’ 
has always signified a group of young people, seemingly without iden-
tity, who face an uncertain, ill-defined (and perhaps hostile) future,” 
writes Ulrich (3). Henseler echoes this epochal distress, this sense of 
being historically belated or premature: X is a synonym for being “in-
between,” “after,” and “lost” (Spanish Fiction 10). Martine Delvaux 
stresses X’s unease with presence, in the present; she dwells on “the 
oxymoronic X which both eliminates it semantically and signifies its 
existence, the X that makes this generation’s presence a thing of the 
past” (178). For Delvaux (who is French Canadian) and Henseler (a 
Hispanicist), “Generation X” is a useful moniker for a globally con-
ceived set of attitudes. Like self-proclaimed X manifestos by Coupland, 
Douglas Rushkoff (editor of The GenX Reader), and Jeff Gordinier 
(author of X Saves the World), they alternate between claiming to be 
invisible and invincible, taken for granted and dismissed, targeted and 
ignored. Xers are poised between presence and absence, disappearing 
here.
 Generation X lacks a definitive vast and violent event, a generational 
trauma like World War II or Vietnam, or a defining cultural moment like 
1968. Unlike their predecessors who mobilized around—or against—
great national conflicts or disasters, youthful Xers experienced violence 
as paralysis (the 1980s were ushered in with the Iran hostage crisis), 
menace (Reagan’s play on the looming specter of the Evil Empire), and 
complicity, wherein violence is battled—or not—with the pocketbook. 
Though the 1990s saw a rise (or perceived rise) in youth violence glob-
ally, it was a violence that, Hans Magnus Enzensberger wrote in 1993, 
seemed strikingly divorced from ideological justification. Francis Fuku-
yama, writing of this “goalless new violence,” underscored its “nihil-
istic character,” its “strange abnegation of self” (“The New World 
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Disorder”). Lacking the great ideological organization of the Cold War 
(the end of which had led Fukuyama, famously, to declare the End of 
History),4 Xers could not fail to notice how the global campaign for dis-
investment from South Africa, though initiated in the 1960s, achieved 
critical mass only in the 1980s. They cheered ironically when Gordon 
Gekko pronounced, in Oliver Stone’s 1987 film Wall Street, that “greed 
is good,” and were haunted by the image of a lone protester facing a 
tank in 1989 in Tiananmen Square. The Israel/Palestine conflict (the 
Intifada of the 1980s) and war in the Balkans (in the 1990s) presented 
competing, and compelling, claims for historical victimization. Ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo (1998) confirmed, for those who needed confir-
mation, the persistence of bloody international conflicts after the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty created the European Union. The genocide in Rwanda 
(1994) underscored the role of race in global definitions of humanity, 
as NATO mobilized in Europe but allowed the killing in Africa to pro-
ceed unchecked. Developments in media and satellite TV brought these 
faraway tragedies home, underscoring the limits of agency. Images of 
famine in Ethiopia and the Sudan perpetuated this sense of futility, 
defined by the controversy around South African photojournalist (and 
Xer) Kevin Carter’s image of a starving child stalked by a vulture (Carter 
reported taking the photograph and leaving).5 Something must be done, 
the thinking goes, and yet the world is too big, its problems too com-
plex, the child too near death, for action.
 4. Fukuyama’s controversial essay appeared in The National Interest in 1989; his 
book The End of History and the Last Man was published in 1992. By “end of his-
tory,” Fukuyama meant the widespread adoption of liberal democracy, which had at 
that point “conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and, most 
recently, communism” (xi). Liberal democracy, Fukuyama argued in both the essay and 
the book, appears to be “the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the 
‘final form of human government,’ and as such constituted the ‘end of history’” (xi). 
Responding critically to Fukuyama’s optimistic thesis, Samuel Huntington stressed the 
resilience of culturally specific values, especially religion; he imagined a multipolar, 
multicivilizational world. Huntington’s thesis was first published as “The Clash of Civi-
lizations?” in Foreign Affairs (1993) and as The Clash of Civilizations and the Remak-
ing of World Order in 1996. The Fukuyama–Huntington affair, which received much 
attention in mainstream press, concretizes the tenor of debates surrounding global poli-
tics in the post–Cold War period.
 5. This iconic image is referenced in House of Leaves (368), Mark Z. Danielewski’s 
complex novel about an unseeable film, an unnavigable house, and an unmanageable 
manuscript edited by an unreliable narrator. Critical response to House of Leaves has 
recognized its mastery of postmodernism, post-postmodernism, poststructuralism and 
deconstruction. Danielewski, a GenXer, has also been described as “a spokesperson for 
disenfranchised, non-party-line youth” (Benzon).
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 Violence is here—of this Xers have no doubt. But the traditional 
ways to engage with it seem to have disappeared. The Cold War battle 
with the Soviet Union, that dictated the rhetoric of the social contract 
through the 1970s and organized the world into West versus Rest, ended 
with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991; in its wake, Generation X’s 
atomism and disaffection are importantly tinged with nostalgia. Evil, 
like Empire, is an organizing principle; the threat of nuclear annihila-
tion that haunted many Xers’ childhoods in the 1970s and early 1980s 
is a loss that must be mourned. Consequently, it is resurrected and bat-
tled in video games like Castle Wolfenstein (1981) in which the player 
battles Nazi guards and members of the SS; Wolfenstein 3D (1992), a 
first-person shooter game in which the player, who assumes the role of 
an Allied spy, attempts to escape from the Nazi prison; and the visually 
sophisticated multiplayer Doom. Released as shareware in 1993, Doom 
was seminal to the emerging online gaming culture (it pioneered the 
deathmatch mode, by which players could kill each other, and encour-
aged players to modify and contribute to the game scenario by designing 
their own game levels).6 But Doom elicited some controversy because 
of its extreme and graphic violence, and the technoculture it repre-
sented was linked, in the public’s imagination, to a generalized anxiety 
about violence and impressionable youth (Doom figured prominently 
in the national soul-searching after the 1999 Columbine school shoot-
ing). For Xers (the youth in question), the distinction between music, 
video, television, online, and real-world violence figured differently than 
for adults; the value of drawing a line between fact and fiction fades 
in the face of pervasive violence, threats, and menace.7 Lacking Nazis, 
 6. In Masters of Doom: How Two Guys Created an Empire and Transformed Pop 
Culture, David Kushner describes the origins of the game, which was developed by id 
software (founded by Xers John Carmack and John Romero). Id developed Wolfens-
tein 3D as well as Doom, and Kushner describes the graphic imagery that accompanied 
both games as the direct product of popular culture. “As the id guys came of age, in 
the 1980s, the action movie genre—with films like Rambo, The Terminator, and Lethal 
Weapon—conquered the box office, just as horror movies like The Texas Chain Saw 
Massacre and Friday the 13th had done in the recent past” (79). Both Wolfenstein 3D 
and Doom reflected the ethos of the early 1990s, Kushner writes: “The Reagan-Bush era 
was finally coming to a close and a new spirit rising. It began in Seattle, where a slop-
pily dressed grunge rock trio called Nirvana ousted Michael Jackson from the top of the 
pop charts with their album Nevermind. Soon grunge and hip-hop were dominating the 
world with more brutal and honest views. Id was braced to do for games what those 
artists had done for music: overthrow the status quo” (94).
 7. Journalist and technology expert Steven Levy, writing about the 1999 Columbine 
school shootings, describes “a violence-fixated cultural landscape” in which the internet, 
Hollywood, video games, and traditional media news coverage in thrall to the human 
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Communists, and imminent apocalypse, haunted by divorce, famine, 
drugs, global warming, and AIDS, the real world appears to Xers too 
random, its violence too diffuse, to be an effective battleground for Evil. 
The self that battles is similarly diffuse, and can easily be simulated 
(especially online).
 This is not to say that violence is absent from X experience of the 
world. On the contrary, Generation X originates from disaster. A “reac-
tion against human atrocities, fallouts, and corruption,” as Henseler 
puts it, X migrates to the marginal, the liminal, the virtual: a hypotheti-
cal, contingent space from which Xers “could reject the storylines writ-
ten by others, especially by institutions, authorities, and politicians” 
(Global 11). This rejection, disavowal, and disenchantment informs 
X’s designation as marginal (Henseler’s term), hybrid (Grassian’s), and 
interstitial: X is poised, as Delvaux puts it, between “the ambiguity of 
the ‘what’ and the everlasting ‘ever’” (179). This awkward, tenuous bal-
ancing act contributes to X’s self-image as the generation that is both 
uniquely privileged and robbed, abandoned, misplaced and missed-out. 
At the same time, it affords Xers a unique perspective. Just as violence 
is simultaneously, immediately, unbearably present and banished with 
a wave of the remote control, Xers learned to keep an eye on both the 
hope of change and the hypocrisy of promise, the attraction of solvency 
and the transience of value, the necessity of action and the resilience of 
personal, economic, and political interest.8
 Such an attitude is of a piece with the postmodern philosophies 
articulated during this period. Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition, published in France in 1979 and translated into English in 
1984, articulated the distrust of master narratives as a defining para-
digm of the age; by the 1990s, the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari were established as 
the shibboleths of contemporaneity. Xer Jeffrey Eugenides’ The Mar-
riage Plot, set at Brown University in the early 1980s, describes what 
attracted young people to this work: “It drew a line; it created an elect; 
it was sophisticated and Continental; it dealt with provocative subjects, 
drama create “a vicious cycle where even the examination of a disaster reinforces the 
violence-obsessed culture that may have helped trigger it” (“Loitering”).
 8. An example is the phenomenon of Band Aid, the charity supergroup founded in 
1984 to raise money for the victims of famine in Ethiopia with a “Feed the World” logo 
and record-breaking single, “Do They Know It’s Christmas?” Even before its release, 
Band Aid was widely derided by critics, who took the project to task for its presumed 
self-righteousness and implicit colonialism. Hebdige discusses the phenomenon in Hiding 
in the Light.
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with torture, sadism, hermaphroditism—with sex and power” (24). The 
appeal of theory points at how, for Xers, traditional youthful activism 
was unavailable. For Eugenides’ characters, college “lacked a certain 
radicalism”; the work of scholars like Derrida “was the first thing that 
smacked of revolution” (24). Xers are less inclined to engage than to 
deconstruct, to dwell in the aporia of irreconcilable opposites. They 
linger, as Xer David Foster Wallace’s characters so memorably do, in 
the restless, counterarticulate logic of addiction, anxiety, neurosis, 
and depression. Depression, as Elizabeth Wurtzel writes in her mem-
oir Prozac Nation (her “author’s note” references deconstruction and 
Derrida), is an appropriate designation for her generation’s “low-grade 
terminal anomie, a sense of alienation or disgust and detachment, the 
collective horror at a world that seems to have gone so very wrong” 
(302). Writing in 1994, Xer Wurtzel describes an emergent “depres-
sion culture” (the music of Nirvana, Nine Inch Nails, Pearl Jam, Beck, 
The Cure, Depeche Mode, The Smiths, Richard Linklater’s film Slacker, 
Coup land’s Generation X, and the rise, in fashion, of grunge and heroin 
chic) and muses that depression may well be a generational response 
to a world “perilously lacking in the basic guarantees that our par-
ents expected: a marriage that would last, employment that was secure, 
sex that wasn’t deadly” (301–2). Of course, depression itself is deadly: 
a fatal marriage of culture and clinic, symbol and act, something “in 
the air” in the mid-1990s and unutterable, unshareable, unspeakable 
despair. David Foster Wallace, who had struggled with clinical depres-
sion for decades, committed suicide in 2008.
 This period also saw the rise of Critical Race Theory, which urged 
reflection on the deep complicity of narratives and institutions in struc-
tural violence. The movement held annual workshops in the 1990s, and 
published readers defining the field and outlining approaches to rac-
ism that focused on its invisible, entrenched, interested forms. Richard 
Delgado and Jean Stefancic, writing of the premises of Critical Race 
Theory, underscore its directives to look both at and through what pres-
ents as ordinary in order to uncover the invisible violence enshrined in 
everyday life. “Racism is normal, not aberrant, in American society,” 
write Delgado and Stefancic. “Because racism is an ingrained feature of 
our landscape, it looks ordinary and natural to persons in the culture. 
Formal equal opportunity—rules and laws that insist on treating blacks 
and whites (for example) alike [. . .] can do little about the business-as-
usual forms of racism that people of color confront every day and that 
account for much misery, alienation, and despair” (xvi). Together with 
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postmodernism and poststructuralism’s ethos of radical critique, the rise 
of Critical Race Theory formalized a general distrust of identitarianism 
and an ethical investment in ambivalence. Xers, who attended college in 
record numbers,9 were well schooled in this kind of work. At the same 
time, witness to the rise of identity politics and political correctness, 
aware of the structural injustices deeply engrained in the status quo, 
Xers—of all colors—are profoundly suspicious of institutional author-
ity, identity, and ethos. As Lila Mae, the protagonist of Colson White-
head’s complex racial allegory The Intuitionist (1999), realizes: “Don’t 
believe your eyes. [. . .] There will be no redemption because the men 
who run this place do not want redemption. They want to be as near to 
hell as they can” (240).
 Lila Mae is an African American woman elevator inspector in a Jim 
Crow–style city who, alone of all her colleagues, works by intuiting, 
rather than empirically verifying, elevators’ functioning and who must 
fight to clear her name from a mesh of schemes designed to frame her. 
In the course of her travails, she learns that John Fulton, her mentor in 
the theory of Intuitionism and author of her personal bible, Theoreti-
cal Elevators, was a black man who passed for white. In the concluding 
pages of The Intuitionist Lila Mae, whose first encounter with Fulton’s 
work is described as “a conversion experience” (59), has dedicated her-
self to completing it. No longer his disciple, she is his ghostwriter, or his 
medium, “filling in the interstitial parts” of his design for the perfect 
elevator that will destroy existing cities and establish new ones, a vision 
of revolution that is inseparable from violence: “They’re all doomed 
anyway, she figures. Doomed by what she’s working on” (254). Soli-
tary, messianic, she thinks, “It will come. She is never wrong. It is her 
intuition” (255). But despite the novel’s bewitching conceit, by which 
Intuitionists like Lila Mae have a 10 percent higher accuracy rate than 
Empiricists in their analysis of elevator functionality, Whitehead’s reader 
cannot abide in the prophetic certainty of this assertion. Lila Mae is not 
never wrong. The novel has recounted her inaccurate hunches, mistaken 
convictions, and misplaced trust. Just like empirical verification, which 
Intuitionists disdain, accuracy and certainty are evoked and dismissed 
in this book. All that remains is faith—in nothing. The vision Lila Mae 
is in thrall to—the promise, from Fulton’s writings, of “another world 
 9. Sixty-four percent of Generation Xers had completed four years of college in 
2007, compared with 54 percent of Baby Boomers. See Carlson 5 (table 2). Note that 
Carlson uses a relatively narrow birthyear range for Generation X: 1965–82 (page 3 box 
1).
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beyond this one” (63)—is, she learns, a black man’s venomous disil-
lusionment with a world that will not let him rise, but Lila Mae keeps 
faith with this promise, knowing its origin is a lie.
 Mistrust and ambivalence have functioned, historically, as productive 
attitudes, elaborated by postmodernism’s and poststructuralism’s herme-
neutics of suspicion. But for Lila Mae, and her X creator Whitehead (for 
whom Intuitionism may well be a cipher for Critical Race Theory which, 
like Critical Legal Studies, feminism, and postcolonial studies, drew on 
the work of Foucault and Derrida to articulate the deep complicities of 
power with knowledge), this equipoise of creation and destruction, cyni-
cism and idealism, engagement and passivity presents unique challenges 
to action and critique. Despite her revolutionary messianic certainty, 
Lila (whose name means “night”) Mae is not an actor but a medium, 
a placeholder; her story is one of a path-breaking, capable woman who 
submerges herself in a great man’s work. By the end of the novel Mae 
(“may”), balanced between possibility and probability, is transient (“she 
writes a sentence and then scratches it out” [254]), mobile (“She likes 
this new room. [. . .] There’s time to move on and find another room” 
[254]), and contingent: though Fulton had described her, earlier, as “the 
one” (211), she realizes that “it didn’t have to be her, but it was” (255). 
With its protagonist writing, erasing, on the move, interstitial, replace-
able, and expectant, Whitehead’s novel confirms, to the reader, this ear-
lier, bleak, X intuition: nothing tells the truth; mistrust is as useless as 
trust (227). To this simultaneous quality of being and not being, of effect-
ing great change by remaining uncommitted, of holding on tightly to 
nothing, an atheist keeping the faith, the music of the 1990s spoke loud 
and clear. Writing of the X anthem, Nirvana’s “Smells Like Teen Spirit,” 
Gordinier states: “that duality, that stuckness between a desire for change 
and profound doubts about how to achieve it, would come to define the 
philosophy of X. If the boomers had shot their wad by trying to forge 
a utopia, Kurt Cobain was saving the world by steering his generation 
away from that delusion” (15–16). On the other end of the 1990s music 
spectrum, arcane Indie folk icon (and Xer) Vic Chesnutt intones: “Free of 
hope, free of a past / Thank you God of nothing, I’m free at last.”10
 10. “Free of Hope” first appeared on Chesnutt’s fourth album Is the Actor Happy?, 
released in 1995 and rereleased in 2004 with liner notes by poet Forrest Gander. Gander 
highlights “Free of Hope,” calling it Chesnutt’s “great elegy to our culture at the end of 
the last millennium,” a “haunting refrain that inverts Martin Luther King’s dream for our 
future and catches our emptiness and irony at the century’s demise.” Chesnutt, who had 
attempted suicide multiple times, died in 2007 at the age of 45.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 W H Y  X  N O W ?  /  2 3
X  ON  THE  MOVE
Any study of Generation X must account for its uneasy situation between 
precision and elision, specificity and negation. X crosses out and marks 
the spot: it is a demographic and a philosophy, a local subculture and a 
diverse global manifestation. True, the persistent association of X with 
slacker, grunge, youth, and white male subculture in the United States 
makes it an unlikely player in a postnational world dominated by the 
images of the spectacular attacks on the World Trade Center on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the fallout from the global recession of 2008, and the 
reverberations of the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring. Further, 
the term’s function as a demographic marker for people born between 
1960 and 1980 aligns it with somewhat empiricist claims, according to 
which Xers are more or less likely than Boomers or Millennials to bank 
or date online. As its title implies, Disappear Here embraces this epis-
temic unease, drawing on the philosophical tradition of writing about 
violence in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and studies of Gen-
eration X that treat it as a youth or popular culture phenomenon, analyz-
ing literary works, film, and cultural artifacts by members of Generation 
X, but situating these in the cultural contexts from which they arose and 
to which they contribute.
 X, “the defiant demographic” (Gordinier xxi), dislikes categories, 
categorization, and the rhetoric of identity generally. Ian Williams or 
“Crasher,” the reluctant X spokesman of Howe and Strauss’s 13thGen, 
puts it thus: “Why do we have to be a generation at all? Why can’t 
we just peacefully take up our place on the great palette of time with-
out people like you coming along and calling us ‘post-whatever’ and 
‘neo-pseudo-classical-glurb’? [. . .] I like being nice and undefinable, 
you’re taking the fun out of everything” (13). Twenty years later X has 
become so established that, Touré notes, its persistent association with 
the white suburban middle class unfairly excludes African Americans. 
“Can the Black community be said to have escaped the key touchstones 
that shaped gen X: divorce, latchkey kids, AIDS, crack, hiphop, MTV, 
and widespread economic troubles? No. These things are absolutely 
part of the experience of Black people who grew up in the 1970s and 
1980s. So how can Blacks not be part of the gen X meme? Of course we 
are” (63). At the same time, Touré is ambivalent about the term: “It’s 
not a great name,” he concedes, “but we’re stuck with it” (64).
 Touré’s attitude, like Crasher’s, is typical X. To a considerable extent, 
X is attitude: negation, defiance, disaffection, dislike—not least of the 
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term “X” itself—and a penchant for the underground. Coupland, whose 
1991 Generation X was seminal for the moniker, rejected the term soon 
after, in 1995, writing that X is “not a chronological age but a way of 
looking at the world,” and lambasting the generational appellation as 
“demographic pornography” (“Generation X’ed”). But pornography (as 
the “porn wars” and the rise of Third Wave Feminism in the 1980s and 
1990s made clear) can be useful, interesting, and even pleasurable and 
enabling. So can demographics. Read in retrospect, Coupland’s declara-
tion, in 1995, that “X is over” is, itself, of a piece with X ’tude, a meta-
phorical instrument smashing in the style of punk and grunge (bands like 
The Clash and Nirvana, like their predecessors in The Who, were famous 
for smashing their guitars onstage). As Xers, hardly “over,” approach 
middle age, and in light of more recent work on commodity culture and 
global capitalism (not to mention the success of post-grunge bands like 
Nickelback and Creed), I propose we revisit this attitude, even embrace 
it, and think about the contemporary after—the preposition means both 
subsequent to and in accordance with—Generation X. Both as an object 
to study and an example to follow, an aging demographic and a beacon 
or guide, X marks the spot of multiple emergences and vanishings.
 Not least of these is the real: a principle, an experiential category, 
an aesthetic quality, and something Xers were expected to get. “Are you 
down for the real?” raps the hip hop band Brand Nubian in their 1994 
album Everything Is Everything. “If you down say you down, if you 
scared say you scared / This is the real don’t fuck around and come 
unprepared.” But even as Sadat X and Lord Jamar (both Xers) warn, 
“This ain’t no TV show or a song from the radio / Murder on the streets, 
yo, is at a high ratio,” the idea of the real as something to be down for, 
(psyched) up for, checked, or fetched is inextricable from the image that 
enraptures, exposes, and betrays. As David Foster Wallace, reflecting on 
the formative impact of the Watergate scandal for his generation, puts it: 
“When even the President lies to you, whom are you supposed to trust 
to deliver the real?” (36). The TV coverage of Watergate offered Xers a 
primer in the fabrication of the real, taught young people to gaze both 
at and through the image, and instructed them in the unique X dyad of 
detachment and immersion: “Television,” writes Wallace, “got to pres-
ent itself as the earnest, worried eye on the reality behind all images. 
The irony that television is itself a river of image, however, was apparent 
even to a twelve-year-old, sitting there, rapt” (36). For a wide spectrum 
of Xers (from rappers to writers), reality—commodified, sensationalized, 
marketed; evacuated, ambivalent, mobile—is both an unarguable pres-
ence and an unappealing investment.
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 X’s unique relation to the real is captured in Howe and Strauss’s 
13thGen: Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail?, the first formal study of Genera-
tion X (what they call “the Thirteenth Generation”). A spinoff of “The 
New Generation Gap,” a popular article in The Atlantic, 13thGen is 
sized like a textbook; its argument (a rather conventional depth model 
by which Howe and Strauss essentially suggest that contemporary youth 
culture functions as a discursive site for the projection of national anxi-
eties and desires) is interrupted by graphs, cartoons, sound bites, and 
(expanding the book’s conceit, by which the Boomer authors upload 
the text to an online chat room which is then “crashed” by the Xers 
themselves) a discussion among Xers who log in and debate the argu-
ment’s points and merits. 13thGen thus straddles sociology and fiction; 
both an important cultural document and a self-conscious commodity, 
it is designed to appeal to the demographic it defines and describes. In 
an early review of Howe and Strauss’s book, Sue Gardner accurately 
sums up its marriage of commodity and critique. 13thGen, writes Gard-
ner, “puts forth its thesis literally by design, in that the layout of the 
book appears to be a reflection of the authors’ vision of the 20-some-
thing mind—fragmented, infested with trivia and ultimately incoherent.” 
Gardner dismissed the book as one more exploitative move performed 
on young people by aging Boomers: “by profiling the 20-something 
niche market, [Howe and Strauss] have simultaneously created a poten-
tially quite profitable market for their own services.” This analysis by 
Gardner (a self-proclaimed Xer) illustrates X’s unique combination of 
superficiality and depth. Early positioned as a marketing target, Xers’ 
eyes were open to marketing’s pitfalls and potential, to the mediated 
quality of perception, and to the fact that there is no outside to power. 
Consequently Xers dropped out and sold out, opted out and bought in. 
“X got hypermarketed right from the start, which was harsh,” Coupland 
complains (“Generation X’ed”); and yet, I submit, this severity invites 
clarity. Harshness frees Xers from illusion, even as, visually figured in the 
grainy aesthetic that came to signify authenticity in film, advertising, and 
music videos in the 1990s, it is itself a media product. Xers could hold 
both in view. The generation with no cause to fight for, with nothing 
to believe in, alert to image manipulation and chronically suspicious of 
empirical certainties, is uniquely poised to articulate the changing nature 
of the real in the decades that preceded, and established, our increasingly 
virtual world.
 Violence is commonly presumed to call a halt to the virtual. It repre-
sents the real—not least, an Evil real, one that demands response, ethics, 
critique, action, and that is historically suspicious of simulation. But X 
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marks the spot from which to think of violence after the mainstream-
ing of opposition described by Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Ten-
nenhouse in The Violence of Representation. Reflecting on the state of 
literary criticism in the late 1980s, Armstrong and Tennenhouse wonder 
about the efficacy of critique. “What can it mean,” they ask, “that such 
belligerent terms as ‘patriarchy,’ ‘resistance,’ and ‘subversion’ are now 
cant phrases?” (1). Indeed: How do you respond to violence when the 
position from which you take your stand has been, essentially, decon-
structed? You turn your gaze to the ground beneath your feet and see it 
vanish. Generation X expresses this dis-ease, a fundamental suspicion of 
being present, of being there, of Dasein, familiar to anyone schooled, as 
many Xers were, in poststructuralist and postmodern thought. Writing 
of X ethics as opposed to Boomers’, Douglas Rushkoff notes wistfully, 
“It must be nice to have something external to believe in. Something 
that doesn’t move. Something absolute” (7). Xers experience reality as a 
moving target, less an event to witness than an opportunity to believe in 
a world devoid of isms (“I want to believe” is the mantra of the popular 
1990s TV show The X-Files).
 Although throughout what follows I contend that violence is real—
and the following chapter pursues the implications of this contention—I 
recognize that reality, for Xers, is mobile, appropriable, subject to revi-
sion, rewriting, rewiring, and reworking in a digital age. Given this 
mutability, we need to examine the role that violence (and “violence”) 
plays in navigating reality’s shifting terrain, that unquiet ground on 
which, as Marc Augé put it in 1999, “the global relationship between 
human beings and the real is altering under the influence of represen-
tations connected with the development of technologies, with the glo-
balisation of certain key issues and with the acceleration of history” (7). 
Generation X’s association with movement, with acceleration, with time 
running out at the millennium’s edge, is also the question of certainty’s 
shifting terrain under the spell of velocity, and concretizes the challenge 
that contemporaneity—the here and now—poses to study. (“I don’t like 
giving names to generations,” Crasher complains in 13thGen, “it’s like 
trying to read the song title on a record that’s spinning” [23].)
 Augé’s reference to “the acceleration of history” is apposite. From 
its inception, X has been on the move, a generation defined by accelera-
tion. Ulrich notes that Coupland’s subtitle to Generation X, “Tales for 
an Accelerated Culture,” echoes Charles Hamblett and Jane Deverson’s 
characterization of 1960s youth culture in their sociological collection 
of interviews, Generation X. Writing in 1964, Hamblett and Dever-
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 W H Y  X  N O W ?  /  2 7
son reflected on the unique problems facing young people after World 
War II. “Things, people, ideas get used up more quickly—yet are cast 
aside with the same old primal ruthlessness. This is one of the problems 
the young must face and conquer: the problem of social and scientific 
acceleration at the expense of biological time” (5). These problems have 
only increased in recent decades, with the advent of social media, the 
proliferation of user interfaces, and the omnipresence of technological 
devices with built-in obsolescence. For Xers, who have always dwelt in 
the tension between the specific and the universal, the document and 
the hypothesis, the demographic and the point of view, reality’s mobile, 
mutable quality poses unique challenges to idealism, judgment, and 
action—especially in the context of violence.
 To capture my topic—violence, the real, and “real violence” today—
from these moving, shifting paradigms, Disappear Here brings together 
two bodies of work: the philosophical tradition of violence and represen-
tation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and studies of Genera-
tion X that treat it as a transient youth or popular culture phenomenon. 
(Disappear Here is thus a departure from the majority of Generation 
X scholarship that relies more on sociology than aesthetics, and that 
privileges an empirical approach over a philosophical one.) To bring 
these two traditions together, I turn to fiction—both in its sense of mold-
ing, making, and forming (from the Latin root fictio) and in the more 
conventional sense of prose narrative associated with the rise of liter-
ary realism in the eighteenth century. Fiction, in this, its broadest sense, 
echoes X’s affiliation with uncertainty and elision, its ethos of creative, 
mobile engagement with the real, and its association with specificity and 
demographics.
 In choosing fiction to approach violence, my methodology, again, 
echoes Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s The Violence of Representation. 
Noting that traditional studies of hegemony and power “have lost their 
oppositional edge” (1), the authors draw a theory of violence from a 
reading of Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (3–9).11 With this move, Arm-
 11. Armstrong and Tennenhouse defend their recourse to fiction, rather than the 
“masculinist social sciences,” as a gesture beyond the oppositional dichotomous think-
ing that perpetually “others” and subordinates in order to name and define. They con-
clude their defense of their methodological choice by affirming the pervasive quality of 
violence in the United States at the end of the 1980s: “As American academics at this 
moment in history, we feel it is somehow dishonest to speak of power and violence as 
something that belongs to the police or the military, something that belongs to and 
is practiced by someone somewhere else. For clearly the subtler modalities of modern 
culture, usually classified as non-political, keep most of us in line, just as they designate 
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strong and Tennenhouse affirm the reciprocal relation of cultural con-
struction and material experience that Richard Slotkin articulates in his 
monumental study of violence in twentieth-century U.S. culture, Gun-
fighter Nation (1992): literary fiction, popular history, film, and other 
commercial culture work together with political events and social crises 
to articulate the terms by which reality is perceived (Gunfighter 24). Like 
these important predecessors (published at the time Xers were reaching 
maturity and beginning to engage critically the culture around them), 
Disappear Here finds in fiction, film, and media a useful site from which 
to mine the truth-claims made by violence in the “new regime of fiction” 
that Augé calls for (6), a regime defined by acceleration, by the evacua-
tion of affect, and by a general rethinking of representation. I claim for 
Xers the wistful attitude of the nameless narrator in Brat Pack author Jay 
McInerney’s Bright Lights, Big City who, as he ricochets around New 
York City in a fruitless flight from grief, reflects: “You don’t want to be 
in Fact. You’d much rather be in Fiction” (22).
ALL  A  GASH
Although this book is about violence after Generation X, Bright Lights, 
Big City is an important precursor and worth some attention. Published 
in 1984 (a year designated by Newsweek as “The Year of the Yuppie”), 
McInerney’s debut book underscores the problem that violence poses to 
representation in this period. The opening lines offer a meditation on 
presence. “You are not the kind of guy would be at a place like this at 
this time of the morning. But here you are, and you cannot say that the 
terrain is entirely unfamiliar, though the details are fuzzy.” Having both 
set and blurred the scene, the narrator continues: “You are at a nightclub 
talking to a girl with a shaved head” (1).
 The girl with the shaved head (so central to the narrative that she 
appears not once but thrice in the 1988 film adaptation, with a screen-
play written by McInerney) poses a challenge to reading and interpreta-
tion that is directly connected to violence in the glitzy world in which the 
novel is set. She has, the narrator notes, “a scar tattooed on her scalp. 
It looks like a long, sutured gash” (3). With this tattoo (itself a subver-
sive signifying regime) a number of signifying regimes are evoked and 
subverted. The tattoo references violence as both sign and symbol, both 
specific ‘others’ as the appropriate objects of violence” (4).
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physical and (as head trauma) psychic, but does so through an image 
that is incoherent: a scar that looks like a gash. A gash implies depth—
a point highlighted by the sutures, which lend the closed edges of the 
wound an additional dimension. A scar, on the other hand, is the mark of 
healed tissue. A scar that looks like a gash both testifies to wounding and 
disavows it, and the fact that this is a tattoo, a wedding of skin to sign, 
invites a reading that refuses reading of the body in pain.
 In the book, the narrator will find and choose Vicky, a blueblood 
cousin of his friend Tad Allagash and graduate student in philosophy 
at Princeton. Vicky has hair “somewhere between strawberry and gold” 
(91) and a voice “like gravel spread with honey” (92)—unlike the bald 
girl whose voice is “like the New Jersey State Anthem played through an 
electric shaver” (3). She recalls to the narrator “Plato’s pilgrims climbing 
out of the cave, from the shadow world of appearances toward things as 
they really are” (93), and she does not appear in the film adaptation. By 
omitting Vicky, the film remains true to the novel’s preoccupation with 
the “problem” to the narrator that the bald girl represents. “The bald girl 
is emblematic of the problem. The problem is, for some reason you think 
you are going to meet the kind of girl who is not the kind of girl who 
would be at a place like this at this time of the morning” (3). Because she 
is emblematic, suggesting something other than what she is, the bald girl 
invites interpretation. She demands to be read.
 In the exchange the narrator has with the girl about the tattoo, read-
ing is very much in question. The narrator, attuned to the language of 
“Kings James and Lear” (8), tells the girl that the tattoo is “very realistic. 
She takes this as a compliment and thanks you. You meant as opposed to 
romantic” (3). The drive toward depth, the sublime, and the unpresent-
able, associated with the Romantics, is countered, here, by a discourse of 
resolute superficiality. The girl’s inability to distinguish between presen-
tation and the unpresentable, figured by the literary traditions of realism 
and romance, attests to her cultural illiteracy. “I could use one of those 
right over my heart,” says the narrator of the tattoo. The girl misses the 
metaphor. “You want I can give you the name of the guy that did it. 
You’d be surprised how cheap” (3).
 But the bald girl is not merely a problem of reading, an expression 
of nostalgia for bygone femininity, a yuppie joke, or a language game. 
Her presence in the novel testifies to what made it so popular: the lac-
erated quality of the narrator’s existence, his perpetual disavowal of 
a very real pain, his fundamental desire to be elsewhere or otherwise. 
“How did you get here?” the narrator wonders. “It was your friend, 
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Tad Allagash, who powered you in here, and he has disappeared” (2). 
The surname Allagash (coined before the founding of Allagash brew-
ery in Portland, Maine, in 1995) speaks to the violence that pervades 
the narrator’s world. When all’s a gash, even tattoos—not to mention 
scars—present as unhealed wounds, and Tad’s relentless superficiality 
betrays the fragility of surface and the menace that lurks beneath it. 
Tad is the narrator’s alter ego: he “is either your best self or your worst 
self, you’re not sure which” (2). Relentlessly womanizing, perpetually 
drunk, continually partying, Tad is “a figure skater who never considers 
the sharks under the ice” (32). In the course of the novel the narrator, 
abandoned by his wife, who chooses a career as a model over domes-
ticity with him, and failing at his job as a fact-checker for a prestigious 
magazine, wanders from bar to bar, party to party. He accepts and then 
rejects various offers (mostly by women) of help and care. Toward the 
end of the novel, he reaches out to Vicky and, in the course of their tele-
phone conversation, the reader learns that what appeared to be behav-
ioral (a manifestation of yuppie malaise) or reactionary (a response to 
the abandonment by his model wife) is, in fact, a symptom of a more 
abiding trauma: the slow and painful death, one year earlier, of the nar-
rator’s mother from cancer. Now, the bald girl is cast in yet another 
light: she must remind the narrator of his mother after chemotherapy, 
a fact that the attentive reader may intuit, but that the narrative never 
acknowledges.12
 The bald girl sets the scene, establishes a problem, and disappears. 
Her tattoo—the incoherent image of a scar that looks like a gash—
speaks to violence that is simultaneously spectacular and structural, but 
refuses both surface and deep reading.13 Such an image underscores the 
interpenetration of violence and its signs, bodies and their meanings, 
presence and its absence. The bald girl, who demands to be read, refuses 
reading and eludes analysis. She is both a simulated diversion and an 
indicator of underlying psychic and social complexities. To the narrator, 
whose life is in tatters, she is one more gash: both the object of misogy-
nistic predation and the repressed, disavowed incitement for traumatic 
repetition.
 12. McInerney’s mother Marilyn died of cancer in 1981, the same year McInerney’s 
first wife, Linda, who worked as an international model, filed for divorce and McInerney 
was fired from the New Yorker’s fact-checking department. McInerney highlights these 
points on his website’s biography.
 13. I return to contemporary discussions of surface reading in this book’s conclusion.
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 I linger on the image that opens McInerney’s 1984 debut because, 
like Ellis’s—published the following year—it is so emblematic of X. 
It demands a careful reading and eludes definitive interpretation. Just 
as X crosses out, marks the spot, and is perpetually on the move, the 
bald girl’s tattoo, which testifies to a wound and conceals it, enacts 
the movement of the entire narrative: its perpetual, and simultaneous, 
affirmation and disavowal of the lacerated quality of existence. Less 
Than Zero moves similarly; like McInerney, Ellis concretizes this nar-
rative style by turning to tropes of the feminine: Muriel, the anorexic/
addict, whose wordless screams echo throughout the book (I discuss 
Muriel in more detail in chapter 3). The centrality of young women to 
the works of these young men, the tendency by female X authors like 
A. M. Homes, Donna Tartt, Jennifer Egan, Gillian Flynn, and Laura 
Albert (a.k.a. JT LeRoy) to choose male protagonists in their medita-
tions on violence and predation, and Ellis’s and Palahniuk’s later self-
identification as gay, call a halt to any easy dismissal of X culture as 
exclusively male or straight. X’s politics of representation might best 
be described though the discourse of negativity—one that combines the 
medium of photography and an ethos of refusal (“Not!” was Word of 
the Year in 1992).14
 That said, the differences between McInerney’s 1984 debut and 
Ellis’s 1985 one are worth noting. Bright Lights, Big City ends as the 
narrator, having confessed to Vicky, trades his Ray-Bans (that emblem 
of distance, detachment, and Brat Pack superficiality) for a roll of bread. 
The smell of bread evokes the past, home, domesticity, and his mother. 
The imagery is of redemption, rebirth: down on his knees, bread in his 
mouth, the narrator realizes, “You will have to go slowly. You will have 
to learn everything all over again” (182). Clay, in contrast, consumed 
by the discourse of negativity that dictated Less Than Zero’s representa-
tional and narrative ethos, disappears into his own hellish fantasies. The 
violent images from the song replace his point of view: his “only point of 
reference” (208), they orient without direction. The difference between 
these two novels could be attributed to the fact that McInerney was born 
in 1955 and does not fall within the Generation X demographic. I value 
more the insight it offers into how the relation between violence and the 
real was beginning to be redefined in the volatile mid-80s. Like Clay, 
who, despite the impressionability that his name connotes, functions 
 14. The annual “Word” is chosen by the American Dialect Society and widely report-
ed in mainstream press. The 1992 selection included the exclamation mark (“Words”).
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as a negative, Generation X exposes violence, but not to confront, cor-
rect, or condemn it. The following chapters explicate how this quality 
grounds Xers’ disinclination to identify, a disinclination that extends 
to the logic of representation and will come to dictate the critique of 
mimesis that developed in the literature of this period. By focusing on 
Xers’ affectlessness, their disaffection, and their dislike of causes, truths, 
and ideals, I hope to underscore the role that fiction and faith (in noth-
ing) play in determining how, in a world without isms, where fervor is 
uncool, Xers find that reality “bites.” The reference is not only the title 
of the 1994 romantic comedy Reality Bites (directed by Ben Stiller and 
starring a host of X actors). It underscores the conflation of fragmenta-
tion (“bytes”) and aversion (“bites”) that leads one of the narrators in 
Coupland’s Generation X to conclude, “It’s not healthy to live life as a 
succession of isolated little cool moments.” Another agrees: “Either our 
lives become stories, or there’s just no way to get through them” (8).
CROSS ING  OUT  AND MARK ING THE  SPOT
“Generation X” is, in its origin, multiple and migratory. Its movement—
from Capa’s photographic project, through Fussell’s and Hamblett and 
Deverson’s sociological texts, Billy Idol’s music, and Coupland’s fic-
tion—attests to the concept’s global appeal. Coupland’s Generation X: 
Tales for an Accelerated Culture begins in Manitoba, is set primarily 
in the Mojave desert, and ends in Mexico, and Coupland’s lone refer-
ence to “Generation X” in his book posits “X” as a translation from 
the Japanese Shinjinrui —“new human being,” a term used in the 1980s 
to denote people in their twenties. In Generation X, the narrator Andy, 
who has lived in Japan, reflects, of Shinjinrui, that “we have the same 
group over here [in North America] and it’s just as large, but it doesn’t 
have a name—an X generation—purposefully hiding itself. There’s more 
space over here to hide in—to get lost in—to use as camouflage. You’re 
not allowed to disappear in Japan” (56). Noting this early alignment of 
the X with both a global cohort and that cohort’s inclination to disap-
pear, I find the appeal of “Generation X” is that, as Daniel Grassian 
puts it in Hybrid Fictions, an early study of U.S. literature after Genera-
tion X, “it aptly describes a diverse generation that cannot be simply 
defined” (14). Like Grassian, I am less interested in delimiting Xers by 
birthyears or nations, finding more value in the “media-focused histori-
cal and political events, as well as television shows, films and music that 
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frequently serve as [Generation Xers’] common frames of reference” 
(Grassian 14).15 For many X scholars, this frame of reference extends 
to a globally conceived popular culture that is in vibrant dialogue with 
U.S. (and British; but mostly U.S.) television, film, and music. Nonethe-
less, U.S. culture is prominent in this study, as it is for Generation X 
generally, a point that deserves some attention.
 I am an Xer and I lived in the Middle East until 1994. There, I was 
attuned to national and ideological economies in which culture circu-
lates. Some of the music, movies, TV shows, and books discussed in this 
study were exported to the Middle East and I learned about them in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Of these, some were translated, subtitled, 
and broadcast in prime time. Some were mistranslated, or broadcast 
without key scenes, or in select cities, or with alternate endings. Others 
were pirated, illegally copied, translated, and disseminated. Still others 
remained for me to discover when I came to the United States for post-
graduate work. For me, the attraction of U.S. culture has always been 
tinged with recognition of these global complexities. A cultlike reverence 
attached to the “American” appellation (both above- and underground) 
during the Cold War; U.S. films and music albums differed, sometimes 
crucially, from their exported versions; telling mistakes were revealed 
in the subtitling, translation, or dubbing processes, or in the market-
ing campaigns; television series were broadcast on nationally run sta-
tions, without reruns, commercial breaks, or teasers, eliciting a different 
kind of watching than in the West. These are just some of the sites of 
productive dissonance that reverberate in my perception of U.S. culture, 
and they inform my readings of this culture to this day. I note my per-
sonal experience in this context because it echoes in the work of Gen-
eration X scholars who share my transnational perspective. Christine 
Henseler, who specializes in Spanish youth culture, makes liberal use 
of Bret Easton Ellis, Coupland, and The Clash in her co-edited volume 
Generation X Rocks; her current project, Generation X Goes Global, 
 15. Although Grassian self-identifies as a member of Generation X, he also clarifies 
that his is not a study of Generation X literature but rather of “hybrid fictions” by 
authors born in the 1950s through the 1970s. This demographic range allows him to 
include some important X authors (Sherman Alexie, Douglas Coupland, David Foster 
Wallace, Dave Eggers, and Michele Serros) as well as authors born just outside the X 
demographic: Neal Stephenson, William T. Vollmann, and Richard Powers. Grassian’s 
approach to “hybrid fictions” claims for literary engagement a mode of critique that is 
politically efficacious: hybridity, he suggests, allows these novels to agitate for socially 
responsible action and political change (Grassian’s models are Bhabha and Bakhtin). 
Consequently, he dismisses Ellis and the Brat Pack authors who are, he suggests, insuf-
ficiently critical of the culture in which they write.
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documents X’s global relevance. Tara Brabazon, an Australian cultural 
studies scholar, articulates Generation X identity with recourse to Irvine 
Welsh’s Trainspotting, Joss Whedon’s Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and 
Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, rightly adding Baz Luhrmann’s Mou-
lin Rouge. For these scholars, as for Martine Delvaux, who is French 
Canadian, Jeff Gordinier (who recalls fondly the formative role, for 
Xers, of the Velvet Revolution in Prague), and Howe and Strauss (who 
note the impact on Xers of corporate globalization), “Generation X” 
is a useful moniker for a globally conceived set of attitudes. Like them 
I find in U.S. popular culture a useful tool for critical work in a global 
context.16
 The centrality of violence to this culture has often been noted. 
In Gunfighter Nation, Richard Slotkin argued that violence plays a 
unique role in U.S. national identity, not because the United States 
is a uniquely violent society but because fiction plays so crucial and 
formative a role in it: “What is distinctively ‘American’ is not neces-
sarily the amount or kind of violence that characterizes our history 
but the mythic significance we have assigned to it, the forms of sym-
bolic violence we imagine or invent, and the political uses to which we 
have put that symbolism” (14). Slotkin argues that symbolic violence 
began to accrue “real” import and impact during Reagan’s presidency 
in the 1980s (a crucial decade for Xers). Since Gunfighter Nation was 
published (in 1992) the reciprocal movement between literary fiction, 
popular culture, journalism, and mass media and political and cul-
tural events that Slotkin traced in that early book has developed into 
a lively critique of mimesis in studies of violence and aesthetics by Joel 
Black, Mark Seltzer, Art Redding, and Elana Gomel, who have traced 
an involution of the relation of reality to representation. But Disap-
pear Here departs from this (however recent) tradition in an important 
respect: Black’s work on murderers (1991), Seltzer’s work on serial 
killers (1998), Redding’s on anarchists (1999), and Gomel’s on killers 
(2003), all take, as their object, the perpetrator of violence. Despite 
the diversity of their approaches to the means by which violence mani-
fests (through writing, in narrative, as art), and despite their eschewal 
 16. Henseler (Spanish Fiction) offers a survey of global X authors, including Victor 
Pelevin (Russia), Christian Kracht (Germany), Hallgrimur Helgason (Iceland), Andrew 
McGahan (Australia), Irvine Welsh (Scotland), and Amélie Nothomb (Belgium) (18–
20). I would add to this list: Etgar Keret and Michal Zamir (Israel), Samir El-Youssef 
(Palestine/Lebanon), Hari Kunzru (British Indian), Mohsin Hamid (Pakistan), Marie 
Darrieussecq (France), Nelly Arcan (Canada), Lauren Beukes (South Africa), Wei Hui 
(China), and Chris Cleave and Tom McCarthy (UK). I discuss global X literature and 
film in the conclusion.
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of a moral or prescriptive agenda in their discussions of it, their focus 
on perpetrators retains them in a somewhat stable realm, one defined 
and prescribed by judgment. The realm of judgment has two crucial 
qualities: it assumes temporal progression (by which a violent act pre-
cedes its grisly aftermath, and judgment follows) and the law’s instan-
tiation, which, in the form of judgment, determines the distinction 
between the perpetrator and (generally, his) victim. Consequently: for 
scholars who focus on violent perpetrators, the critique that violence 
demands must perforce occur after the fact of violence and within the 
realm of law.
 But violence cannot always be captured by the sensemaking mech-
anisms of critique. Violence does—it destroys, constructs, and trans-
forms—but it also is: a pure, immediate manifestation of force that 
cannot be captured by legalistic or even epistemic categories, by judg-
ment, by “right” or “wrong.” Violence signals this epistemic unease: 
the great criminal, as Walter Benjamin reflected in 1921, elicits “the 
secret admiration of the public. This cannot result from his deed, but 
only from the violence to which it bears witness” (“Critique of Vio-
lence” 281; emphasis mine). With this image of violence that is outside 
the law, Benjamin articulated, decades before Foucault, “the law’s 
interest in a monopoly on violence.” Benjamin knew that “violence, 
when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that it 
may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law” (281). How-
ever taken we may be by Hannibal Lecter (and we are taken indeed!) 
our point of view remains with Clarice Starling’s: capable but limited, 
fascinated but frustrated, and always, as Kathryn Hume puts it (dis-
cussing violence in fiction by Brian Evenson, Bret Easton Ellis, Cor-
mac McCarthy, Samuel R. Delany, Dennis Cooper, and Kathy Acker), 
required to worry about “the nature of law and about which laws seem 
justified” (Aggressive Fictions 116). I explicate this argument in more 
detail in chapter 2. For now, know this: work on murder, killers, and 
perpetrators (real and fictional) remains within the somewhat secure 
realm of justice, legality, and judgment: of right and wrong. Disappear 
Here seeks less stable ground.
 This is not to say that these scholars’ important work on violence is 
not crucial for my own focus on violent images and images of violence in 
fiction, film, and popular culture. In the 1980s and 1990s, these images 
were the object of much debate (recall the NEA controversies in the 
United States and the criminalization, in Europe during those decades, 
of Nazi images and symbols). These debates revolved around judgment, 
value and values, and the potential of an aesthetic object to do harm. 
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Growing up in those decades, Generation Xers saw the representation 
of violence and the violence of representation intersect. Disappear Here 
probes the implications of this coincidence.17
 My focus on violent images in fiction and film requires attention to 
developments in media during these decades, developments that left Xers 
with unique control over the images they saw. The ability to rewind and 
replay left Xers in a different relation to temporal progression, the inex-
orable one-two of cause-and-effect that is violence’s grammatical core. 
This assumption of temporal inevitability has begun, in recent years, 
to be rethought, replaced by logics of affect, addiction, repetition, and 
accrual. In his important Violent Affect: Literature, Cinema, and Cri-
tique after Representation (2007), Marco Abel suggests that we revisit 
temporal inevitability (the idea that violence always occurs prior to cri-
tique) and the limiting nature of judgment that this temporal construct 
imposes. Borrowing from the language of masochism (articulated by 
Deleuze in Coldness and Cruelty), he envisions an encounter with vio-
lent images and events that is accompanied not by swift judgment but 
by judgment’s delay. He proposes that we remain suspended—as if on 
pause—before judgment, before the law, and dwell in the affective inten-
sity of sensation. Openness to this affective intensity is, for Abel, an 
ethical act, one that “requires a giving over of oneself to the Other, to 
becoming-other, to the process of being affected and effectuated by and 
from the future” (25).
 X is notoriously affectless, though, a point to which I will return. 
It is also a generation accustomed to revisit crime scenes, reinterpret 
evidence, and reverse or refuse convictions. In addition to the public 
trials surrounding O. J. Simpson and the Rodney King beatings by the 
members of the LAPD—cases that revealed the pervasive racial violence 
of American society, and in which conviction, or lack thereof, was per-
 17. My approach is thus directly different from the work of James R. Giles in his 
2000 study Violence in the Contemporary Novel: An End to Innocence and his 2006 
The Spaces of Violence. Giles opens Violence in the Contemporary Novel with an ac-
count of the 1994 murder of Robert Sandifer, an eleven-year-old victim of racial and 
urban violence that permeates inner-city life. Sandifer’s tragic story represents, for Giles, 
the “plague of violence” that contemporary writers document and attempt to explain. 
Giles concludes his book with another account, also “ripped from the headlines,” of the 
death of Girl X in foster care in 1997. By framing his study of violence in fiction with 
real-world accounts, Giles puts fiction in service of real violence (fiction witnesses vio-
lence, records it, and thus engages with it—but only between the covers of the book!). 
The Spaces of Violence further underscores the difference between real violence and 
fiction: Giles limits fictional texts to being mere “reporters of social and human condi-
tions” (9). In contrast, Disappear Here treats real-world violence and fiction as recipro-
cal and recursive. I expand on this point in chapter 2.
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ceived as a violence in itself—the 1990s also saw the public trials of 
Michael Jackson and Bill Clinton, media circuses that revolved around 
allegations of abuse of trust. Violence, judgment, and justice seem strik-
ingly confused; prosecutor and defendant might easily change sides. 
Confession culture, wound culture, and reality TV all concretized, as 
Seltzer put it in his 2007 book True Crime, “the intensified turn of inte-
riors, bodies, and acts into communication (the media apriori)” and 
“the radical entanglement of violence and technical media (the violence-
media complex)” (7).18 Given this entanglement, distinctions, assump-
tions, and classifications that are traditionally at work when we talk 
about violence need to be revisited. The first is the premise that there 
is a difference between real violence and fiction, or, as Seltzer puts it, 
“real and fictional reality” (True Crime 2) and, more importantly, that 
this difference matters. If we relinquish our affective investment in fact/ 
fiction (a distinction that violence is repeatedly called upon to navigate, 
as the image of violence is commonly presumed to call a halt to such 
cynical speculation), we will be in a zone where, as Abel puts it (chan-
neling Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho), judgment is “not an exit” 
from the multiple challenges that violence poses—not least, to ethics, 
judgment, and justice.
 This is why, in what follows, you will read about violence in media, 
philosophy, fiction, and cyberspace, but you will not learn much about 
the sociopaths, psychopaths, or otherwise ill individuals who become 
violent predators in real life. Indeed, the link between mental illness and 
serial killings or mass murders (which are extremely rare) should not be 
drawn casually. Most people with mental illness are not violent, and are 
far more likely to be the victims of violent crime or suicide than they 
are likely to perpetrate criminal homicide.19 In the United States in the 
 18. Seltzer’s book is subtitled Reflections on Violence and Modernity, and for Seltzer, 
modernity extends from the late nineteenth century into the twenty-first. But Seltzer’s own 
turn from “the trauma thing” (in his 1998 Serial Killers) to the “fact/fiction thing” in his 
2007 True Crime (38) confirms, to me, an increased interest in the extent to which, as 
Seltzer himself puts it, “modern violence has become inseparable from the mass-mediated 
relaying of violence” (True Crime 39).
 19. “Asking whether mental illness causes violence is a bit like asking whether politi-
cal dysfunction causes war. The two correct answers are ‘sometimes’ and ‘it depends’” 
(Swanson). Levin quotes this statement by Thomas Insel, M.D., director of the National 
Institute of Mental Health: “Most people with mental illness are not violent, and most 
acts of violence are not committed by people with mental illness [. . .] People with un-
treated psychotic illness are at increased risk of irrational behavior, including violence, 
especially directed at family and friends. This usually happens at the onset of illness 
and before diagnosis or treatment. However, once treatment starts, these people have no 
higher risk of violence than the general population and are more often victims of crime.”
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1990s, a number of media events underscored the limits of affect as a 
gauge for human accountability in the media age of which Xers are a 
product. One is the case of Louise Woodward, or “the British Nanny.” 
Woodward was a British teenager employed as a nanny in the United 
States by Sunil and Deborah Eappen. On October 30, 1997, she was 
found guilty of the murder of eight-month-old Matthew Eappen and 
sentenced to life imprisonment after a three-week trial that received 
extensive coverage in the U.S. and British press. Ten days after the con-
clusion of the trial, the judge Hiller Zobel revised the jury’s decision 
from guilty to involuntary manslaughter and commuted the sentence to 
time served. Media coverage of the case made much of Xer Woodward’s 
problematic affect both during and after the trial. “In the courtroom 
Woodward was seen to giggle or, alternatively, to sit calmly and silently. 
Her actions were interpreted by media commentators as insolent and an 
obvious sign of her lack of compassion” (Holohan 33). Even after her 
return to the UK, Woodward “appeared without remorse, sadly lack-
ing in gracefulness and arrogant in her dismissal of the parents of the 
child she is convicted of killing” (Antonowicz). A cover story in Time 
magazine by Roger Rosenblatt includes the Woodward case in his char-
acterization of an affective instability that defined the period: “With the 
notable exception of religious fundamentalism, the past 25 years have 
seen an aggressive pursuit of depersonalization, a shutting off of the 
emotions at once so purposeful and complete that many people, the 
young especially, speak of envying machines.” Echoing much of the con-
temporary terminology around Generation X (though he does not use 
the term), he writes: “There was no Vietnam War to protest, no sexual 
revolution or drug culture to adopt (live free and die), no generation 
gap worth exploiting. The Gap had become a clothing store, the coun-
terculture reduced to a few average hysterics who thought it exciting to 
proclaim God dead and the family expendable.” Rosenblatt concludes 
by encapsulating the link of affective instability with ontological uncer-
tainty and spectral menace that is the subject of Disappear Here: “the 
presence of absence, which eats at the mind quietly and which can, when 
touched by one last straw, incite a riot” (“Year Emotions Ruled”).
 And there’s the case of the West Memphis Three: Xers Damien 
Echols, Jessie Misskelley, and Jason Baldwin, who, as teenagers, were 
arrested and, in 1994, convicted of the 1993 murder of eight-year-olds 
Steve Branch, Christopher Byers, and Michael Moore in the Robin Hood 
Hills of West Memphis, Arkansas. The children had reportedly been 
raped and tortured as part of a Satanic ritual. Here, too, media cover-
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age made much of the reported affectlessness of the defendants, even 
as the authors of The Blood of Innocents (a sensationalist true-crime 
account of the murders) describe reported ringleader Damien Echols as 
fairly typical of the “antisocial, antiestablishment preoccupations of a 
teenager in the early 1990s,” listing the music of Metallica and Ozzy 
Osbourne and the novels of Anne Rice and Stephen King as evidence 
of his obsession with death and horror (Reel, Perrusquia, and Sullivan 
91). Subsequent to investigative journalism by Mara Leveritt (Devil’s 
Knot), two HBO documentaries (Paradise Lost [1996] and Paradise Lost 
2: Revelations [2000]), the outreach and fundraising efforts of the web-
site www.wm3.org, and the public advocacy of a number of Genera-
tion X artists (including Henry Rollins, Eddie Vedder, Johnny Depp, and 
Natalie Maines), the West Memphis Three reached a plea bargain with 
prosecutors that neither affirmed nor denied their innocence. Their sen-
tences were revised to time served and they were released in 2011, after 
eighteen years in prison.
 If these sad stories have a lesson to teach, it is that to take X attitude 
as evidence of criminality is, quite simply, to torture sense. Indeed, mass 
murders at Columbine, Virginia Tech, Aurora, and Sandy Hook have 
underscored how, especially in the United States, combining easy access 
to firearms with prohibitive costs of health care yields a deadly brew. 
Like the assumption of a causal link between cultural tendencies and 
pathological actions, the discourse of rights, freedoms, and blame that 
proliferates around such tragedies obscures dysfunction that is far more 
systemic, costly, and tragic. The affectlessness I explore in the following 
chapters is of a different breed: not a psychiatric diagnosis but a cultural 
ethos, one deserving of thoughtful examination rather than condemna-
tion, correction, or cure.
 Abel, of course, means something else by “affect.” For him, Deleuz-
ian affect theory provides the terms for a relocation of the site of ethical 
engagement with violence: from the abstract realm of judgment to the 
concrete site of the body where violence is registered. Viewed as affec-
tive impact, violent images on TV and film are not different, Abel argues, 
from violent events that we witness, experience, or read about in the 
world. I value Abel’s important critique of the representationalist logic 
that is brought to bear on violent images, his approach to the reality 
of violence as a question of intensity, and his willingness to forgo judg-
ment. But I cannot share his faith in the body as a site of affective reg-
ister and ethical engagement. “The body”—whatever that means—is, at 
best, a noisy system, an unruly control, a moving target; I am unsure 
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of its reliability as a register, and distrust the accuracy of its affect as a 
gauge. Together with Rei Terada, I suspect that affect theory—broadly 
defined to include work by Teresa Brennan and Sara Ahmed—partici-
pates in poststructuralist anxiety according to which emotions articulate 
concerns about ethics that haunt poststructuralism after the “death of the 
subject.” The dead subject, memorably described by Terada as a zombie, 
“unable to make decisions or to refute Nazis, likely to praise bad poetry 
or rip your lungs out” (154), is a construct that is more useful as an 
incitement for claims about values and demands for judgment than it is a 
vehicle for critique (the zombie will return to Disappear Here at the end 
of chapter 6).
 The undead, moving en masse, is an apt figure for a world in which, 
as Hans Magnus Enzensberger reflects (writing from Germany), “vio-
lence has freed itself from ideology”; its perpetrators appear “autistic,” 
striking in their “inability to distinguish between destruction and self-
destruction” (20). But if the zombie is our de facto image for the posthu-
man, that image is not devoid of hope—not despite its inherent violence 
but because of it. Detached from affect, conviction, justice, and ideals, 
violence, in all its problematic potential, is revealed: it establishes con-
nections, demarcates differences, and transforms personal and politi-
cal lives. Violence challenges representation and undoes the difference 
between presence and absence. It incites affect and thwarts it, and all too 
often it destroys the very body that would register its impact. Given this 
ferocious fragmentation, invasion, and ruin, from the site of the collapse 
of destruction and self-destruction, being and appearance, presence and 
absence, fiction and the real, an X critique of violence can be forged: 
formed from disaffection, founded on faith in nothing, searching for 
what disillusion brings to light.
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Violence: anything and everything can be conceived in terms of it. On 
one hand, violence seems self-evident—like pornography, we know it 
when we see it. On the other hand, violence inheres precisely in what is 
not known, not seen, and not self-evident: like pornography, its nature, 
and its danger, is subject to dispute.1 Menacing, threatening, vicious, 
spooky; inevitable and preventable, promise and premise, an ineradicable 
presence, a fact of power, a force of nature, and a specter—elusive, omi-
nous, a glance, a snigger, a furtive movement in the shadows, vanishing 
or materializing in the corner of your gaze. As fantasy, reality, and voice-
less fear, violence is everywhere and nowhere. Visible and invisible, it 
disappears here.
 Precisely because of this range and volatility, violence has been uti-
lized to claim attention for a wide array of issues, including the violence 
of speaking, the violence of silence, of the normal and the abnormal, the 
violence of subjectivity, of affect, of critique. This breadth and variety 
speaks to something fundamental about violence: its utility as a means 
 1. Giles (Spaces) makes this analogy between violence and pornography as well (5). 
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to stake a claim to the real. Violence always connotes urgency, emer-
gency. It points to a problem that must be solved, a phenomenon that 
must be addressed, a presence that must be banished (though erasure or 
banishment is a site of further violence). Conversely, to violence’s object, 
or victim, accrues political value and ethical weight, a coming-to-pres-
ence that is imbricated in its own complex logic of representation. Vio-
lence grants visibility even as it perpetrates erasure. How are we to grasp 
this breadth of functions? The one thing they have in common is that 
violence is. Violence happens: it is what takes place, though that place 
may be on the page, the screen, the couch, or the battlefield. It is this, 
the broadest sense in which violence signifies, that I take as my starting 
point for an X critique of violence: Violence is real. It follows, then, that 
violence in fiction (that is, violence that is fantasized or faked) is not 
real, or, it is not “really” violent.
 Those quotation marks around “really” refer to reality’s tenuous 
nature; they underscore how the reality that founds the definition of 
violence is always, already, in question. My goal here is to investigate 
the reality associated with violence. I focus on the 1980s and 1990s, a 
period in which, I argue, the epistemic validity of violence (its quality 
as “real”) disappears; I pursue the implications of this disappearance 
for judgment, critique, and action. In what follows I trace how develop-
ments in film, media, and high and popular culture in the United States 
propelled Generation X to redefine the relation of representation to its 
object, initiating a move away from the twentieth-century approach to 
violence as a founding trauma that fiction reflects and responds to. With 
the vanishing of the premise that violence is real, questions about the 
function and utility of violence as a means by which reality is established 
come to the fore. When reality is produced for television and marketed 
for consumption, it is, I posit, fiction—in the sense of fashioning and 
fabricating, as well as illusion and delusion—and faith—an attitude of 
fidelity in the face of vanishing economic and epistemic certainties—that 
move to center stage in the creation, construction, and preservation of 
“real violence.”
V IOLENCE  I S  REAL
Since Samuel Johnson countered George Berkeley’s philosophy of imma-
terialism—the idea that the material world does not exist independently 
of our ideas about it—by kicking a stone (an anecdote related in James 
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Boswell’s 1791 Life of Johnson), the simulated, mediated, virtual, and 
relative nature of reality has haunted assertions of its empirical, given 
quality. In Connected, or What It Means to Live in the Network Soci-
ety, Steven Shaviro refers back to Berkeley’s philosophy, suggesting that 
immaterialism most perfectly anticipates our present-day existence. 
Writing in 1997, citing similarities between Berkeley and cognitive sci-
entists Andy Clark and Richard Dawkins, Shaviro stresses that “our 
sense of reality is the product of a simulation. It only remains for the 
cognitive scientists to follow Berkeley all the way and jettison the 
‘outer world’ altogether as an extravagant, unnecessary hypothesis” 
(84). Traditionally, such flirtations with the virtual halt, respectfully, 
at the threshold of violence. The body in pain presents an immediacy 
that decries postmodern play. History—defined, in Fredric Jameson’s 
memorable phrase, as “what hurts”—calls a halt to speculations about 
simulation.2
 In X’s mediatized, detached, dissociated world, how are we to think of 
the relation of violence to the real? Rather than embrace Berkeley’s phi-
losophy of immaterialism for our digital world, as Shaviro urges, I sug-
gest we revisit Johnson’s eighteenth-century refutation of it, as recalled by 
his biographer Boswell. “I shall never forget,” writes Boswell, “the alac-
rity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force 
against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus’” (1:431). 
This anecdote is commonly posited as an argument for the existence of 
things in themselves.3 But in Boswell’s account, violence functions not as 
 2. Jameson’s statement appears at the conclusion of his chapter “On Interpreta-
tion” in his 1981 The Political Unconscious. It is his answer to the criticism leveled 
against Marxist methodology by the then growing field of semiotics (represented by Eco 
and Habermas). Semioticians, and, later, poststructuralists, argued that for Marxists, 
“History” functions as an unthematizable force, an immutable fact that eludes analysis. 
Jameson responds by articulating History formally, as an effect of what Louis Althusser 
(borrowing from Baruch Spinoza) termed an “absent cause.” “Conceived in this sense,” 
Jameson concludes, “History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable 
limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its ‘ruses’ turn into grisly and iron-
ic reversals of their overt intention. But this History can be apprehended only through 
its effects, and never directly as some reified force. This is indeed the ultimate sense in 
which History as ground and untranscendable horizon needs no particular theoretical 
justification: we may be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget us, however 
much we might prefer to ignore them” (102).
 3. For evaluations of this argument, see Patay and Silver. Most discussion of this 
phrase centers on the stone from which Johnson’s foot rebounds, not the impetus toward 
violence (though Patay discusses the phrase “mighty force” [140–41]). Natoli, who notes 
Johnson’s refutation of Berkeley in This Is a Picture and Not the World, underscores its 
“scripted” quality (7).
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a check to meditations on virtuality but as a tool for navigating the rela-
tion between the material and the immaterial. With Johnson’s kick of 
the stone (why not caress it? smell it? taste it?) something crucial about 
the relation of violence and reality comes clear: it is not the stone but 
the violence directed against it—the “mighty force” with which John-
son strikes—that establishes the reality of things in themselves. Violence, 
itself real, also works to lay claim to the real. Violence is the means by 
which reality is defined and redefined and, ultimately, produced. It is both 
tenor and vehicle, though what it lays claim to is hardly metaphorical.
 Activists in the 1960s and 1970s relied on this world-defining power 
to legitimize violence as a tool for social change. Schooled by Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Frantz Fanon, they wielded violence to establish a new real-
ity, one formed and fashioned by faith in a cause. In contrast, for Xers, 
the role of violence in constructing reality underscores causality’s artifi-
cial nature and lays bare the fictive quality of faith. Xers were schooled 
not by Sartre and Fanon but by Atari and VCRs. Accustomed to the 
power to freeze, rewind, and replay images, Xers early began to chart 
the extent to which “truth” is not an issue of verification or veracity 
but an assemblage. They began to lay bare the relation of violence to its 
representation, and to explore how fiction—forming and molding—par-
ticipates in the construction of the real, and of the reality of violence. 
In an age of mass simulation, stimulation, and media saturation, vio-
lence renders reality malleable, precarious; by violence reality can be 
made and unmade, claimed and dismissed, created, uncreated, decon-
structed, and erased—X-ed out. Fiction may well be the term that best 
reflects this amorphous quality, a point familiar to literary critics, who 
will not fail to note the mediated nature of Boswell’s narrative, or the 
fact that it was written at the birth of narrative realism in the eighteenth 
century. Johnson’s kick of the stone, this iconic assertion of the reality 
of the thing in itself, is, after all, Boswell’s tale. Probably embellished, 
possibly apocryphal, it speaks to the role of fiction in troubling John-
son’s claim—“troubling,” in the sense of productive dislodging of con-
ventional certitude and in the sense of the moral disquiet that inevitably 
accompanies such work.
V IOLENCE  I S  F ICT ION
For Xers, the relation of violence to its reality was never a given. Vio-
lence haunts Generation X, but it is a violence that is both there and 
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not there, palpable and ephemeral. The first generation conceived when 
birth control was widely available, whose parents paid for a babysit-
ter and went out to see Evil-Child movies like Rosemary’s Baby (1968), 
The Exorcist (1973), The Omen (1976), and Halloween (1978),4 pre-
sented the worry of the latchkey child, orphaned by divorce, subject 
to predators and predatory music. The 1980s saw a rise of regulations 
to control teenage behavior, as Baby Boomers became convinced that 
their children, Xers, are the very threat that Boomers were accused of 
being.5 The 1990s saw a spate of cases in which repressed memories 
of trauma and abuse were brought to light, accompanied by increased 
debate over psychiatrists’ methods for eliciting such memories; the sub-
sequent “recovered memory debate” raised questions about the validity 
of testimony to trauma and abuse and concerns about the fabrication of 
memories of violence.6 Horror films and conspiracy theories play a cru-
cial role in this generation’s self-image. Wes Craven’s 1984 A Nightmare 
on Elm Street, in which violence emerges from dreams, was formative; 
the explicit, grindhouse-style violence of the Friday the 13th franchise 
produced nine films—almost a decalogue—between 1980 and 1993. The 
TV series Twin Peaks (1991) and The X-Files (1993) elaborated compel-
ling discourses of paranoia. Both horror films and conspiracy theory are 
sites where violence combines with fiction—where violence is most real 
as fiction. This is the case not only for fantasy but for reportage. Writing 
in 1983, Robert Stam states that “all of television, including the news, 
is inflected by fiction. [. . .] At times, the news has more than the attri-
butes of fiction: it literally is fiction” (31). In the United States, the rise 
of CNN (founded in 1980) made the established networks compete for 
national attention. CNN carried the only live footage of the Challenger 
explosion in 1986, and that network’s coverage of the rescue of Jessica 
McClure in 1987 drew the nation’s attention with compelling, real-time 
storytelling. The effect was an erasure of the temporal lapse between the 
 4. These titles are included in 13thGen’s “A Brief Chronology of the Evil-Child 
Movie Era (1964–1984)” (Howe and Strauss 66).
 5. In Decade of Nightmares, Philip Jenkins writes: “So enormous was the genera-
tional gulf that by the mid-1980s, even many boomer parents were prepared to believe 
that their offspring were being assailed by a rock music culture awash with images of 
rape, violence, and devil worship, very much like the devil music that they had been 
accused of listening to twenty years before. [. . .] Through the 1980s, teenagers found 
themselves the subject of parental campaigns to regulate their behavior, to restrict the 
influence of gratuitous sex and violence. [. . .] Fears about threats to the young forced 
a definitive cultural change, ordained by families and enforced by police” (197).
 6. See Porter, Yuille, and Lehman for an account of the recovered-memory debate in 
the 1990s.
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happening of an event and its reporting, with crucial implications for the 
relation of reality and fiction. “Facts all come with points of view,” as 
The Talking Heads put it in “Crosseyed and Painless,” and Xers, write 
Howe and Strauss in their seminal study of Generation X (they call it 
“the 13th Generation”), “don’t draw the division between fiction and 
reality the way older people do. In this age of participatory techno-cul-
ture—of hand-held video cameras and digital editing—13ers know that 
anyone can reveal the news and, conversely, that anyone can lie” (181).
 During this period the changing face of war (traditionally, as Elaine 
Scarry stresses, a site for the establishment of reality in the form of 
opened and broken bodies) further marks the revision of the relation of 
violence to the real. For Xers in the United States, who were never sub-
ject to the draft, battle is something to watch on TV—or, more precisely, 
it is something seen on TV in childhood: the Vietnam War footage from 
the 1960s and 1970s, interspersed with sitcoms, reruns, and issue-driven 
“movies of the week.” “As children, members of Gen X might watch 
The Brady Bunch after school, and then watch the fall of Saigon on 
the news with their parents over dinner,” writes G. P. Lainsbury. “Each 
seemed equally real or unreal, each had the same truth content” (191). 
Lainsbury’s characterization underscores Vietnam’s mediatized quality 
that Coupland describes in Generation X: “Growing up, Vietnam was a 
background color in life, like red or blue or gold—it tinted everything. 
And then suddenly one day it just disappeared” (151). The Gulf War 
of the 1990s underscored this vanishing: increased government control 
over the images broadcast ensured the virtual disappearance of battle 
footage from television screens. Reflecting on this shift, Margot Norris 
describes Vietnam as “a television war, its gritty images of close-up com-
bat and injury brought into the American living room every night for 
more than a harrowing decade.” In contrast, she continues, “the Persian 
Gulf War of the early 1990s was different: video within video, represen-
tations not of carnage but of technology, a media production of media 
that looked more like simulation than representation” (234). Once war 
is derealized, Norris concludes, it no longer serves to anchor issues; it 
no longer serves the reality-making function of traditional warfare.7 
 7. Norris writes, “Precensorship’s pre-editing of representation places not only the 
phenomenological events of the fighting but also the political and historical significance 
of the enterprise under erasure. The war passed through the public imagination and 
memory like a video phantom, unable—in the absence of any national pain or suffer-
ing—to imprint a lasting inscription on either the national conscience or the national 
self-image” (248). Norris is interested in how “the Persian Gulf War’s hyperrealities were 
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If we are all, as good Lacanian subjects, haunted by a lost or inacces-
sible Real, this inaccessibility takes a peculiar form for Xers: they are 
haunted by the loss of the real as image, the loss of the real on TV, as 
well as the loss of the real as violence. In Xer Gillian Flynn’s 2012 best-
seller Gone Girl, a clever crime novel that probes the presumptions of 
veracity that surround intimacy, violence, and confession, the antago-
nist Nick, a self-described Xer, reflects on his generation’s unique rela-
tion to the real: “We were the first human beings who would never see 
anything for the first time. We stare at the wonders of the world, dull-
eyed, underwhelmed. [. . .] Jungle animals on attack, ancient icebergs 
collapsing, volcanoes erupting. I can’t recall a single amazing thing I 
have seen firsthand that I didn’t immediately reference to a movie or TV 
show. [. . .] I’ve literally seen it all, and the worst thing, the thing that 
makes me want to blow my brains out, is: The secondhand experience is 
always better. The image is crisper, the view is keener, the camera angle 
and the soundtrack manipulate my emotions in a way reality can’t any-
more” (72).
 The rise of reality-based television in the 1980s and 1990s further 
underscored the extent to which “reality” is available to be produced and 
marketed, and the attractions of violence (both the uses and abuses of 
power and the positive irruptions of the natural world) were evident in 
early reality TV shows like COPS and When Animals Attack—both prop-
erty of the new network Fox. Established in the mid-1980s, Fox staked 
out its identity as the “fourth network” in the terrain of reality-based TV, 
rightly wagering that reality promises good ratings and attracts desirable 
demographics. Reality TV captured the nature of television which, as 
James Friedman puts it, “does not simply portray a window onto a real 
world ‘out there’ but frames the world, contextualizes the narrative, and 
argues for the integrity of the reality it depicts” (16); studying the nature 
of these arguments in Europe in the 1990s, Arild Fetveit suggests that the 
popularity of reality TV in the digital era—specifically, reality TV that 
stresses disaster and violence—underscores a change in the “credibility” 
attributed to the image, credence that, at the end of the twentieth century, 
is “less dependent upon technology and more based on institutional war-
rant” (131). Reality TV thus figures reality as credibility and warrant, a 
contractual exchange in the currency of trust and faith; banking on “a 
longing for a lost touch with reality,” reality TV reclaims the evidentiary 
constructed out of a military press censorship whose agenda was to derealize casualties, 
to strip them of the impact of ‘reality’ and thereby make Operation Desert Storm murder-
ously destructive yet simultaneously corpselike” (236).
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power for the image and, with that image, re-establishes a sense of con-
nectedness to the world (Fetveit 132). But this fact-defining quality is 
not a given: it is fashioned by televisual devices like graphic overlays, 
replays, and reenactments that overwrite immediacy, rendering it legible, 
the product of narrative, and network, convention.
 If this erosion of the distinction between reality and fiction was 
always characteristic of television (and Xers commonly describe them-
selves as raised by TV), technological developments in production in 
this period traced the evaporation of the human perspective and of 
the judgments generally associated with that perspective. “The mur-
ders reported on Eyewitness News (forever playing the B-film to the 
high-art seriousness of Network News), murders that amount to nar-
rativized visualizations of statistics, differ from the murders in police 
or mystery shows mainly in the fact that they happened to occur in the 
three-dimensional world,” writes Stam (33). As the distinction between 
fiction and reality dissolves, so do other distinctions, like between per-
petrator, victim and bystander, and the distinction between censure and 
approval. “Subjective shots suture us into the perspective of rapists and 
assassins. The viewer becomes voyeur and accomplice, domestic private 
eye, subconsciously applauding a spectacle of death and abuse” (Stam 
33). Films of these decades articulated what Peter Hanson identifies as a 
“new morality” in the X directors David Fincher, Tarsem Singh, Quen-
tin Tarantino, and Spike Jonze (9): “mired in mixed messages, undefined 
anger, inarticulate declarations, and visceral impact” (12). Like most 
Xers, these directors’ approach to violence was informed by their expe-
rience of network television, home media, and cable: CNN and MTV—
specifically, MTV’s aesthetic of quick cuts, speeded-up storytelling, and 
fragmentation.
 Television production in the 1980s saw a rise of motion-control tech-
nologies: the Steadicam, Camrail, and other robotically controlled studio 
cameras. This “gang of new and automated motion-control devices” (as 
John Caldwell describes them) redefined the realism posited by the tele-
visual image; by replacing the human perspective promised by the manu-
ally controlled, pedestal-mounted camera, they “automate an inherently 
omniscient point of view and subjectivize it around a technological rather 
than human center”; the camera eye “floats like the eye of a cyborg” 
(81). As the digital began to replace the analog, electronic and nonlin-
ear editing underscored this elision of human perspective, detaching film 
from human time as well as from human space: these editing systems 
“helped shatter the sequential and temporal straitjacket necessitated by 
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conventional forms of editing” (Caldwell 81). As cause and effect lose 
their purchase on reality, veracity and certainty present as special effects 
of technology. Man, measure of all things, like the fictional ’80s veejay 
Max Headroom, flickers, stutters, and disappears. Since the birth of cin-
ema, the camera’s mechanical eye has claimed access to a truth otherwise 
invisible; but for Xers, who grew up on ’80s TV, “nothing visual was set 
in stone” (Caldwell 82).
 Violence strikes that stone, laying claim to its empirical quality, 
so it is no coincidence that, concurrent with these developments, vio-
lence in film and television was a subject of much agonized discussion 
that revolved around a few highly publicized examples that galvanized 
debates about appropriate representation (mostly of pornography) (Slo-
cum 8). Such debates posited Xers as a worrying audience, one that 
could not effectively distinguish between representation and reality. 
Teenagers and young adults were condemned as culturally illiterate 
by E. D. Hirsch Jr. in Cultural Literacy (1987). They were dismissed 
as closed-minded by Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American 
Mind (published the same year). They were derided as stupid, unable 
or unwilling to distinguish violent actions from violence on screen, in 
song lyrics, and in the media. They laughed in a screening of Schindler’s 
List.8 “DUMB,” write Howe and Strauss, rehearsing the generalized 
sense of dismay around young people during this period. “They can’t 
find Chicago on a map. They don’t know when the Civil War was 
fought. They watch too much TV” (18). For Xers—the subjects of these 
agonized debates—the 1993 Congressional Hearings that cited MTV’s 
iconic show “Beavis and Butt-head,”9 the legislation around Parental 
Advisory labels for music albums in the 1980s and 1990s, and the dis-
cussions around the NEA’s funding of Robert Mapplethorpe’s photog-
raphy (in 1989 and 1990) underscored the imbrication of all violence 
 8. On January 17, 1994, approximately 70 students of Castlemont High School 
in Oakland, California (the school has a mostly Black and Latino/a student popula-
tion) were taken by their teacher to a screening of the film. Some laughed at a scene 
of casual shooting. The event propelled much public debate, a visit by Steven Spielberg 
to the school, and multiple crisis forums, evidence of what Yosefa Loshitzky, writing 
of Schindler’s List in 1997, describes as “the way the film has been used as a ‘weapon’ 
in the multicultural wars dividing the contemporary ethnic landscape of American so-
ciety” (6). The general adulation surrounding Schindler’s List was parodied in “The 
Raincoats,” a two-part episode of the hit TV show Seinfeld. “The Raincoats” aired on 
NBC in April 1994.
 9. See Cynthia A. Cooper’s Violence on Television: Congressional Inquiry, Public 
Criticism, and Industry Response, especially pages 127–30, for an analysis of these de-
bates.
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in the instrumental logic of power, and the disappearance of the real 
into the chatter of judgment. True to their characterization by Douglas 
Rushkoff as ignoring the products advertised in commercials and focus-
ing instead on the marketing devices (5), Xers tuned not to the argu-
ments in these debates but to the urgency and emergency with which 
their rhetoric was couched. Relinquishing their stakes in the very reality 
that violence, in these discussions, is wielded to establish, Xers change 
the channel.
 The effect of this divorce of affect from critique should not be under-
estimated. As violence is deemed all-pervasive, and its readers or view-
ers stupid, its reality becomes mobile, contagious; it migrates from the 
content of the text to the context of its reception, from the page or the 
screen out into the world. Witness to concerns about copycat killers and 
to worries about the real-world effects of violence in cinema, in music, 
in video games, and on TV, Xers find fiction to be both cause and effect 
of violence. This is not only the case for notorious literary texts like 
Ellis’s American Psycho and A. M. Homes’s The End of Alice, both of 
which, published in the 1990s, elicited public censure and controversy, 
as if the predation the authors depicted was real, not fiction.10 For Xers, 
real predation takes its cue from fiction, just as predation in fiction cop-
ies the real, and literary works like Ellis’s and Homes’s were a logical 
extension of a general cultural atmosphere. Writing of the Columbine 
1999 school massacre, James Alan Fox and Jack Levin describe Dylan 
Klebold and Eric Harris’s actions as part of the copycat phenomenon 
in which killers took their inspiration from real-life killers, from the 
portrayal of killers in fiction and film, and from video games (213).11 
 10. Homes’s The End of Alice is narrated by a convicted pedophile who corresponds 
with a nineteen-year-old girl about her plans to seduce a twelve-year-old boy and remi-
nisces about his rape and murder of a twelve-year-old girl named Alice. Reviewing the 
book for The New York Times, Michiko Kakutani compared The End of Alice to Ellis’s 
American Psycho and described it as “a novel that proves that a woman can write as 
badly, violently and misogynistically as a man.” In the UK, the NSPCC (National Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children) condemned the book, which was banned by 
bookseller W. H. Smith. In contrast to American Psycho (which I discuss in chapter 3), 
The End of Alice has received very little attention from critics since the initial contro-
versy surrounding its publication.
 11. Several very popular films in this period explicitly thematized the copycat phe-
nomenon: Michael Mann’s Manhunter (1986), Jon Amiel’s Copycat (1995), and Jona-
than Demme’s Silence of the Lambs (1991). Concern about copycat violence accompa-
nied the release of Oliver Stone’s Natural Born Killers in 1994. Reflecting on the copycat 
phenomenon, Mark Seltzer writes: “Fact and fiction have a way of exchanging places 
here: virtual reality, after all, has its own reality. [. . .] The distinction between fact and 
fiction and bodies and information vanish, along the lines of an identification without 
reserve” (Serial Killers 16).
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The widely publicized copycat phenomenon illustrates a general disin-
tegration of causality, as real events, imitating fiction, become fictional, 
with crucial implications for the truths constructed about them. Rather 
than an unqualified reality that calls a halt to fiction, or an evil that 
demands and determines judgment, violence is alternately object and 
agent, means and end. The relation of image to action is an open switch, 
a reciprocal loop, alternating between immediate somatic sensation and 
discursive epistemes.12
 In a departure from much of the tenor of public discourse around 
violence that posits it as a problem to be resolved or a scourge to be 
eradicated, some scholars have explored the implications of the interpen-
etration of fiction and reality that I have been describing. Writing of the 
1980s, Joel Black reflects on how “the very activity by which we repre-
sent or ‘picture’ violence to ourselves is an aesthetic operation whereby 
we habitually transform brutal actions into art. We are greatly assisted 
in this by the mass media, which expose us, liminally and subliminally, 
to artistic representations of violence” (5). The 1980s produced what 
Mark Seltzer, in 1998, calls “wound culture: the public fascination with 
torn and open bodies and torn and opened persons, a collective gather-
ing around shock, trauma, and the wound” (1).13 Stressing that trauma 
figures both the wound and its absence, Seltzer defines trauma as “an 
effect in search of a cause” (257), and consequently trauma becomes a 
site where the basic intimacy, even involution, of fact and fiction, event 
and repetition, bodies and signs, the virtual and the real is revealed. 
Elana Gomel, who traces the emergence of the violent subject from the 
nineteenth century into the twenty-first in her 2003 book Bloodscripts, 
sees a similar involution of story and action, fiction and real: “Literary 
 12. Concrete example: David Koresh, founder of the Branch Davidian sect, whose 
Mount Carmel ranch in Waco, Texas, was raided by the FBI in 1993 after a fifty-one-day 
siege (the raid, which was televised live, left seventy-six cult members dead, including 
seventeen children), modeled the Waco siege on TV coverage of the 1992 L.A. riots. 
For Koresh, Caldwell writes, “the fires that raged when Los Angeles burned in 1992 
provided not a sense of simultaneity or realism, but rather a powerful and codified tem-
plate for stylized and horrific spectacle. The alienated televisuality of the L.A. rebellion 
could be appropriated and choreographed for the benefit of the mass audience, even by 
those in other places and with very different apocalyptic ends” (31). An apt pupil of this 
reciprocity of violence and its televised image, Xer Timothy McVeigh cited the Waco 
incident as a motivation for the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, timed to 
coincide with the second anniversary of the Waco assault.
 13. Seltzer notes “less an opposition between bodies and representations than their 
radical involution: a basic entanglement of bodily processes and technologies of repro-
duction and visualization, reproduction and mimesis, that is not simply reducible to, or 
contained by the order of representation” (Serial Killers 36).
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murderers are not pale reflections of some essential violent psyche. On 
the contrary, actual murderers are stories of violence made flesh” (xiv).
 This revision of classical mimesis’s ancient hierarchy of image and 
event, fact and fiction is explicitly articulated in the Video Backpacker 
scene of Richard Linklater’s iconic X film Slacker (1991).14 Surrounded 
by televisions that broadcast images of pornography, media violence, 
and disaster, and wearing a television as a backpack, Video Backpacker 
(none of the characters in Slacker have names) elaborates on the ero-
sion of the privileged position traditionally accorded to the experience, 
or witness, of violence. “Back when I used to go out,” he says, “when 
I was last out, I was walking down the street, and this guy, like came 
barreling out of a bar, fell right in front of me, and he had a knife, right 
in his back. Landed right on the ground. And . . . well, I have no refer-
ence to it now, I can’t refer back to it, I can’t press rewind, I can’t put 
it on pause, I can’t put it on slo-mo and see all the little details. And 
the blood was all wrong, it didn’t look like blood, and the hue was 
off, I couldn’t adjust the hue, I was seeing it for real but it just wasn’t 
right.” Video Backpacker’s affectlessness (which echoes an earlier char-
acter’s affectlessness as he publicly murders his mother, then sits calmly 
in front of the TV set waiting for the police) is characterized by a dis-
missal of the values that violence is traditionally called upon to estab-
lish. He does not express fear or pity, or call for justice. Nor does he 
care about the distinction between reality and fiction, the real and its 
image, real and “real” violence. This vignette offers the foundation for 
a critique of violence after Generation X, one that takes, as a given, the 
identification of image as violence and its detachment from the real: as 
Video Backpacker puts it, “a video image is much more powerful and 
useful than an actual event.”
 14. Radwin’s reading of this film claims for Slacker an articulation of Generation 
X’s philosophy, values, and attitude, which he aligns with postmodern cinema. Radwin 
identifies in Slacker four ideas central to Generation X: questioning master narratives, 
anarchy, conspiracy, and the value of images over reality (36). Because Video Backpacker, 
writes Radwin, is a relatively static moment in a film marked by fluidity and open fram-
ing (he is limited to just three feet of space), he redefines space and mobility: “While he 
does not have mobility in the usual sense, he can see far beyond the rest of us and virtu-
ally go anywhere the televised image can take him” (45). For Video Backpacker, “the 
image is not a source to be conquered with revolutionary force. On the contrary, it must 
be courted. [. . .] Video Backpacker has come to share substance with the sets, not merely 
cohabitating with them, in exchange for access to and control of images and the powers 
they possess” (46).
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A  H I STORY  OF  V IOLENCE
We should step back and consider the bodies of work that have left us 
at this point. Studies of violence in the twentieth century can be divided 
into two streams. The first brings together approaches to violence that 
treat it as mediate or mediated, a means (justified or not) to an end: 
mediate violence is instrumental, structural, or systemic. The second 
brings together approaches to violence that stress its immediate mani-
festations: violence that is excessive, unspeakable, sublime. These two 
approaches to violence differ in their conceptions of power, causality, 
agency, and temporality. For the tradition of mediate violence, violence 
serves a purpose; its clearest articulation is in Hannah Arendt’s and 
Michel Foucault’s thinking on power, which employs violence to disci-
FIGURE 3. Slacker (1991). Screen grab. Video Backpacker (Kalman Spelletich) shows off his collection. 
Note the texts broadcast on the screens (“TV IS,” “WE ARE,” and “IMAGINE YOUR SELF”). Throughout 
the scene, the screens, as if in symbiosis with the speaker, display images that reflect on and underscore 
his points. © Linklater/Orion.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
5 4  /  C H A P T E R  T W O
pline, regulate, subdue, and create docile bodies. In her 1969 book On 
Violence, Arendt distinguishes between violence and power. Violence, 
she writes, “is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands 
in need of guidance and justification through the ends it pursues” (51); 
consequently, violence cannot be viewed in isolation but is always in dia-
lectical relation to power that legitimizes or justifies it. For Foucault, the 
modern era is defined by the dissemination of violence into a myriad of 
disciplinary mechanisms by which power, invisibly, painfully, produces 
its subjects (his 1975 Discipline and Punish is, of course, the seminal 
text for this tradition). This type of violence (mediate violence) is at base 
creative and generative, though we may dislike or decry its methods and 
objects, and it is intimately linked to law and justice, the instruments of 
the State. Because of its intimacy with institutions and other mechanisms 
of discourse in which it inheres, mediate violence is difficult to tease out 
of the logic of power that grounds the law; discussions of mediate vio-
lence inevitably turn on evaluations of the end to which it serves as a 
means. Mediate violence may be just or unjust, legitimate or illegitimate, 
but it cannot be observed independently of the institutions and systems 
through which it operates.
 In the realms of sociology, politics, and theories of power, medi-
ate violence tends to be approached with recourse to a logic of cau-
sality. Its critique focuses on the presence or absence of a causal link 
between violent images and violent behavior, and privileges terminology 
of sight, spectacle, and the subject. At the time Arendt and Foucault 
were writing, these terms were very much in dialogue with concepts of 
power that, as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have since pointed 
out in their monumental Empire, now need to be rethought in terms of 
monadism, multiplicity, and movement. The tradition of mediate vio-
lence proved quite fruitful for literary criticism in the 1980s and 1990s: 
mediate violence inheres in language, articulating the deep structure of 
culture, as well as the bodies and minds that culture produces. These 
attributes make mediate violence an attractive topic for poststructural-
ist thinkers for whom the decentered nature of power, like the absent 
transcendental signified, defies and defines discourse. The temporality of 
articulation, the diachronicity of speech, and the means-to-ends logic all 
anchor mediate violence to causality and temporal progression—in other 
words, to history—and make writing a useful site from which to identify 
and critique it. For many of the authors in Nancy Armstrong and Leon-
ard Tennenhouse’s influential collection, The Violence of Representation 
(1989), all writing is violence—a logical but somewhat empty conclusion 
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to the tradition from which Derrida writes of the violence of the letter. 
Reflecting on this tradition in 1998, Art Redding writes that “Violence 
points to what critics not so long ago were fond of calling a transcen-
dental signified, hollowed of precise meaning yet necessary to structure 
our language into a series of ideologically sensible and value-ridden 
binaries” (Raids 14). These methods of critique are unavailable to Gen-
eration X. Like Redding, Xers dislike binaries and are suspicious of the 
values they represent. Literacy is a product not of writing and reading 
but of viewing and re-viewing popular culture. The ability to rewind and 
replay undermines causality at its core. Authority is absent, evacuated, 
ineffective. Institutions like the state are perceived as being too deeply 
complicit in extensive networks of power to be efficaciously critiqued.
 In contrast to this instrumental tradition (mediate violence) is a more 
positivist one for which violence inheres in the stark fact of destruction. 
I call this type of violence immediate violence. Immediate violence is 
predicated on the pure instantiation of somatic sensation, itself inar-
ticulable or alien or hostile to language. The ancient tradition of the 
sublime elicited the compelling nature of an immediacy that refuses rep-
resentation; Georges Bataille, in the 1950s, elaborated on a violence that 
exceeds reason, mastery, and the law of taboo, “that which can never 
be grasped, but we are conscious of being in its power” (40). Building 
on this tradition in the 1980s, Jean-François Lyotard outlined a post-
modern discourse of the sublime, an admixture of pleasure and pain 
at the encounter of the somatic and the nonsensible: “not a pleasure, 
it is a pleasure of pain: we fail to present the absolute, and that is a 
displeasure, but we know we have to present it, that the faculty of feel-
ing or imagining is called on to bring about the sensible (the image)” 
(126). Lyotard’s elision of the distinction between sensation and sight 
(the sensible / the image) underscores how the purview of immediate 
violence is not legitimacy but representation, not law but art—aesthet-
ics, from the Greek aistheta, meaning that which is available to per-
ception, and which, Joel Black has pointed out in his important book 
Aesthetics of Murder, entered English through the macabre (3). Unlike 
mediate violence, which is aligned, through its means-to-ends logic, with 
chronological progression, the temporal mode of immediate violence is 
not progression but repetition—hence its association with trauma. In 
recent decades, this affective charge of the unpresentable (Lyotard’s 
“faculty of feeling”) has been vested with ethical weight in the discourse 
of unspeakability that surrounds genocide and torture and terror, a 
discourse richly informed by trauma theory. Elana Gomel, writing of 
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violent perpetrators, brings together the discourse of trauma with the 
discourse of the sublime in Bloodscripts: Writing the Violent Subject. 
“The ellipsis of the violent subject’s life-story is a scar of the sublime. 
Violence both wounds the narrative and stimulates its recovery. [. . .] 
The initial trauma shatters the plot of the self, producing gaps, lacunae, 
silences, and inconsistencies; but the sublime sense of power generates 
a narrative reconstruction, which, nevertheless, bears the traces of the 
initial fragmentation” (xxix).
 By virtue of its location outside discourse, immediate violence 
promises the possibility of a site of resistance and transformation. This 
promise has, of course, historically proved fatal—both literally and met-
aphorically. Consequently, critiques of immediate violence are deeply 
concerned with the ends to which immediate violence may prove to 
be a means. Such critiques are interested in who evokes the power of 
purity, heimat, or faith; how these promises are put to work, in what 
arenas, and to what purpose. In other words, critiques of immediate 
violence subject immediacy to the criteria (instrumentality; temporality; 
means and ends) that define, and determine, mediate violence. Domi-
nick LaCapra, writing of these disparate types of violence, walks straight 
into this trap: “The concern becomes acute when violence is not only 
seen (however contestably) as useful or necessary to achieve certain 
results [. . .] but is also transfigured in sacred, sublime, redemptive, or 
foundational terms” (History and Its Limits 7). Mediate violence (itself 
debatable and contestable though potentially justifiable if it results in a 
greater good) is always a means to an end: it is employed for the pur-
pose of ultimate reform, transformation, or cure. Immediate violence 
is not employed but, as LaCapra puts it here, “transfigured.” It pres-
ents as the inviolable: the sacred, the sublime, the realm of aesthetics or 
art. Precisely because of this departure from the means-to-end logic and 
that logic’s juridical, political, and scientific realm, immediate violence 
is worrying: it elicits “acute concern.” Musing on immediate violence’s 
destructive potential, LaCapra stresses empirical research that serves as 
a “reality check” (History 8). But this critical gesture is, itself, in need 
of critique. It treats the empirical as a stable, constant quality. Reality is 
wielded to control, or to check, the fantastic excesses of the immediate. 
Immediate violence is thus posited as, at worst, a fantasy, a child’s tale, a 
tragic lie; at best, it is a disguise with which real power masks its opera-
tions. Critical work, so goes this logic, tells the truth, pulls the mask off, 
and shows by whom, how, and why the fantasy of redemptive violence is 
produced. It draws back the curtain to reveal the faceless men in suits.
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 This is the challenge that immediate violence poses to critique. Cri-
tique folds immediate violence into a logic of mediation: the immediate 
is interrogated about the ends to which it serves as a means. Its histo-
ricity is evaluated, the ethics of its actors are weighed and judged. But 
aren’t the men in suits employed by other men in nicer suits, themselves 
in thrall to some deeper, darker force? Indeed, the idea that immediate 
violence can be checked—that is, that its fictional quality can be ascer-
tained, and that its transformative power can be restrained—is predi-
cated on the assumption that critique can unveil a more or less reliable 
and stable distinction between reality and fiction, between historical 
fact and its guises. It is predicated on the assumption that the buck 
stops. Generation X is distrustful of precisely such work. Unwilling to 
incline toward the immediate in their media-saturated world, unlikely 
to align with critique over the promise of presence, Xers, with charac-
teristic ambivalence, refuse to choose. Awake to the operations of medi-
ate violence, the pervasive quality of power (corporate, ideological) that 
controls what presents as real, aware but wary of immediate violence, 
the lure of total destruction, revolution, holocaust, apocalypse, reluc-
tant to take a stand, loath to judge, inclined to see positions as deeply 
vested and interested, simultaneously compelled by and weary of the 
narratives produced around the videotaped police beating of Rodney 
King in 1991 and the O. J. Simpson murder trial in 1994, Xers view 
causality as just one more narrative, affect as one more attitude, and 
judgment as a somewhat arbitrary cessation imposed on the mobility 
and nomadism that drive this “accelerated culture.”15 Cessation pres-
ents as a wishful fantasy, an arbitrary pause, and the distinction of 
agent from object, cause from effect, emerges as a construct, grounded 
only in faith.
BOD IES  IN  PA IN
But wait: it bleeds. It screams. It’s broken. For many scholars and crit-
ics, the body in pain is ground zero for thinking about violence. Pain 
figures as certainty: its pure unmediated somatic sensation is a firm site 
 15. From its inception, “Generation X” has been associated with acceleration. Ulrich 
has pointed out that Hamblett and Deverson use the term “accelerated culture” in their 
1964 Generation X, a collection of interviews with young people in Britain, and that 
Coupland borrowed the phrase for his 1991 Generation X, subtitled Tales for an Acceler-
ated Culture (“Generation X” 9–11).
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for the location of violence’s reality, set in stark opposition to its simu-
lation or fictionalization. “We are truly convinced of the thingness of 
the body when we see it open—and red,” writes Gomel. “Outside lan-
guage, locked in the brutal thingness of physical suffering, the victim 
confronts—and becomes—the Real” (5). The traditions of mediate and 
immediate violence approach the body in pain differently. For the former, 
it is a means to an end in the logic of power. For the latter, it is an end, 
the end of all ends; here all logic stops. Two seminal theories of violence 
and the body in pain—Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, first published 
in English in 1977, and Scarry’s The Body in Pain, published in 1985—
straddle the period I am discussing and inform the kinds of conversations 
that literary discourse produced around violence in this period. Tak-
ing the two together underscores how the body in pain presents both as 
absolute certainty and as void of all certainty. Generation X is poised at 
the crux of this intersection.
 In Foucault’s seminal articulation of mediate violence, the harrow-
ing account of the torture to death of the body of the condemned that 
opens Discipline and Punish is designed to underscore the vanishing 
of immediate violence from the public sphere. The memorable open-
ing pages, a collection of graphic accounts of the execution of Robert-
François Damiens, vividly demonstrate the stakes of his study, set in the 
wake of “the disappearance of the tortured, dismembered, amputated 
body, symbolically branded on face or shoulder, exposed alive or dead 
to public view. The body as the major target of penal repression disap-
peared” (8; emphases mine). For Foucault, modern power renders the 
body in pain invisible; its absence is the condition of possibility for the 
production of the modern subject and the mediated reality in which she 
lives. Like Foucault in Discipline and Punish, Elaine Scarry’s The Body 
in Pain takes as a starting point pain’s vanishing. Pain, Scarry stresses, is 
invisible; its very somatic plenitude ensures that it eludes the epistemic 
certainty that it is wielded to establish. “Vaguely alarming yet unreal, 
laden with consequence yet evaporating before the mind because not 
available to sensory confirmation, [. . .] the pains occurring in other 
people’s bodies flicker before the mind, then disappear” (4). In contrast 
to Foucault, who disappoints many a bloodthirsty undergraduate after 
those vivid opening pages, Scarry dwells repeatedly on—one might say 
she returns obsessively to—the unarguable reality of the human body in 
pain, the pure untrammeled physicality of which is the site from which, 
she argues, power fashions culture through specifically aesthetic work: 
making and unmaking the world. Indeed, it is pain’s very invisibility—
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its unspeakable, unrepresentable quality—that ensures, for Scarry, its 
perpetual presence: “pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once 
that which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed” (4). 
Both Foucault’s tortured body and Scarry’s body in pain figure as the 
site of unmediated physical sensation, a Real untouched by fiction. But 
the one disappears, the other is here.
 The co-presence of Scarry and Foucault reflects an intersection, in 
the 1980s, of the two traditions of thinking on violence: the mediate 
violence of discourse and power and the immediate violence of unspeak-
able sensation. As the mediate and immediate intersect, the specific chal-
lenge that immediate violence poses, not only to critique but to presence 
for critique, becomes clear. The challenge is this: by virtue of its uneasy 
presence—it both compels and repels, it both disappears and is here—the 
immediate qualifies and forecloses mediate violence. It is its outside or 
its core, available only by mediation, which raises questions of media 
and transmission, and with them, questions of verification and certainty. 
Like mediate and immediate, speculation and action, fiction and his-
tory, pain’s radical unknowability and its fundamental thingness coexist, 
two lenses that resolve into a single stereoptic image. For Foucault and 
Scarry, the body in pain is such an image, and like all images it flickers; 
both here and not here, its indexical function is determined as much by 
its absence as by its presence. This flickering should put us in mind of the 
contingent relation to the real that, historically, has haunted all images, a 
contingency that comes to the fore as images become increasingly avail-
able to manipulation. Walter Benjamin’s meditations on photography 
and film in the 1930s (in “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technical 
Reproducibility”) stressed the liberatory implications of a medium that 
can construct reality; Jean Baudrillard, in the 1960s, celebrated the mur-
der of the real by the image. Continuing this development, Joel Black 
argues for an approach to violence as an aesthetic experience—“rather 
than moral, physical, natural, or whatever term we choose as a synonym 
for the word real” (3). Aesthetic violence, by which Black means mur-
ders that are actes gratuits, claims the immediate as its objective and thus 
collapses the distinction between being and appearance on which the 
classical idea of mimesis is predicated. Black traces the aestheticization 
of violence from Romantic philosophy and literature, through Thomas 
De Quincey’s 1827 essay “On Murder Considered as One of the Fine 
Arts,” into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the inspiration 
for his book is, he states explicitly, the 1980s: “a time when ‘reality’ is 
mediated to an unprecedented degree by the visual mass media,” and the 
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distinction between reality and appearance is available to be seized by 
terrorists, killers, and film directors alike (17).
 Writing of the same decade, Richard Slotkin identifies Ronald Rea-
gan’s administration as a moment in U.S. culture in which “the myths 
produced by mass culture have became credible substitutes for actual 
historical or political action [. . .] The substitution of myth for history 
serves not only as an advertising ploy for electing the candidate but as an 
organizing principle for making policy” (644). This revision of the rela-
tion of fiction and fact, according to which fiction precedes, organizes, 
and explains the “facts” that it produces, was perfected, Slotkin con-
cludes, by Reagan: “At the height of his powers he was able to cover his 
actions with the gloss of patriotic symbolism and to convince his audi-
ence that—in life as in movies—merely symbolic action is a legitimate 
equivalent of the ‘real thing’” (644). These symbols, myths, or anecdotes 
took very real form in the continental United States and Central America 
in the 1980s; George H. W. Bush’s War on Drugs and the 1991 Gulf War 
further attest to what Slotkin describes as a tendency, within the politics 
and media at the time, “to think mythologically about policy questions, 
substituting symbol and anecdote for analysis and argument” (652).
 The slacker is the wise child of this development, and offers a per-
spective on the body in pain that is less invested in safeguarding its reality 
than in exploring its potential for the creation of new realities—aesthetic, 
epistemic, and political. “We all know the psychic powers of the tele-
vised image,” says Video Backpacker in 1991, “but we need to capital-
ize on it and make it work for us instead of us working for it.” As the 
technology to fabricate images was increasingly available in the 1990s, 
Xers assumed a detachment of image from a documentary role; the rela-
tion of the image to the real is an opportunity for mischief, and mischief, 
as Tyler Durden instructs us in Fight Club, is an anomic site from which 
violence can work revolution or devolution, saving or ending the world.
 This identification of violence with its image, and the detachment of 
image from document, has long elicited concern about verity and docu-
mentation. Such concern is predicated on the assumption that there is 
a distinction between real and fake, and that that distinction matters. 
And yet, as Susan Sontag writes in Regarding the Pain of Others, the 
image’s evidentiary function is inextricable from the stories told about 
it. Musing on the medium of photography, Sontag stresses that the pho-
tograph’s unique claim on reality renders the real vulnerable to fiction. 
Precisely because “photographs of atrocity illustrate as well as corrob-
orate, [. . .] the illustrative function of photographs leaves opinions, 
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prejudices, fantasies, misinformation untouched” (Regarding 84). Writ-
ing of the Abu Ghraib torture photos in 2006 (when Xers are in their 
30s and 40s), David Simpson is struck by the paucity of suspicion in 
their reception. “One might at least imagine that these photos were 
faked. [. . .] We live in a world in which the accusation or assumption 
of faked evidence is almost normative. But no one raised this question 
about Abu Ghraib. [. . .] The staging of these incidents as pranks rather 
than as formal spectacles provided exactly the touch of the real that 
might have been absent from more carefully composed images falling 
into the inherited genres of wartime reporting” (133). That “touch of 
the real”—the real as touch-up—is not exclusive to the visual image. It 
is part and parcel of any attempt to make sense of the world. Reflecting 
on the role of violence in literary visions of politics in her 2010 book 
Binding Violence, Moira Fradinger writes that even “the always new, 
material, untransferable experience of pain can only be metaphorized 
through our existing symbolic reservoir. This is to say that because of 
the gap between experience and our means to apprehend it, ‘our reality’ 
presents itself to us with the structure of fiction. Inseparable from the 
conventions through which we make sense of it, give it its consistency 
and coherence, reality results from the workings of fiction, even as it 
also always leaves a remainder of materiality that cannot be symbol-
ized” (20). For Generation X, poised at the intersection of immediate 
and mediate violence, the reality premised by the body in pain is both 
undeniable and uncertain, both fiction and real.
 This epistemic unease extends, for Xers, from the somatic certainty 
of the body and its experience to an existential discomfort with the fun-
damental categories of metaphysics: presence and being. With the social 
and media developments in the 1980s and 1990s, Xers bore witness to 
a uniquely modern kind of disappearing. Modernity, as Leo Charney 
notes, signals the loss of presence and of full sensation, and Charney 
finds in the spate of “ultra violent” films released in these decades a 
reaction to this loss and an anxious attempt to re-present presence in a 
world haunted by its lack. “The force of violence externalizes and ren-
ders as temporary kinesthetic effect the rolling hunger to face the pres-
ent, to feel it and see it and re-present it,” writes Charney; “Moments 
of violence aspire to restore, or at least to represent, the moments of 
tangible presence that are otherwise unachievable, as if their very force 
could hurtle them into the inside of a present moment” (49). J. David 
Slocum, surveying the history of violence in American cinema, also 
notes a tendency in this period toward elision of fact, fiction, and image. 
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“Especially in a modern society mediated by popular culture,” he writes, 
spectators “los[e] track of the distinctions between representation and 
reality in everyday life” (3). In postmodern cinema, “even the most 
graphic instance of violence [. . .] potentially becomes like any other 
image, homogenized and empty of meaning or seeming originality” (Slo-
cum 21). The assumption that violence is real, or not “really” violent, 
turns on this disappearance of presence; much depends, as U.S. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton notoriously put it in 1998, on what the meaning of is 
is. Clinton’s equivocation did not come as a surprise to Xers. Schooled 
by David Cronenberg’s 1983 Videodrome, which plots how the “real 
violence” on screen (the snuff TV that the protagonist pursues) stages 
the mutation of the human body and of the reality in which it acts, and 
his 1996 film Crash, in which broken human bodies assert the reality of 
staged scenes, Xers are inclined to think the reality of violence is pos-
sibly real, probably faked—the two options are not antithetical—and 
most likely produced for the camera, less of a bedrock of fact than a 
wager of faith. In Bret Easton Ellis’s Less Than Zero, the screening of 
a snuff film produces these avowals: “I bet it’s real. [. . .] It’s gotta be” 
(154, my emphasis)—a protestation of certainty that betrays how, as 
Charney puts it, violence in this period works “to substitute and com-
pensate for an actual presence of presence” (57).
CR IT IQUES  OF  V IOLENCE  ( 1 ) : 
Benjamin and Derrida
What, you may ask, are the stakes of this discussion? Is its author in 
thrall to a fantasy of transformative violence promised by revolution, 
crusade, or jihad? Violence is real; if the reality of violence disappears, 
how is violence to be critiqued? My discussion of the traditions of medi-
ate and immediate violence lingered on the specific challenge each tra-
dition poses to the work of critique. I now turn to Walter Benjamin’s 
seminal 1921 essay “Critique of Violence,” to Jacques Derrida’s influ-
ential reading of this essay in “Force of Law” (1992), and to Giorgio 
Agamben’s discussion of its fundamental stakes for contemporary cul-
ture and politics in State of Exception (2003). Benjamin’s essay has been 
disquieting to many of his readers who see in its final move to “pure” or 
“sovereign” violence an embrace of the absolutist logic that character-
ized Fascism, evidence of immediate violence’s complicity in totalitarian 
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thought and its genocidal effects. The essay has come to represent a limit 
case for thinking on violence; it functions as a cautionary tale by which 
the tragic Jewish philosopher, in thrall to a fantasy of the immediate, 
produced an articulation of violence that replicates the logic of National 
Socialism. I turn to the essay and to Derrida’s influential discussion of 
it in the 1990s to concretize my thinking on violence: the challenges it 
poses to critique, the tendency of violence’s reality to disappear, the role 
of fiction in articulating this reality, and the limits this vanishing poses 
to judgment. Taking my cue from Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou, I 
suggest a new approach to violence and fiction, and to reality and faith. 
For me, that approach must take as its starting point Generation X.
 Written as a thought experiment inspired by Georges Sorel’s Reflec-
tions on Violence, “Critique of Violence” dissects mediate and imme-
diate violence; its goal is to articulate a notion of violence that might 
lay claim to revolutionary force and create, as Sorel imagines violence 
will create, new conditions for existence. The original German (Gewalt) 
weds violence to force, legitimate power, and justified authority, identi-
fying mediate violence as the site from which Benjamin begins his inves-
tigations. Benjamin identifies a circular logic in thinking on violence: 
whether violence is regarded as a fact of nature or a product of history, 
its critique takes the form of what Benjamin calls “this basic dogma: 
just ends can be attained by justified means, justified means used for just 
ends” (278). This tautology dictates discussions of violence and lim-
its such discussions to issues of legitimacy, confining a critique of vio-
lence to the realm of violence’s relation to the legal system, and retains 
violence firmly in the realm of the mediate. Critique (Benjamin means 
examination in the Kantian sense of identifying separations and distinc-
tions, rather than the evaluative sense of passing judgment) is limited 
to determining whether violence by or against the system is justified (by 
the system that, with recourse to legality, determines what is and what is 
not legitimate).
 Unlike Sorel, who speaks of violence as if he knows what it is, Benja-
min does not presume that the object of his investigation is readily avail-
able. Much of his “Critique” reflects on the difficulty violence poses as 
an object of study. Violence, for Benjamin, is hard to find, and he ulti-
mately locates the object of his study in fiction. The question of the cri-
tique of violence, he notes at the outset, is a question of whether the 
means or the ends to which violence is employed are just, that is, autho-
rized as lawful by the state (hence the dominance of state power in his 
discussion). After pressing on the circular logic that the dogma repre-
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sents (“just ends can be attained by justified means, justified means used 
for just ends”), Benjamin aims to exit it: his goal, after all, is to cri-
tique violence, not justice or law. So he moves, in the final pages of the 
essay, to nonmediate or immediate violence. Benjamin articulates two 
types of immediate violence: mythic and divine, or sovereign, violence. 
Mythic violence, illustrated by the Greek myth of Niobe, is, Benjamin 
concludes, deeply vested in causality (what Benjamin calls fate) and judg-
ment. Niobe, condemned for the sin of arrogance, is punished with the 
deaths of her children. Apollo, who would have spared her last son, had 
already loosed the arrow that kills him, and the boy’s death is dictated 
not by divine intention but by natural law (the laws of physics and the 
inevitability of temporal progression that dictated the trajectory of the 
arrow’s flight). This pervasive quality of law in mythic violence renders 
this violence the site of judgment, unveiling and enshrining guilt. Niobe 
is spared, “more guilty than before through the death of the children” 
(“Critique” 295).
 As an illustration of divine violence (and, perhaps, as a paral-
lel to Sorel’s recourse to Christian religious tradition in his reliance on 
accounts of the miracles of the saints), Benjamin turns to the Old Tes-
tament story of the judgment of the company of Korah. Korah and his 
associates attempted to disrupt the hierarchy of desert society, under-
cutting Moses’s privileged relation to God by claiming that God may 
reside in all Israelites—a radical dissemination of divine presence and a 
challenge to the logic of representation that retained a privileged posi-
tion for Moses and his family as sole representatives of God and God’s 
law. The deliberate erasure of the distinction between the law and power 
advocated by Korah (which could also be seen as a dangerous reproduc-
ibility, and dissemination, of the divine) is corrected as God has the earth 
open and swallow the company. The supernatural quality of this vio-
lence underscores how the destruction of Korah is premised on a radical 
refusal of natural law (this is what Benjamin means by it being “blood-
less” [297]). If Apollo’s arrow was subject to a law that exceeded the 
god’s intention, the God that strikes Korah manifests as pure power, dis-
tinct from the law and from justice as dispensed by law. The violence 
“strikes privileged Levites, strikes them without warning, without threat, 
and does not stop short of annihilation. But in annihilating it also expi-
ates” (297). In contrast to Niobe, who remains as an emblem of guilt, 
“more guilty than before,” Korah, expiated, disappears. Divine violence 
without law (and thus without justice or guilt), is, for Benjamin, pure or 
“sovereign”: violence unavailable to judgment, that establishes the real 
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without legislating it, and that is extracted from the logic of ends and 
means that governs mediate violence. Benjamin describes this violence 
in terms of the groundless image, one detached from causality and refer-
ence: it is “the sign and seal but never the means of sacred execution” 
(300).16
 Such an approach to violence is not without risks. In “Force of Law: 
The ‘Mystical Foundations of Authority,’” Derrida dwelt on those risks. 
The essay was first delivered as a lecture at Cardozo School of Law in 
New York City in 1989—soon after the revelations, in 1987, surround-
ing Paul de Man’s World War II journalism, revelations that elicited 
much soul-searching in academia about the ethics of deconstruction—
and participates in a movement, prominent in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
within literary criticism to articulate the relation of the present to violent, 
traumatic history. The essay’s published form in 1992—coincident with 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub’s seminal book Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing, in which the de Man scandal also plays a significant role—
remains a very loving reading of Benjamin’s “Critique.” But it includes a 
postscript in which Derrida parts ways with Benjamin, evoking Nazism 
and the Final Solution as the point at which Benjamin’s essay makes 
available “a temptation to think the holocaust as an uninterpretable 
manifestation of divine violence” (62).17
 Derrida’s departure from Benjamin is couched as a series of inter-
secting concerns about violence, mimesis, and affect. The problem with 
“Critique of Violence,” according to Derrida, is that it may be, or may 
be made to be, “about” the Holocaust, and the potential of this simi-
larity produces a reading (or interpretation) of history that he finds 
unbearable. “When one thinks of the gas chambers and the cremation 
ovens, this allusion to an extermination that would be expiatory because 
 16. Put differently: violence rules. Generation X is well positioned to consider the 
implications of sovereign violence—violence that rules, with no specification as to what 
violence rules over. According to The Oxford English Dictionary, the first application 
of the intransitive verb “rules” to a specified activity or object (i.e., not a person) is 
in 1981 (“Rules”). Xer Mike Judge’s popular animated show “Beavis and Butt-head,” 
which aired on television between 1993 and 1997, appropriated the intransitive verbs 
“rules” and “sucks” as aesthetic criteria with which to rate music videos.
 17. Derrida’s reading of Benjamin has been authoritative (though Beatrice Hanssen 
seems to wish to distance herself from it). Hanssen, who notes that Benjamin is think-
ing about the logic of means to ends and trying to think of violence in terms of pure 
means, concludes that Benjamin’s essay “fell short of providing an incisive differentiation 
between just and unjust uses of violence, and therefore, in the final analysis, of offering 
a credible critique of violence” (23). I discuss the function, in critique, of credulity—or 
faith—in the following section.
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bloodless must cause one to shudder. One is terrified at the idea of an 
interpretation that would make of the holocaust an expiation and an 
indecipherable signature of the just and violent anger of God” (62). 
In the wake of the Holocaust—of any holocaust—only one reading is 
appropriate: one that is affectively laden, that causes shuddering and ter-
ror. Within these affects inhere assumptions about judgment, representa-
tion, and action. Derrida is concerned with the possibility that through 
interpretation, the unjustifiable may be justified—the immediate may 
enter the realm of the mediate, and function as a means to (unaccept-
able) ends. Or, more precisely, it may look like what it shouldn’t: the 
text, Derrida writes, “seems to me finally to resemble too closely, to the 
point of specular fascination and vertigo, the very thing against which 
one must act and think, do and speak” (62; emphasis mine).18 I linger 
on Derrida’s reading of Benjamin because its assumptions about mimesis 
and affect, its impulse toward action (thinking, doing, speaking), and its 
reliance on the empirical validity of historical violence (emblematized by 
the Holocaust) evokes the logic by which critiquing immediate violence 
folds it into mediate violence and makes it disappear (this logic trapped 
LaCapra, too). Generation X puts this logic to question, and offers a 
way out.
 Derrida’s instantiation of genocide as a limit case for thinking about 
violence reverberates with the debates about the ethics of Holocaust rep-
resentation, and the complexities of memory, in the 1980s (especially 
after the airing of the NBC television miniseries Holocaust in 1978) 
and 1990s (especially after the 1993 Hollywood blockbuster Schindler’s 
List). Both Holocaust and Schindler’s List represented a “mainstream-
ing” of an atrocity urgently designated, in the developing discipline of 
Holocaust Studies and by such as survivor-spokesman Elie Wiesel, to 
be unspeakable. The Holocaust’s formal induction into popular culture 
was accompanied by much debate about the ethics of memory and of 
representation—echoed in the Historians’ Debate in Germany—discus-
sions that revolved around how these events would figure for future gen-
 18. Derrida’s turn to history (which is also a turn to politics and a critique of state 
power) is especially striking because Benjamin has, at this point in his essay, abandoned 
the sociopolitical realm. Though Benjamin briefly cites the image of an angry man as an 
example of immediate violence, and offers “the educative power” as an example of di-
vine violence (a point noticed by Redding), it is fiction—Hellenic and Hebraic myth—to 
which he turns to articulate the tricky concept of immediate violence. Derrida finds this 
turn to fiction disquieting: he evokes history—as Holocaust—to counter it. Though I am, 
of course, sympathetic to the impetus behind Derrida’s gesture, I linger on Benjamin’s 
move to myth because it hints at the power of fiction in thinking on immediate violence.
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erations (read: Generation X). In the course of these discussions, and in 
the wake of the de Man scandal, the Holocaust figured as a definitive 
real violence, an absolute evil, one irreconcilable with ethical relativ-
ism or constructivist theory, a forbidding warning to postmodern play, a 
uniquely unarguable—because uniquely and unarguably violent—reality.
 Precisely because Xers are acutely attuned to the constructed nature 
of causality, the vagaries of justice, and the production of real violence 
for stage and screen; because of their acquaintance with confession 
culture, wound culture, and reality TV; and because of their aware-
ness of the inevitability of complicity in acting, thinking, and speak-
ing, they cannot hold to the assumptions about history, about justice, 
about trauma, and about reality that informed Derrida’s reservations 
about “Critique of Violence” (reservations that were echoed in subse-
quent work on Benjamin by Martin Jay, LaCapra, and Hanssen). Der-
rida’s “specular fascination,” and the challenge it poses to action, are, 
for Generation X, a starting point, not a limit case; as for Video Back-
packer in Slackers, specular fascination is something to be embraced, 
not eschewed. The slacker is unlikely to care about what may lie beyond 
representation’s limits; she is more inclined toward situational ethics 
than the ineffable, and is notoriously unconcerned with history. “Gen-
eration Xers possess a media literacy which allows a celebration of an 
investment in the image that is not linked to the real,” proclaims Xer 
Tara Brabazon (21). She continues to reflect on the implications of this 
detachment of the real from judgment: “Good Guys and Bad Guys no 
longer wear white and black hats. They look the same. Both use vio-
lence. Both justify the use of violence through religion” (28). She con-
cludes by relinquishing the distinctions that violence and judgment are 
evoked to establish: “If any collective or community offers potential to 
be subjected to the vagaries of fact and fiction, truth and ideology, then 
it is Generation X” (55).
NOTH ING TO  BEL I EVE  IN
Dangerous relativism? No doubt, though to be dangerous, relativism 
must maintain a firm faith in the boundaries it aims to transgress. For a 
generation with nothing but faith in nothing, it is precisely faith—fidel-
ity—that comes to the fore in understanding the relation of truth to 
fiction after the spectacular detachment of violence from the real. Espe-
cially after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, both accounts of 
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disaster that call on fiction to validate experience (“it was just like in 
the movies”) and the more cerebral responses that urge us to safeguard 
violence from fiction testify to how violence renders reality precari-
ous. The truth that violence is called upon to make presents as mobile, 
nomadic, a question of verification, attribution, and attitude. I use the 
term fidelity to describe this question and the work it asks us to do. In 
keeping with this book’s self-description as a form of theft, I appropri-
ate for this term its connotations of faith and trust (phenomenal, eco-
nomic, and interpersonal). I also borrow from Alain Badiou’s work on 
the subject. Badiou distinguishes the object of fidelity from knowledge, 
dissociates fidelity from conventional thinking on ethics, subjectivity, 
and religion, and posits truth as the product, not the object, of a “pro-
cedure” of fidelity. Because Generation X is so frequently characterized 
as the generation with no cause to fight for, nothing to believe in, the 
concept of fidelity is crucial to understanding how X rewrites the rela-
tion of violence to the real.
 As a genre with particular claims on the contemporary, the novel’s 
specific brand of realism is dictated by fidelity. Writing of the genre’s 
inception in his study of Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding, Ian Watt 
states, “the novel’s primary task is to convey the impression of fidel-
ity to human experience” (13). With the development of postmod-
ernism, this impetus to fidelity has only come more starkly into view. 
Precisely because of violence’s inarguable facticity, fiction is enjoined 
to evince a particular kind of fidelity: it must, paradoxically, be true. 
“History is the record of real human action and suffering, and is not to 
be tampered with lightly,” writes Brian McHale in Postmodernist Fic-
tion (emphasis mine); departing from the historical record is commonly 
conceived of as “a betrayal” (96). When postmodernism meets fiction, 
“history and fiction exchange places, history becoming fictional and fic-
tion becoming ‘true’ history—and the real world seems to get lost in the 
shuffle” (96). McHale’s phrasing is a relatively mild articulation of the 
sense that fiction about violent events must be true to the known facts 
of those events. The violence of history, the record of atrocity, terror, 
genocide or abuse, commonly calls a halt to simulation, imagination, 
and fiction. In the 1960s and 1970s, postmodern texts that dealt with 
vast and violent historical events acceded to this logic by figuring vio-
lence and disaster as the limit case of discourse—what I have elsewhere 
described as the unspeakable (Against the Unspeakable). In her study 
of the figuration of history by postmodern texts, Amy Elias has pointed 
out that postmodernism is modeled on “a post-traumatic consciousness 
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that redefines positivist or stadialist history as the historical sublime, 
a desired horizon that can never be reached but only approached in 
attempts to understand human origins and the meaning of lived exis-
tence” (xviii). The breakage of the frame associated with postmod-
ernism, its distrust of certitude and coherence, is ultimately a gesture 
of fidelity to an unspeakable, unknowable history that must not be 
betrayed, a gesture that underscores the incommensurability of vast his-
torical violence to the world in which these texts are written and read. 
(Elias notes a decrease in postmodern literary experimentation after the 
1980s, possibly because of increased political conservatism with the rise 
of Reagan and Thatcher, and possibly because of a decrease in faith in 
the ethical and politically redemptive possibilities of experimental nar-
rative form [75].)
 We should reflect on this gesture of fidelity, the urgency with which 
it signals, and the subject and object it presupposes, in order to chart 
how Generation X, that faithless crew, figures the relation of violence 
to reality in its absence. Both injunctions to historical accuracy and 
gestures toward the limits of comprehension locate “real violence” in 
the realm of the unspeakable. But what lies beyond the limits of lan-
guage is a vast, uncharted space; to locate historical certainty there is a 
supreme act of faith in our powers of orientation. When Saul Friedlän-
der writes, in his introduction to the influential 1992 collection of 
essays on Holocaust aesthetics, Probing the Limits of Representation, 
“one cannot define exactly what is wrong with a certain representation 
of the events, but [. . .] one senses when some interpretation or repre-
sentation is wrong” (3–4; emphasis mine), he presumes an affective, 
sensitive subject as the site for the determination of what is historically 
accurate and aesthetically sound, a subject that, like Derrida’s, “shud-
ders,” and does so in all the right places.19 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
when Generation X’s reputation as uncaring, unschooled, irresponsible, 
and violent was becoming established (Howe and Strauss extensively, 
and indignantly, document this reputation in 1993), the ethics of this 
subject are of no small concern, and much is made of her responsibili-
ties to the past, to history, and to the reality of violence. Studies of wit-
ness, testimony, trauma, and ethics in this period evinced what Amy 
Hungerford (Holocaust of Texts) has called a logic of personification, 
according to which texts are treated like people, with urgent injunc-
 19. Derrida’s “Force of Law” was part of a 1990 colloquium organized by Friedlän-
der on the subject of his 1992 edited volume, Probing the Limits of Representation: 
Nazism and the “Final Solution” (Cornell, Rosenfeld, and Carlson 3).
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tions toward memory and care—an extension of ethics from relations 
between people, to people’s relations to texts, to history, to the real. 
Hungerford is quite critical of this logic, which valorizes fidelity to the 
facts of extreme historical violence. If facts are elided, forgotten, dis-
missed or denied, this erasure of the historical comes to stand for an 
erasure of the personal, as if to miscount, or discount, the victims mur-
ders them all over again. Fidelity to the unspeakable ensures that his-
tory’s violence is both factually registered and affectively charged and 
guides us to the “right,” and responsible, readings of silence.
 For Xers, whose adult finances coincided with the establishment of 
the concept of the credit default swap (CDS) in the 1990s and who saw 
401(k)s diminish when Enron filed for bankruptcy in 2001, “fidelity’s 
just the name of a discount brokerage house.” This statement is spoken 
by arch-plotter Bernard Melman—possibly a figure for Bernard (Bernie) 
Madoff—in Jay McInerney’s novel Brightness Falls (168), which sets 
the stock market crash of 1987 and the AIDS crisis in a context of mari-
tal and professional infidelity. Like marriage and monetary trust, reli-
gious faith, for Xers, is predicated on incoherence and uncertainty and 
colored by irony.20 In Finding Faith: The Spiritual Quest of the Post-
Boomer Generation, Richard W. Flory and Donald E. Miller write of 
Xers that “there seem to no longer be any universal truths [. . .]. [W]hat 
is true for one person may not be true for another, and it is all based 
on one’s own experiences, whether through religion, lifestyle, ethnicity, 
or ‘whatever’” (10). In Virtual Faith, self-identified Xer Tom Beaudoin 
advocates “seriously attending to the revelatory significance of hesita-
tion, ambiguity, ambivalence, and instability in the lives (and faith expe-
riences) of many Xers” (141). “Xers have a sense of self that, in its 
fragmentation, simulates the real, undivided self that we were assumed 
to have,” he writes (140). Such an approach to faith eschews any easy 
distinction between love and violence, fidelity and revolution. Cultural 
atomism and isolation drive Xers to violence as an expression of fidel-
ity: they marry the sign to the somatic with piercings and tattoos. “In 
a sense,” Beaudoin writes, “these bodily incisions love our bodies (and 
there is a great confusion between body and self) unconditionally. They 
will never leave, which is blessed assurance for our abandoned genera-
tion” (141). Violence as an expression of fidelity found another form in 
 20. This refusal of faith has characterized Generation X since its inception. Ham-
blett and Deverson’s Generation X concludes, with fifteen-year-old Michael Jacobs, “we 
have done away with God and yet have found no suitable replacement” (191).
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 A N  X  C R I T I Q U E  O F  V I O L E N C E  /  7 1
the explosion of Christian rock music in the 1990s, and churches soon 
saw the utility of harnessing the oppositional ethos of this music as a 
recruitment tool to undo the damage done by sex scandals surrounding 
televangelists like Jim and Tammy Bakker, media events that illustrated, 
for Xers, “the failure and hypocrisy of corporate, political, and religious 
institutions to act ethically,” a failure that resulted in widespread “dis-
trust and cynicism of large-scale institutions” (Flory and Miller 9).
 But fidelity is not solely the realm of finance and religion. Faith 
underwrites truth claims, and “much depends,” writes Barbara Herrn-
stein Smith in Scandalous Knowledge: Science, Truth and the Human, 
“on an untroubled faith in the simplicity and stability of truth” (36). 
Herrnstein Smith’s reference to faith is of a piece with the terminology 
of dogmatism and orthodoxies with which her argument’s contempo-
rary stakes are defined. “The charge of ‘postmodern relativism,’” Her-
rnstein Smith concludes, “when directed at those pursuing unorthodox 
lines of thought in epistemology, ethics and social and political theory, 
operates by the same rhetorical and institutional mechanisms as did 
the charges of cynicism, materialism and nihilism directed in the past 
(and, in some places, still) at secular, naturalistic challenges to received 
theological-humanistic accounts of the human. [It is] A scapegoat label” 
(38–39). Xers witnessed the holy wars of these epistemological debates. 
Precisely because it is so irreverent, taking Generation X as our starting 
point for thinking about the relation of violence to the real exposes the 
work that fidelity performs in writing this relation and in constructing 
the subject that defines itself accordingly.
 Though its impact on Anglo philosophy was not to be evident until 
over a decade later, Alain Badiou’s Being and Event, published in France 
in 1986, recaptured fidelity as a philosophical paradigm. Fidelity does 
not exist in and of itself, argues Badiou. Its presence or absence can’t be 
verified. Rather, fidelity can be identified only in what it produces, and 
what it produces is truth. Thus, in a decisive break from the religious 
tradition, Badiou reverses the relation of fidelity to truth: not an eternal 
beacon or fundamental ground accessed by faith, not an object toward 
which the subject yearns, truth, for Badiou, is the product of what he 
calls a “procedure of fidelity” (Being 335). In other words: counter to 
established notions of faith as a pre-existing quality, possessed by the 
subject, that maintains a subject’s integrity through a variety of situa-
tions, Badiou puts fidelity under the sign of the modernist erasure of pres-
ence. “There is no general faithful disposition,” he emphasizes; fidelity 
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is not an effect of mimesis or the manifestation of a person’s unswerving 
faith in a god, ideal, or ism; it is, simply, “a functional relation to the 
event” (Being 233).21
 Hypercritical, affectless Xers, for whom violence is real, reality is fic-
tion, the body intersects with its image, and affective certainty is absent 
or disappeared, have much to gain from considering the theory of fidel-
ity elaborated here, not least because of the version of the subject that 
informs this approach. Drawing on mathematics as well as philosophy, 
Badiou posits a subject that is not affectively impacted; in other words, 
a subject that is neither a physical body, nor a subject in the tradition-
ally psychological sense. Such a subject, because it is not identified with 
a coherent body or psyche that can be violated or traumatized, offers an 
approach to violence from which the implicit moralization of affect—
feeling or sensing what’s wrong—is, in essence, subtracted. Furthermore, 
because Badiou divests fidelity of religious belief, his approach sets the 
stage for an articulation of contingent affiliations and alliances.
 In his more accessible Ethics, Badiou expresses the stakes of this 
work for the decades in which Xers came of age. Written in the 1990s, 
Ethics was, Badiou reflects, “driven by a genuine fury. The world was 
deeply plunged in ‘ethical’ delirium. Everyone was busily confusing pol-
itics with the hypocrisy of a mindless catechism. [. . .] The presumed 
‘rights of man’ were serving at every point to annihilate any attempt to 
invent forms of free thought” (liii). This confusion is an expression of 
what Badiou calls the ideology of human rights, which rallies around 
the image of the victimized human body to demand, in terms weighted 
with moral urgency, action that is assumed to be ethical, but that, in 
fact, prohibits new kinds of knowledge by urgent invocations of right, 
wrong, and the reality of violence. Rather than a moral gathering around 
the rights of human being conceived as the victim of violence, Badiou 
demands, in Ethics, a return to the antihumanist projects of Foucault, 
Althusser, and Lacan, and proposes an alternative conception of ethics, 
defined by mobility (the maxim “Keep going!”) and characterized by per-
sistence in a hypercritical stance and affective detachment (réserve) (Eth-
ics 91). For Generation X, the attractions of this approach hardly need to 
be spelled out.22
 21. An event, according to Badiou, exceeds the multiple situations that humans find 
themselves in. Fidelity describes a relation to this event that forms and re-forms someone 
into a subject. I return to Badiou, and his thinking on the event, fidelity, and ethics, in 
chapter 5.
 22. Nonetheless, I spell them out in chapter 5. “Not Yes or No: Fact, Fiction, Fidelity 
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CR I T IQUES  OF  V IOLENCE  ( 2 ) : 
Agamben
We are not yet done with “Critique of Violence.” Agamben revisits 
Benjamin’s essay in his 2003 State of Exception. Writing with a sense 
of urgency propelled by the instantiation of the USA Patriot Act and 
the authorization, by President G. W. Bush, of indefinite detention in 
2001, haunted by a history of totalitarianism in Europe and by the 
Nazi genocide, Agamben attempts to articulate the relation of law to 
life, and locates at the heart of this attempt the dialogue between the 
Jewish philosopher Walter Benjamin and the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt 
on the nature of anomie—the zone outside of language or law. Ben-
jamin’s “Critique of Violence,” Agamben writes, aims “to ensure the 
possibility of a violence [. . .] that lies absolutely ‘outside’ (außerhalb) 
and ‘beyond’ (jenseits) the law. [. . .] The task of Benjamin’s critique 
is to prove the reality (Bestand) of such a violence” (53). Agamben’s 
characterization of Benjamin’s essay underscores what is at issue in any 
critique of violence: the reality that violence claims or is claimed by, the 
reality that violence is leveled against or that it brings about. How can 
this reality be accessed by critique?
 Agamben mentions Derrida’s “Force of Law” only briefly (37), treat-
ing its title as an opportunity to articulate the state of exception as “the 
separation of ‘force of law’ from the law” (38)—what Agamben calls 
‘force-of-law.’ He writes: “Such a ‘force-of-law,’ in which potentiality 
and act are radically separated, is certainly something like a mystical ele-
ment, or rather a fictio by means of which law seeks to annex anomie” 
(38–39). Agamben’s term fictio is significant, and I turn to it below. First 
I note his staging of the issue through the conversation between Benja-
min and Schmitt in their publications in the 1920s, a conversation that 
continued, after Benjamin committed suicide in 1940 while attempting to 
escape the Nazis, in Schmitt’s citations and references to Benjamin in his 
published work and correspondence.23
 Agamben approaches this material with a focus on Benjamin’s and 
Schmitt’s reflections on the relation of violence to law (remember: law 
is the realm of mediate violence). Schmitt, Agamben argues, is attempt-
in Jonathan Safran Foer” returns to Badiou’s thinking on the event to pursue this argu-
ment’s philosophical and ethical stakes.
 23. For an account of the Benjamin–Schmitt dialogue, see Bredekamp. The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy offers a good account of the controversy surrounding 
Schmitt’s legacy [“Carl Schmitt”]).
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ing to appropriate the immediate violence (or anomie) that Benjamin’s 
essay articulates. In other words, Schmitt studied the logic that trapped 
LaCapra and Derrida, by which any attempt to critique immediate vio-
lence folds it into the mediate, names it as fantasy, fable, or falsehood. 
Schmitt, Agamben concludes, tried to capture anomie with law and 
inscribe it within the juridical (55). But note the imagery in which Agam-
ben’s work on anomie is couched: immediate violence is real; inscribing 
it turns it into fiction. Distinguishing between Benjamin’s “real” state of 
exception (57–58) and Schmitt’s “fictitious” one (59), Agamben stresses 
the “pure violence” that Benjamin articulates: pure violence refers to 
human action that is extraneous to the law, that neither makes law nor 
preserves it, that is neither end nor means, that is, indeed, unavailable 
to the logic of mediation. At issue (and here is where Agamben’s cri-
tique of violence intersects with my own) is not only the distinction of 
reality from fiction but the question of whether violence can be assured 
an existence outside the law—that is, outside the realm of the mediate 
that folds immediate violence into the logic of the mediate, that wor-
ries about the ends to which it serves as a means, and by thus worry-
ing makes it disappear. In Benjamin and Schmitt’s dialogue Agamben 
sees the ultimate stakes of Western politics and metaphysics, stakes that 
are, importantly, imaged in terms of language and of presence. “Pure 
violence as the extreme political object, as the ‘thing’ of politics, is the 
counterpart to pure being, to pure existence as the ultimate metaphysi-
cal stakes; the strategy of the exception, which must ensure the relation 
between anomic violence and law, is the counterpart to the onto-theo-
logical strategy aimed at capturing pure being in the meshes of the logos” 
(60). At this point of his argument, as if startled by its extreme level of 
abstraction, Agamben offers this concrete analogy: the relation of law to 
anomie is like the relation of language to its limits, a relation on which 
real life depends. “Everything happens as if both law and logos needed 
an anomic (or alogical) zone of suspension in order to ground their ref-
erence to the world of life. Law seems able to subsist only by capturing 
anomie, just as language can subsist only by grasping the nonlinguistic 
(60; emphasis mine).24
 24. Agamben often turns to language in State of Exception to underscore his study’s 
metaphysical stakes. In a digression that reflects on this methodological tendency, Agam-
ben reflects that “not only language and law but all social institutions have been formed 
through a process of desemanticization and suspension of concrete praxis in its immedi-
ate reference to the real. [. . .] The floating signifier—this guiding concept in the human 
sciences of the twentieth century—corresponds to the state of exception in which the 
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 In the course of State of Exception, this analogy of law and language 
will solidify into a concern with fiction. Pure violence, Agamben will 
conclude, is bound to law by fiction, a term that appears seven times in 
the short book’s final pages (86–88). “Fiction,” for Agamben, under-
scores a departure from the brute facticity of bare life and illustrates 
the essentially fabricated or constructed nature of power. The state of 
exception, he writes, “is founded on the essential fiction according to 
which anomie [. . .] is still related to the juridical order and the power 
to suspend the norm has an immediate hold on life. As long as the two 
elements remain correlated yet conceptually, temporally, and subjectively 
distinct [. . .] their dialectic—though founded on a fiction—can neverthe-
less function in some way. But [. . .] when the state of exception, in which 
they are bound and blurred together, becomes the rule, then the juridico-
political system transforms itself into a killing machine” (86; emphasis 
mine). The ultimate aim of State of Exception, Agamben concludes, is to 
make this fiction evident, “to bring to light the fiction that governs this 
arcanum imperii [secret of power] par excellence of our time” (86); “Life 
and law, anomie and nomos [. . .] result from the fracture of something 
to which we have no other access than through the fiction of their articu-
lation and the patient work that, by unmasking this fiction, separates 
what it had claimed to unite” (88). Only thus, he stresses, can new con-
ditions for existence be forged.
 But how? And by whom? Throughout this discussion, I have held 
to this Generation X stereotype: “slackers, emotionally and intellectu-
ally stagnant and vapid, apathetic, brainwashed creations of popular cul-
ture” (Grassian 14). I do not propose that beneath this stereotype lurks 
an as-yet-untapped resource for transformative ethics. Instead, I propose 
to embrace it, to think of violence after—that is, according to—Genera-
tion X. The generation with no cause to fight for, with nothing to believe 
in, is uniquely able to articulate, as Agamben urges us to, the fiction that 
forms our world.
norm is in force without being applied” (37). Discussing the concept of “pure violence” 
that Benjamin advances in “Critique of Violence,” Agamben turns to Benjamin’s writing 
on language—in his 1931 essay on Karl Kraus—finding there a useful parallel to a tricky 
concept: “Just as pure language is not another language, just as it does not have a place 
other than that of the natural communicative languages, but reveals itself in these by ex-
posing them as such, so pure violence is attested to only as the exposure and deposition 
of the relation between violence and law” (62).
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NEVERMIND
The genocides and horrors of the twentieth century, the spectacular 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City that ushered in the 
twenty-first century, seem to call a halt to any easy equation of violence 
and fiction, as does the evidence of more private, pervasive violence on 
broken bodies, economies, ecosystems, and psyches. Together with reli-
gious extremism and patriotic fervor, fidelity’s most murderous manifes-
tations, this history reminds us that violence is real. And yet: as reality 
is mediated, digitized, disseminated in information and reconfigured as 
connectivity, its relation to violence needs to be examined, as does the 
role of violence in establishing reality, the role of reality in designating 
“violence,” and the utility of the distinction of reality from fiction in the 
discussions that violence incites us to have. Precisely because violence is 
real, we might more usefully turn our attention to the forms this reality 
takes: it is the product of the work of molding, making, and forming in 
the Latin root fictio, the blurring of politics and bare life that transforms 
the state into a killing machine, and the tradition of prose narrative asso-
ciated with the rise of literary realism in Boswell and Johnson’s time, 
a tradition that, in the 1990s (as Xers were nearing maturity) reached 
what Joseph Tabbi calls “a crisis of reference and representation” (208).
 Crises are traditionally resolved with judgment. Judgment dis-
tinguishes truth from lies, reality from fiction. It demarcates zones of 
agency, imputes culpability, nominates perpetrators and victims, and 
closes the book. And yet, as Agamben makes clear, judgment is the realm 
of law, of language; its claims to power are, quite literally, fictitious. For 
Xers, attuned to the construction of cause-and-effect, schooled in the 
media circus, justice presents as written by history, under the sign of the 
victors or the powerful; guilt and innocence are not stable categories, 
nor are they atemporal or absolute. Video Backpacker put it best: “I was 
seeing it for real but it just wasn’t right.” What’s real and what’s right 
do not coincide for Xers. Precisely because of the discourse of threat, 
fear, and menace that surrounds them, X marks the spot of multiple col-
lapse: not only of such fundamental distinctions as reality from fiction, 
immediate sensation and mediated image, but of the categories that rely 
on them: prosecutor from defendant, real from right, right from wrong. 
For a generation that expects, even demands, to rewind, the idea that 
violence must align with sensation, precede critique, and dictate (just 
and righteous) action seems, at best, misguided. Victim and perpetra-
tor intersect; X icon Kurt Cobain’s suicide, both an expression of gen-
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erational malaise and an act of self-inflicted violence, imaged as “the 
bullet that shot through a generation,” posited X as its own victim/exe-
cutioner.25 Like Cobain, the rapper, the suicide bomber: both predator 
and prey, violence’s agent and object, X offers a perspective on violence 
that is, crucially, divested from sensemaking mechanisms. The slacker 
is disinclined to fold the immediate into the mediate and make it disap-
pear. Anomic, affectless, alyxithymic, a product of “a culture that has 
the unique distinction of being both hyper- and anaesthetic at the same 
time,” as Joel Black writes of the 1980s (3), she is also disinclined to 
care about such work.
 This is not to say that the very real questions that violence poses do 
not still resonate in politics, culture, and society today. These questions 
are familiar. They go like this: How do we distinguish real-world, bodily 
violence from violence that is fantasized, fictional, fake? How must we 
mobilize to safeguard the oppressed, without perpetrating further the 
damage wrought by centuries of hegemony? How can we respond, with 
appropriate affect, to images that teach to titillate? How do we oppose 
symbols and words that affirm and disown a history of oppression? 
To these questions, vibrant with urgency, freighted with weight, reso-
nant with the horror that the questioner may be herself complicit in the 
very violence she so fervently wishes to end, the preceding pages have 
attempted to outline an alternative: an X critique of violence.
 An X critique of violence expects us to eschew those familiar, ethics-
laden verbs—distinguish, mobilize, respond, oppose, end. With causal-
ity, judgment, and faith Xed out, the generation with no cause or credo 
offers an exercise in subtraction: of affect from the unspeakable, of judg-
ment from representation, of urgency from the distinction of fiction 
from fact. Tarry in the noncommittal, withhold judgment, do so without 
recourse to the promise of future justice or immediate affective response-
ability. Rewind and witness, in your mind’s eye, Johnson’s foot abandon 
the stone. Forsake faith, not only in an ideal or a cause or a metajuridical 
outcome but in the perceiver’s ability to feel her way or to “sense” what’s 
“wrong,” pause, and abide, like Clay in the final lines of Less Than 
Zero, in the flickering light of the unmoored images that orient without 
reference. In their bleak light, know only this: violence is real. Or is it? 
Minus affect, judgment, and urgency, in a world where disinformation is 
its own, privileged kind of knowledge, the reality of violence becomes a 
 25. Wurtzel and Delvaux both cite the phrase “the bullet that shot through a genera-
tion,” ascribing it to Newsweek’s coverage of Cobain’s suicide.
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test of faith, a test that Xers will resolutely fail. Violence is real. But its 
reality, while hard, is also hard to find. Is it real? Does it matter? What 
difference does it make? At this point, Ground Zero of the twenty-first 
century, X changes the channel. X quits the program. X answers, “what-
ever.” X says: Nevermind.
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“People are afraid to merge on freeways in Los Angeles.” Thus begins 
Less Than Zero, Bret Easton Ellis’s iconic novel from 1985. Like driv-
ing (its isolation, its dangers, its perpetual objectlessness) and free-
ways—the habits and hazards of unlimited freedom—the fear of 
merging speaks directly to the atomism and loneliness that pervade the 
scene of young, hyperprivileged, disaffected college students who drift 
aimlessly from party to party, in and out of each other’s beds, toward 
and away from the desert, toward and away from the beach. In keeping 
with the novel’s title, the opening paragraph proceeds through a series 
of “nots”—narration by subtraction. Reflecting on his friend Blair’s 
statement that people are afraid to merge, Clay, the narrator, feels that 
nothing else seems to matter: “not the fact that I’m eighteen [. . .] not 
the mud that spattered on my jeans in New Hampshire [. . .] not the 
stain on the arm of my shirt [. . .] not the tear at the neck of my grey 
argyle vest [. . .]. All it comes down to is that I’m a boy coming home 
for a month and meeting someone whom I haven’t seen for four months 
and people are afraid to merge” (9–10).
 Clay is alienated—a Holden Caulfield for the ’80s. His sense of iso-
lation concretizes the more general isolation represented by the novel’s 
7 9
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opening sentence. But even though it’s all it comes down to, the fear of 
merging gives way—it doesn’t matter, or it matters less—in light of Clay 
and Blair’s friend Muriel’s anorexia. “It seems easier to hear that people 
are afraid to merge rather than ‘I’m pretty sure Muriel is anorexic,’” 
he reflects (9). Both resistant to the dictate to be thin, fragile, and in 
control, and complicit in a society determined and driven by image, 
anorexia is an embodiment of the image: an inscription, on the body, 
of the dictate of subtraction. The series of “nots” that compose the 
opening paragraph point to more conceptual subtractions. Clay’s sense 
of being out of place (his clothes, and especially his vest, feel “vaguely 
eastern” compared with Blair’s outfit) falls away in the light of “people 
are afraid to merge.” The fear of merging falls away when confronted 
by the reference to anorexia. The reference to anorexia is qualified or 
uncertain—Blair is only pretty sure Muriel is anorexic, and Muriel’s 
thinness may well be the product of drug use. At the vanishing-point of 
these subtractions is “Disappear Here.” Clay first sees the phrase on a 
billboard, and, like “people are afraid to merge,” the image of Muriel 
shooting up, and the sound of her wordless screams, “Disappear Here” 
echoes through the book.
 But it is Clay’s vest, with its red diamond pattern, that sets the stakes 
for this chapter’s discussion of violence and representation in fiction 
between 1985 and 2010. When Clay and Muriel meet at a party, she 
is immediately enamored of the vest. “It looks like you got stabbed or 
something,” says Muriel, “please let me wear it” (82). What’s attractive 
about this vest is not its preppy pattern or its chic ghoulishness but its 
image of a wound. In Less Than Zero’s culture of excess, signs of visceral 
immediacy are scarce commodities. Clay gives his vest to Muriel because 
he’s “too tired to say no” and proceeds into a world of sex, drugs, clubs, 
television, and violence: a snuff film, a dead body in an alley, a young girl 
tied to a bedpost and gang-raped. In this world, signifiers are detachable 
and substitutable; emotions are displaced or misplaced. Like the other 
characters, who can’t keep track of who is sleeping with whom, who 
interrupt a night of clubbing to cry for no reason, and who perpetu-
ally counter each other with shibboleths like “what do you do?” “what’s 
going on?” and “wonder if he’s for sale,” Clay wanders toward and 
away from the land’s end (the phrase refers to the beach, to a club, and, 
of course, to Los Angeles) before subtracting himself from the scene of 
the novel and returning to college and the East. Before he does he returns 
to the party house to reclaim his vest. He finds it in a pile of abandoned 
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clothing by a wall where someone has written the alphabet with the let-
ters out of order. Outside, by the pool, Muriel is still screaming (149).
 Due to Ellis’s immense popularity and Brat Pack marketability in the 
mid-1980s, Less Than Zero was immediately optioned for film, and the 
adaptation was released in 1987. Muriel doesn’t appear in the film, but 
Clay’s vest does: adapted to a white silk shirt with what looks like a 
blood-spatter over the heart that is worn by the character of his friend 
Julian (played by Robert Downey Jr.). In the novel, Julian’s descent into 
prostitution and addiction was more or less dispassionately observed 
by Clay; in the film, Clay and Blair try hard to save Julian before he 
dies from an overdose in the desert outside of Palm Springs. Julian’s 
character, his death, and the adaptation set the scene for Ellis’s 2010 
novel Imperial Bedrooms, which revisits the characters from Less Than 
Zero. “They had made a movie about us,” Imperial Bedrooms begins 
(3), and Clay, now a screenwriter, recalls the screening of the film in 
1987: “In the book Julian Wells lived but in the movie’s new scenario 
he had to die. He had to be punished for all of his sins. That’s what the 
movie demanded. (Later, as a screenwriter, I learned it’s what all movies 
demanded.)” (8). Imperial Bedrooms goes on to recount what happened 
to the “real” Julian Wells:
The real Julian Wells didn’t die in a cherry-red convertible, overdosing 
on a highway in Joshua Tree while a choir soared over the sound track. 
The real Julian Wells was murdered over twenty years later, his body 
dumped behind an abandoned apartment building in Los Feliz after 
he had been tortured to death at another location. [. . .] His body was 
discovered by a group of kids who went to CalArts and were cruising 
through the streets off of Hillhurst in a convertible BMW looking for 
a parking space. When they saw the body they thought the “thing” 
lying by a trash bin was—and I’m quoting the first Los Angeles Times 
article on the front page of the California section about the Julian Wells 
murder—“a flag.” (9–10)
 In the 1985 novel, Clay’s vest was detached not only from the body 
but from affect. Its promise to impart visceral urgency to the psychic 
wound was unfulfilled. The film restored the signifying function (the 
white shirt Julian wears that signals his punishment or sacrifice) and 
appropriated the sign of the wound for the purposes of judgment and 
justice—not out of affirmation of these values but because of the logic 
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of images represented by cinema: “it’s what all movies demanded.” To 
these demands Ellis’s 2010 novel responds with the image of an American 
flag—drenched in signification.1 Like the vest, and like the wound, the 
flag signals and distracts. It compels reference and eludes it and interferes 
with the signifying order of text: coming across the word “flag,” Clay 
has to stop reading the article and start again from the beginning (9). 
With this image—itself, of course, a simulation, as the students mistake 
the body for the flag—Ellis reappropriates the anomic amorality of Less 
Than Zero, and qualifies the logic of image, reference, and commodity 
appeal that dictated its adaptation.
 This chapter examines how this happens and what it means for vio-
lence and its representation in fiction in recent decades. I follow the 
trajectory of Ellis’s novels (Less Than Zero, The Rules of Attraction, 
American Psycho, Glamorama, Lunar Park, and Imperial Bedrooms), 
setting them in the cultural contexts through which they are read: Gen-
eration X, blank fiction (a literary mode that began to be developed and 
described in the 1990s), and the contemporary extreme. Ellis is a poster 
boy for Generation X and a formative figure for theorists of blank fic-
tion; extremity best articulates the trajectories of his most recent works. 
Though in what follows I dwell on these terms and contexts, my goal is 
not to separate into periods or classify by genre but to provide a frame 
for my examination of the relation of violence to fiction; specifically, 
the mobility of violence that wanders from the content of the text to 
the context of its reception in the quarter century between the publica-
tion of Ellis’s first novel and his most recent book. From the epistemic 
violence to which Muriel’s anorexia mutely attests, to the casual racism 
and sexism that characters in Ellis’s novels display (and of some readers 
to whom his works appeal), to the rapes, murders, torture, and terror 
depicted in such graphic detail (especially, but not exclusively, in Ameri-
can Psycho), to the virulence with which Ellis’s work is derided or dis-
missed, “violence” disappears: so wide a range of manifestations and 
definitions pose significant challenges to critical work. Rather than sep-
arating real violence from its representation, extricating violence from 
“violence” or fact from fiction, I trace how Ellis’s novels subtract epis-
temic certainty from violence and tease apart violence and the reality 
 1. For Colby, who also notes the similarity of Julian’s corpse to an American flag, 
this image is a comment on the G. W. Bush administration. With it, writes Colby, bor-
rowing terminology from Žižek’s Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Ellis “brutally es-
tablishes the novel’s subjective violence as the underwritten counterpart to the objective 
violence of American neoimperialism” (171–72).
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attributed to it. They blur distinctions between reality and fiction, object 
and agent, violence and “violence,” underlining the mobile or unstable 
nature of the ground from which such judgments may be made.2
 The care with which I treat Ellis’s work may come as a surprise to 
readers for whom “Bret Easton Ellis” denotes a has-been wunderkind, 
a half-baked celebrity writer whose substanceless, flashy, trashy novels 
reflect the vagaries and superficialities of contemporary commodity cul-
ture and whose reputation, as his critics are happy to point out, is based 
on Less Than Zero. But the philosophical seriousness of Ellis’s work was 
recognized early on—as early as 1988, David Pan (writing in Telos) set 
Less Than Zero at the center of his reflections on voyeurism, violence, 
aesthetics, and critique in 1980s culture. Ellis’s value for critical work 
has been reaffirmed by a recent edited collection (Mandel, Bret Easton 
Ellis) and two book-length studies. Georgina Colby, in Bret Easton Ellis: 
 2. My approach to Ellis’s work thus bears some similarity to Colby’s recent, and 
excellent, Bret Easton Ellis: Underwriting the Contemporary. Colby approaches Ellis 
through the concept of underwriting, by which existing paradigms are both undermined 
and reinforced, and is attuned to the political and cultural scenarios with which Ellis’s 
writing is in dialogue (she reads Imperial Bedrooms as a post-9/11 text [165–88]).
FIGURE 4. Less Than Zero (1987). Screen grab. Julian (Robert Downey Jr.), flanked by Clay (Andrew 
McCarthy, right) and Blair (Jami Gertz, left), before he dies of an overdose in the film’s final scene. 
Julian’s death, his white shirt with the blood-red patch, and Blair and Clay’s attempts to save him 
depart from Ellis’s more ambiguous 1985 novel. © Kanievska/Fox.
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Underwriting The Contemporary, affirms Ellis’s philosophical serious-
ness: his work underwrites—that is, both inscribes and guarantees—the 
contemporary scene in which he lives.3 Sonia Baelo-Allué, too, sees in 
Ellis a new literary paradigm. In Bret Easton Ellis’s Controversial Fic-
tion: Writing Between High and Low Culture, she identifies Ellis as an 
author who embraces celebrity status, combining high literary culture 
and mass entertainment.4 Both Colby and Baelo-Allué see in Ellis’s work 
a refusal of judgment, of convention, of value, and of the traditional sta-
tus of literature.
 For me, the revision of values that Ellis represents (both in recent 
critical assessments and in the initial acclaim, and then censure, that 
surrounded his work) is an opportunity to revisit the nature of value, 
and values, in critical debate. In the controversy around his 1991 novel 
American Psycho, the book’s (and the author’s) market value contrasted 
with the values in the name of which critics derided the novel and its 
author or called for a boycott of its publisher, Knopf. At the same time, 
Ellis’s work has been the grounds for serious meditations by scholars 
like Walter Benn Michaels, David Punter, Elizabeth Young, and Marco 
Abel who recognize the conceptual sophistication of his work and value 
his prescience as a cultural touchstone. But the ambivalent nature of 
Ellis’s stature as an artist is not a question to be resolved or an illusion 
to be dispelled. I do not want to suggest that his work has value hereto 
unappreciated or unacknowledged. To do so would be to assume that 
beneath the cool, disaffected, violence-is-chic ethos to which he appeals 
lie more conventional literary depths. Ellis is both trashy and disposable 
and innovative and deep. His work does and does not have value. In this 
way it elicits questions about the nature of value—literary, market, and 
moral. Precisely because of the dubious nature of Ellis’s value and values, 
and because the literary value of his fiction does not go without saying, 
 3. “Ellis transforms the contemporary into literature through a writerly act that in-
scribes contemporary conditions onto his surface narratives,” writes Colby (4). “Through 
resisting any imposition of moral authority and by courting hermeneutic variability,” she 
concludes, “Ellis’s novels withstand the forces of cultural reification. As such, his narra-
tives are not static but embody a dialectical space in which contemporary moments are 
uneasily held in a topology of narratives. By this means, Ellis presents a new literary 
paradigm” (187).
 4. Baelo-Allué writes: “Nowadays corporations and the market have promoted the 
entrance of authors into the entertainment industry, a phenomenon which will probably 
mark their future role [. . .] Celebrity authors cannot be judged by past standards, ac-
cording to which they have ‘sold’ themselves to the system and do not deserve any serious 
attention” (21).
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his novels set the stage for questions about violence: its relation to value, 
to judgment, and to the reality in which it figures.5
 The previous chapter’s closing gambit was that Generation X chooses 
not to care whether violence is real or not. Violence is real—or it is not 
“really” violent—but the reality of violence, I argued there, becomes hard 
to find in the decades that saw Ellis’s rise to fame (and his swift descent 
to notoriety). The previous chapter also traced the ways in which the 
question of how to critique violence is bound up with judging whether 
the ends justify the means for which violence is employed; such judg-
ment inevitably turns on questions of legality and justice. In evaluating 
works of art the logic of ends and means similarly applies, though it 
is value, not legality, that drives judgment: violence in art elicits ques-
tions of whether a work has “earned” its right to this material, and the 
answers revolve around the categories of justified and gratuitous. In the 
controversy over American Psycho, for example, assessments of the novel 
contrasted the violence in the text with its literary merits. Tara Baxter, 
who reports running Ellis’s writing through a readability index calcula-
tor, dismisses the text’s literary value out of hand in order to focus on the 
violence of an exploitative male fantasy that Ellis, she claims, indulges. 
Norman Mailer and Christopher Lehmann-Haupt considered the novel’s 
function as critique of 1980s excess and concluded that the novel does 
not rise to the moral challenge posed by the violence it depicts. For all, 
the value of the work (and, for such as Baxter, the values of its author) 
is indexed by the ends to which violence is judged to be a means. “Is it 
worth it?” critics ask; the ambiguity of the pronoun both highlights this 
economy and obscures it.
 Ellis’s novels stage the detachment, or dislocation, of violence from 
value, from judgment, and from cause-and-effect that my previous chap-
ter described, and explicate what it means, when confronted with “real 
violence,” to turn away or say, “Whatever.” Both the vest, and the flag, in 
different ways, fail or refuse to reference wounding. This failure initiates 
a detachment of wounding from pain, cause from effect, reference from 
signification, violence from the real. Clay, who owns the vest, disowns 
or disavows the pain it represents. Muriel, the anorexic who internalizes 
and performs society’s crippling demands on femininity, appropriates the 
visual confirmation of wounding, but then abandons or is abandoned 
 5. Some recent scholarly work on Ellis’s novels has taken up this concern with 
monetary value, focusing on the underlying violence of 1980s Reaganomics and contem-
porary deficit finance. See Godden, Heise, and La Berge.
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by it (the disordered alphabet, the wordless scream). Julian’s murder 
in Imperial Bedrooms reverses this process: red and white stripes are 
added to the broken body after the fact, simultaneously simulating and 
confirming the violence inflicted on it. Refusing the epistemic certainty 
with which violence is traditionally aligned, images are taken apart and 
put back together, revealing their quality as fictive—formed, fashioned, 
staged. Clay, who knows too much about this murder, notes that the 
white suit “belonged to [Julian] but it wasn’t something he was wearing 
the night he was abducted” and that its red streaks are puzzling, because 
“Julian had been stripped before he was killed and then re-dressed” (10).
 The vest in Less Than Zero failed or refused to signify violence. 
Imperial Bedrooms reconstitutes the sign, marks or flags it, and fash-
ions violence from trompe l’oeil: “If they thought it was a ‘flag,’” muses 
Clay, “then where was the blue? And then I realized: it was his head. 
The students thought it was a flag because Julian had lost so much blood 
that his crumpled face was a blue so dark it was almost black” (10). 
As violence is owned and disowned, invested and divested, flagging and 
flagged, detached and redressed, the criteria for its critique—judgment, 
value, volition—disappear. To begin to trace this erasure, its trajecto-
ries and consequences, I set Ellis’s earliest work within the context of a 
generation defined by its lack of values, the people that consumed Ellis’s 
fiction and figured in it, but who were not yet established enough, in the 
1980s and 1990s, to worry publicly about its influence on them: Genera-
tion X.
“WHATEVER” :  GENERAT ION  X
An absence of faith (because there is nothing to believe in) or relegation 
of faith to the invisible hand of the market (for which belief is every-
thing or nothing) characterizes Generation X and its literature, both of 
which have been disparaged as more attuned to the clamor of advertis-
ing than to the nuances of art. In his introduction to The GenX Reader, 
Douglas Rushkoff lists some of the qualities commonly attributed to 
Xers: “illiterate, unmotivated, and apathetic couch potatoes [who] have 
no career goals, no cultural pride, no political ideology, no family val-
ues, and no discernable ambitions” (3–4). Rushkoff identifies two cen-
tral characteristics of Generation X. The first is the centrality of images, 
particularly from advertising, that function as the main language of the 
postmodern cultural landscape. Xers view images not as transparent 
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vehicles for meaning but as complex texts; their much-reviled pas-
sive spectatorship is but a guise for sophisticated dissection and keen, 
if detached, analysis. “Exposed to consumerism and public relations 
strategies since we could open our eyes,” writes Rushkoff, “we GenX-
ers see through the clunky attempts to manipulate our opinions and 
assets, however shrinking. When we watch commercials, we ignore the 
products and instead deconstruct the marketing techniques” (5). This 
cynical, ironic, hyperliterate spectatorship contributes to Generation X’s 
much-commented-on disaffection—dropping out, or opting out, of cul-
ture and ideology—and leads us to its second characteristic: political 
and cultural apathy, a lack of commitment to the causes and agendas 
that characterized the ’60s. As Kathryn Hume puts it in her discussion 
of Coupland, McInerney, and Ellis, “American culture is McDonald’s 
and Nike, Microsoft and Armani, cellular phones and the World Wide 
Web. This is it, we live it, and they do not think we will find anything 
more worthwhile by looking further, looking backward, or trying to 
change” (American Dream 281). For Hume, these novelists and their 
characters “hardly celebrate this life, [but] they do not reject it in the 
name of some other values” (281). This is a world in which happiness is 
the product of Prozac, serenity is elicited by Valium, love is haunted by 
AIDS, and certainty is dismissed with “whatever.”
 Ulrich, who traces the term from Capa’s early 1950s’ photographic 
project through the Beats, punk, and into 1980s white male subculture, 
situates Generation X at the “paradoxical borderline status (inside and 
outside, within and against the mainstream), with ‘X’ capturing the dual 
sense of negation and freedom and ‘generation’ signifying a kind of 
hyperbolic assertion of subcultural, rather than demographic, solidarity” 
(19). Indeed, the X signals the atomism and disaffection that Less Than 
Zero expresses. But its alliance with negation also needs to be read in the 
context of a period—the 1980s—in which “not” signaled neither protest 
nor failure but a truly viable option. In fact, an emphatic “not” following 
a declarative sentence was a popular form of sarcasm for young people 
at the time (“Not!” was the “Word of the Year” in 1992). Read as coun-
terpoise, not negation, “not” articulates X’s existential mode that Gon-
zalo Navajas describes in terms of Continental philosophy: unlike Sartre, 
Derrida, Althusser, and Balibar, for whom critique operates through a 
struggle of the self with its historical and cultural context, “for the writ-
ers of the Generation X, negation is devoid of all attributes of ethical 
greatness and it has become a customary and banal Lebensstil that does 
not need further elaboration” (6).
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 If such a group could be said to have a literary manifesto, it might 
best be described by the “policy of storytelling” in Douglas Coupland’s 
novel, Generation X:
Inspired by my meetings of the Alcoholics Anonymous organization, I 
instigated a policy of storytelling in my own life, a policy of “bedtime 
stories,” which Dag, Claire, and I share among ourselves. It’s simple: we 
come up with stories and we tell them to each other. The only rule is that 
we’re not allowed to interrupt, just like in AA, and at the end we’re not 
allowed to criticize. This noncritical atmosphere works for us because 
the three of us are so tight assed about revealing our emotions. A clause 
like this was the only way we could feel secure with each other. (13–14)
 The enforced apathy (“we’re not allowed to interrupt”) posits the 
characters as spectators to each others’ performance; the abstention 
from critique (“we’re not allowed to criticize”) reflects Generation 
X’s notorious postmoral or amoral stance. This attitude of apathy and 
abstention is often dismissed as disaffection, but as Coupland presents 
it, willed atomism and disinterestedness holds the characters together—
this is what grants the book its coherence. The “policy of storytelling” 
thus has specific implications for narrative: Generation X is not quite 
a novel, not quite a collection of short stories; its structure is informed 
by repetition, not progression; by the policy’s repeated instantiation, 
not the characters’ development. Teleology—that traditional narrative 
engine—is replaced by tautology: the same thing happens, over and 
over.6
 In such a context, violence serves no purpose: it just is, and its detach-
ment from volition recasts the relation of violence to the world in which 
it functions as cause or effect. In Less Than Zero Clay recalls himself 
at fifteen collecting newspaper clippings of violent acts, some accidental 
and some purposely murderous, but his archive serves no testimonial or 
memorial function: “I collected a lot of clippings,” he muses, “because, I 
guess, there were a lot to be collected” (77; italics in original). The coun-
terpoise of violence as a means to an end, and violence as unmotivated or 
 6. Delvaux reads Coupland’s “policy of storytelling” differently: “Rather than con-
stituting a means of escaping, the act of storytelling represents a way to keep reality in 
check. [. . .] Fragments of horror are woven into narrative threads to be shared with 
friends, in all security, away from the streamlining stories of media malevolence. The 
policy goes against the monovalence of the official discourse on Generation X, a discourse 
which dismisses its need for interaction, dialogue, security” (181).
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misdirected, highlights the arbitrary nature of judgment. Invited to par-
ticipate in a rape, Clay refuses, stuttering, “It’s . . . [. . .] It’s . . . I don’t 
think it’s right”—the only recognizable moral code in the entire novel, 
and a strikingly inarticulate one (189). Clay’s friend Rip responds to this 
tentative gesture toward morality with an assertion of power: “What’s 
right? If you want something, you have the right to take it. If you want 
to do something, you have the right to do it” (189). As the negative 
moral code (Clay can only articulate morality by defining it as what it 
isn’t) is countered with a discourse of self-determination and enfranchise-
ment (you have the right), the conflation of power and morality in the 
dual definition of what’s “right” effectively undercuts any judgment of 
violence as means or end.
 That violence must serve some end, if only a political one, is trou-
bled in the 1980s with the emergence of “identity politics” according to 
which power is presumed to accrue to groups that can claim a history 
of disenfranchisement or victimization. The recognition of the value 
of such histories, however justified and belated, infuses X’s plaints of 
disenfranchisement with agonistic affect (Douglas Rushkoff’s defiance 
in The GenX Reader; Geoffrey T. Holtz’s resentment in Welcome to the 
Jungle). Discussing these attitudes, Andrea L. Harris asserts that “the 
so-called alternative position of 1990s white male youth culture is in 
fact a position appropriated from the truly alternative or marginalized 
of American culture—women, African Americans, lesbians and gays, 
and the poor” (270). Harris’s reading of X in terms of identity politics 
is itself notable: her distinction between the inauthentic (“so-called”) 
alternative and the “truly” marginalized aligns authenticity with mar-
ginalization and posits, for the critic, the important task of distinguish-
ing a false alternative from the true one. This logic is also evident in 
the curricular restructuring in the 1980s in which, as John Guillory 
puts it, “Canonical and noncanonical authors are supposed to stand 
for particular social groups, dominant or subordinate” (7), and in the 
debates around affirmative action in the popular press. “Self-righteous-
ness has given way to situational ethics,” writes Hornblower of Gen-
eration X in 1997. “Their parents fought attack dogs and fire hoses to 
desegregate lunch counters; now Xers struggle with ambiguous battles 
over affirmative action, where helping blacks and Hispanics arguably 
hurts Asians and whites.”
 This political and cultural context in which identity is wedded to 
what is culturally marked as marginal adds another dimension to the 
challenges of defining “Generation X.” While the rhetoric of a disen-
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franchised minority may well be inappropriate, the rhetoric of sub-
culture (to which Ulrich appeals) is also limited.7 Imagining X as a 
subculture, battling for specificity within the context of commodity cap-
italism, clinging to the “alternative” nature of music broadcast on Top 
40 radio, forecloses the more radical implications of what X signifies 
(or refuses to signify) that Ellis’s early novels articulate. To return to 
my discussion of Clay’s vest in Less Than Zero: the markers of iden-
tity and the visual signification of culture’s assault on femininity are 
urgently appropriated, but then abandoned, by Muriel; in the film ver-
sion, these markers are reappropriated for the beautiful and doomed 
emblem of Generation X, in the form of a commodity (Julian’s fashion-
able white shirt) sported by Brat Packer and Xer Robert Downey Jr. 
In Ellis’s second novel, The Rules of Attraction, signification becomes 
increasingly unreliable, the logic of the commodity extends out to high 
culture and in to the body, authenticity fades away, and identity dis-
solves into repetition.
 Set in Camden College in New Hampshire, a thinly disguised ver-
sion of Ellis’s alma mater Bennington College in Vermont, The Rules of 
Attraction is structured as a series of monologues by a range of char-
acters, including Sean Bateman (whose brother Patrick is the narrator 
of American Psycho), Victor (the protagonist of Glamorama), Lauren 
Hynde (who also appears in Glamorama), and Clay, who is referred 
to as “that guy from L.A.” (17, 18, 22, 84). As in Less Than Zero, the 
characters in The Rules of Attraction drift from party to party and in 
and out of each others’ beds; unlike Less Than Zero of which Clay is 
the sole focalizer, The Rules of Attraction’s decentered structure pro-
vides multiple takes on events. Sean’s relationship with Paul Denton, 
for example, is described in loving detail by Paul and explicitly denied 
by Sean. This abandonment of epistemic certainty underscores the logic 
of exchange, but unlike the commoditized world of Less Than Zero 
(in which, as James Annesley puts it, characters drive BMWs, not cars, 
and wear Ray-Bans, not sunglasses [Blank Fictions 7]), in The Rules of 
Attraction characters commoditize themselves through academic dis-
ciplines—the inscription of knowledge on the body and its manifesta-
tion as affect. Characters have “Drama major arms” or “Social Science 
major breakdowns”; in their quest for identity they are constantly 
changing their major; true to the newer-is-better logic of the commod-
ity, they (mis)identify to each other as freshmen (a more desirable posi-
tion than senior).
 7. See chapter 1 footnote 3 for a discussion of Ulrich’s terminology of subculture.
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 Within this logic of exchange, epistemic certainty fades away. What 
happened is unimportant, as is who it happened to. The novel revolves 
around a case of mistaken identity (Sean’s obsession with Lauren is 
based on his erroneous conclusion that Lauren has been putting anony-
mous notes in his mailbox), and in the novel’s opening pages each of 
its main characters is introduced by a vignette that feature mistakes of 
affect and value. In the stream-of-consciousness account of a nameless 
girl (probably Lauren) who loses her virginity to someone she thought 
was from NYU but was really a townie, groans of pain are mistaken 
for groans of pleasure. Sean and Paul are introduced through mis-takes 
of high culture: stealing books. Sean, noticing a girl at a party, thinks 
“I’ve seen her stealing Dante in the bookstore” (17); Paul, choosing 
against a drunken random sexual encounter, steals a girl’s copy of 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude. For Paul, 
Sean, and the Dante thief (alternately named Deidre, Dede, D), liter-
ary value is not intrinsic but appropriable. Neither Dante nor Marquez 
have any value in and of themselves or for the characters who steal 
them; the act of stealing the book (generally associated with the logic 
that taste overrides the rights of ownership) undercuts the rights of 
ownership but not in the name of any value, aesthetic or otherwise. 
Indeed, none of the mistakes in the novel seem to merit correction or 
restitution. When Paul and Lauren determine that Sean’s obsession 
with Lauren had been based on a mistake, they both conclude that “it 
doesn’t matter” (280). In the final pages of the novel Paul chases after 
a motorcycle driven by a figure who may or may not be Sean. “I don’t 
know why I was running after that motorcycle but I was. [. . .] I was 
running and I was running because it felt like the ‘right’ thing to do” 
(281). If, in Less Than Zero, what’s “right” is the site of a confronta-
tion of morality with power, in The Rules of Attraction, “right” is rote. 
“I wasn’t acting on passion,” Paul confesses, “I was simply acting” 
(281; Paul is a drama major).
 Xers are commonly opposed to Boomers, and for Generation X, the 
political foment of the ’60s provided a cause for every rebel, set forth 
clear choice of action, and promised for that action political and ethi-
cal consequences. Regardless what the ’60s were really like, for many 
Xers the tie-dyed hippie stands in nostalgic contrast to the preppy Rea-
ganite. “Our parents were rebels of the sexual revolution and Vietnam 
War veterans, hippies now turned yuppies,” writes Martine Delvaux; in 
contrast, she laments, Xers “live through talk-shows, sit-coms and email, 
condoms, and anti-depressants” (171). In The Rules of Attraction, Ellis 
redefines this nostalgic relationship. The Rules of Attraction character-
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izes the ’60s as a disaster: one of the characters claims the assassination 
of JFK as the origin of the generational malaise. “There was this . . . 
our mothers were pregnant with us when we . . . I mean, he . . . was 
blown away in ’64 and that whole incident . . . screwedthingsup” (30; 
ellipses in original) (of course, Kennedy was assassinated one year earlier, 
in 1963).
 The opposition of the ’60s to the ’80s is figured in this novel by the 
character of the hippie, and Sean’s relation to the hippie has, at its cen-
ter, the insecurity of violence’s epistemic certainty and the challenge this 
uncertainty poses to judgment—aesthetic and ethical. The scene is set 
as a flashback: inspired by a graffito “Whatever Happened to Hippie 
Love?” Sean recalls a hippie, whom he describes as the first girl he liked 
at Camden. The hippie (she’s never named) dissolves the generational 
contrast on which Generation X relies for its articulations of futility. 
She is both a fashion choice in the ’80s and a residue of the ’60s; she is 
defined by her carefully cultivated image and by her inherent hippiness. 
“This is the Eighties,” Sean remembers thinking, “How could there be 
any hippies left? I knew no hippies when I was growing up in New York. 
But here was a hippie.” Both generic and genuine, the hippie confirms 
and subverts expectations: “A hippie who was not too tall, who had long 
blond hair, features sharp, not soft like one would expect a hippie’s fea-
tures to resemble, yet distant, too” (94).
 The hippie is sharp, and her acuity is the crux of her relationship with 
Sean, whose attempts to define himself uniquely in relation to the hippie 
are stymied by her designation of all people as “beautiful.” This deni-
gration of individualism (and especially white male individualism) goads 
Sean, who responds by pointing to other people in the room, and grows 
increasingly frustrated by the hippie’s refusal to judge.
“What about him?” I pointed to a guy who it was rumored had actually 
caused his girlfriend to kill herself and everyone knew. There was no way 
in hell the hippie could think that he, this fucking monster, was beautiful.
 “Him? He’s beautiful.”
 “Him? Beautiful? He killed his fucking girlfriend. Ran her over,” I 
said.
 “No way,” the hippie grinned.
 “Yes! It’s true. Ran her straight over with a car,” I said, excited.
 She just shook her lovely, empty head. “Oh man.”
 “Can’t you make distinctions?” I asked her. “I mean, our sex is great, 
but how can everything, everyone be beautiful? Don’t you understand 
that that means no one is beautiful?”
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 “Listen man,” the hippie said. “What are you getting at?”
 She looked at me, not grinning. The hippie could be sharp. What was 
I getting at?
 I didn’t know. (97)
 The hippie’s refusal to make distinctions sheds an unwelcome light 
on Sean’s own neglect of the distinction between driving a girl to suicide 
and running her over with a car. Her generic affirmation of everything 
as “beautiful” undercuts Sean’s craving for distinction and eviscerates 
his judgments—not just his moral judgments or his judgments of taste, 
but his judgments about violent acts and agents—and points to the 
epistemic uncertainty on which they are founded (the murder is con-
firmed and unconfirmed: both a rumor and something that “everyone 
knew”). Sean navigates this impasse by repeating, mantralike, “I fucked 
the hippie.” Sean’s characterization of the hippie as someone he fucks 
inflects their relationship with violation and in this way reintroduces 
distinctions: not between beauties and monsters or agents and victims 
but between the ’80s and the ’60s, himself and the hippie. Though she 
is the first girl he liked, he is not like her, so he redescribes his fasci-
nation as alienation, not just from the hippie but from the values she 
represents and from his own attraction to them. The sex is terrific, the 
hippie is cute, but fucking counteracts the fondness, protectiveness, and 
even tenderness with which he recalls their relationship; with a bravado 
that betrays his ambivalence and uncertainty, he concludes the vignette: 
“This little hippie girl with a wreath on her head, looked at me as I 
held her and said, ‘The world blows my mind.’ And you know what? I 
fucked her anyway” (98).
“STAB” :  B LANK  F ICT ION
The inarticulate violence with which Sean resists the collapse of dis-
tinctions that the hippie represents demonstrates how the literary mode 
of blank fiction operates within the context of Generation X. For Gen-
eration X, a sense of an inevitable complicity presents as apathy: Xers’ 
notorious reluctance to rally in the name of an agenda or a cause. Blank 
fiction resists this apathy, but not in the name of any cause other than 
that of resistance. Blank fiction invests X’s sense of complicity with an 
ethos of resistance, and, as such, it forces questions about the nature 
of reality. It does so with violence: blank fiction focuses on the role of 
transformation and revolution and the necessity of violence to bring 
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it about. Like Tyler Durden who, in Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club, 
emerges from the narrator’s malaise to wreak havoc on a corporate and 
commoditized world, blank fiction originates from Generation X and 
operates within it; also like Tyler Durden, whose existence apart from 
the narrator is ultimately in question (is he a fantasy or a reality that 
threatens to overtake the narrator’s?), blank fiction’s resistance to com-
modity capitalism, however futile, reads as a dissolution of the distinc-
tion between fiction and reality and underscores the role of violence in 
defining each. If Coupland’s “policy of storytelling” best articulates X’s 
literary ethos, blank fiction finds its most succinct articulation in Dennis 
Cooper’s Frisk, in which an account of a sex game turned real concludes 
with one word: “Stab” (64). Simultaneously the act of wounding and 
the experience of it, “Stab” abolishes the distinction between cause and 
effect. It disposes of volition, effaces the difference between violence’s 
agent and victim (or continues the blurring of this distinction initiated 
by the voluntary aspect of the BDSM scenario). Detached, by the ital-
ics, from the narrative point of view, it seems to ascribe point of view 
to the text itself—a coming into consciousness of the text as violence. 
Cooper’s Stab marks a departure from Ellis’s image of the vest with 
which I opened this discussion. Less Than Zero’s stab’s value is its veri-
similitude. Muriel was attracted to Clay’s vest because, recall, “it looks 
like you got stabbed or something.” Cooper’s “Stab” is performative: it 
unites, in action, the characters, reader, and text. Like Tyler Durden’s 
terrorism in Fight Club, the reality of its violence is simultaneously real 
and fiction: both given and debatable.
 Blank fiction is associated with Ellis, Palahniuk, and Cooper’s “flat, 
affectless, atonal prose and non-committed narrative voices” (“U.S. Lit-
erature: Blank Fiction”). But true to Richard Hell’s punk anthem from 
which the term derives, “blank fiction” reverberates with the angst of 
a counterculture movement; it is informed by an ethos of resistance, 
however inarticulate or futile. Elizabeth Young and Graham Caveney 
in Shopping in Space appropriate Hell’s phrase “blank generation” for 
the fiction of the New York literary scene in the 1980s. For Young and 
Caveney, the term provides what they see as a necessary association with 
punk but links this apathy to ’80s excess and conveys the “flat, stunned” 
quality of the writing (iii). James Annesley in Blank Fictions extends the 
term to U.S. literature of the 1990s in which “there is an emphasis on 
the extreme, the marginal and the violent. [. . .] A sense of indifference 
and indolence. The limits of the human body seem indistinct, blurred by 
cosmetics, narcotics, disease and brutality” (1). Annesley approaches this 
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fiction with an eye to its relationship with consumer culture, a relation-
ship that is informed by capitalism’s relentless dialectic of articulation 
and co-option.
 Robert Siegle’s Suburban Ambush, about the 1970s and ’80s New 
York downtown scene, is an important recourse for scholars of blank 
fiction. Siegle’s interest is in authors like Kathy Acker and Joel Rose 
whose “energetic reflexivity inevitably takes one deep into a critical 
engagement with the social, political, and economic structures of the 
culture” (xiii). For Siegle, the marginal, hip, underground, or cult sta-
tus of these authors lends their critiques of power/knowledge an inter-
ventionist and oppositional edge. Though some of the authors Siegle 
discusses (Lynne Tillman and Dennis Cooper) figure prominently in 
Annesley’s and Young and Caveney’s studies of blank fiction, Siegle dis-
misses Ellis, who writes what he calls “the wrong fiction” (xii). But for 
self-identified scholars of blank fiction—for Young and Caveney and for 
Annesley—Ellis is central and crucial. His role, in their work, is simi-
lar to Althusser’s and Foucault’s in Siegle’s study: Ellis’s novels provide 
the theoretical scaffolding from which these scholars define the nature 
of this fictional mode’s critical engagement, its vocal but inarticulate 
opposition.8
 The privileging of Ellis in scholarship of blank fiction is in part an 
expression of impatience with high postmodernism and with the reso-
lutely readerly products of creative writing workshops. Young writes 
that blank fiction texts “seem almost blind and stunned in terms of ‘lit-
erary’ qualities, as if surprised to have found themselves written at all” 
(239; she makes an exception for Cooper). Robert Rebein in Hicks, 
Tribes, and Dirty Realists privileges the work of Raymond Carver, Wil-
liam T. Vollmann, Thom Jones, Lorrie Moore, and Dorothy Allison 
over and against what he dismisses as the “self-reflexive, end-of-the-line 
works of fantasy and fabulation” represented by the canonical postmod-
ernists John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Robert Coover, William H. Gass, 
and Thomas Pynchon (1–2). Carver, Vollmann, Jones, Moore, and Alli-
son represent, for Rebein, the vitalization of realism, “a new realism 
that is more or less traditional in its handling of character, reportorial 
in its depiction of milieu and time, but is at the same time self-conscious 
about language and the limits of mimesis” (20). For Ellis and other 
blank fiction practitioners, this realism’s coming-to-consciousness is fun-
 8. Baelo-Allué surveys a number of terms applied to Ellis’s work (Brat Pack, post-
modern, minimalism, downtown writing) and chooses blank fiction as the term that best 
accounts for Ellis’s style (22–35).
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damentally Hegelian in its reliance on violence. True to the master–slave 
dialectic that Hegel outlines in Phenomenology of the Spirit, violence 
will realize—in the sense of making real—and requires realization: when 
its epistemic validity is uncertain, it must be granted by recognition.
 Because blank fiction is characterized by the blurring of the dif-
ference between reality and fiction, mimesis floats free. “It’s not dates 
that matter, nor is it situations or personalities, it’s the commercial fea-
tures of the environment that provide these novels with their reference 
points. Blank fiction does not just depict its own period, it speaks in 
the commodified language of its period,” writes Annesley (Blank Fic-
tions 7). This period is one in which, as Young and Caveney put it, 
“it is increasingly difficult to ‘see’ anything, let alone render it in text 
through the blizzard of fall-out from an uncertain, nervously apocalyp-
tic world which seemed constantly poised, like a psychotic at bay with 
no hostages, on the brink of shooting itself in the head” (20). In Young 
and Caveney’s image (that cannot but recall Ellis’s American Psycho, 
as that novel plays a prominent role in their book) violence does not 
communicate about the real; it communicates the real, and communi-
cates the real as violence; to paraphrase Annesley, blank fiction does not 
just depict violence, it speaks its language. Violence raises the stakes of 
resistance and underscores blank fiction’s interrogation of a world in 
which, as Kathy Acker puts it, “language is always fiction and true” (4).
 Like Generation Xers, blank fiction writers are haunted by the 
vagaries of identification where there is nothing to identify with, and 
troubled by the nature of resistance within consumer capitalism that 
co-opts opposition and markets it as “alternative.” Their response is 
to resist this culture on the level of reference. In Hell’s “Blank Genera-
tion” anthem, the refrain alternates “we are all a blank generation” 
and “we are all a ____ generation,” drawing attention to the opacity of 
the blank, that signifies by its refusal to signify. Blank fiction does not 
reflect or represent the reality in which it is written; it is an attempt to 
communicate the real itself in a world where, as Young and Caveney 
put it, “there has been an inevitable erosion of the ‘real’” (19) and in 
which “fiction is now the closest we’re likely to come to truth” (iv). 
Here, too, blank fiction scholars take their cue from Siegle’s book. Sub-
urban Ambush, subtitled The Fiction of Insurgency, sets as its stakes 
the blurring of the distinction between fiction and fact, and raises the 
question of resistance or revolution within the context of this blur-
ring. “Downtown writing is insurgent,” writes Siegle, “but its alpha 
and omega reside in the other half of the double genitive—in its status 
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as fiction rather than revolution” (3). By forcing together the urgency 
of resistance and the inevitability of its failure, and locating the effects 
of social and political reality in fiction, Siegle sets the stage for blank 
fiction’s uneasy relation with realism, its eschewal of a depth model of 
representation, and underscores the stakes of the violence, subversion, 
and extremism that characterize many texts in this genre, and of which 
Ellis’s American Psycho is Exhibit A.
 Notorious for its descriptions of rape, torture, murder, mutilation, 
cannibalism, sexism, homophobia, and racism, American Psycho turns 
on the distinction between reality and fiction, surface and depth. The 
novel is narrated by Patrick Bateman, an investment banker in Man-
hattan. His lifestyle is defined equally by conspicuous consumption and 
gruesome murders—both the consumption and the murders are ren-
dered in excruciating, and chilling, detail. In a world in which “surface 
surface surface was all that anyone found meaning in” (375), Patrick 
attempts to find meaning in surface by repeated penetrations of it—not 
just with his penis, but by cutting, biting, stabbing, drilling, and, in a 
notorious scene, with a hungry rat. But the novel remains resolutely 
superficial. Like the characters’ perpetual confusion of referent and ref-
erence, words and what they mean, Patrick’s victims blur, or bleed, into 
each other and become indistinguishable and interchangeable. In dreams 
lit like pornography he fucks girls made of cardboard (200), and even 
his confession of existential angst, like his confession of his multiple 
murders, means “nothing” (377; italics in original).
 The critical reception of American Psycho underscores the crux on 
which it teeters: the violence of representation and the representation of 
violence. These are hard to tease apart because the novel itself undoes 
the fundamental categories on which mimesis is predicated: the distinc-
tion of appearance from reality, surface from depth, is subject to “a 
slow, purposeful, erasure” (282). In one of his rare addresses to the 
reader, Patrick clarifies that the grounds for comparison and contrast 
are absent: “There is no real me,” he states. “Though I can hide my 
cold gaze and you can shake my hand and feel flesh gripping yours and 
maybe you can even sense our lifestyles are probably comparable: I 
simply am not there” (377). Indeed, though his first-person narration 
dominates the novel, Patrick does not emerge as a narrator until after a 
long rant by his mirror image and alter ego Timothy Price. Initially, the 
two men are indistinguishable: both wear an Armani overcoat, receive 
exactly the same greeting, appear interchangeable to Patrick’s fiancée, 
and Timothy, Patrick stresses, is “the only interesting person I know” 
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(22). But Timothy disappears: “I . . . am . . . leaving,” he says to Pat-
rick, “Leaving. Disappearing” (60), and proceeds to run along the train 
tracks of the nightclub Tunnel, “disappearing into blackness” (62). 
Timothy returns in the novel’s concluding pages, distinguished from the 
other characters by a smudge on his forehead that only Patrick can see 
and by his evident dismay with TV footage of President Reagan. “How 
can he lie like that,” Timothy complains of Reagan (396). “He looks 
so . . . normal. He seems so . . . out of it. So . . . undangerous” (397). 
This dismay over Reagan’s lies does not translate into an affirmation 
of the value of truth; Timothy does not illuminate Patrick’s motives. 
Patrick’s is a world where people find meaning in surface, and in which 
“the lines separating appearance—what you see—and reality—what 
you don’t—become, well, blurred” (378). Timothy, having emerged 
from the vanishing-point where the parallel lines of the train tracks 
meet, cannot quite articulate this resolute superficiality, not to mention 
its implications. Speaking of Reagan, Timothy reflects: “He presents 
himself as a harmless old codger. But inside . . . [. . .] But inside . . . .” 
Patrick completes the sentence with the words Timothy cannot utter: 
“doesn’t matter” (397).
 Beyond the controversy surrounding its publication—the details 
of which are by now well known—American Psycho has spawned an 
extensive tradition of criticism, much of which turns on whether its 
violence is “real.” There is evidence that the killings and tortures may 
be fantasized by Patrick: his hallucinations include fantastic scenarios 
reported in the same affectless detail with which he enumerates his vic-
tims and their gruesome fates. At the same time, the unnerving docu-
mentary quality of these scenarios compelled Tara Baxter to describe 
the book as a “‘How-To-Kill-Women’ manual for that ever-growing spe-
cial interest group: the good ol’, all-Amerikan misogynists” (246) and 
Roger Rosenblatt to title his review “Snuff This Book.” Both Baxter 
and Rosenblatt locate the violence to which they are responding in the 
world into which the novel enters; to make their arguments, they claim 
that the violence perpetrated or promised by the book coincides with 
the violence Patrick describes. Whether fictional or not, a feature of the 
novel’s prose or a fact in the world in which the book is bought or 
sought, it all comes down to this: violence—particularly, in this contro-
versy, violence against women—is real.
 In more sophisticated assessments of the novel, violence is not some-
thing the book promises but, rather, its premise. American Psycho figures 
not as a perpetrator who must be identified, judged, and condemned, 
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but as a helpless collaborator in violence of a more diffuse, epistemic 
nature. Carla Freccero locates the “real” violence in the real-world con-
text in which Ellis writes. Abel, discussing “the level of violence launched 
against Ellis’s novel,” focuses on “the inevitability of violence that criti-
cism does to that which it encounters” (Violent Affect 33). Young dis-
misses the distinction between real and fictional violence in favor of the 
text’s impact on the reader: “What difference does it make whether we 
believe Patrick committed some, any, or all of the murders, or not?” she 
asks. “We still have to read all the detailed descriptions of the killings 
and the effect on us is exactly the same” (116; emphasis mine). For all, 
the question of whether violence does or does not occur (in the mind 
of the narrator or the fictional world of the novel), and where violence 
might or might not take place (in the text, in the reader, in society, in 
criticism) does not matter, or it matters less, than the fact that violence is. 
The critical discourse produces, as C. N. Serpell puts it, a “blank space, 
limned by the competing discourses of whatever the critic has decided 
Bateman represents. [. . .] And yet this blank space acts” (52). It not only 
acts; it moves: as “real violence” wanders from the content of the text to 
the context of its reception, from the mind of the psychotic narrator to 
the impact of the text on the reader or the market, there is no outside to 
which violence can be consigned, no safe space to which it can be ban-
ished, no comfortable “real” to which the reader can retreat and from 
which she might praise or denigrate the novel’s representational quality. 
The novel does not offer its reader any ground from which to distance 
herself from the point of view of its protagonist, and no position from 
which to condemn his violent actions. Consequently, the categories with 
which to critique violence or judge it disappear.9
 Writing of the “blank” in blank fiction, Michele Aaron describes “the 
mapping of an empty space for the assumption and occupation by the 
reader” (126), what she calls a “grafting” of the reader into the fiction. 
But American Psycho does not graft the reader into the fiction. It grafts 
her into the reality of the violence by which the text is occupied. The 
extreme violence of this text cannot be dismissed, but the possibility that 
the violence in the novel may be hallucinated by its protagonist blurs 
the line between fact and fantasy, leaving the reader unsure whether, by 
registering the violence, she is affirming reality or departing from it. In 
 9. Like Abel, Serpell concludes that the text leaves the reader suspended between 
judgment and immersion, and locates within this zone of suspension the novel’s ethical 
stakes: American Psycho, Serpell concludes, forces readers to recognize their complicity 
in the very horrors that the novel recounts (68).
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contrast with the mobility of “real violence” (a violence that moves from 
the content of the text to the context of its reception, from personal psy-
chosis to social problems in the 1980s, from the atomism and alienation 
of consumer capitalism to the “wet snapping sounds” of Patrick’s hands 
in a victim’s stomach before she dies [305]), the text is bracketed by liter-
ary references to a hermetic hell (American Psycho opens with the quote 
from Dante’s Inferno and closes with a reference to Sartre’s No Exit) and 
dominated by Patrick’s narrative voice. The novel is sealed, inscrutable, 
and opaque, qualities that sit uneasily with its resolute superficiality and 
its deadly mobility. But it will migrate to other Ellis fictions and explode 
in the pages of Lunar Park.
“ IN  I S  OUT” :  EXTREME
Though the trajectory of his novels sits well within the context of Gener-
ation X (for whom he has been claimed as a poster boy) and the literary 
mode, within Generation X, of blank fiction (for which his work func-
tions as a condition of possibility), Ellis is, ultimately, an uneasy fit. The 
functional repetition of Coupland’s policy of storytelling and the blunt 
impact of Cooper’s “Stab” do not quite account for American Psycho 
or for Ellis’s subsequent novels Glamorama and Lunar Park. For these, 
the genre of the contemporary extreme helps articulate how Ellis nego-
tiates the reality of violence, and the violence of reality, in the wake of 
the disappearance of epistemic certainty and any stable criteria by which 
violence might be evaluated. Set in a world that both solicits our rec-
ognition and resists it, contemporary extreme novels are controversial, 
often violent, works that challenge the distinction between the world we 
live in and the words we use to describe it. Durand and Mandel define 
contemporary extreme novels as “set in a world both similar to and dif-
ferent from our own, a hyper-real, often apocalyptic world progressively 
invaded by popular culture, permeated with technology, and dominated 
by destruction” (1). Brian Richardson characterizes extreme narration 
as positing outrageous, impossible, experimental, and eccentric narra-
tive points-of-view that reflect a disintegration of grammatical and psy-
chic subjectivity. Discussing a movement toward “extreme realism” 
in art after the 1980s, Mario Perniola describes “a disturbing experi-
ence where repulsion and attraction, fear and desire, pain and pleasure, 
refusal and complicity are mixed and mingled. [. . .] The meeting place 
between human and machine, organic and inorganic, natural and artifi-
cial, impulse and electronics, people and commodities” (4).
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 Located at the intersection of GenX complicity and blank fiction’s 
refusal, the extreme reflects the ethos and attitudes of each, by way of 
inversion. Rather than responding or re-presenting, extremity pursues; it 
enhances, rather than resists. The term’s connotations of political extrem-
ism—a grotesque literalization of engagement—is the flip side of the 
reticence that causes Xers to dismiss ideological fervor as uncool. Simi-
larly, blank fiction’s affirmation of inarticulate refusal echoes the moral 
outrage that extreme situations elicit: resistance is justified, even neces-
sary, though the categories with which to articulate it vanish into the 
differend. In the 1980s and ’90s “extreme” proved a potent marketing 
device for which resistance to the system can be distilled into a slogan, 
stamped on a T-shirt, advertised, and sold. In the 1990s, X replaced the 
“ex” of “extreme,” eschewing, with the elimination of that wimpy vowel 
“e,” any connotations of negation or belatedness: “Urban Xtreme,” ini-
tially the name of a youth advisory agency that articulated the fashion 
of urban hipness and grunge in the United States in the early ’90s, is 
still a vibrant, global, logo. “Extreme” subsequently moved to sport (the 
term “extreme sport” entered the language in 1989; the X-games were 
established in 1995), and cinema: Asian extreme, a genre of horror films 
characterized by gore, violence, and the supernatural (especially the films 
of Xer Park Chan-wook). In common parlance, “extreme” serves as an 
interjection to denote radicalism (an evolution of the 1960s’ “far out”). 
Finally: extreme describes a physical dissolution or explosion (the etymo-
logical origin of the term traces a trembling outwards).
 It is in this final sense that extremity best articulates how Ellis’s nov-
els eliminate the categories by which violence can be critiqued. Unlike 
American Psycho, which takes as its aesthetic credo Patrick’s lament, 
“surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in,” Glam-
orama is motivated by the declaration by Victor Ward (a reincarnation 
of Victor Johnson in The Rules of Attraction) that “in is out. Out is in” 
(17); indeed, in a series of terrorist bombings, cars, buildings, and people 
explode. The novel’s unlikely premise involves a series of ungainly plots, 
some political, some cinematic, some perpetrated by an unlikely group 
of terrorist supermodels. The prominence of film, fashion, and imaging 
technology in Glamorama certainly evokes Perniola’s extreme realism, in 
which images, “endowed with the strongest emotional impact,” “inter-
act with images of fashion, cinema, television, internet, graphics, adver-
tisement, design, making possible a social imaginary characterized by 
provocation” (10).
 Because most, but not all, of the carnage is real (some of it is a prop, 
and most of it is staged for one or more of the novel’s ubiquitous film 
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crews), Glamorama challenges the fundamental distinction between 
diegetic and extradiegetic, setting as the stakes of this challenge mimesis 
and coherence. “I don’t want a lot of description, just the story, stream-
lined, no frills, the lowdown: who, what, where, when and don’t leave 
out why [. . .] what’s the story?” (5), demands Victor in the novel’s 
opening scene, but this gesture toward origin, motivation, and design 
dissolves into multiple, disparate movements. Unlike Patrick, who dis-
engages from social situations with “I have to return some videotapes,” 
Victor moves—or quits—by splitting; his exasperated mantra is “spare 
me,” and, in the course of the novel, he disappears, replaced, it seems, 
by the machinations of the political forces that are orchestrating his poli-
tician father’s rise to power and have demanded, of playboy Victor, “a 
new you” (90). But Victor’s disappearance is not, merely, the effect of 
violence; he has always, already, disappeared. In the novel’s originary 
scene (a pool party at a house on Ocean Drive), Victor recalls: “The 
future started mapping itself out and I focused on it. In that moment I 
felt as if I was disappearing [. . .] floating above the palm trees, growing 
smaller in the wide blank sky until I no longer existed” (545).
 Victor’s desire for coherence (“who, what, where, when and don’t 
leave out why”) is a response to specks that he has noticed on the wall 
of a nightclub he is opening in the novel’s first section. Like the “body 
parts—legs and arms and hands, most of them real, skidding across the 
platform” in the aftermath of an attack on a Paris métro station (364; 
emphasis mine), the specks are not reliably organic or inorganic. Nor 
can their presence be established unequivocally. “Everyone’s acting like 
there’s a question as to whether these specks are an illusion or a real-
ity,” declares Victor, “I think they’re pretty goddamn real.” But he is 
informed that “reality is an illusion” (10). The specks’ reality is ulti-
mately irrelevant, as the more important question is whether they are 
in—in the sense of being fashionable, and hence present by design—or 
out (that is, unacceptable to the up-to-the-moment hipness of the club). 
Initially Victor thinks the specks are part of a design: “They don’t look 
accidental but like they were somehow done by a machine” (5). At 
the same time, he recognizes the distinct possibility that the specks are 
biological: “Specks, man, look at these fuckers. [. . .] I think they’re 
spreading. I don’t think that patch was here before!” (7). Both real and 
illusion, in and out, somatic or not, specks or specs, the specks prefig-
ure the novel’s decoupling of narrative from coherence, coherence from 
volition, and violence from the real so as to stage what Perniola calls “a 
veritable irruption of the real in the rarefied and highly symbolic world 
of art” (3).
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 Despite Victor’s demands for one, Glamorama lacks an overarch-
ing narrative; instead of a story, there are multiple designs. Victor’s own 
projects and schemes intersect with those of F. Fred Palakon’s, Bobby’s, 
his father’s, and those of the directors of the films in which he is alter-
nately the star, an extra, or a willing or unwilling spectator. As these 
designs overlap, intersect, obscure each other, peter out, and never 
resolve into a single explanatory account, Glamorama presents design 
as pattern, rather than purpose. Like the specks, machination (human 
or not) is purposive without purpose (in a novel very much concerned 
with beauty), and dislocates cause from effect (in a novel very much con-
cerned with conspiracy).10 The multiplicity of designs and their failure to 
resolve to a single purpose reflect the detachment from the real and its 
realization elsewhere; if American Psycho demonstrated that violence, 
while mobile, is firmly attached to the real (as the novel’s “real violence” 
migrates from the content of the text to the context of its reception), 
Glamorama dismantles this attachment: Victor is dis- and reassembled as 
digital image manipulation sets him in situations and locales he does not 
remember or disavows. Even his account of disappearing, in the novel’s 
originary scene, is subject to erasure. Recalling the pool party on Ocean 
Drive, “I might not even remember this afternoon, I was thinking. I was 
thinking that a part of me might destroy it. A cold voice inside my head 
begged me to” (545).
 Glamorama’s explicit engagement with cinema is an evolution of 
American Psycho’s reliance on cinematic terminology: the slow dissolves 
and jump zooms to which Patrick made occasional reference.11 Sheli 
Ayers has suggested that the specks in Glamorama’s opening section, the 
confetti that pervades the novel, and the flies that Victor sees in some of 
the posh nightclubs he visits suggest digital pixelation. But given the nov-
el’s concern with pattern and randomness, the specks, confetti, and flies 
should be seen as static, not pixelated; the novel’s quarrel with mimesis is 
worked out through the analog, not the digital. Specks, confetti, and flies 
 10. “Purposive without purpose” is, of course, Immanuel Kant’s definition of aes-
thetic judgments of beauty in his 1790 Critique of Judgment. Redding (“‘Merely Politi-
cal’”) and Schmid discuss Glamorama’s reliance on the narrative modes of conspiracy 
and paranoia, both very popular in the 1990s, as evidenced by the prominence of the 
TV series The X-Files. Jodi Dean’s “Uncertainty, Conspiracy, Abduction” offers a fine 
account of The X-Files’s reliance on modes of paranoia and conspiracy in the 1990s. In 
contrast, I posit, the specks evince a concern about the relation of pattern and random-
ness (rather than presence and absence), a concern that situates the novel firmly within 
the epistemic shift that N. Katherine Hayles identifies with the posthuman (27).
 11. Serpell, writing of the cinematic language in both novels, notes that its effect is 
“to convey a reality that is inseparable from simulacra” (60).
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are stochastic: they point to the interpenetration of pattern and design. 
As static, a dot pattern that obscures the analog, they evoke and obstruct 
mimesis. They also evoke and undercut volition, pointing to the limits of 
design: like the specks, confetti may or may not be present on purpose 
(it may be the residue of a party or placed as a warning). The flies, too, 
reflect and undercut intentionality: they are drawn by the smell of excre-
ment that pervades the spaces through which Victor moves, but these 
spaces, which are so cold Victor can see his breath, would freeze a fly, 
causing it to fall out of the air. In any case, Glamorama begins and ends 
with evaluations of magnitude (“specks” is its first word, “mountain” 
the last), and the specks, confetti, and flies are recast, in extreme close-
up, as the wreckage in the wake of the bombing of a 747 airplane outside 
Paris. Pieces of the plane and of its passengers are scattered in the for-
est like specks of confetti, or flies frozen in flight. This scattering, too, is 
overlaid with a random dot pattern. “Since a cargo of party confetti and 
gold glitter—two tons of it—were being transported to America, millions 
of tiny dots of purple and green and pink and orange paper cascade over 
the carnage” (502).
 As Victor’s own presence is not documented but produced and repro-
duced, his quest for the story, for certainty, and for the distinction of 
reality from illusion dissolves. Like the flies, specks, and confetti that 
obscure and distract from the conspiracy theories, film scripts, terror 
plots, and carnage, purpose and coherence separate into discrete asigni-
fying parts. In the novel’s final scene Victor sees “billboards with answers 
on them: who, what, where, why.” Violence, objectless, emerges from 
the static. Cause detached from effect, it serves no purpose: it simply 
is, “a flattening of the existent from which none is saved,” as Perniola 
writes of extreme realism, “showing the existent without any theoretical 
mediation” (5). In an account of one of the many terror attacks in the 
novel, an authoritative third-person narrator states this explicitly: “The 
extent of the destruction is a blur and its aftermath somehow feels beside 
the point. The point is the bomb itself, its placement, its activation—
that’s the statement. [. . .] It’s not the legs blown off, the skulls crushed, 
the people bleeding to death in minutes. The uprooted asphalt, the black-
ened trees, the benches splattered with gore, some of it burned—all this 
matters just as much. It’s really about the will to accomplish this destruc-
tion and not about the outcome, because that’s just decoration” (337).12
 12. Patrick Walter, discussing this passage, makes a similar point: “Victor’s bound-
less intellectual vacancy provides the perfect template for terrorism not because terrorists 
inscribe certain ‘agendas’ or ‘answers’ on this blank slate but instead because this ideo-
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 Given Glamorama’s explicit concern with cinema and imaging tech-
nology, Ellis’s turn, in Lunar Park, to a more conventional literary form 
is, on the surface, surprising. But as Shaviro notes in an early review 
of the novel, Ellis asks serious questions about what it means to write, 
and to be a writer, in a postliterary age, the foremost of which speak to 
the implications, for authorship, of the dismantling of mimesis (“Lunar 
Park”). Richardson, discussing extreme narration, argues that the bound-
aries between homo- and heterodiegesis should be recognized as perme-
able: much is to be gained, he suggests, by not insisting on the difference 
between historical and implied authors. The blurring of this distinction 
is autofiction, a deliberate conflation of the autobiographical and the fic-
tional that, as Durand and Mandel note, “lends crucial weight to the 
critical controversies that accrue to contemporary extreme authors and 
their works” (3).13 Even as the distinction between the author and narra-
tor is blurred in Lunar Park, characters from all of Ellis’s previous nov-
els people this text, a resolute intertextuality that extends Ellis’s fictional 
world into our own.
 Lunar Park is narrated by a Bret Easton Ellis who, after the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001, retires to the suburbs with his wife Jayne 
and their two children (one of them his). Bret, who is the author of Less 
Than Zero, The Rules of Attraction, American Psycho, Glamorama, 
and, finally, Lunar Park, also attended Camden, the fictional version of 
Ellis’s own alma mater. Consequently, the novel’s setting is both realistic 
and surreal, documentary and futuristic; the explicitly paranormal ele-
ments of its ghost story are counterpoised with Bret’s repeated assertions 
that this novel is a document of which “every word is true” (30).14 Bret’s 
description of cities as “mournful places, where everyday life was sud-
denly interrupted by jagged mounds of steel and glass and stone” and 
his reference to “the stained, tattered photocopies of the missing posted 
everywhere, which were not only a constant reminder of what had been 
lost but also a warning of what was coming next” (27–28) are pretty 
accurate accounts of New York City after the attacks on the World Trade 
Center, but Lunar Park is also set in a dystopia: Bret and Jayne flee the 
logical blankness is the very basis of media terrorism as such. [. . .] The mayhem is the 
message; the fait accompli of the bomb expresses no other agenda or knowledge than its 
own taking place” (147).
 13. Nielsen (“What’s in a Name?”) offers an extended discussion of Lunar Park’s 
engagement with the narrative mode of autofiction.
 14. Karnicky has explored the multivalent implications of this truth-claim; see also 
Baker.
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cities because urban areas are now plagued by snipers and suicide bomb-
ers, “morning papers ran aerial photographs of bombed-out buildings 
on the front page, showing piles of tangled bodies in the shadow of the 
crane lifting slabs of scorched concrete. More and more often there were 
‘no survivors’” (27).15
 True to the themes of patrimony and authorship with which it is 
explicitly occupied, Lunar Park is characterized by replication. The nar-
rator is worried by a copycat killer who is inspired by American Psy-
cho, and stalked by one Clayton who leaves with the narrator a script 
titled Minus Numbers, an exact replica of the first draft of the novel 
that became Less Than Zero, complete with that draft’s misspellings and 
typos (300). With replication comes error, mistakes that may prove to be 
permanent: Lunar Park is also concerned with mutation, as the interpen-
etration of fictions, and of fiction and reality, distorts and unsettles the 
contours of the recognizable. Finally, Lunar Park’s extremity takes the 
form of inversion: not merely turning the body inside-out as in Glamor-
ama (though in Lunar Park bodies explode and are skinned and surfaces 
are slimed) but, through the dialogue it stages with American Psycho, 
in its pursuit of blankness. True to the irruption or trembling outward 
denoted by “extreme,” blankness, in the form of the unrepresentable, is 
produced by the superimposition of one text, one design, over another, 
and the irruption of violence from within and through these patterns.
 In American Psycho, Patrick, after an especially gruesome double 
murder, scrawls in blood the words “I AM BACK” on the wall of the 
apartment above “a scary drawing which looks like this” (306) but 
which is not included in the book. Patrick later returns to the apartment 
in which he wrote and drew but finds it immaculate, prowled by Mrs. 
Wolfe, a real estate agent; “a commercial where a stain walks off a jacket 
and addresses the camera” plays on the large-screen TV (368). Though 
this image of detachment of surface from surface “doesn’t make me for-
get [. . .] the torrents of gore and the blood that had washed over the 
apartment, the stench of the dead, my own confused warning that I had 
drawn in—” (368), Patrick can no longer name the blood in which he 
wrote. Nor is he able to avow his authorship of the text, image, or car-
nage. He experiences a perpetual erasure that extends to his own body, 
his speech, and the world in which he moves: “Confused, I reach out for 
a moment to touch Mrs. Wolfe’s arm, to steady myself, but I stop it in 
 15. See Godden (“Bret Easton Ellis”) and Worthington for further discussion of Lu-
nar Park as a post-9/11 text.
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midair, move it to my chest instead, but I can’t feel it.” Though Patrick 
is, in fact, back, he cannot confirm this, and when Mrs. Wolfe dismisses 
him, he meekly assents. “I suggest you go,” she says. “Don’t come back.” 
“I won’t,” Patrick promises. “Don’t worry” (370).16
 Lunar Park worries about whether Patrick is back. It is a ghost story 
in which Bret is haunted by his own writing, and Lunar Park is concerned 
with the theme of return—specifically, with the return of blankness, of 
what did not appear in American Psycho: scenes from the original manu-
script that no one but the author had read, as well as childhood drawings 
that no one but the author has seen. Lunar Park’s concern with writing, 
drawing, authorship, and return comes to a head in its penultimate scene 
that points, as American Psycho pointed, beyond language and represen-
tation. Bret’s son Bobby disappears, and when Bret does see him again, 
Bobby leaves Bret a drawing: “a landscape of the moon. [. . .] One word 
was written on it” (306). The same word—we never learn it—is written 
in the ash that lines the sides of the safe deposit box where Bret’s father’s 
ashes had burst from their own box. In is out; what is inside exits and, 
like a bomb, American Psycho’s hermetic quality (it is sealed by its final, 
famous, sentence, “THIS IS NOT AN EXIT” [399]) explodes in Lunar 
Park’s elegiac final pages, as the ashes and their unspeakable message 
are described as “exiting the text” (308). What is drawn but not shown, 
written but not published, traced but not spoken in American Psycho 
migrates to Lunar Park and, propelled outward, disappears into the 
extradiegetic: Bret describes the ashes as “losing themselves somewhere 
beyond my reach, and then vanished” (308).
THE  GAME THAT  MOVES
In Less Than Zero Clay, driving down Sunset Drive, notices a billboard. 
“All it says is ‘Disappear Here’ and even though it’s probably an ad 
 16. Clark reads the absence of the “scary drawing” in American Psycho as evidence 
that “the words have been stripped of their referential and expressive functions; they 
offer no clue to a way out of the maze. The violence associated with these words can-
not be located in the world.” He suggests locating the site of violence “on the line that 
Patrick draws between appearance and reality [. . .] and ‘reality’ should be understood 
here precisely as what cannot be seen from or admitted to the world of appearances and 
empty signs that the characters inhabit” (26). But, as Patrick confesses to Jean, “the 
lines separating appearance—what you see—and reality—what you don’t—become, well, 
blurred” (378); this blurring extends, I submit, from signification and vision to action 
and volition.
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for some resort, it still freaks me out a little” (38). Invitation, exhor-
tation, or warning, the commodification of escape or option or means 
(a final exit; a last resort), “Disappear Here” returns and reappears in 
Ellis’s later novels. In Glamorama Victor twice sees the phrase when he 
returns to the house in Paris after learning that his fiancée Chloe has 
been impregnated by a Victor imposter—the initiation of the slow, pur-
poseful erasure he will experience (474, 480). In Lunar Park Bret finds 
the words on the wall of his son’s room after the boy has vanished (288). 
In both instances, each letter of the phrase is set in a different typeface, 
so that the words dissolve into asignifying parts, like specks, like the 
billboards Victor sees at the end of Glamorama with the answers to his 
questions (who, what, where, when, why). The point of this return is 
to elicit our recognition of Ellis’s authorship of this intertextual world, 
even as typefaces recall an age in which an assemblage of letters from 
various print sources ensured anonymity. Simultaneously signature and 
threat, the phrase asserts Ellis’s authorship and undermines it. He disap-
pears here, into textuality, literariness, the product, it seems, of what 
Marc Augé calls “the new regime of fiction” in which “fiction invades 
everything and the author vanishes. The world is penetrated by a fic-
tion without any author” (102).17 This process extends to the attentive 
reader. In Imperial Bedrooms Clay, emerging from nightmares, encoun-
ters the words in red letters on a mirror (104). The perspective from 
which words on a mirror can be read obscures or blurs the mirror image 
of the reader. Visualize the scene, and you will see Clay vanish as “disap-
pear here” comes into focus.
 “Even though it’s probably an ad for some resort, it still freaks me 
out a little.” Clay has good reason to feel uneasy. His name invites us to 
think of someone who will be shaped and formed, impressed upon by his 
experience, but he is, as I’ve said, subtracted. Imperial Bedrooms encour-
ages this perspective. It is, as Colby writes, a “non-narrative” (170), and 
the final lines of Ellis’s last novel (specifically, the reference to “the game 
that moves as you play,” one of Less Than Zero’s epigraphs, and a line 
from “The Have Nots,” a song by the band X) evoke, reverse, and cross 
 17. Baelo-Allué suggests that Ellis represents a new kind of author: a celebrity au-
thor, one that embraces his or her identity as a commodity. Ellis, Baelo-Allué writes, 
“represents a new form of writing and selling fiction which does not hesitate to exploit 
the promotional techniques that used to be reserved for the entertainment industry alone. 
[. . .] Ellis’s novels have been promoted through posters, trailers, fake web pages and TV 
appearances” (20). For more on Ellis’s celebrity author status, see Annesly (“Brand El-
lis”).
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out his first.18 Imperial Bedrooms is signed with the date range 1985–
2010, which led some readers to surmise that Ellis is, with this novel, 
signaling the end of his literary career (an interpretation that Ellis has not 
disavowed).19
 Of course, whether Clay was there to begin with is an open ques-
tion. In the final pages of Less Than Zero, sitting literally in the shadow 
of the billboard, Blair tells Clay, “You were never there.” “I don’t know 
if any other person I’ve been with has been really there, either,” she 
continues, “but at least they tried. [. . .] You never did” (204). Twenty-
five years since the publication of Less Than Zero, Ellis reaffirms the 
subtraction the billboard promised. Reflecting on the adaptation of 
Less Than Zero to film, Clay, in Imperial Bedrooms, notes his unlikely 
role as the film’s moral center in his attempts to save Julian. Imperial 
Bedrooms corrects this error: the book is “another—and very differ-
ent—movie” (10) in which Clay orchestrates Julian’s murder, reappro-
priating, as I have said, the anomic amorality of Less Than Zero and 
qualifying the logic of image and commodity appeal that dictated the 
adaptation. Such work does not lend Clay substance—this is no affir-
mation of critique. Imperial Bedrooms, with its “filmlike aesthetic” 
(Colby 172), delivers the final coup de grace to Ellis’s vexed relation 
to fiction. After Julian’s abduction—“he disappears so quickly it’s as 
if he was never here at all” (Imperial Bedrooms 154)—Clay retreats to 
a house in Palm Springs for a weekend of sexual violence and abuse, 
“and in the house was a copy of the book that had been written about 
us over twenty years ago and its neon cover glared from where it rested 
on the glass coffee table until it was found floating in the pool [. . .] 
 18. Baelo-Allué also notes the similarities between the opening of Ellis’s 1985 debut 
and the conclusion of Imperial Bedrooms, identifying the latter as “a reworking of the 
famous opening of Less Than Zero” (191). Colby describes the evaporation of Clay’s 
textual authority in the course of Imperial Bedrooms’s dialogic relation with the 1985 
book. “Ellis has Clay disappear,” she writes (169), and traces his elimination through 
the course of the text, a process that culminates in Imperial Bedrooms’s final sentence, 
“I never liked anyone and I’m afraid of people.” With this sentence, which both Colby 
and Baelo-Allué see as a reference to “people are afraid to merge,” Clay, writes Colby, 
“disappears into his first enunciation in 1985” (186).
 19. Asked this question directly, Ellis responded in both the affirmative and with typi-
cal equivocation: “I don’t know if I’m ever going to write another novel again, but that’s 
just not how it works. I might say that, but that might not be the case. I might be feeling 
very differently about it a month or a year from now—I don’t know. I can’t answer that 
conclusively. I don’t want this to be my last novel, but I’m also thinking about the novel—
what more can be done with it? I’m interested in television right now. Television seems 
to be, in a way, where I want to take the novel. I want to take the novel into television” 
(Chaplinsky).
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water bloated, the sound of crickets everywhere, and then the camera 
tracks across the desert until we start fading out on the yellowing sky” 
(Imperial Bedrooms 158–59). As Clay, and all the other characters in 
Ellis’s intertextual world, disappear here, Less Than Zero figures as just 
another casualty.
 Clay gave Muriel his vest because he was “too tired to say no,” a 
lethargy characteristic of Generation X; in the wake of value’s exhaus-
tion, complicity undermines critique. Violence serves no purpose, it just 
is; unmoored from reference or signification, it is mobilized in blank 
fiction, where it functions as an inarticulate resistance without promise 
or premise. This pursuit of intensity leaves its object exploded or col-
lapsed, and violence migrates outward, a moving target. Ellis’s novels 
span this trajectory; through them, we can trace this movement toward 
and away from causality, toward and away from signification, toward 
and away from the real, as the criteria for critique—judgment, value, 
volition—disappear. The billboard marks the spot where they vanish 
into blankness. The book floats in the pool, a bloated corpse. And Bret 
Easton Ellis, like Imperial Bedrooms’s Clay, now claims a screenplay 
as his most recent work (The Canyons was released in 2013) and, like 
his characters Patrick and Victor, both of whom have a significant pres-
ence in cyberspace, he is especially active on Twitter. Even here, though, 
his inclination is to disappear. “Unfollow,” he exhorts his subscribers. 
“Unfollow.”
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In the opening pages of Don DeLillo’s Falling Man, Keith Neudecker, 
the novel’s protagonist, stumbling from the ruins of the World Trade 
Center, sees something empty in the sky. A shirt floats in the wind. Set 
against the bleak descriptions of “a time and space of falling ash and 
near night” (3), the shirt is “outside all this, not belonging to this, aloft.” 
It is not fallen but falling, “lifted and drifting in the scant light and then 
falling again” (4). Keith, too, drifts in the course of Falling Man. He 
wanders toward and away from his estranged wife, Lianne, toward and 
away from Florence Givens, another survivor of the North Tower, with 
whom he has a brief affair. At the end of the novel Keith is disappear-
ing. He is increasingly absent from his family, fading into the perpetual 
poker games in Vegas, decelerating the repetitions of his physical therapy 
exercises, emptying out, disintegrating, “becoming the air he breathed” 
(230).
 Falling Man traces Keith’s erasure in the days and months after he 
appears on Lianne’s doorstep “like smoke” (8). But even before he hears 
or feels the North Tower’s fall—“That was him coming down, the north 
tower” (5)—Keith sees the world from the point of view of one no lon-
ger in it. “There was something critically missing from the things around 
1 1 1
Something Empty in the Sky
9/11 after X
f o u r 
·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·
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him,” Keith reflects. “They were unfinished, whatever that means. They 
were unseen, whatever that means [. . .] Maybe this is what things look 
like when there is no one here to see them” (5). The novel’s concluding 
chapter, which returns Keith to the moment of impact and traces his exit 
from the North Tower, pursues this subtraction. “He could not find him-
self in the things he saw and heard. [. . .] He watched them move into the 
stunned distance. That’s where everything was, all around him, falling 
away, street signs, people, things he could not name” (246).
 The empty shirt seems to counter this subtraction. Though empty, 
it is. It flickers into being in the course of the novel’s parallel narra-
tive, focalized by Lianne. Lianne works with Alzheimer’s patients in an 
attempt to stave off her fear of the “breathless moment when things 
fall away, streets, names” (156), a fear that echoes Keith’s sense, in the 
wake of the towers, that the world is retreating, “falling away, street 
signs, people, things he could not name.” But in contrast to Keith, 
who disappears in the course of Falling Man, Lianne resolutely moves 
toward presence. From an early, striking image of her outlined in fog 
on a mirror (106), Lianne feels her body come into being; for her, as for 
Keith, the medium of the shirt is crucial for this work. In the conclud-
ing pages of the novel, Lianne pulls on a T-shirt and smells “just her, the 
body through and through. It was the body and everything it carried, 
inside and out, identity and memory and human heat” (236). Keith’s 
movement to absence, and Lianne’s to presence, leaves them in the same 
space, one peopled with nameless things and marked by erosion: “it was 
a small moment, already passing, the kind of moment that is always 
only seconds from forgetting” (236).
 “In its desertion of every basis for comparison, the event asserts its 
singularity,” writes DeLillo in his essay “In the Ruins of the Future.” 
“There is something empty in the sky. The writer tries to give mem-
ory, tenderness, and meaning to all that howling space” (39). Together 
with Art Spiegelman’s iconic New Yorker cover, that figures the World 
Trade Center towers as black spaces in a starry night, DeLillo’s phras-
ing has been read as a gesture toward an overwhelming absence that 
fragments narrative, resists closure, and demands silence. Writing of “In 
the Ruins,” Linda Kauffman describes DeLillo as trying “‘desperately’ 
to imagine the unspeakable”; the essay, she continues, traces “absence, 
emptiness, the howling space of the void: the rest is silence” (357).1 The 
 1. Critical responses to DeLillo’s essay have lingered on this phrase. The majority 
of them have reinforced the vein of Kauffman’s lament. Conte writes: “After 9/11 the 
towers [. . .] must also be regarded in ‘all that howling space’”; he describes the towers’ 
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register of Kauffman’s essay eloquently evokes the shock and horror 
that many felt in the aftermath of the terror attacks, an affect amply 
served by the discourse of trauma or tremendum defined by the vio-
lences of the twentieth century. But Falling Man’s spare prose and flat 
affect fit uneasily with this register, and the novel’s designation of the 
events of September 11, 2001 as “the planes” signals a departure from 
this discourse. Multiple, mobile, flat surfaces, infinitely large, with zero 
thickness, “the planes” image 9/11 not as the limit case of perception 
but as a refusal of depth. What are the implications of this refusal for 
the reality of events that are, as many commentators have noted, strik-
ingly similar to fiction? What does representation look like, when its 
object is something empty in the sky?
 This chapter answers these questions by reading 9/11 after—both 
subsequent to and according to—Generation X. The 15-to-25-year-olds 
for whom, in 1985, Less Than Zero struck a chord are, in 2001, in their 
30s and 40s, with jobs, mortgages, marriages (sometimes more than 
one). Of course, in the initial aftermath of the attacks, the “whatever 
generation” participated in the rest of the country’s shock and horror. 
Ulrich writes that 9/11 was accompanied by proclamations of “the end 
of Generation X’s cynical, self-indulgent, quietistic attitude” and that 
9/11 was considered “the defining historical moment that would shake 
[Generation X] out of its cynicism and apathy, and confer upon it some 
sort of concrete identity and coherent, meaningful purpose” (29–30). But 
he notes that such proclamations did not retain their credibility and Gen-
eration X remains uneasily poised between the alternative and the main-
stream, its allegiances in question, its definition negotiable, its identity 
appropriable, and its “truths” to be determined.
absence as “the epitome of mourning and collective trauma” (560). Walker reads De-
Lillo’s “howling space” as “the terror narrative that threatens to overwhelm all,” and the 
novelist’s response as “to insist upon a return to narrative as personal, partial, incom-
plete, to contribute to the limitless mosaic of plots that do not insist upon domination” 
(337). Versluys, discussing DeLillo’s essay, does not reference this phrase directly, though 
his focus on “a communion of telling, which somehow fills the void caused by the attacks 
and offsets the murderous intents of the terrorists” (20) certainly echoes its sentiment. 
Abel’s reading of “In the Ruins” departs from this trend: his interest is more on the es-
say’s ethos of movement (its treatment of acceleration, deceleration, and speed); “In the 
Ruins” speaks, Abel concludes, to the response literature can posit to real-world violence 
(Violent Affect 189). In an earlier incarnation of his argument, Abel does quote De Lillo’s 
reference to “something empty in the sky” (“‘Ruins of the Future’” 1246); his focus 
there on the writer’s response to 9/11, and he concludes that “the writer does not know 
if his effort will succeed.” Abel’s refusal of a discourse of trauma, and his reluctance to 
affirm terminology of moral clarity, leads Versluys to dismiss his argument as “erudite 
but misconceived” (196n1).
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 I examine three 9/11 novels by X authors: Frédéric Beigbeder’s Win-
dows on the World, Claire Messud’s The Emperor’s Children, and Jess 
Walter’s The Zero (an additional 9/11 novel by an Xer, Jonathan Saf-
ran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, is discussed in the 
following chapter). Beigbeder’s 9/11 novel is one of the first; Messud’s 
has been treated harshly by critics; Walter’s has been relatively neglect-
ed.2 These novels offer me the opportunity to elicit an X attitude to the 
reality of 9/11, its immediacy, its presumed epochality, and its affective 
charge. Each contains what DeLillo calls a counternarrative, in which 
a character claims, falsely, to have lost someone in the attacks. In Beig-
beder’s Windows on the World, the French author (also named Frédéric 
Beigbeder) travels to New York City as part of his book project to write 
the fictional story of Carthew Yorston, a man his own age, and his two 
young sons who are trapped in the Windows on the World restaurant 
at the top of the World Trade Center. In New York, in conversation 
with someone who asks him why he’s writing about 9/11, he gives, 
as an answer, that his cousin died in the restaurant with his children 
(the narrator/author lost no family in the attacks). In Claire Messud’s 
The Emperor’s Children, a young man—the character’s name is Bootie 
Tubb—treats the attacks of 9/11 as an opportunity to vanish from his 
life and begin anew. He takes a bus to Miami, renames himself Ulrich 
New (after Robert Musil’s The Man without Qualities), and allows his 
friends and family to believe he is dead. In Jess Walter’s The Zero, the 
protagonist—Brian Remy, a First Responder—is called to a family meet-
ing with his ex-wife Carla to learn that his son, Edgar, has been telling 
everyone in school that his father had died in the attacks. Edgar refuses 
 2. Duvall and Marzec include a brief discussion of The Zero (385–88) in their intro-
duction to a special issue of Modern Fiction Studies, “Fiction After 9/11.” They describe 
Walter’s novel as “an undervalued text that might complicate the current discussion of 
9/11 fiction” (389), stress its satiric quality, note its treatment of paranoia, and praise 
its political engagement with the “War On Terror” (388). Since the MFS issue was pub-
lished in 2011, a few article-length studies of Walter’s novel have appeared in print. 
Duvall’s “Homeland Security and the State of (American) Exception(alism)” stresses the 
novel’s “ludic postmodernism” as an assertion of irony’s resilience after 9/11 (281), and 
Aaron DeRosa’s “Alterity and the Radical Other in Post-9/11 Fiction” compares DeL-
illo’s and Walter’s representations of terroristic alterity. Both Duvall and DeRosa stress 
the novel’s political valences: like me, they see in The Zero an opportunity to articulate 
an alternative approach to the discourse of national exceptionalism and the priority 
of trauma in 9/11 fiction. Kristine Miller’s “Reading and Writing the Post-9/11 Cop” 
compares the representation of Remy, the traumatized First Responder, to firsthand oral 
histories to argue against the opposition of private trauma and its public representation; 
like me, Miller sees in the novel an opportunity to “examine the presumed boundaries 
between fiction and nonfiction, fantasy and reality, language and experience” (31).
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to apologize: “Don’t tell me I shouldn’t be devastated by the death of 
my father just because he isn’t dead!” he says (35).
 Writing of the counternarrative, DeLillo posits it as a site where 
correction and conspiracy, accuracy and inaccuracy, witness and fic-
tion combine. “For the next fifty years, people who were not in the area 
when the attacks occurred will claim to have been there. In time, some 
of them will believe it. Others will claim to have lost friends or rela-
tives, although they did not” (“Ruins” 37). Tellingly, DeLillo does not 
follow this observation with injunctions to specificity: fiction and fact, 
experience and its appropriation, art and documentation join forces in 
his imagination of a literary response to 9/11.3 For the novels discussed 
in this chapter, the counternarrative offers an opportunity to revise the 
relation of violence to the real at precisely this, an event heralded as 
the “return of the real.” But, I submit, their approach to 9/11 is not an 
expression of youthful X ’tude. It opens up an approach to violence that 
refuses the affective ethos of trauma, the singularity of U.S. exceptional-
ism, and the presumption of fidelity that, in the informal patriotic fervor 
and official bellicose rhetoric, assumed such murderous manifestations in 
the months and years following the attacks.
 Robert Capa, who coined the phrase “Generation X,” described as 
the main problem for that generation the question of “going to war or 
not” (Whelen, qtd. in Ulrich 31). Recalling Capa’s question, John Ulrich 
reflects, in 2003, that “Generation X must once again grapple with this 
same problem, as the Bush administration expands its war on terrorism 
to include military action against nations it suspects of developing weap-
ons of mass destruction and providing assistance to the al-Qaeda terror-
ist network” (31). When suspicion affects patriotism, and the enemy is 
determined by the channel you subscribe to, the real threat is what you 
 3. In his willingness to abandon the distinction between fiction and fact, DeLillo 
continues Derrida’s meditation on the paradox of testimony and literature in his 1998 
Demeure: Fiction and Testimony. For Derrida, testimony, by definition, contains the pos-
sibility that it may be a fiction. “There is no testimony that does not structurally imply 
in itself the possibility of fiction, simulacra, dissimulation, lie, and perjury—that is to 
say, the possibility of literature,” he writes in Demeure (29), and describes literature as 
“the name without the thing” (20). Just five years later Derrida’s concept of literature 
features in his confrontation with the events of 9/11: in “Autoimmunity: Real and Sym-
bolic Suicides,” “September 11,” too, is the name without the thing: “We perhaps have 
no concept and no meaning available to us to name in any other way this ‘thing’ that has 
just happened,” he suggests (86), and locates in the repetition or reiteration of “9/11” 
an attempt “to conjure away, as if by magic, the ‘thing’ itself, the fear or the terror it 
inspires” and an attempt “to deny [. . .] our powerlessness to name in an appropriate 
fashion, to characterize, to think the thing in question” (87).
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choose to believe it to be. It may even (as it is for David Simpson) be the 
role of belief in politics (Simpson 149). This X approach, with its atten-
tion to the variances of fidelity, also illuminates other 9/11 novels, dis-
missed or ignored by critics, that thoughtfully and courageously confront 
the attacks and their aftermath, as I demonstrate in my discussion of Jay 
McInerney’s The Good Life and Ken Kalfus’s A Disorder Peculiar to the 
Country. Though neither falls within the X demographic, McInerney and 
Kalfus, like DeLillo, employ Xers as characters through whom to focal-
ize 9/11, and offer me an opportunity to examine what an X approach 
to 9/11 makes possible. Finally, I return to Falling Man, reading it after, 
or under the sign of, X: a simultaneity of presence and absence, an epis-
temic validity that, like something empty in the sky, disappears here. But 
before I do any of this: true to an event characterized by multiplicity, by 
twinning, by simulation and replaying, I want to pause, to rewind, and to 
begin this chapter again.
REAL I TY  CHECKS
In Claire Messud’s The Emperor’s Children, Baby Boomer Murray 
Thwaite and Generation Xer Danielle Lipkoff awake from a night of pas-
sion in Danielle’s apartment, a room with a view of downtown Manhat-
tan, on the morning of September 11, 2001. After the shock of the initial 
impact,
They lived the next hour and a half in stereo, watching through a win-
dow [. . .] and watching on the screen, as if they were simultaneously 
in Manhattan and anywhere on the planet [. . .] and everything they 
saw seemed somehow more and less real on the television because what 
they saw with their own eyes they couldn’t quite believe. [. . .] What 
took place outside the window could have been credited as sorcery, some 
trick of the light, almost comical, so absurd, were it not for the fact that 
it was being filmed—the filming of it the assurance of its reality: the 
whole world was seeing this, and the Pentagon, too, and this was how 
you knew that it was really true. (411–12)
 9/11 has widely been described as the inversion of the relation of fic-
tion and reality. The real-time nature of the attacks, combined with their 
similarity to a disaster movie, invite reflection on the relation of reality 
to image and the pre-eminence of spectacle in the discursive construc-
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tion of truth. This brief moment in Messud’s novel parses the sense that 
real violence is not so much experienced as it is, like the reality of real-
ity TV, produced.4 Both affirmed and undercut by television, reality is 
registered as a matter of degree, wavering between paucity and surplus: 
more and less real. Authenticity, represented by experiential certainty, 
is similarly undercut. The twin images—the view through the window 
 4. Joseph Natoli’s This Is a Picture and Not the World explores the extent to which 
cinema shapes perception of reality—especially after 9/11. In an introductory chap-
ter framed as an interview, Kevin Nicholoff presents the formal refutation of Natoli’s 
theory: “But the attack itself—that was real. People died. That was real. Those towers 
are gone. That’s real.” Natoli’s response is worth quoting at length: “Sure. It’s an his-
torical fact. Place, date, and all. Like Pearl Harbor. Vietnam. Wait. Aren’t those histori-
cal events, like all historical events, now imagined within the dimensions of a present 
cultural imaginary? Their existence is at once a matter of representation, which is a 
matter of cultural mediation. The 9/11 attack was unique in that it happened on our TV 
screens at the same time it happened in the world. From the very first TV images of a 
plane and a building the event went through the kind of mediating filtering TV gives to 
reality and we give to TV. At once, what we saw on TV was like a movie and we could 
digest it no other way” (14–15).
FIGURE 5. City Workers in London Watch News of Terrorist Attacks in America. September 11, 2001. 
Laura Tanner writes, “For spectators around the globe, the proliferation of images rendered the 9/11 
attacks spectacularly immediate yet simultaneously unreal” (59). © Reuters/Corbis.
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and the image on the screen—dislocate Danielle and Murray, who find 
themselves “simultaneously in Manhattan and anywhere on the planet,” 
an undoing of “the profound disparity between the lived experiences of 
those ‘on the ground’ and the vast audience watching [that] is a domi-
nant theme in the ‘literature of Terror’” (Randall 2).
 To say that 9/11 represents an inversion of the relation of fiction to 
reality is to return to Baudrillard’s and Žižek’s early responses to the 
attacks. Both suggest that, despite the horror, trauma, and wrenching 
loss of life, the violence offered some respite from the hyperreal, virtual 
world of globalized commodity capitalism. “We thought we had seen 
(perhaps with a certain relief) a resurgence of the real, and of the vio-
lence of the real, in an allegedly virtual universe,” writes Baudrillard. 
But, he continues, such an impression belies the centrality of the image 
in which reality and fiction are intertwined. “Rather than the violence of 
the real being there first, and the frisson of the image being added after, 
the image is there first, and the frisson of the real is added. Something 
like an additional fiction, a fiction surpassing fiction” (27–29). Žižek 
disagrees: “We should not mistake reality for fiction—we should be able 
to discern, in what we experience as fiction, the hard kernel of the Real 
which we are able to sustain only if we fictionalize it” (Welcome 19; ital-
ics in original). In the wake of the attacks and of the subsequent war on 
terror to which Baudrillard and Žižek are responding, the question of 
whether the real has become fiction, or whether it is inextricable from 
its own fictionalization, is a nice point. The more salient point is that 
concern with the real—its availability, its attraction, and the epistemic 
certainty it represents—is an expression of what Alain Badiou calls the 
“passion for the real” characteristic of the twentieth century, for which 
“the real, conceived in its contingent absoluteness, is never real enough 
not to be suspected of semblance. [. . .] Nothing can attest that the real 
is the real, nothing but the system of fictions wherein it plays the role of 
the real” (Century 52). Badiou concludes that this passion for the real 
is the passion for the authentic, an affirmation of identity that is inex-
tricable from destruction and purification (56). It is part and parcel of 
the logic that authored the atrocities and horrors that characterized the 
previous century.5
 5. Discussing the events of 9/11, Badiou states that designating the destruction of 
the World Trade Center as an “attack,” and the corresponding affect implied in such 
designation, is an expression of this passion. “It has a fin de siècle ring to it, but it is of 
another century” (Polemics 15). The nihilistic logic of the passion for the real, Badiou 
will go on to argue, is shared by the “War against Terrorism.”
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 One may identify this logic in the reverence accorded to empiri-
cal validity in the wake of disaster, especially in early responses to the 
attacks. John Frow observed, in 2003, that 9/11 “figures as something 
like a bedrock of fact,” obscuring the extent to which “brute reality” is 
constructed as such (76). When this “brute reality” is extended to the 
forms, shapes, and meanings an event may assume, injunctions of fidel-
ity to it work to limit the kinds of sense—critical or fictional—one can 
make, with the effect not of imagination’s abnegation but of its legis-
lation and, by extension, a legislation of the kinds of responses, both 
personal and political, we can have. Speaking of U.S. public discourse 
in the months that followed the attacks, Judith Butler laments the align-
ment of grief and mourning with silence and consent, when any attempt 
to “understand” was considered a legitimation of the attacks and an 
exoneration of the perpetrators. Jacques Derrida, speaking of the same 
period, describes “being made to feel that it is actually forbidden, that 
you do not have the right, to begin speaking of anything, especially in 
public, without [. . .] making an always somewhat blind reference to this 
date” (“Autoimmunity” 87). His response is to focus on “9/11,” recast-
ing its refusal of reference as an invitation to critique. “We do not in fact 
know what we are saying or naming in this way [. . .] We do not recog-
nize or even cognize, that we do not yet know how to qualify, that we do 
not know what we are talking about” (86).
 These early evocations of 9/11’s challenge to reference figure promi-
nently in more recent studies of literary texts that take as their subject 
the terror attacks. “9/11 is unpossessable,” writes Kristiaan Versluys, “it 
is a limit event that shatters the symbolic resources of the culture and 
defeats the normal processes of meaning making and semiosis” (1). “If 
there was one thing writers agreed about in response to 9/11, it was the 
failure of language; the terrorist attacks made the tools of their trade 
seem absurd,” asserts Richard Gray (1). Both cite Derrida, and for both, 
trauma theory proves a useful tool with which to evaluate and analyze 
these texts. Indeed, trauma theory is the dominant paradigm through 
which 9/11 fiction is approached, a point reiterated by John N. Duvall 
and Robert P. Marzec in their introduction to a special issue of Novel: 
A Forum on Fiction devoted to 9/11 (395–96). The purview of trauma 
studies is the relation of history to violence: the inability of history to 
master violence and the crucial work of witness and attestation to his-
tory that violence demands. Trauma happened, and while it can be reg-
istered as presence or absence, directly or indirectly, both acting out 
trauma and working through it (to borrow terminology from Dominick 
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LaCapra) testify to its reality and to the violence of this reality. When 
history is trauma, its violence is real: trauma, as a discourse, checks real-
ity’s unstable, multiple, and mobile quality. For Xers, though, reality is 
checked not through traumatic experience but through television. Wit-
nessing simultaneously through her window and her television set, Dani-
elle reflects that “she had seen the people jumping, from afar, specks in 
the sky, and she knew that’s what they were only from the TV, from the 
great reality check of the screen” (414).
 Like Messud’s The Emperor’s Children, Frédéric Beigbeder’s Win-
dows on the World and Jess Walter’s The Zero treat 9/11 as an event 
that is both “more and less real,” and examine the nature of truth when 
reality (what’s “really true”) is confirmed by mechanical reproduction—
the fact of being filmed. For all, perception, witness, memory, and mas-
tery of 9/11 are informed by television, specifically, their acquaintance 
with televisuality: replaying, rewinding, repeating. Televisuality dictates, 
for each, their perception of causality. The sequence of events is avail-
able to be reordered, as is the inexorable quality of cause and effect: 
the grammatical core not only of violence itself but of the narratives 
constructed around it. For these X authors—as for McInerney, Kalfus, 
and DeLillo—infidelity, in the form of lies, affairs, and inaccurate mime-
sis, provides a site wherein violence’s relation to the real is evaluated, 
negotiated, and revised. All these novels take seriously the terror attacks’ 
quality as more and less real and, while none denies that 9/11 happened, 
each submits that the happening of an event—its brute facticity—is not 
sufficient to ensure its reality. If violence is real or not “really” violent, a 
violent event that is both more and less real invites questions about the 
kind of truth claims that surround it.
MISS ION  IMPOSS IBLE
The attempt to achieve a profound, “true” experience through fiction—
and the inevitable failure of this attempt—dominates Frédéric Beigbe-
der’s Windows on the World.6 The novel’s structural conceit posits fact 
and fiction in parallel. Beigbeder employs two narrators. The first is 
 6. Beigbeder’s novel received mixed reviews from critics. It was termed “disgusting” 
and “obscene” (qtd. in Wyatt), eliciting charges of sensationalism (Brownrigg), “kitsch” 
(Laura Miller), and “schlock” (Lacey). More sympathetic reviews expressed admiration 
for Beigbeder’s attempt “to imagine the unimaginable” (Douthat 50), even if the result 
produces what Douthat calls “a bad book” (50).
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fictional: Carthew Yorston, an American from Texas, who is trapped 
in Windows on the World with his two young sons. The second nar-
rator is Beigbeder himself, in an explicitly autobiographical, or auto-
fictional, portrayal. The American Carthew Yorston and the French 
Frédéric Beigbeder (both parents of young children, both in their 40s, 
both divorced) are, like the towers, mirror images. Pursuing this logic of 
mimesis, Beigbeder sits in Le Ciel de Paris, the restaurant at the top of 
the Tour Montparnasse in Paris and the French equivalent of Windows 
on the World, in order to acquire some sense of what it must have been 
like for Yorston. The novel is thus structured as an experiment in expe-
riential commensurability: it tests the power of literature to evoke expe-
rience, and as an experiment, it is cognizant, early on, that it will fail. 
As the narrator Beigbeder puts it, “For me to be able to describe what 
took place on the far side of the Atlantic, a plane would have to crash 
into this black tower beneath my feet” (8).
 Of course, a plane does not hit the Tour Montparnasse, and, despite 
all his attempts to imagine it, the closest Beigbeder can get to his sub-
ject is an overpriced restaurant in the ugliest building in Paris (the best 
thing about the view from the Tour Montparnasse, he says, is that you 
can’t see the Tour Montparnasse [7]). Even though the author brings 
his three-year-old daughter to the restaurant for breakfast, thinking 
of Yorston with his children in Windows on the World, this principle 
of equivalence is necessarily doomed. Beigbeder will never know what 
he wants to learn. Reciting a bleak list of facts—numbers, figures, esti-
mations of quantity and force—he concludes by reiterating the novel’s 
compelling opening sentence: “You know how it ends: everybody dies” 
(1). “Obviously,” he later reflects, “this piece of information removes 
any element of suspense from this book. So much the better: this isn’t a 
thriller; it is simply an attempt—doomed perhaps—to describe the inde-
scribable” (55). The novel’s tendency to dwell on its limits has domi-
nated its critical reception. Alain-Philippe Durand, in his seminal 2006 
account of the novel and its reception, sets the stakes of Windows on the 
World in these terms: “Can literature transcribe the unspeakable, and if 
so, how?” (109). Characteristically, the narrator asks himself that very 
question. His answer is this: “The only interesting subjects are those 
that are taboo. [. . .] Nowadays, books must go where television does 
not. Show the invisible. Speak the unspeakable. It may be impossible, 
but that is its raison d’être. Literature is a Mission Impossible” (295).
 This affirmation of transgression seems appropriate for an early 
novel about 9/11 that comes so close to its topic—“the black smoke 
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seeping from the floor, the heat melting the walls, the exploded win-
dows, the asphyxiation, the panic, the suicides, the headlong stampede 
to stairwells already in flames, the tears and the screams, the desper-
ate phone calls” (9). Like most affirmations of transgression, it leaves 
intact the distinction between representation and its object, just as dis-
obedience leaves intact the power structure from which the subject is 
delinquent. But this assertion of the power of literature is interrupted by 
television. Mission Impossible is italicized and capitalized (the French 
original has it in quotation marks), referencing the iconic American tele-
vision series that ran from 1966 to 1973, spawned a remake and several 
films and is still immediately, viscerally recognizable by the opening bars 
of its soundtrack. At the point of transgression, the gesture toward the 
limits of representation, this statement about the book’s raison d’être, its 
claim for literature, literature, going beyond television, is television (that 
the television program in question is an American import is appropri-
ate—Beigbeder has affirmed his fondness for U.S. culture).
 The limits of representation are thus linked to a logic of inversion. 
This logic (in which each of the X authors discussed in this chapter par-
ticipate, and to which we return in the discussion of The Zero, below) is 
reinforced when Beigbeder, again, gestures toward representation’s limits. 
As he ruminates on the terrorists’ motivations, Beigbeder recalls Jacques 
Martin’s TV show Incredible but True, and reflects on the challenge to 
representation posed by 9/11: “It was an event which was unforesee-
able because it was impossible. It was, quite literally, incomprehensible, 
by which I mean it passes human understanding” (264). He then offers 
a list (“check box as applicable”) building up to a re-enactment of the 
TV show in which Martin would suggest “Incredible, but . . .” and par-
ticipants would answer, “TRUE!” Like “Mission Impossible,” the pas-
sage traces a closed circuit in which television is both within and beyond 
the limits of representation. Television, in fact, determines and defines 
representation and its limits. Beigbeder’s brave gesture toward taboo, 
his evocation of the unthinkable, the unspeakable, his move beyond the 
limits of imagination and certainly beyond the mundanity of television, 
returns him to the TV shows of his childhood. 9/11 is a repeat, a replay, 
a remake.
 This is not to say that Windows on the World fails, or that it embraces 
the limits of imagination in the context of disaster. Even as it acknowl-
edges the limits of its structural gambit (the parallels of its mimetic sym-
metries collapse), televisuality, fantasy, and fiction come to the fore as 
active agents in the construction of 9/11 under the sign of simultaneous 
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affirmation and negation. In the course of the novel, Beigbeder abandons 
Le Ciel de Paris and travels to New York City on the Concorde. Because 
the Concorde travels so quickly—it takes off from Paris at 10 a.m. and 
lands in New York City two hours earlier—Beigbeder is moving through 
time as well as through space. Essentially, he is rewinding. Time travel 
is cheap, says Beigbeder, “the price of a Chanel dress” (150); sitting in 
the ’70s-style Concorde lounge, he muses, “I think I’m writing about 
September 11, but actually I’m writing about the seventies: the decade 
that spawned the WTC, the Tour Montparnasse, and the Concorde [. . .] 
of which three two no longer exist” (150–51). In the final chapter, as he 
returns to Paris, Beigbeder addresses the reader, inviting her to imagine 
him lying on the floor of the airplane, “fists clenched stretched towards 
the cockpit. [. . .] And do you know what I thought?” he continues, 
“That if I just closed my eyes and took away the cabin, the engines and 
all the other passengers, I’d be alone in the ether, 30,000 feet up, speed-
ing through the blue at supersonic speed. Yes, I thought I was a super-
hero” (303). The reference, of course, is to Superman, who, in the 1978 
film, circled the earth so many times he reversed its rotation, turned back 
time, and resurrected his love Lois Lane. But the reference is also to an 
earlier moment in the novel when Beigbeder’s fictional creation Carthew, 
still in the inferno of the burning tower, snaps at his son: “David, I’m not 
Superman! I wish I was!” (191). Beigbeder’s gesture, in the novel’s final 
sentence, is a double homage: both to the films of his childhood and to 
the fantasies of his fictional character’s kids.
 Beigbeder’s visit to New York City is instigated by an axial moment 
in the novel when his character, Carthew, addresses the narrator/author 
directly. Reflecting on the jumpers from the towers, Beigbeder sug-
gests that to leap from a burning building represents “one last mani-
festation of dignity: they will have chosen their end rather than waiting 
resignedly. Never has the expression ‘freefall’ made more sense” (148). 
Carthew, who will jump from the burning building, addresses Beigbe-
der (the only moment in the novel when he does so) and contradicts 
him. “Bullshit, my dear Beigbeder. [. . .] You don’t jump 1,300 feet 
because you’re a free man. You jump because you’re a hunted animal. 
You don’t jump to preserve your humanity, you jump because the fire 
has reduced you to a brute beast. The void is not a rational choice. It’s 
simply the only place that looks good from up there, somewhere you 
ache for, somewhere that doesn’t slash your skin with white-hot claws, 
doesn’t put out your eyes with searing-hot pokers. The void is a way 
out” (149). This direct address from his fictional character propels Beig-
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beder to abandon his attempt to achieve experiential commensurability 
in Paris. “OK, Carthew, if you’re going to be like that, I’ll go to New 
York. I realize the Tour Montparnasse isn’t the third World Trade Cen-
ter tower” (150). He chooses, instead, affective engagement, traveling to 
New York City on the Concorde, seeking, through physical proximity, 
to traverse the experiential incommensurability on which his novel is 
premised.
 In Manhattan Beigbeder relishes his position as a dark tourist, a voy-
eur of horror. “I circle the building like a vulture in search of corpses. 
I wander the vertical streets breathing in fresh calamity. A writer is a 
jackal, a coyote, a hyena. Give me my dose of desolation” (235). He 
seeks out a former employee of Windows on the World and engages him 
in conversation, introducing himself as a French writer who is writing 
about the restaurant. Asked why, he answers, “Because my grandmother 
was American—her name was Grace Carthew Yorstoun, and I didn’t 
go to her funeral” (298). This exchange—which appears immediately 
after Beigbeder’s reflection on why he was drawn to this topic—posits, 
alongside the aesthetic credo (“show the invisible, speak the unspeak-
able”) something more personal: the missed experience propels a fic-
tional re-enactment. For Beigbeder’s interlocutor in this scene, the logic 
behind this explanation, or the explanation itself, remains obscure. 
But the reason varies between the 2003 French original and the 2004 
English translation. “I’m sorry Sir,” Beigbeder’s interlocutor says, “but 
I don’t understand what you’re talking about. [. . .] I’ve got work to do. 
And I don’t understand french. You’re bothering me, Mister!” reads the 
French original (2003, 364–65; emphasis mine). In the English transla-
tion, “I don’t understand french” is replaced with “I don’t care about 
your grandmother” (2004, 298). It is understandable, of course, that the 
English phrases that pepper the prose of the original text would require 
some reworking for an American audience with no command of the 
French-English hybrid, Franglais, in which most of the novel is written. 
But the conversation heightens the tension between knowledge (what 
Beigbeder, in the Tour Montparnasse, failed to achieve) and caring (what 
he, as an Xer, is reputably unlikely to do).
 The tension between knowledge and caring is made quite explicit 
in the author’s note, where the occasion of the novel’s translation into 
English identifies the tension between knowing and caring as a matter 
of translation of fact into fiction. The purpose of this note is ostensibly 
to explain why some of the graphic depictions of sex acts and some ref-
erences to the Holocaust were cut from the English version. Beig beder 
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couches this omission in terms of fiction, fact, and tact. “A novel is a 
fiction; what is contained within its pages is not truth. The only way to 
know what took place in the restaurant [. . .] is to invent it,” writes Beig-
beder, and continues: “merging fiction with truth—and with tragedy—
risks hurting whose who have already suffered, something of which I 
was intensely aware when rereading the novel in English—the language 
in which the tragedy happened” (307; emphasis mine). He concludes 
abruptly: “Consequently some scenes have been revised for this edition” 
(307). It is hard to believe that Beigbeder (who, Durand reports, did 
not want to endorse the cuts) is not being disingenuous here.7 But by 
stating that 9/11 happened in English Beigbeder posits the original as, 
itself, a translation, and suggests that despite the novel’s multiple ges-
tures toward immediacy, experience is inextricable from mediation.
 A Franglais text with an English title about an event that “happened” 
in English, Windows on the World both demands translation and resists 
it. As would be expected, the Tower of Babel is a recurring motif, and 
the image of Babel in this novel reveals a great deal about the novel’s 
relationship to the languages in which it is written, even as the story 
of architectural hubris, divine punishment, and linguistic confusion 
seems more than apt as a metaphor for the novel’s subject. Both narra-
tors quote the Genesis text (55–56, 82, 117); Carthew, marooned in the 
North Tower, meditates on the appropriateness of the fable to his situ-
ation (“the Tower of Babel? I wonder if that’s where I am now” [116]); 
Beigbeder cites a myth that there were, in fact, two (or twin) towers 
of Babel (231–32); and in the elegiac penultimate chapter, the absent 
towers seem to be resurrected as the text runs in parallel columns on 
the page (301–2). But the bilingual quality of Windows on the World 
powerfully counteracts the Babel metaphor: the Franglais in which much 
of the novel is written is characterized as “a global language, one that 
defies God: the single language of Babel. Les words du world” (135) [La 
langue mondiale, celle qui désobéit à Dieu: la langue unique de Babel. 
Les words du world (2003, 175)].8 Given the prominence of the Babel 
motif, translation (both between languages and from fact into fiction) 
is the site where the demands of knowledge and of empathy collide. 
When “I don’t understand” translates to “I don’t care,” the conflicting 
demands of affect and fact must be approached in terms other than those 
 7. “Officially, the editing was Beigbeder’s decision,” writes Durand. “In reality, it 
was one of several requests the publishers imposed upon Beigbeder” (“Beyond the Ex-
treme” 114).
 8. For a different reading of this passage, see Schehr (137).
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of fidelity and infidelity, the logic of which has dominated the novel’s 
reception.9
 The interpenetration of fact, fiction, English, and French as a source 
of affective urgency is the crux of this conversation with the former Win-
dows on the World employee, and it is here that the counternarrative 
makes its appearance. To Beigbeder’s claim for American heritage (one 
that, he says, goes back to Daniel Boone), his interlocutor rejoins, in 
English, “So what?” Beigbeder responds, also in English, “We do not 
hate you.” He continues, in French:
“You scare us because you rule the world. But we’re blood relations. 
France helped your country to be born. Later, you liberated us. And 
my cousin died in your restaurant on September 11, 2001, with his two 
sons.”
 I don’t know why I lied like that. I wanted to move him. Cowardice 
makes you a pathological liar. Carthew Yorstoun was my grandmother’s 
family name. Take out a “u” and you have Carthew Yorston, a fictional 
character. (299)
In this bilingual exchange, the interrelation of French and English extends 
into the relation between fiction and fact: the name of the novel’s fictional 
character is produced by removing a “u” from an existing French name. 
In English, “u” sounds like “you,” suggesting that the production of fic-
tion is predicated on an erasure of alterity, and implying that the origi-
nal French of the novel is not the only language in which it can be read 
(hence, perhaps, its English title).
 Mimicking the collapse of the personal and the political in Beigbe-
der’s identification both as and with Americans, the linguistic interre-
lation between French and English extends to France and the United 
States. “We’re blood relations. France helped your country to be born. 
Later, you liberated us”—these sentences extend Beigbeder’s consan-
guineous affiliation with the United States (via his grandmother, Grace 
Carthew Yorstoun) to relations between the two nations and, even more 
globally, between the nation and its Other, “we” and “you.” Real con-
 9. My “Fiction et fidélité: Windows on the World” (2008) focused on the promi-
nence of fidelity and infidelity in the novel’s reception. Subsequent scholarship on Win-
dows on the World has turned away from this paradigm to focus on the novel’s explicit 
aestheticization of 9/11, tracing how Beigbeder elicits from the event a new represen-
tational system. See Lawrence R. Schehr (“Éffondrements”) and Mihaela P. Harper 
(“Turning to Debris”).
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sanguinity, in its metaphorical form, is refracted through the prism of 
novelistic imagination to confer reality on to a fictional character. With 
“my cousin died in your restaurant,” Beigbeder claims that Carthew 
Yorston is real although Carthew, who dies with his sons in Windows 
on the World, is “real” only within the pages of Windows on the World. 
Meditating on this statement, Beigbeder confesses, “I don’t know why I 
lied like that. I wanted to move him. Cowardice makes you a pathologi-
cal liar.”
 As the transnational context merges with the interpersonal one, a 
need to “move” (attendrir), to elicit an emphatic response, propels Beig-
beder toward fiction. The author lies, distorts, alters the truth, takes 
leave of the facts. He does so not as a gesture of fidelity to a different 
order of truth (he doesn’t know why he lied), and not out of bravado in 
face of representative taboos (he describes his act as “cowardly”), but 
in order to move his interlocutor, to make him care. This moment in 
the novel echoes an earlier meditation on the relation of fiction to real-
ity that led Beigbeder to conclude, “since September 11, 2001, reality 
has not only outstripped fiction, it’s destroying it. It’s impossible to write 
about this subject, and yet impossible to write about anything else. Noth-
ing else touches us” (8) [Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, non seulement la 
réalité dépasse la fiction mais elle la détruit. On ne peut pas écrire sur ce 
sujet mais on ne peut pas écrire sur autre chose non plus. Plus rien ne 
nous atteint (2003, 18)]. As being touched (atteindre) by reality propels 
Beigbeder to a fiction that moves (attendrir), the initial tension between 
caring and understanding is extended from a specific instance of transla-
tion to a much broader realm: defined not by mimesis but by movement, 
not by affect but by fiction, not by authenticity but by recycled images. 
In this realm, the role of literature is not to capture reality but to move 
its readers into a different relationship to it. The final image of that rela-
tionship—Beigbeder’s mimicry of Superman—casts it as an homage to 
precisely such a wishful fantasy.
PO ISED  IN  THE  VO ID
For many scholars of 9/11 literature, the ethics and aesthetics of trauma 
demand disrupted, fragmented texts that attest to the limits of fiction. 
“The best 9/11 novels are diffident linguistically,” writes Versluys, “the 
narratives shy away from the brute facts, the stark ‘donnée’ of thou-
sands of lives lost. As an event, 9/11 is limned as a silhouette, express-
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ible only through allegory and indirection” (14). Martin Randall, too, 
eschews “realist fiction” in favor of “hybrid forms” that attest to the 
challenge 9/11 poses to representation. Richard Gray demands of 9/11 
texts “an enactment of difference: not only the capacity to recognize that 
some kind of alteration of imaginative structures is required to register 
the contemporary crisis, to offer testimony to the trauma of 9/11 and 
its consequences, but also the ability and willingness imaginatively to 
act on that recognition” (29–30).10 Given these criteria, The Emperor’s 
Children is not a “good” 9/11 novel, and critical responses to Messud’s 
novel have been quite dismissive of its treatment of 9/11. The privileged 
background of some of her characters, the realism of her prose, and her 
reliance on the structure of the family romance—all are treated as evi-
dence that the novel insufficiently registers the gravity of the events. For 
Randall, for example, The Emperor’s Children raises “the question of 
how such a traumatizing event can be accommodated within a realist fic-
tion” (67).
 With its title, The Emperor’s Children invites reading in terms of 
generational relations. The novel is set in 2001, and populated with 
members of the New York liberal elite Thwaite family and their friends. 
Boomers Murray Thwaite and his wife, Annabel, are associated with 
1960s idealism, with great causes and social justice. Murray, who has 
great success in his practice of what he calls “moral journalism,” is occu-
pied with railing against injustice in the world and the state of liberalism 
in America. Annabel is preoccupied with her activities as a children’s 
rights lawyer. Their daughter, Marina (born in 1970), and her college 
friends, Danielle Minkoff and Julius Clarke, are Xers. Marina, a child of 
privilege, lives with Annabel and Murray in a spacious Central Park West 
apartment and toys with the idea of writing a book. Danielle and Julius 
lead less comfortable lives in Lower Manhattan. Danielle, the daughter 
of an Ohio contractor, struggles as a documentary filmmaker; Julius, the 
biracial son of a Green Beret who met his wife while on tour in Vietnam, 
 10. Smith departs from the tenor of this approach: responding to Gray’s argument, 
she contends that “the difficulty of channeling the traumatic force of 9/11 in a way 
that encourages new ways of thinking, feeling, and creating is intimately linked to the 
historical conditions of the post-9/11 period in the United States. [. . .] The novels 
that represent and articulate the attacks as world-changing while remaining formally 
familiar do indeed reflect the post-9/11 nexus of trauma, politics, and aesthetics with 
remarkable accuracy” (154–55). Heffernan and Salván also refuse the primacy of trau-
ma in approaches to 9/11 novels, arguing instead for their situation within the literary 
tradition that has always been galvanized by the role of violence in constituting national 
community.
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is a seductive, talented gay man who likes to conceal the mundanity of 
his childhood in Michigan; he barely makes ends meet by freelancing as 
an art critic. Murray’s nephew Frederick (Bootie) Tubb represents Mil-
lennials or Generation Y: he has just graduated from high school and 
in the course of the novel he moves from the decaying Victorian house 
in Watertown, New York, where he lives with his widowed mother, to 
Manhattan, where he works as his uncle’s secretary and endures a hope-
less infatuation with Marina. In the course of the novel Bootie’s hero-
worship of Murray will turn to dismay and disgust when he learns of 
Murray’s affair with Danielle and reads his manuscript, “How to Live.” 
For Bootie, Murray’s manuscript and his infidelity are “evidence”—in 
every sense of the world—that Murray is “someone for whom words had 
no fixed meaning” (269). Bootie writes an exposé of Murray and sub-
mits it to Marina and her fiancé, the Australian Ludovic Seeley, for the 
inaugural edition of Ludovic’s new journal The Monitor. The journal’s 
launch, scheduled for September 13, 2001, is indefinitely postponed.
 The title also references the Hans Christian Andersen story “The 
Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which a fiction of authority is revealed 
by a child’s truth-telling, and the book Marina ultimately writes, The 
Emperor’s Children Have No Clothes, a work of pop sociology that 
speculates on what we can learn about a society from the way its chil-
dren dress. Like Murray’s, Marina’s book is alternately smart and trite. 
Murray perceives it as “an artfully wrapped gift box, a flurry of elegant 
paper and ribbons that, when opened, proved to be empty. Perhaps not 
entirely empty: a few glittering, worthless marbles rolled around in the 
bottom” (319). The title thus points to the simultaneity of absence and 
presence, promise and premise; in this lightweight world, fidelity—mari-
tal, familial, idealistic—both demands truth and cancels it out. Bootie’s 
exposé of his uncle is of a piece with his youthful idealism that caused 
him to drop out of college and embark on a process of self-education on 
his way to his goal, “the life of the mind.” Bootie perceives truth as a 
violent, destructive, transformative force; the omniscient narrator, how-
ever, sets his idealism in some perspective. Thinking of his exposé—an 
analysis of Murray’s unpublished manuscript—Bootie reflects that he 
“was going to tell this truth, show the world the man as he was. It was 
going to be devastating; [. . .] it was going to be great. Telling the truth: 
what could be more important? [. . .] So here he was, washed in sweat, 
his jockey shorts sticking to his skin, the rest of him palely bare [. . .] 
penning the article that would change the world. Or change his world, 
for sure. This was revolution for you” (243).
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 Bootie’s body—plump, awkward, inconvenient, often undressed—is 
underscored in the course of the novel, and, though he flees the Thwaite 
clan and tries to vanish (decamping from Manhattan to Brooklyn), it 
is September 11 that provides him with an opportunity to erase it. As 
this idea comes to him, it is couched in terms of a simultaneity of pres-
ence and absence, the concretization of, and an escape from, his existen-
tial unease. “He had been given—his fate—the precious opportunity to 
be again, not to be as he had been. Because as far as anyone knew, he 
wasn’t. [. . .] It would be as if he had been there, in the lee of the towers, 
vanished, pulverized, the loathed Bootie Tubb meeting his unspeakable 
fate” (438). Bootie takes a bus to Miami, adopts the name Ulrich, and 
thinks back on “the falling towers, his own personal cinema,” reflecting: 
“It was all about control” (441).
 In contrast to the Millennial, Bootie, whose ungainly plenitude pro-
pels him toward revolution, Danielle, the Xer, is the site of substitution, 
mistakes, and erasure. Her affair with Murray, whom she has known for 
over a decade as her friend Marina’s father, is predicated on the chance 
fact that Murray encounters Danielle just after he chose not to pursue an 
affair with Roanne Levine, an undergraduate in a seminar he is guest-
teaching. Flush with desire and alcohol, he engages Danielle in conversa-
tion, thinking that his daughter’s friend “resembled Roanne Levine, but 
with a slightly smaller mouth, better breasts, and without the aggravat-
ing laugh” (45). With the return home of Annabel and Marina, Danielle 
is invited to stay for dinner, where she has “the peculiar sensation of 
having usurped her friend’s role in the Thwaite family” (46). This substi-
tution—not of Marina, as she thinks, but of Rowena—haunts Danielle, 
and throughout her email exchanges with Murray she feels that “there 
was something not right about it all, some touch of titillating betrayal in 
their pithy messages, whether the slightest flutter of the sexual or merely 
an inappropriate ascription of the father-daughter bond” (93). Their 
affair, founded thus on simulation and substitution, produces, in Dani-
elle’s mind, a bifurcated quality; her reality and morality appear in split 
screen. Reflecting on her first sexual encounter with Murray, Danielle 
notes that “she held in her mind two disparate realities: one was the 
fierce tenderness she felt for this disintegrating giant, the joy at his small 
kindnesses and vulnerabilities [. . .] The other was a certainty of wrong, 
a moral repugnance. This she experienced abstractly, with her mind; it 
was, consequently, the weaker of the two realities. [. . .] The disgust was 
an idea, something she knew she ought to conjure, the way an autis-
tic child can learn to smile at his mother to show happiness” (231). In 
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the course of her affair with Murray, this split-screen quality begins to 
dominate Danielle’s perception, subtracting certainty from experience. 
Her apartment, for example, “no longer presaged a meditative solitude 
[. . .] [but] the stage set for a play, a site awaiting action. As if it weren’t 
quite real on its own any longer” (260). This duality of realities persists; 
after Marina’s wedding (Danielle, alone of the guests, is invited to stay at 
the family’s home), she feels, again, “two incompatible but equally cer-
tain visions that she held simultaneously”: Murray’s established married 
life with Annabel and his connection with her (386). Caught between 
these two certainties, Danielle feels cancelled out. “It didn’t matter which 
vision was true [. . .] So the desire, whether a fact or a figment—and 
yet, its reality, its unknowable fact-ness, was of consuming importance 
to her—was not ultimately even relevant” (386). Danielle’s disintegrat-
ing sense of reality is characteristic of all the Xers in the novel. Marina is 
early imaged as “standing on nothing, poised in the void” (49) and Julius 
is a pathological fabulist.
 Murray, the Boomer, is the site of the novel’s most direct reflections 
on truth, faith, and betrayal. His relation with Annabel is predicated 
on a version of trust that is decidedly fraying. She is consumed with 
her activities as a children’s rights lawyer; he is something of a woman-
izer (Danielle is hardly his first extramarital dalliance). But Murray’s 
policy is to return each night to Annabel, and he makes an exception 
for Danielle on the night of Monday, September 10. Arranging his alibi, 
Murray reflects that “he wasn’t, in some regard, a liar. An actor, yes; 
and a good one. Guilty, upon innumerable occasions, of sins of omis-
sion, a great believer that what you didn’t know couldn’t hurt you [. . .] 
a smoother of waters whose techniques had been known to include a 
gentle reshaping of the facts” (406). He defines his relationship with 
Annabel in terms of trust, though he admits that each might define that 
term differently. “His definition of trust, on his wife’s behalf, being that 
she could always know herself supremely loved, and always—ah, until 
now!—know that at day’s end he came home faithfully to rest his head 
beside hers” (406–7). 9/11 blows Murray’s alibi; he leaves Danielle in 
her apartment and returns home to Annabel, confirming Danielle’s ear-
lier sense that the fact-ness of her reality is irrelevant. For Danielle, 
on 9/11, Murray’s reassertion of the fiction of fidelity that cements his 
marriage to Annabel combines with the images outside her window to 
cancel her out. Abandoned, she feels nothing. “She was as if anesthe-
tized, she felt nothing, nothing at all, you could have amputated a limb 
and it wouldn’t have mattered. She had seen the second plane, like a 
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gleaming arrow, and the burst of it, oddly beautiful against the blue, 
and the smoke, everywhere, and she had seen the people jumping, from 
afar, specks in the sky, and she knew that’s what they were only from 
the TV, from the great reality check of the screen, and she had seen the 
buildings crumble to dust; [. . .] she had seen these things and been left, 
forever, because in light of these things she did not matter [. . .] there 
was no call to feel anything, there was nothing to feel” (414–15). This 
affectlessness is the direct result of the process of subtraction initiated 
by the parallel realities established by her affair, and it continues, as 
life does, in Manhattan after the eleventh. “And the world, in spite of 
the bigger disasters, or perhaps because of them, stoically kept on, you 
could see the bustling citizens from the window, and when you were out 
in the street (only when you had to be), they jostled and butted against 
you as if not just your wound but you were invisible, as if it would be 
better all around if you just weren’t there. With which, if anyone had 
asked, you would heartily have agreed” (267–68).
 Both Bootie and Danielle, then, experience 9/11 as an opportunity to 
disappear. They are united in this, and in their experience of the events 
of that day as “cinema.” They are united, too, in their thwarted love 
for Murray, the 1960s titan. In the novel’s penultimate chapter they 
meet: Danielle, vacationing in Miami with her mother to recover from 
her depression, recognizes and confronts Bootie, who is working as 
a waiter and who pretends not to know her. He articulates and con-
cretizes Danielle’s sense of fraying presence. “It’s Ulrich,” he tells her, 
“Frederick doesn’t exist; and for me, for Ulrich, you don’t exist.” When 
Danielle persists, Bootie both confesses to his masquerade and denies 
it. “I needed to go,” he tells her, “I would be dead, otherwise. [. . .] If I 
would’ve killed myself otherwise, then I’d be dead, really dead” (476–
77). Reminding her that he is not her friend Bootie but a stranger, he 
concludes, formally: “I’m sorry for the confusion. And sorry about your 
friend.” Danielle assents to the masquerade. “Me too,” she says, affirm-
ing both the confusion and the loss of her friend, though he’s standing 
right in front of her (477). Later, she describes Bootie as “just someone I 
thought I knew” (478).
 Bootie’s assumption of the name Ulrich is an homage to the book 
he is reading at the time, Robert Musil’s The Man without Qualities. In 
Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, Niall Ferguson argues 
compellingly that historical thinking is informed by determinism—the 
idea that what happened had to have happened because it did—and 
limited by adherence to thinking about the past “as it actually was.” 
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Ferguson argues that such thinking is the residue of master narratives 
and linear, deterministic assumptions about causality, and suggests, 
instead, treating the past as stochastic—he proposes “chaostory.” Fergu-
son references a number of literary texts, including Martin Amis’s Time’s 
Arrow, Robert Harris’s Fatherland, and stories by Jorge Luis Borges. The 
most notable intertext, though—one that opens and closes Ferguson’s 
long chapter—is The Man without Qualities, a text that Ferguson finds 
striking both for its attention to mobility and for how it traces a detach-
ment of reality from truth. In a passage on which Ferguson lingers, Musil 
writes: “A possible experience or possible truth does not equate to real 
experience or real truth minus the value ‘real’; [. . .] in the opinion of its 
devotees, it has in it something out and out divine, a fiery, soaring qual-
ity, a constructive will, a conscious utopianism that does not shrink from 
reality but treats it, on the contrary, as [. . .] an invention” (Musil 12, 
qtd. in Ferguson 3–4).11
 Like Messud’s, Musil’s book is poised on the brink of apocalypse. 
The Man without Qualities is set in an Austrian society that is about to 
celebrate the Archduke Ferdinand whose assassination in Sarajevo pre-
cipitated the First World War and the onset of modernity. It was penned 
in the wake of World War I and in the looming menace of World War 
II. As a Jewish writer whose works were banned by the Nazis, who died 
in obscurity and exile in 1942, Musil witnessed firsthand how history 
can be erased, causes can be revised, human beings can be made to dis-
appear, and belief can assume the form of fact.
 The Man without Qualities is an important intertext for The Emper-
or’s Children, and its role as an intertext helps to underscore Messud’s 
point: 9/11’s epochality, like that of World War II, is, in fact, a repetition: 
the intertext situates the characters within history even as it detaches 
them from it. The present is already a remake, an homage, like a Tar-
antino film. Frederick/Bootie/Ulrich is Messud’s equivalent of the man 
without qualities (who, in Musil’s novel, is also named Ulrich). Bootie 
wanders through Manhattan in the chaotic days after the 11th, clutch-
ing a copy of Musil’s book. Thinking of the terrorists, and of what they 
 11. Sophie Wilkens’s translation of Musil’s original German text is slightly, but sig-
nificantly, different from the translation quoted by Ferguson: “A possible experience or 
truth is not the same as an actual experience or truth minus its ‘reality value’ but has—
according to its partisans, at least—something quite divine about it, a fire, a soaring, a 
readiness to build and a conscious utopianism that does not shrink from reality but sees 
it as a project, something yet to be invented” (11; my emphasis). This incipient quality 
is significant, as Messud’s novel ends on a note of a menace, or promise, of revolution-
ary violence.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
1 3 4  /  C H A P T E R  F O U R
have wrought, Bootie is struck by how “you could make something 
inside your head, as huge and devastating as this, and spill it out into 
reality, make it really happen. You could, for evil—but if for evil, why 
not for good, too?—change the world” (439). Inspired by this, and by 
his own experience of 9/11 as “cinema,” he promises: “Ulrich would 
fashion the reality inside his head and then, when the time was right, 
would give birth to it, would make them all at last understand, would 
take them by surprise” (441). The novel ends on this note of menace. The 
new Ulrich, who has replaced his surname “Tubb” with the more appeal-
ing “New,” packs, lightly, ready to depart. There is a sense that he will 
die young, and spectacularly. “This time, he was ready. This person in 
motion was who he was becoming; it was something, too; a man, some-
day, with qualities. Ulrich New. Great geniuses have the shortest biogra-
phies, he told himself; and take them by surprise. Yes. He would” (478). 
As the sentences fragment, temporal progression is dislocated: the new 
Ulrich is Ulrich New. Repetition (“take them by surprise”) produces, as 
effect, affirmation: “Yes. He would.” In these, Messud’s novel’s conclud-
ing lines, incipience, menace, the promise of revolution, like the ceaseless 
cyclicality of all violent transformation, is inspired in equal parts by ter-
ror, reality, and fiction.
THE  WORLD  INS IDE  OUT
Beigbeder attempted to imagine dying in the North Tower, realized the 
limitations of his novelistic gesture, traveled to the World Trade Cen-
ter site, and underscored the interpenetration of all these gestures with 
media: television, translation. Messud moves along different vectors: 
her realistic narrative and multigenerational cast of amusing, sympa-
thetic characters enable her to present and toy with themes of fidelity, 
betrayal, complicity, and truth. For both, though, 9/11 is presented as 
an event that impacts (in Beigbeder’s case, graphically) the lives of the 
characters, and its temporal specificity (8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. of Tues-
day, September 11, 2001) dominates the progress and structure of both 
novels. Jess Walter’s The Zero departs from this tendency. The novel is 
narrated in short fragments, it moves backward and forward in time, 
disconnected from narrative and from temporal progression. 9/11 is 
imaged through three paradigms that operate simultaneously: it is paper 
(scraps of text; numbers, records, communications), organic matter (liv-
ing and not), and media (the looping television footage and the crack-
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ling and spots of deteriorating film). Walter’s striking opening gesture 
evokes all three:
They burst into the sky, every bird in creation, angry and agitated, awak-
ened by the same primary thought, erupting in a white feathered cloud-
burst, anxious and graceful, angling in ever-tightening circles toward 
the ground, drifting close enough to touch, and then close enough to 
see that it wasn’t a flock of birds at all—it was paper. Burning scraps of 
paper. All the little birds were paper. Fluttering and circling and growing 
bigger, falling bits and frantic sheets, some smoking, corners scorched, 
flaring in the open air until there was nothing left but a fine black edge 
. . . and then gone, a hole and nothing but the faint memory of smoke. 
Behind the burning flock came a great wail and a moan as seething black 
unfurled, the world inside out, birds beating against a roiling sky and 
in that moment everything that wasn’t smoke was paper. And it was 
beautiful. (3)
 The novel opens by confusing organic with inorganic: what appear to 
be birds are, in fact, sheets of paper. Vision and proximity (being “close 
enough to see”) promise to correct this confusion. But they do not suf-
fice. From the black hole that, like a living being, wails and moans, 
emerges an inversion that will dictate the narrative: “the world inside 
out.” The paper resumes its living quality: it is, again, birds, “birds beat-
ing against a roiling sky.” It is, in fact, “everything that wasn’t smoke,” 
which the narrative names “beautiful.”12 From this striking opening 
gesture the novel focuses on the point of view of its protagonist, Brian 
Remy, an Xer, a police officer and a First Responder, who awakens 
from this flashback/dream to find himself on the floor of his apartment. 
Remy’s vision is imaged in cinematic terms: “He was lying on his side, 
panning across a fuzzy tree line of carpet fiber. [. . .] The world focused 
into being one piece at a time.” This point of view, again, combines the 
organic and inorganic: Remy identifies himself with an empty whiskey 
bottle. “They were both tipped over on their right sides on the rug, par-
allel to one another, the whiskey fifth and him. In this together, appar-
ently” (3).
 This conflation, or interpenetration, of the organic and the inor-
ganic haunts the novel. Ground Zero—The Zero, in the terms of the 
first responders and cleanup crew—is imaged as a living thing: “hum-
 12. See Kristine Miller (34) for an alternative close reading of this passage.
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ming” (15), fanged (38), lit at night “like a stage. Or a surgery” (36). 
It is a “massive smoldering jungle [. . .] fire raged in its roots and hot 
shoots jutted from the pile” (18). Its smell, too, is a powerful presence in 
this novel, almost a character in its own right. “The smell never left him 
now,” Remy reflects. “It lived in the lining of his nose and the fibers of 
his lungs—his whole body seemed to smell, as if the odor were working 
through his pores, the fine gray dust: pungent, flour of the dead” (14). 
The smell, both living and not, unlocatable and omnipresent, threatens 
to redefine the very nature of existence in terms of something empty. 
“The dust rose, and the smell found you, and Remy could imagine that 
one day everything in the world would be reduced to such a fine dust—
replacing even the air, so that you not only smelled it but tasted it, and 
felt it too, on your skin, in your mouth, deep to your bones like a chill, 
that the whole world would swim in dust—finer and finer until there was 
nothing but an absence of substance and meaning” (44).
 This interpenetration of organic and inorganic, the image of the 
drifting sheets of paper, and the conceit that paper—or text—is “every-
thing,” dictates the novel’s plot. Remy works for a (fictitious) agency, 
“the Office of Liberty and Recovery,” which oversees two feuding 
bureaus: the Remains Recovery Department and the Documentation 
Department. The role of the latter is to reconstruct the paper record of 
the world. The analogy of paper with people is made explicitly: “the 
people and the paper burned up or flew away or ran off, and after it 
happened, they were considerably less than they had been in the begin-
ning” (19). The role of the Documentation Department is predicated 
on the absurdity of this analogy: “If we do not make a fundamental 
accounting of what was lost, if we do not gather up the paper and put it 
all back, then the forces aligned against us have already won. They’ve. 
Already. Won” (19).
 Remy has vision problems: macular degeneration (which manifests 
as a blind spot at the center of the visual field, and interferes with the 
processing of information) and vitreous detachment, which causes “float-
ers” or specks that interfere with vision. These symptoms are repeatedly 
aligned with the interpenetration of paper and birds, and they attach this 
imagery to the motif of television—a source, throughout The Zero, of 
fascination, disgust, and a privileged kind of witness. “I haven’t turned 
off my TV since it happened,” reports one character. “I was glued to the 
news coverage for the first few days. [. . .] I ordered out every meal and 
just went from channel to channel, watching it from different angles, lis-
tening to the newscasters and the public officials” (65–66). “I watched 
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TV and I was sick,” confesses another (83). Remy’s friend Paul Guterak, 
a fellow First Responder, reflects: “Sometimes I wish we’d just gone to 
a bar that morning and watched the whole thing on CNN. [. . .] I envy 
people who watched it on TV. They got to see the whole thing. [. . .] I 
think the people who watched it on TV saw more than we did” (85).
 For Remy, the television coverage is indistinguishable from his mem-
ories, and his memories are defined by his deteriorating vision. Watch-
ing cable news replays of 9/11 coverage, Remy reflects that “the news 
had become the wallpaper in his mind now, the endless loop playing 
in his head—banking wings, blooms of flame, white plumes becom-
ing black” (8). The decrease in color density associated with macular 
degeneration informs, or deforms, these visual images, both in his mind 
and on the screen: the white plumes become black and then “gray, end-
less gray, geysers of gray, dust-covered gray stragglers with gray hands 
covering gray mouths running from gray shore-break, and the birds, 
white—endless breeds and flocks of memos and menus and correspon-
dence fluttering silently and then disappearing in the ashen darkness” 
(8–9). The dissolution of the distinction of organic and inorganic, tele-
vised image and experienced reality, persists even when Remy closes 
his eyes. He sees then “what he always saw: shreds of tissue, threads 
of detachment and degeneration, silent fireworks, the lining of his eyes 
splintering and sparking and flaking into the soup behind his eyes—
flashers and floaters that danced like scraps of paper blown into the 
world” (9).
 Remy’s vision problems are not a 9/11 health effect. And yet they 
are presented as such, as Guterak rehearses his account to a group of 
sightseers he ushers about Ground Zero. Guterak points out Remy’s 
eye condition (which he calls “muscular vicious disintegration”) and 
implies that Remy is suffering from the effects of first response. “What 
it is, see, is his fuggin’ eyes are flaking off. From inside, is what that 
shit is. Creepy, huh? I mean this is some serious shit we went through 
here,” says Guterak. Remy reflects that “he’d told Guterak ten times that 
his eye condition had nothing to do with the burst blood vessel in his 
right eye, and therefore with that day, that he’d had escalating eye prob-
lems for years. But Paul insisted on making it part of the tour” (26). 
This loose, and fallacious, attribution of effect to cause itself attests to 
the novel’s concern with causality, “the loose string between cause and 
effect” (3) which, early in the novel, Remy identifies as “the problem. 
These gaps in his memory, or perhaps his life, a series of skips—long 
shredded tears, empty spaces where the explanations for the most basic 
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things used to be” (5). “These were the most common gaps that Remy 
had been suffering, holes not so much in his memory but in the string of 
events, the causes of certain effects” (43). For Remy, the eye problems 
(to which 9/11 is falsely attributed as a cause), and the memory gaps 
(which do seem to be an effect of his Ground Zero experience) com-
bine in the novel’s narrative style of detached fragments and sections. 
Lacking background and context, these fragments trace a world in 
which, as Remy reflects, “the moment could slip the way so many 
moments slipped now—loosed of their context and meaning and float-
ing gently to the ground” (78). With this narrative style, Walter extends 
Remy’s symptoms to an existential malaise, undermining the privileged 
experience that First Responders are assumed to possess. Formed, as 
many Xers were, by the mediation of experience, the collapse of great 
ideologies, and entrenched paranoia, Remy reflects: “Maybe this was not 
some condition he had, but a life, and maybe every life is lived moment 
to moment. [. . .] What do you trust? Memory? History? No, these are 
just stories, and whichever ones we choose to tell ourselves—the one 
about our marriage, the one about the Berlin Wall—there are always 
gaps” (160).
 The effect of these gaps is articulated by Remy’s son Edgar. Like 
Beigbeder, Danielle, and Bootie, Edgar falsely claims to have lost some-
one in the attacks. Early in the novel, Remy’s ex-wife Carla calls him 
to a meeting with the teenage Edgar, who has been telling everyone 
in school that his father had died. Edgar emerges from a computer 
game called Empire that he describes as “a communal computer expe-
rience . . . like an alternate world. It’s character-driven and action- 
reaction oriented. Just like the real world” (30). “You do realize,” says 
Carla, with Remy present, “your father isn’t dead. He’s right here” 
(31). Edgar refuses to apologize. He stresses that he is not delusional, 
he knows Remy isn’t dead, and he doesn’t wish Remy was dead—this is 
not a wish-fulfillment fantasy or an unacknowledged psychic truth (32–
33). He also stresses that he is not using the claim his father is dead to 
articulate other emotions, like anger over his parents’ divorce or, Carla 
is quick to suggest, Remy’s commitment issues. Edgar stresses that his 
grief is real, and personal. He dismisses a sense of generalized grief after 
9/11. Unlike “general grief,” which Edgar describes as “a lie, [. . .] a 
trend, just some weak shared moment in the culture,” Edgar’s counter-
narrative enables him to feel “real grief.” “The death of a father . . . is 
the most profound thing I’ve ever experienced. [. . .] There are times 
when I can barely breathe. I can’t . . . get over it. And I don’t want to. 
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The only way to comprehend something like this is to go through it. 
Otherwise, it’s just a number. Three thousand? Four thousand? How do 
you grieve a number? [. . .] I have chosen to focus my grief on one indi-
vidual. On the death of my father. [. . .] And you know, frankly, I guess 
I expected a little more support from you” (34).
 Not least because it is quite funny, this passage has drawn quite a bit 
of attention. Reviewers and critics are quick to underscore the dispar-
ity between what Edgar says (his father is dead) and what is the case 
(Remy is, in fact, alive), reflecting on the implications of this disparity. 
In these discussions, authentic experience, the inviolability of trauma, 
and national mourning are privileged.13 But the counternarrative chal-
lenges us to a more risky, because affirmative, enterprise, one attuned 
to the power of fiction, and to the changing nature of the real (which 
Edgar learns about from Empire, his computer game). Like Danielle, 
who, with “me too,” acknowledged and mourned Bootie’s sorrow and 
her own, Carla accedes to and recognizes Edgar’s grief. “I’m sorry, 
honey,” she says, “I’m sorry we got divorced and I’m sorry about your 
father.” She and Edgar embrace and weep, excluding Remy (35). Carla 
and Danielle know that the claims for loss are false. But they acknowl-
edge the emotion, validating the grief not in its incomparable singular-
ity but as an equivalent, affirming affect through a logic of exchange. 
“Sorry about your father,” like “sorry about your friend,” situates the 
object of grief as evacuated, the empty space between two equipoised 
alternatives, each equally valid, each revealed, in its mirror image, to be 
fragile, contingent, erected on shifting ground.
 Just like the World Trade Center site. In the concluding pages of The 
Zero, Remy returns to Ground Zero and is struck by the extent of the 
 13. For Duvall and Marzec, the question raised by this passage is whether 9/11 can 
“produce a trauma that is constitutive of a new collective American identity” (386). 
Duvall (“Homeland”) elaborates: the scene, he concludes, “satirizes the urge to find 
a collective traumatic identity in the post-9/11 moment. While Edgar’s insistence on 
working through the death of his father as the only appropriate way of understand-
ing the trauma of 9/11 (even as Edgar fully acknowledges that his father is, somewhat 
irrelevantly, actually alive) becomes a running source of humor in the novel, it is a 
humor that ultimately serves to ironize the personal form of grieving that Edgar argues 
to be more authentic” (288). DeRosa underscores “the absurdity of Edgar’s ‘authentic’ 
mourning for his father who sits next to him on the couch,” which “represents Wal-
ter’s not-so-subtle attack on post-9/11 rhetoric” according to which “‘9/11’ has become 
usurped and hidden” (177). Kristine Miller disagrees: “Edgar’s manufactured trauma 
is undeniably real and crippling, even if his grief is over an imagined death. [. . .] Ed-
gar’s story makes readers aware of the need both to make trauma meaningful through 
narrative and to consume such narratives cautiously, since fictions have the power to 
determine the course of real lives” (44).
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cleanup: “Remy turned from side to side, taking the whole thing in, feel-
ing incomplete, cheated in some way, as if they’d taken away his memory 
along with the dirt and debris” (307). This conflation of organic and 
inorganic extends, for Remy, to an interpenetration, and evacuation, of 
psyche and place. “Maybe his mind was a hole like this,” he reflects, “the 
evidence and reason scraped away. If you can’t trust the ground beneath 
your feet, what can you trust? If you take away the very ground, what 
could possibly be left? And yet that’s what they had done” (307). Con-
firming his epistemic insecurity, the absence of a cause, of something to 
trust or believe in, the cleanup of Ground Zero casts new light on Remy’s 
X apathy. “He had expected to feel something. But what can you feel 
about a place when that place has been scraped away?” (308).
TH I S  WAS  J IHAD
For Beigbeder, Messud, and Walter, the counternarrative offers the 
characters an opportunity to suture themselves into the reality of 9/11. 
Precisely because of 9/11’s virtual, mediated quality—of which these X 
authors are all keenly aware—fiction is crucial for ascertaining its rel-
evance and impact. And yet, fiction means betrayal—in each of these 
novels, characters engage in at least one extramarital affair—and con-
tributes to a sense of unreality, proffering layers of mediation, and 
underscoring art’s inadequacy in the wake of so raw a disaster. None-
theless (I submit), infidelity is a productive paradigm through which 
to approach 9/11 after X, because it underscores the extent to which 
violence, though real, is also mediated, multiple, and available to be 
employed to bring about other realities, personal and political. In this 
section I discuss two 9/11 novels: Jay McInerney’s The Good Life and 
Ken Kalfus’s A Disorder Peculiar to the Country. Though McIner-
ney and Kalfus were born in the mid-1950s and are not, technically, 
Xers, like DeLillo they employ members of Generation X as characters 
through which to figure the events of 9/11. Both novels are preoccupied 
with marital infidelity, and both reflect on the use to which 9/11 can be 
put in forming, or fashioning, reality anew.
 McInerney’s The Good Life revisits Corrine and Russell, the protago-
nists of his 1992 novel Brightness Falls. Brightness Falls revolved around 
the market crash of 1987, chillingly described as “paper airplanes crash-
ing to the pavement of Manhattan” (3; italics in original) and a crisis in 
Corrine and Russell’s marriage. In The Good Life, real airplanes crash to 
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the pavement of Manhattan, and Corrine and Russell—now the parents 
of twins, conceived in vitro with the help of Corrine’s sister Hilary, who 
acted as a surrogate—are again in marital crisis. McInerney’s characters 
make this analogy explicit. Speaking to Corrine of his friend Jim, who 
died in the World Trade Center, Russell recalls their friend Jeff, whose 
death from AIDS was recounted in Brightness Falls: “Jeff was my best 
friend, and Jim kind of took his place. And they both got taken away 
in a kind of mass catastrophe” (Good Life 189). Referring to the bull 
market of the 1980s, Corrine, speaking to her lover Luke, reflects, “It 
all came crashing down. Not like this of course, but the crash of ’87 
seemed, I don’t know, cataclysmic at the time. [. . .] Personally, it was a 
real disaster” to which Luke, a First Responder, responds: “Personally is 
maybe the only perspective we have” (Good Life 157).
 When Corrine and Luke meet, both experience, as Danielle did, a 
multiplication of realities and an underlying epistemic uncertainty. On 
Tuesday morning Luke had arrived late to a meeting at Windows on the 
World, worked at the site without gloves or a mask until blacking out, 
and stumbles out of Ground Zero, covered with dust, the following 
morning. Corrine hands him a bottle of water. Each suspects the other 
is a fantasy. Luke’s presence is untimely; Corrine’s first impression is 
that he is “at least a day late”; he seems to her “like a statue com-
memorating some ancient victory, or, more likely, some noble defeat” 
(Good Life 73), and, as she puts it, “it’s hard to tell [. . .] what’s real” 
(74). For Luke, who wonders “Is this really happening?” (“‘I think so,’ 
she replies”), Corrine’s beauty has a cinematic quality that contributes 
to his insecurity: he’s not sure she’s real because, he realizes, she looks 
so much like an old-timey movie star (76). In the course of the novel, 
Corrine and Luke come to represent, each to the other, an alternative 
to their unsatisfactory existence. Corrine shares with Luke her fantasy 
of “Disappearing. I keep imagining that there must be somebody who 
walked away from those towers and just decided to keep walking. Start 
a new life. Sometimes I wish it were me. [. . .] I think about it. Keep 
trying to figure out a way that it would be possible” (248). For Luke, 
haunted by nightmares of a faceless body he saw at the World Trade 
Center site (“Our Lady of Ground Zero”; 184), Corrine grounds his 
post-9/11 reality. “Whenever I’d closed my eyes, I’d see that woman 
without a face,” he confesses. “But there you were, giving the world 
a new face. [. . .] Sometimes I still wonder if it was all just an after-
image, because nothing feels very real to me anymore, except being 
with you” (262).
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 After Corrine is raped by a drunken Russell and decides to end her 
marriage, Luke rents an apartment on Tenth Street. Together, they imag-
ine the life they could have if they made their fantasy real. Leaving the 
apartment together, they are confronted by this surreal image: a “herd 
of Santas.” “A flash of red and then another—two Santas marching up 
Tenth Street, one fat and the other skinny. Approaching the street, she 
spied two more and two more behind them, one showing what she sup-
posed was Desert Storm camo beneath his red coat and talking on a cell 
phone, one carrying his red-and-white hat in his hand. A cavalcade of 
Santas, ten, fifteen, more than twenty in all” (353). To this vision of fan-
tasy run amok, they respond by retreating to “Famous Ray’s,” which, 
Luke assures Corrine, is “the real Ray’s. Forget about all those Original 
Ray’s” (354). From this copy of a copy they retreat, again, into their 
original worlds, revealed now as simulacra: the “dramas of daily life.” 
These dramas, and the “satori flash of acute wakefulness and connected-
ness that had followed the initial confrontation with mortality in Sep-
tember” (363), are counterpoised, mirror reflections. Fantasy and reality 
are equal, equivalent, each the other’s viable alternative, as Luke thinks 
of Corrine: “she was his lost twin, his sundered other half, and after 
half a lifetime he had found her, and now he would let her go” (363). 
McInerney’s treatment of 9/11 is thus attuned to the mediated, multiple, 
quality of reality. The attacks—undeniably real—unveil reality’s multi-
plicity, its perpetual twinning, that menaces the original or authentic. 
Most radically imaged by the Santacon into which Luke and Corrine 
stumble on their way out of the apartment on Tenth Street,14 multiplic-
ity reconfigures all realities: lived and desired, the mundane “dramas of 
daily life,” and the vivid “satori flash,” are fragile, substitutable, inter-
changeable. Corrine and Russell’s twin children, with which the novel 
opens and ends, concretize this point. Predicated on surrogacy, untimely 
(premature) and fragile, they are menaced by the return of Hilary, who 
threatens to usurp Corrine’s role as the twins’ “real” mother. Their pre-
cariousness is the city’s: this is Corrine’s bleak epiphany. Thinking of her 
twins, she realizes that “she would always be hovering near the surface 
of consciousness in the perpetual light of the restless city, alert to the 
sound of a cough, the thump of a falling body, the drone of a plane over-
head” (355).
 14. Santacon originated in 1994 as a part of a night of Kringle Kaos organized by 
the Cacophony Society. It is now a global phenomenon in which people dressed as Santa 
Claus gather, primarily to drink (see http://santarchy.com/). McInerney’s novel may well 
be referencing the Santacon held in New York City on December 8, 2001.
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 A Disorder Peculiar to the Country proceeds along different lines. If 
McInerney’s novel was predicated on analogy, Kalfus’s frontally mobi-
lizes analogy to reflect on what it means to see one event through the 
lens of another. Like McInerney’s, Kalfus’s novel also revolves around 
marital crisis: an acrimonious divorce becomes the grounds from which 
to extrapolate not only to the terror attacks but their aftermath, the 
anthrax scare, the war on terror, the War in Iraq, and the tortures at Abu 
Ghraib.
 The divorce is figured as a territorial dispute. Marshall, the hus-
band, and Joyce, his soon to be ex-wife, still share an apartment in 
New York City with their small children; neither is willing to move out. 
Even before the attacks, their relationship has “acquired the intensity 
of something historic, tribal, and ethnic, and when they watched news 
of wars on TV, reports from the Balkans or the West Bank, they would 
think, yes, yes, yes, that’s how I feel about you” (7). This affirmation of 
difference and its incorporation into the personal domesticates the terror 
attacks—a move that most critics see as a fatal flaw, an undue taming of 
9/11’s traumatic impact.15 But by domesticating terror, Kalfus does not 
tame its trauma—he brings it home. Joyce and Marshall are saboteurs. 
The novel begins with them witnessing the attacks on the World Trade 
Center. Each assumes the other is killed, and, like Al Qaeda warriors, 
each exults. So Joyce, as she watches the building collapse, feels “some-
thing erupt inside her, something warm, very much like, yes it was, a 
pang of pleasure [. . .] The building turned into a rising mushroom-
shaped column of smoke, dust, and perished life, and she felt a great 
gladness” (3).
 The chapters set in the wake of the attacks offer critical meditations 
on the bald analogy on which the novel is structured. Each posits a par-
adigm through which to view the war on terror. Joyce, plotting revenge 
against Marshall, sleeps with his friend Roger, according to the logic—
borrowed from popularizations of images of Afghan culture—that 
“‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ ‘the friend of my enemy is my 
 15. Critical response to Kalfus’s novel has dismissed it as unduly focused on the 
domestic and, consequentially, insufficiently or inefficiently political. Duvall concludes 
that A Disorder Peculiar to the Country is unable “to articulate a clear political or 
ethical vision” (281). Gray, too, dismisses Kalfus’s novel as insufficiently registering 
the trauma of 9/11, though his reference to Joyce engaging in “terror sex” (she does 
not) would indicate that he had not read it carefully (Gray 25, see Kalfus 22–23). In 
an exception to this trend, Irom reads Kalfus’s turn to the domestic as unsettling the 
cultural dominant, identifying a “process of inversion” that “[turns] the domestic idyll 
inside out” (527).
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enemy’” and that, for Afghan women, “sex wasn’t ‘fun’ or an expres-
sion of ‘love,’ it was a weapon” (63). The tortures at Abu Ghraib are 
figured as, at a drug-fuelled party, Marshall witnesses a scene in which 
a young African American man, with his head in a sack, is molested by 
a white woman who flashes the thumbs-up sign—the scene, with the 
woman’s consent, is captured on film (213–18). The September 11, 2001 
attack on the World Trade Center occurs literally within the domestic 
space: in a chapter narrated by Viola, Joyce and Marshall’s daughter, an 
ugly argument over an antique vase is settled by Viola’s younger brother, 
who shoots a toy plane across the room with a rubber band. “The plane 
swiftly gained altitude as it crossed the living room. It flew steadily, 
without tumbling. [. . .] When the toy piece struck, the glass changed 
color top to bottom, from purple to a bright, pinkish white, and the vase 
iridesced before it crashed and returned to its original elements so that 
not a single piece of it could be recognized” (141).
 Analogies make sense—a point that the novel raises and, again, 
inverts. Marshall, walking in Manhattan, hears an enormous crash and 
immediately registers it in terms of the suicide bombs in Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem. Just before he hears the crash, analogies are spinning out of 
control. The sky, Marshall reflects, “seemed unnaturally close, at the 
scraping edges of the city’s towers, a transparent glass bowl.” Then the 
analogies multiply: “Or it was like a teardrop swelling before its fall. Or 
like a child’s spinning top in its terminal wobble. Or like a blow before 
its pain was registered” (177). What brings this accelerated burgeon-
ing to a halt is the crash that unites victim and perpetrator, the popu-
lations of the Middle East and New York City: “within this moment 
they lived the terror as it had been experienced within the [Tel Aviv] 
pizzeria, by the bomber and his victims together” (179). Reflecting on 
this interpenetration—Manhattan and Tel Aviv, Al Qaeda and Palestin-
ian terror, suicide bomber and victim, global terror and domestic dis-
cord—the narrative voice identifies the process as both justice and jihad: 
“In a single lightning flash the unconnected parts of the world had been 
brought together and made into sense. No, sense was not made. This 
was a world of heedless materialism, impiety, baseness, and divorce. 
Sense was not made, this was jihad: the unconnected parts of the world 
had been brought together and made just” (179).
 The alliance of jihad with a justice, and the distinction of justice from 
sense, returns in the novel’s culminating scene. Here, the novel reflects 
critically on its adoption of analogy and its own attempt to make sense. 
Marshall, losing his battle for the property and for custody, moving out 
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of the cherished apartment, sees Joyce and the children watching the 
statue of Saddam Hussein being toppled on TV, and bursts out with this:
I’m not Saddam Hussein, if that’s what you think [. . .] That’s what you 
think! [. . .] You think it’s symbolic, don’t you? “Another evil person 
removed!” Am I right? Tell me, am I right? [. . .] There’s no analogy 
here! [. . .] I haven’t gassed any Kurds, I’m not threatening anyone with 
weapons of mass destruction. I’m a nice guy. In fact, I think a case can be 
made that I’m a great guy—okay? Maybe not a great husband or a great 
father, but I did my best. [. . .] I gave up more of my basic human rights 
than you did! I was the one who was oppressed! To compare me with 
Saddam is totally unjust. (225–26)
“To compare me with Saddam is totally unjust”—this statement cata-
pults representation into the context of justice. It is the analogy that is 
unjust—the comparison—because it is the collapse of analogies in the 
immediacy of experience that performs justice, aligns it with jihad, and 
distinguishes it from sense. Marshall and Joyce, like Corrine, Russell, 
and Luke, are Xers, for whom, as Clay learns, there is no “right,” just 
power. Marshall’s complaint speaks not to his fleecing by Joyce’s cut-
throat attorney or even to his political situation as an American, com-
plicit in U.S. imperialism and human rights abuses, but to A Disorder 
Peculiar to the Country: specifically, to the analogy that had dictated the 
novel’s subject and form thus far—for from this moment the narrative 
reverses course. Rather than paralleling the events of 9/11 and the war 
on terror, it becomes a counterhistory. So the Iraq War is won quickly 
and easily (229), peaceful demonstrations in Syria topple the government 
of Bashar al-Assad (232), WMDs are discovered and safely dismantled 
(230), Israelis and Palestinians magically agree on the settlements and 
on shared sovereignty of Jerusalem (234), Osama Bin Laden is captured 
(234; this novel was, remember, published in 2006) and carefully, legally, 
civilly brought to justice (230).
 The novel’s final scene invites us to imagine footage of Ground Zero 
on September 11, screened in reverse. Rather than the familiar images of 
thousands fleeing the World Trade Center site amidst a blizzard of fall-
ing debris, A Disorder Peculiar to the Country ends with crowds surg-
ing back in triumph, singing patriotic anthems. “This time they headed 
downtown, this time with their shoes on their feet. [. . .] Just-shredded 
confetti fell in a multicolored blizzard. The mob kicked it up again” 
(235). Returning to the moment before the first plane hit, Marshall, 
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Joyce, and the children meet. True to the perception of the United States 
as a global bully, a murderer, a state whose disregard of human rights 
is matched only by its moral certitude—a perception that the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and events in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib have, 
for a significant part of the world, confirmed—the children are wear-
ing “Death to Terrorists!” shirts. The united American family, victorious 
in the war against terror, produced by analogy, counterhistory, and fic-
tion: simulated, contingent, nothing but a lie. This concluding image of 
domestic harmony, predicated on multiple infidelities, is, in every sense, 
untrue. It is, in the terms set forth by the novel itself, jihad: the uncon-
nected parts of the world brought together, made just. And it is poised 
on the brink of implosion. Standing with his family, Marshall sees that 
“the vastness of the emptiness of the hole in the city [is] inflamed with 
human noise and aspiration. [. . .] The moment would last forever, or 
until everything contained within it was completely destroyed” (237).
HABEAS  CORPUS
“What was beneath all those piles? Nothing? No one?” wonders Remy as 
he gazes as the World Trade Center site (307). The prominence of coun-
ternarratives in 9/11 novels may speak to the implications of the absence 
of bodies in the wake of these events. With 9/11, the image of the torn 
or broken human body that has historically functioned as a guarantor 
of violence’s reality was not readily available. Achingly absent, its loss 
marked by images of the missing or portraits of grief, and overwhelm-
ingly present—as smell, as dust, as scraps salvaged by workers or seagulls 
at the Fresh Kills landfill, the body—the confirmation of violence—is 
both present and absent, available and unavailable as an object of knowl-
edge.16 It flickers—like an image on a TV screen—illuminates us briefly, 
and vanishes.
 What it shows is hardly flattering, and the texts discussed in this 
chapter navigate this uneasy terrain in a variety of ways. Beigbeder 
 16. Laura E. Tanner offers an extended reflection on the embodied apprehension of 
9/11: “At the most basic level, the physical dynamics of the terrorist attacks frustrated 
the public’s quest to reach past representation into the realm of bodily contact. The 
blasts obliterated not just victims’ bodies but also their possessions, leaving behind 
materials that failed to assume the recognizable form of objects and that defied tactile 
embrace [. . .] The stuff of Ground Zero resisted stabilization and differentiation at ev-
ery level, from the mammoth building supports that threatened constantly to collapse to 
the particles of dust that New Yorkers breathed into their bodies for months” (64–65).
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focuses on media, and stresses mediation: in contrast to the scenes in the 
World Trade Center that are explicitly—even graphically—imagined, he 
refers to “the thunderous noise of the falls in the documentary by the 
Naudet brothers” (261; Beigbeder is referring to 9/11, the 2002 docu-
mentary by James Hanlon and Jules and Gédéon Naudet), and adopts an 
ironic and acerbic tone to reflect on the paucity of images of the dead: 
“When a building collapses, feel free to repeat the footage endlessly. But 
whatever you do, don’t show what was inside: our bodies” (262). McIn-
erney makes brief but vivid reference to bodies “falling slowly and then 
suddenly exploding like rotten fruit on the concrete” (75), while Walter 
lingers on their uncanny quality: “Here’s what you didn’t get on TV, it 
was so far up there, it didn’t seem real, not until someone jumped, arms 
flapping crazy like they could change their minds, but of course, they 
couldn’t . . . and you’d watch ’em grow as they came down . . . hitting 
like fuggin’ water balloons, but deeper, you know—thumping and . . . 
and . . . bursting” (25). In A Disorder Peculiar to the Country, the burst-
ing body is posited as eminently seeable and as an injunction against 
seeing. Marshall, trying to help a fellow victim from the site, watches 
as “an object that was recognizably a woman in a navy business suit, 
possibly a suit that could be described in regard to its cut and weave, 
and possibly even its likely provenance if you knew about such things, 
thumped hard less than twenty feet away, and bounced and burst. Her 
shoes had come off in mid-fall and clattered emptily against the pave-
ment a moment later. ‘Don’t look,’ Marshall said. ‘For God’s sake don’t 
look’” (16). The specificity of seeing that Kalfus imagines, and the 
injunction against seeing that immediately follows it, speak to a fasci-
nation with the macabre that the X authors all refuse to disavow; tell-
ingly, they add to vision other senses—smell, sound—that, unlike sight, 
penetrate orifices, underscoring the body’s openness. In The Emperor’s 
Children, Bootie’s mother Judy calls her estranged brother Murray after 
9/11. “‘Tell me something, Murray: Can you smell it? What does it smell 
like, for God’s sake?’” Murray shares some of her distance and all of 
her fascination. “We’re too far away, up here,” he tells her, promis-
ing, “I’m going tomorrow. [. . .] Marina’s already been” (425). In The 
Zero, Guterak, ever the truth-teller, reports his response to tourists who 
inquire about the sound bodies made when they hit the sidewalk out-
side the World Trade Center. “I say to clap their hands as hard as they 
can, so hard that it really hurts. Then they clap, and I say: No. Harder 
than that. And they clap again, and I say, No, really fuggin’ hard. And 
then they clap so hard their faces get all twisted up, and I say, No, really 
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hard! And then, when their hands are red and sore, they say, ‘So that’s 
what it sounded like?’ and I say, ‘No. It didn’t sound like that at all’” 
(85).
 These smells and sounds are nowhere in Falling Man. Indeed, what 
DeLillo calls the event’s “singularity” may be read not just as that which 
is distinctive but as a gravitational singularity. Like a black hole, some-
thing empty in the sky consumes world and words: both fall away from 
Keith, whose name means “wind”—a perpetual displacement and move-
ment—and who is described as “a man scaled in ash” (6). Ash could 
be present on Keith’s skin like a scaly layer, protecting it; or Keith has 
been “scaled,” his protective layer peeled away, his skin smoothed, or 
removed, his body vulnerable, open. Like scales, the shirt—with which 
this chapter opened—reveals and conceals. Image of the presence and 
absence of the body, it is also a literal image, a flicker, the photographic 
residue of a jumper Keith did not quite glimpse when he was still in the 
North Tower.17 In the confusion after the plane hits, “Something went 
past the window, then he saw it. First it went and was gone and then he 
saw it [. . .] white shirt, hand up, falling before he saw it” (242). In the 
hot windowless dark of the North Tower’s stairwell, Keith sees, an after-
image, the figure again: “going past the window [. . .] the man falling 
sideways, arm out and up, like pointed up, like why am I here instead of 
there” (244).
 Keith’s missed vision leaves him “staring out at nothing” (242), an 
emptiness from which the image of the shirt is formed or fashioned. 
Point of view is elicited from this nothingness, and shifts from Keith 
(who, seeing the arm, likens its posture to pointing) to a falling man’s 
(“why am I here instead of there”), as the string of similes (“out and 
up, like pointed up, like why”) propels reference away from referent, a 
process initiated (or continued) by Keith’s nameless son who, with his 
friends, persists in calling Bin Laden Bill Lawton. Abandoned by refer-
ence, the falling man flickers: simultaneously a literary image and the 
 17. Conte links DeLillo’s image of the shirt to Richard Drew’s famous photograph. 
“The white shirt that appears to defy gravity serves as an icon of all those who stepped 
out into airy nothingness while yearning for an impossible rescue. [. . .] It functions as 
a synecdoche for all those who leapt to their death. [. . .] The image of the shirt adrift 
is nearly all the traumatized viewer can bear to register” (577). Carroll offers a different 
reading of the shirt and of this scene: he names the shirt as symbol (of trauma; the limits 
of representation; the unaccountable) and synecdoche: representing the falling body while 
remaining separate from it. Carroll concludes that the image of the shirt concretizes the 
denial of knowledge, reference, and certainty that characterize 9/11’s purported challenge 
to representation.
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aftermath of an imprint, it manifests through repeated viewings, like the 
images of David Janiak, the Falling Man performance artist, that Lianne 
clicks through on her computer. The repetition confirms the disappear-
ing: “the fact that there were two of them signifies the end of any origi-
nal reference. If there had been only one, monopoly would not have been 
perfectly embodied. Only the doubling of the sign truly puts an end to 
what it designates” (Baudrillard 39). In the wake or in the ruins of this 
annihilation of reference, the body is evoked and—though not entirely—
disavowed. It disappears here.
 “In the absence of all basis for comparison, the event asserts its sin-
gularity,” writes DeLillo in “In The Ruins of the Future” (39). True to 
the definition of a singularity as the place where parallel lines meet, the 
shirt is where the pillars of the narrative combine. Presence and absence: 
submersion and survival. Keith disappears: Lianne is here. “The towers, 
for their part, have disappeared. But they have left us the symbol of their 
disappearance, their disappearance as symbol,” writes Baudrillard (47). 
But reading the shirt as a symbol is, ultimately, too easy. In the novel’s 
final sentence Keith again sees the shirt fall, “arms waving like nothing 
in this life” (246). The attribution of arms (rather than sleeves) to the 
shirt figures it not as symbol but catachresis: a refusal of reference. Con-
firming the interpenetration of the nonsensible and the somatic (“arms 
waving”), the novel’s final simile seals the equation of absence (like noth-
ing) with presence (in this life): something empty in the sky. With the 
shirt, the singularity, the narrative black hole, the site where the par-
allel lines—or planes—intersect, the body is affirmed and relinquished, 
demanded and abandoned, commemorated and crossed out: a bleak and 
futile habeas corpus.
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We have seen that a generation accustomed to pause, rewind, and 
remotely control the image is likely to refuse the temporal inevitabil-
ity of cause and effect. In the final pages of Jonathan Safran Foer’s 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, Oskar, the child narrator, does 
just that. He arranges a series of images that he has downloaded from 
the internet. The images are of a falling figure that Oskar suspects may 
be his father, who died in the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001. “I reversed the order, so the last one was first, and the first was 
last,” recounts Oskar. “When I flipped through them, it looked like 
the man was floating up through the sky” (325). Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close concludes with these images; the reader is expected to 
flip through them—to rewind. This brief moment in the novel has elic-
ited a wide range of critical responses, from “moving and cathartic” 
(Bird 564) and “one of the most curious happy endings ever contrived” 
(Updike 140), to “poor taste” (Myers 119) and “truly horrific” (Gessen 
72).
 Turning away from aesthetic judgments about the flip-book to 
reviewers’ descriptions of it, we see, again, a wide range of assertions. 
Gessen sees “a man falling out of one of the towers” (72), while Gornick 
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describes “an object in the sky that resembles a falling body” (32; 
emphasis mine). Gornick has no doubt that the photographs are of “the 
side of the World Trade Center” (32), but B. R. Myers is less sure—the 
man is falling from “what appears to be one of the World Trade Cen-
ter’s towers” (119; emphasis mine). The technical nature of the medium 
is also debatable—the images are described as video stills (Kirn), doc-
tored photos (Munson), and a digital simulation (Solomon). Nor is it 
clear how many images are being discussed: Myers counts eleven, Gor-
nick fifteen. One point on which there is no debate, though, is this: 
regardless of what these images contain, what type of images they are, 
and how many of them there may be, what they represent is not the 
truth. The truth, as Kirn baldly puts it, is that “the flesh-and-blood per-
son on the film was—in undoctored, forward-rushing fact—jumping or 
falling to his death” (1).
 The extent of disagreement about the images—how many there are, 
what they depict, whether they are photos, video stills, or digital simu-
lations—and the unilateral agreement that what they depict is not, in 
fact, what happened at the World Trade Center site on September 11, 
2001, demonstrate more than the truism that, as W. J. T. Mitchell puts 
it, “words can ‘cite,’ but never ‘sight’ their objects” (152). It attests to 
something more fundamental: the fragility of reality as such, a fragil-
ity that the image simultaneously affirms and denies.1 Even “in this 
era of political spin, agitprop, Photoshop, and made-for-TV reality, we 
still regard photographs—even those suspected of having been manipu-
lated—as conveying a kernel of truth,” writes David Friend (xiv). Turn-
ing to the photographic record of 9/11, he continues: “For much of the 
world it is pictures that have served as the only reliable vessels of the 
experience of that day” (xvi).
 Vessels of the experience: this documentary aura ensures and refuses 
witness, captures reality and crosses it out. Like the bodies of those who 
jumped to their deaths from the World Trade Center towers, both an 
unarguable fact and the object of perpetual disavowal, reality flickers, 
exposed belatedly to the traumatized mind’s eye. Writing of Richard 
Drew’s famous image of a falling man, Mauro notes that “the scene [. . .] 
was not witnessed directly by the photographer. [. . .] Due to the motion 
 1. Photographs document and assert the factual quality of an event, providing, as 
Susan Gubar puts it in her discussion of Holocaust photographs, “indispensable evi-
dence that the inconceivable did in fact occur” (99). Note that in Gubar’s formulation, 
it is the inconceivable, and not the Holocaust, that the image verifies. For a discussion 
of the relation of Holocaust photography and photographs of 9/11, see Zelizer.
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blur of the towers, the artificial proximity attributed to the 200mm zoom 
lens, and the closure of the shutter that obfuscates the image at the very 
moment of exposure, Drew could not see the moment as it flit past” 
(588). Precisely because of the fragility of perception to which it attests, 
the documentary aura persists. “Photographed images do not seem to be 
statements about the world so much as pieces of it, miniatures of reality 
that anyone can make or acquire,” writes Susan Sontag (On Photogra-
phy 4); “A fake photograph,” Sontag continues, “falsifies reality” (86).
 A reader who turns to the book’s copyright page will see the image 
described as a “photo illustration based on a photograph by Lyle 
Owerko.”2 Photo illustration is an imaging technique according to which 
a digitized photograph is transformed, making its subject vulnerable to 
illustration, enhancement, distortion, and denial: in short, to fiction. 
Precisely because 9/11 represents an inversion of the relation of fiction 
and reality (the collapse of the towers resembled countless disaster mov-
ies), factual specificity plays a crucial role in discussions of it. Scholars 
seem compelled to cite facts even as they gesture to the inextricability of 
these facts from their discursive manifestation and ideological manipula-
tion. For Kristiaan Versluys, for example, 9/11 “demonstrates, if not the 
primacy, then at least the inevitability of discourse”; at the same time 
(in fact, in the same sentence), 9/11 is also the “most real of all real 
events—220 stories crashing down, thousands of tons of steel collaps-
ing” (3).
 At work in descriptions such as these is a paradoxical affirmation 
and disavowal of fiction’s incursion into the real. In the context of trau-
matic violent events, the implications of this incursion come starkly to 
view. The vehement iterations that the images in the last few pages of 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close represent everything but the truth 
attest to a venerable tradition of countering violence with the empirical 
and the factual; if the distinction between fact and fiction seems inacces-
sible, the distinction as such is valorized. In responses to the flip-book, 
for example, critics tend to contrast the images with some extratextual 
quality, stress the incongruity of the two, and urge the primacy of one 
over the other. Beck’s major concern about the flip-book has to do less 
with the fact that 9/11 “did happen,” and more with the extent to which 
“Foer’s book does nothing to address why or why not” (n. pag.)—rather 
 2. Ingersoll identifies the Owerko reference but neglects to note that the image is 
not a photograph but a photo illustration based on the Owerko photograph (64); Dawes, 
referring to the image, describes it as a photograph that “both exemplifies and rewrites 
the role of visual images in the collective memory of 9/11” (534).
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 F A C T,  F I C T I O N ,  F I D E L I T Y  I N  J O N AT H A N  S A F R A N  F O E R  /  1 5 3
a tall order for any novel, let alone one narrated by a nine-year-old, but 
one that renders a work of fiction answerable to history, to the geopo-
litical causes of which 9/11 is an effect. Gornick describes “staring at 
the final photograph of the World Trade Center with a clean and empty 
sky beside it, thinking, That’s it? Is this the literary use to which ‘the 
worst day’ is to be put?” (32)—a response that seems to set the novel up 
to fail (presumably, putting “the worst day” to any literary use would 
be ethically and aesthetically suspect) but points to the special responsi-
bilities that fiction about real violence is assumed to bear. Robert Eagle-
stone castigates Foer for neglecting to “address [. . .] the issues” (19) and 
emphasizes the novel’s general failure to comprehend “the current cri-
sis” (22) but neglects to name the issues or define the crisis in question. 
What issues should the novel have addressed? Just what literary use is 
Gornick thinking of, just what answers to “why or why not” does Beck 
expect? In each case, the truth of historical violence is assumed, the value 
of fidelity is reiterated, but the object of fidelity remains as blurry as the 
images themselves. 
 I linger on the flip-book that closes Extremely Loud and Incred-
ibly Close in order to articulate the stakes of this book’s claims for the 
possibilities offered by fiction even, or even especially, in the context of 
vast and violent historical events. Foer deliberately blurs the distinction 
between fiction and fact, but responses to the flip-book that simultane-
ously assume and disavow its fictional quality foreclose investigations 
of this gesture. I attempt here a different approach: one that responds 
to evocations of the fact/fiction distinction with “Nevermind,” focusing, 
instead, on the novels’ ethics of complicity and the trajectories of fidel-
ity they trace. My goal is to examine Foer’s novels’ engagement with 
real, historical violence, but without disavowing the fact that these are 
novels; they are fiction. The peril of such an approach, of course, is the 
radical relativism it courts. It flies directly in the face of a general senti-
ment that, especially in the case of historical violent events, fiction must 
be true to the facts in order to safeguard the reality of violence from rep-
resentation and protect history from denial. But there are attractions to 
this approach as well. It creates the conditions of possibility for exiting 
cycles of violence. It attests to the role of fiction in particular, and art in 
general, in creating conditions for change.
 Jonathan Safran Foer was born in 1977. He is the youngest author 
in this study, both the product of the X culture my previous chap-
ters described and a register of its impact today. Violence occupies his 
work: his debut novel Everything Is Illuminated is set in the wake of 
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the Holocaust; Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close takes 9/11 as its 
subject but the firebombing of Dresden in World War II figures promi-
nently as well. Foer has said that “both the Holocaust and 9/11 were 
events that demanded retellings” (Solomon 42). With this deceptively 
simple statement, Foer gestures toward the alliance of historical events 
with narrative, testimony, and witness that such events, as he puts it, 
“demand”—an attribution of agency to a violent past that has, tradition-
ally, elicited an ethos of verity and an aesthetics of disrupted, fragmented 
texts that attest to the limits of fiction. But for Foer, the demand in ques-
tion is not for silence but for speech: plenitude, multiple, revisionary 
narratives: not telling but retelling. “Retelling” implies that reality, for 
Foer (as it is for many Xers) is always already a discursive production, 
and that historical events demand not the facts, but multiple versions or 
accounts.
 X silences (it crosses out) and erupts (it multiplies); after X, both 
speech and silence are urgent and vexed, a paradox that is familiar in 
discussions of violent historical events like 9/11 and the Holocaust. 
Here, though, we should pause and consider the implications of put-
ting these two together. 9/11 has often been compared to the Holo-
caust in its traumatic impact, its epochal situation, and its cultural 
reverberations. This analogy is faulty at best. But to dismiss it would 
be too easy. Like most analogies, analogies of 9/11 and the Holocaust 
have little to say about the events themselves and much to tell about 
the function of analogy—here, as a call to witness an epoch-making 
event. Regardless of whether 9/11 is, in fact, epochal (the novels dis-
cussed in the previous chapter insist that it is not), this call to witness 
is striking: it presupposes both historical verity and the necessity of 
this verity’s verification. There is both too much knowledge and too 
little, so the limits of knowledge come starkly into view. The discourse 
of unspeakability established around the Holocaust and American 
slavery in the 1980s and 1990s (when Xers were teenagers and young 
adults) resurfaced after 9/11 in early responses to the attacks and per-
sists in the dominance of trauma as the primary critical paradigm with 
they are approached. But Xers, who were admonished, as young peo-
ple, to “Remember” even as what they could remember was described 
as unspeakable and available for witness only through television and 
film, had, by adulthood, an opportunity to articulate an alternative 
approach to historical violence, an approach defined not by history but 
by fiction, not by nation but by affiliation, not by conviction but by 
ambivalence: not yes or no.
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F IDEL I TY,  H I STORY
Everything Is Illuminated and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
are strikingly similar in form and theme. Each novel tells essentially the 
same story: the coming-to-knowledge of a young male protagonist pro-
pelled toward an engagement with the past. In Everything Is Illumi-
nated, the young (American, Jewish) Jonathan and his (Ukrainian) guide 
Alex (both Xers) travel to the ruins of the Jewish shtetl Trachimbrod 
in search of a woman named Augustine who saved Jonathan’s grand-
father from the Nazis. In the course of this journey the figure of Alex’s 
grandfather increases in significance and, in the novel’s climactic scene, 
recounts betraying his best friend to the Einsatzgruppen by pointing at 
him and saying “he is a Jew.” In Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, 
the young Oskar is obsessed with determining whether or not an image 
of a falling figure is his father who died in the World Trade Center, and 
traverses New York City in the search of a lock to fit a key he finds in 
his father’s closet. In the course of this journey Oskar encounters his 
own grandfather, who survived the firebombing of Dresden by Allied 
forces in World War II. As the above descriptions show, Foer is no Holo-
caust denier or 9/11 conspiracy theorist. At the same time, the novels 
engage critically the tradition (specifically, what I will call a tradition 
of fidelity) through which they are commonly read: his characters begin 
from a position of moral certainty—specifically, a world in which there 
are clear distinctions between good and evil, victims and perpetrators—
and their journey into the past is a journey into moral ambiguity in 
which these distinctions are no longer so clear-cut. Finally, each novel 
has, as its traumatic kernel, a moment that redirects our sympathies 
from the conventional allegiances its subject matter implies: a sympa-
thetic portrayal of a collaborator (possibly a perpetrator) in the novel 
about the Holocaust; the bombing of a city by U.S. and British forces in 
the novel about 9/11.
 Foer’s novels emerge directly from a cultural conversation about his-
tory and memory that was prominent in the 1990s. In the United States, 
the airing of Schindler’s List, the opening of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, and the declaration that 1993 was the “Year of the 
Holocaust” were all accompanied by much discussion about the avail-
ability of history, and of competing histories, to public memory.3 The 
 3. Loshitzky, describing the “Holocaust Boom” of 1993–94, includes, with the 
opening of the USHMM, the signing of a New Jersey bill requiring Holocaust educa-
tion, the rebroadcasting of NBC’s miniseries Holocaust, and the reception of Elio Toaff, 
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“recovered memory debate,” the development of trauma theory, the 
prominence of what Mark Seltzer has described as “wound culture,” and 
highly publicized controversies (such as Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta 
Menchú’s autobiography, attacked in 1999 by anthropologist David 
Stoll, and faux Holocaust survivor Binjamin Wilkomirski, exposed, also 
in 1999, as Swiss-born Bruno Dösseker) lent urgency, even a tinge of 
peril, to these debates. Dominick LaCapra and Berel Lang, both of whom 
published important work in Holocaust studies in the 1990s, addressed 
these issues directly. Each underscores that it is crucial to assert and rein-
force the facts of history in the face of fiction’s menacing encroach. In a 
comparative examination of truth claims in history and fiction, Domi-
nick LaCapra notes that in the case of violent or “extreme” events it 
is appropriate to employ the truth claims of historiography to critique 
those of art. Taking the Holocaust as his example, he writes: “one 
might justifiably criticize a work of art on historical as well as aesthetic 
and normative grounds if it treated the Third Reich in a manner that 
excluded or marginalized the Nazi genocide” (Writing History 14). For 
Berel Lang this valorization of historical fact authorizes some accounts 
but prohibits others. “Although there are two sides to many stories,” 
writes Lang, “for some stories there are not two sides but one. At times, 
in other words, the facts do speak for themselves” (Post-Holocaust 106). 
Statements such as these privilege not only history and its facts (which 
are presumed to be distinct from, and to pre-exist, their representation 
in fiction) but fidelity to them. Fidelity to the facts takes precedence—
epistemically and morally—over fiction. “If there is no crucial difference 
between imaginative and historical writing,” writes Lang, “than there 
can be no crucial difference between denials that [a violent event like] 
the Holocaust occurred and the discourse that affirms this occurrence” 
(Holocaust Representation 13).
 LaCapra’s work and Lang’s represent this tradition of fidelity that 
enjoins being true to the facts, to the fundamental features of a violent 
event. There are, of course, significant differences between the two. Lang 
stresses the centrality of the chronicle as the necessary basis for respon-
sible representation; LaCapra warns against fidelity to trauma. But 
both Lang and LaCapra assume a fundamental temporal progression by 
which the truth precedes fidelity to it. The subject is situated after his-
tory, in the wake of events, the facts of which she must know in order 
Rome’s chief rabbi, at the Vatican. “Schindler’s List was the ‘Jewel in the Crown’ of the 
‘Year of the Holocaust,’ confirming once again the power of popular cinema to shape 
collective memory and to generate topics for popular conversation” (6).
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 F A C T,  F I C T I O N ,  F I D E L I T Y  I N  J O N AT H A N  S A F R A N  F O E R  /  1 5 7
to be true to them. By doing so, they conclude, she acts ethically; eth-
ics, in this case, takes the form of cementing violence to its reality and, 
by doing so, foreclosing denial of either violence or the real. Genera-
tion Xers, as we have seen, are accustomed to rewind, to replay, and to 
reverse causal progression. Further, the generation with no cause to fight 
for and with nothing to believe in, witness to the attachment to trau-
matic histories that dictated the form and tenor of identity politics in the 
1980s and 1990s, are disinclined to participate in the problematic valori-
zation of trauma that LaCapra terms “fidelity.” (Though LaCapra warns 
against fidelity to trauma, he does so because such fidelity ties the subject 
to history in a problematic way, condemning her to a type of “acting 
out” that mimics traumatic repetition and prohibits the more desirable 
process of “working through.”) My point is that both acting out trauma 
and working through it retain the epistemic validity of trauma’s violence 
and privilege the historical record of it. The object of fidelity is bound up 
in knowledge: stating and maintaining the facts. According to this logic, 
fidelity to fiction not only is wrong, it does wrong.
 This discourse of fidelity has a juridical valence. It organizes the facts 
to which the ethical subject is to be true into categories in which the 
moral and the legal are combined. Thus a perpetrator is guilty, a victim 
innocent, a bystander complicit—in the juridical and the moral sense, if 
not the psychological one.4 Fictional depictions of the facts are expected 
to assert and maintain this moral/legal dyad, and the reader is expected 
to reassert and enforce this dyad by evincing fidelity to historical accu-
racy. This (so the logic goes) grants her work legal validity (LaCapra’s 
wording, “one might justifiably criticize a work of art,” is quite telling). 
This tradition of fidelity accords a significant responsibility to the reader 
or the critic of fiction who, in the quest of an ethical reading, will evalu-
ate aesthetic productions on the basis of fidelity not only to fact but to 
justice. As Lang writes, “The rudimentary details of the answers to the 
questions of who, what, and when [are] a test of whatever else is con-
structed on them. Both as a matter of fact and as a matter of justice” 
(Holocaust Representation 13; emphasis mine). Put briefly: according to 
the venerable tradition of countering violence with the empirical and the 
factual, from which LaCapra and Lang write, “being true” means being 
right as well as being ethical, and “being right” means being just as well 
 4. LaCapra defines “victim” in social, political, and ethical terms, not psychological 
terms (Writing History 79). The distinction between these categories allows for the align-
ment of victim with innocent in a way that the psychological category of victim does not. 
See Mandel (Against the Unspeakable 56–57).
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as being correct. But Xers do not so easily subscribe to this binding of 
the real (matters of fact) to judgment (matters of justice). As Video Back-
packer puts it in Richard Linklater’s iconic X film Slacker, “I was seeing it 
for real but it just wasn’t right.”
TRAUMA,  JUST ICE
Of course, violent historical events like those dealt with in Foer’s fic-
tion are commonly approached in terms of trauma and, in the context 
of trauma, the epistemic stability of fidelity’s object may not be a given. 
Both as a psychic experience (in psychoanalytic terms; Freud is the prime 
example) and as an epistemological model (in literary critical terms) 
for an engagement with history in the work of trauma theorists such as 
LaCapra, trauma is a break with established orders of knowledge. As 
an event that eludes psychic mastery, its reality can only be established 
through—to return to Foer’s term—retelling. Given the prominence of 
this discourse in discussion of Foer’s novels, it is worth investigating 
whether trauma offers a different approach to fidelity, one not limited to 
the facts.
 On the face of matters, trauma is an inviting paradigm through 
which to approach Foer’s work. The Holocaust and 9/11 are generally 
described in terms of their traumatic impact. In a much-cited interview 
with Deborah Solomon, Foer has referred to an event in his childhood 
that he calls “the Explosion”: a classroom chemistry project gone awry 
that left many children injured, including Foer’s best friend. Solomon’s 
conjecture is that “in writing his novel, Foer [. . .] combined a personal 
trauma that occurred in 1985 with the national trauma that befell the 
country on Sept. 11, 2001” (44). Scholars of Foer’s work have followed 
Solomon’s hypothesis and read both of Foer’s novels through the struc-
ture and theme of trauma. Philippe Codde, for example, suggests that 
the Explosion is the source of Foer’s “intimate knowledge and under-
standing of traumatic events as instanced by his novels” (“Philomela 
Revisited” 242). For Foer, he writes, “the aporia at the heart of the trau-
matic experience can, indeed, only be filled with words to ease the pain 
[. . .] but the words can never really capture or represent the traumatic 
past” (“Philomela Revisited” 245–46). Writing of Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close, Sien Uytterschout and Kristiaan Versluys diagnose 
Thomas Schell (the grandfather) as melancholic, the (nameless) grand-
mother Schell as a victim of survivor guilt, and, drawing on LaCapra’s 
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terms, they describe Oskar as both “acting out” his trauma and “work-
ing through” it.
 Though Uytterschout and Versluys do not consider the novel’s sta-
tus as fiction, their emphasis on the accuracy of its depiction of trauma 
reflects the dictate that fiction, in the context of violence, must be 
“true”—if not to the facts, than to the manifestations of their psychic 
impact. Versluys’s reading of the novel in Out of the Blue is also predi-
cated on the reality of trauma and the accuracy of fiction’s depiction 
of it. Codde, who does take the special status of fiction into account, 
reaches a similar conclusion: “The form of the novel, far from being 
playful, is actually an accurate representation of a young boy’s trauma-
tized mind” (“Philomela Revisited” 251). Such readings reflect the same 
investment in epistemic validity and factual accuracy that I described in 
the opening pages of this chapter. Though fidelity is directed not to the 
historical record but to the psychic reverberations of violence, the unde-
niability of its object remains the guiding principle. This somewhat naïve 
assumption that the work mirrors the world disavows the novel’s status 
as fiction, and forecloses investigations of Foer’s deliberate blurring of 
the distinction between fiction and fact in his novels about traumatic his-
torical events.
 To take the blurring of this distinction seriously—to examine fic-
tion’s engagement with historical trauma without disavowing fiction’s 
status as fiction—is to witness the force of this discourse’s juridical 
dimension. When trauma is decoupled from history, the distinction 
between victim and perpetrator is commonly evoked to reinstate the 
primacy of the historical and to enforce its moral/legal valence. As an 
example of such a gesture, I turn to a seminal moment in 1990s trauma 
theory: Cathy Caruth’s reading of the parable of Tancred and Clorinda 
that opens her important 1996 study Unclaimed Experience. Tancred 
fatally wounds his beloved Clorinda in battle; later, in an enchanted 
forest, he strikes at a tree that cries out in Clorinda’s voice. This par-
able, suggests Caruth, “can be read [. . .] as a larger parable, both of the 
unarticulated implications of the theory of trauma in Freud’s writings 
and, beyond that, of the crucial link between literature and theory” (3).
 By reading the story as a parable of traumatic repetition, literary 
evidence of how “the experience of a trauma repeats itself, exactly and 
unremittingly, through the unknowing acts of the survivor and against 
his very will” (2), Caruth links literature and trauma theory and puts 
them in service of a vision of ethics by which the experience of traumatic 
violence draws diverse people together. Clorinda’s voice testifies not only 
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to Tancred’s trauma but to the “the way in which trauma may lead [. . .] 
to the encounter with another, through the very possibility and surprise 
of listening to another’s wound” (8). In other words: Caruth’s recourse 
to the figure of the parable enables her to found, in fiction, a discussion 
of how trauma may float free from the historical and, in doing so, open a 
space for ethical engagement with traumatic experience and history.
 Ruth Leys’s Trauma: A Genealogy, a seminal 2000 overview of 
trauma theory, takes Caruth to task for this. In the concluding chapter, 
Leys turns to Caruth’s book, stressing the “hazards” of her approach 
to trauma (292) and its “chilling implications” (297). These lie not 
in the link between literature and theory but in the blurring of his-
tory by fiction. “If [. . .] the murderer Tancred can become the vic-
tim of the trauma and the voice of Clorinda testimony to his wound,” 
writes Leys, “then Caruth’s logic would turn other perpetrators into 
victims too—for example, it would turn the executioners of the Jews 
into victims and the ‘cries’ of the Jews into testimony to the trauma 
suffered by the Nazis” (297). Leys’s logic (“If Tancred . . . then Nazis”) 
extends Caruth’s literary-theoretical investigation to the historical-eth-
ical realm, an extension that she, like Caruth, performs by zeroing in 
on the literary mechanism of the parable. “What exactly is the par-
able offered by Tasso’s poem according to Caruth?” asks Leys, and 
answers: “The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘parable’ as follows: 
A fictitious narrative or allegory (usually something that might occur 
naturally), by which moral or spiritual relations are typically figured 
or set forth. [. . .] On Caruth’s interpretation, what the parable of Tas-
so’s story tells us is that not only can Tancred be considered the victim 
of a trauma but that even the Nazis are not exempt from the same dis-
pensation” (297; emphasis mine). In other words, referencing the par-
able’s recourse to fiction to establish morality, Leys turns to history in 
order to demonstrate that Caruth’s reading produces injustice.
 Both Leys’s argument and its vehemence (as well as the general 
agreement among trauma theorists that Caruth has gone too far)5 tes-
tify to what is at stake: the danger that the distinction of perpetra-
tor from victim may be blurred. Foer deliberately courts this danger. 
His reliance on the photo illustration importantly resembles Caruth’s 
reliance on the parable: both the parable and the image blur the dis-
 5. For a discussion of Leys’s reading of Caruth and critics’ responses to it, see Man-
del, Against the Unspeakable 54–59.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 F A C T,  F I C T I O N ,  F I D E L I T Y  I N  J O N AT H A N  S A F R A N  F O E R  /  1 6 1
tinction between fiction and truth, make claims for each, and situate 
fiction as the origin of possible truths. Responses to both the parable 
and the photo illustration mobilize trauma as a juridical instrument, 
wielding it to distinguish victim from nonvictim and, by extension, vic-
tim from perpetrator. The reverberations of this imperative are evi-
dent in Versluys’s discussion of Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close. 
Versluys reads the book as articulating the traumatic impact of his-
torical violent events. Struck by the fact that Foer, an American Jew 
whose family was affected by the Holocaust, chooses German protago-
nists for his novel, he makes sure to clarify in a footnote that the fam-
ily “though German, is anti-Nazi” (199); describing the book as “a 
strong plea for tolerance, refusing to take sides,” he immediately speci-
fies that, in fact, “it takes the side of the victims, irrespective of their 
national origin or allegiance” (82). This is an example of how, in the 
context of trauma’s shattering of distinctions between past and pres-
ent, fiction and fact, the distinction between perpetrator and victim is 
maintained—not within the novel or the fiction but in critical readings 
and responses to it.6 In the name of fidelity, they conflate the histori-
cal with the juridical, invest both with moral weight, and adjudicate 
accordingly.7 Judgment—in the sense of evoking and applying legal cat-
egories—is both the origin and end of this kind of reading. Fiction is 
locked into a closed circuit, bound and circumscribed by the assump-
tions about violence and history that legislate and limit the kinds of 
responses we can have.
 6. Additional examples are Codde’s (“Keeping History at Bay”) and Saal’s discus-
sions of Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close. Both focus on the character of Simon 
Goldberg. Codde argues that Goldberg haunts the narrative, and Saal underscores his 
“muted” presence, but for each, Goldberg—the novel’s sole Jewish Holocaust victim—
undercuts the radical relativism that the intersection of Dresden, Hiroshima, and 9/11 
courts. Menachem Feuer, discussing Everything Is Illuminated, argues that Alex’s grand-
father is, in fact, Jewish. For all, the Jewish Holocaust victim—an image par excellence 
of ethnic authenticity, racial persecution, moral authority, and bare life—is evoked to 
counter Foer’s unmooring of violence from the real.
 7. LaCapra, who, as I noted earlier, privileges the truth-claims of historiography 
over those of fiction in the context of “extreme, traumatic” events, raises the issue of 
“fidelity to trauma, a feeling that one must somehow keep faith with it” (Writing History 
22). LaCapra’s distrust of fidelity to trauma responds to this conflation of the victimized 
with traumatized: because he insists that it is only the victim who may act out or work 
through trauma, “fidelity to trauma” might be more accurately described as “fidelity to 
victimization (by traumatic violence)” or fidelity to a simulacrum (as defined by Badiou; 
I turn to Badiou’s work on fidelity later in this chapter).
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F IDEL I TY,  TRUTH
How, then, are we to approach violence after Generation X? Because 
fidelity determines affiliations—to be faithful is to be true—and informs 
representation, communication, and community even (or especially) in 
the absence of a god, cause, or ism, it cannot be abandoned. But nor can 
fiction simply replace fact as fidelity’s object. Because fidelity produces 
truth claims, fidelity to fiction can deny that historical events occurred, 
or proffer an account of them to counteract established facts. Generation 
X, defined and determined by the historical events and social develop-
ments that accompanied their maturing in the 1980s and 1990s, may 
well find that reality “bites” and long, with McInerney’s narrator in 
Bright Lights, Big City, to replace Fact with Fiction, but in Everything Is 
Illuminated and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, history is ineluc-
table: it happened, and the question of fiction’s ethics in the wake of its 
violence remains open and urgent.8 The question is this: When violence 
blurs the distinction between fiction and fact, can fiction remain fiction 
and be true?
 To begin to answer this question, I turn to Alain Badiou’s work on 
fidelity, truth, and ethics. For Badiou, the object of fidelity is not knowl-
edge (which Badiou aligns with established orders of thinking) but that 
which breaks with knowledge. Badiou terms such a break an “event” 
and, for Badiou, the event need not be of momentous historical signifi-
cance.9 In Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Badiou offers 
four categories of an event: amorous, political, scientific, or aesthetic (the 
examples he gives are falling in love, the French Revolution, the Coper-
nican revolution, Schoenberg’s twelve-tone scale). Truth is not singular 
 8. Foer’s novels include some significant gestures toward alternate or allohistories. 
Alternate history is a “what-if” exercise in imagining what might have happened had 
history turned out differently (examples include Xer Michael Chabon’s The Yiddish 
Policeman’s Union). In a discussion of allohistory in fiction, Adam Rovner describes al-
lohistory as a philosophical genre, one that unmasks illusions we hold about historical 
evidence and objectivity. “Ultimately,” he concludes, “these novels dispel the illusion of 
determinism that the historical perspective creates: this liberation enhances the freedom 
for thought, for reform, for change” (149–50). The multiple trajectories of fidelity in 
the novels I discuss do open this possibility, but their allohistoric gestures remain firmly 
rooted in historical actuality. The flip-book, for example, allows Oskar to imagine an 
alternate world, but this world is also identified as an impossible one through the gram-
matical form of the third conditional: “we would have been safe” (Extremely 326; my 
emphasis.
 9. Badiou’s event has, as Keith Jenkins puts it, “no particular content [. . .] its hap-
pening is not a matter of ‘the facts,’ of the cognitive; its significance cannot be ‘proven’” 
(46).
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but plural, and truths are not the objects but the products of fidelity: the 
outcome of a process of being faithful, of “being true.” Thus, though an 
event is always situated in history (which Badiou thinks of as a reservoir 
of situations, each of which is a site of multiplicity), it is distinguished 
from history by its impact on someone who, compelled to be faithful to 
this impact, is propelled by fidelity into subjecthood: fidelity makes her 
a subject of an event. (In Being and Event Badiou defines the subject 
as “the process of liaison between the event [. . .] and the procedure of 
fidelity” [239].)
 Badiou’s thinking on fidelity recasts the term in three ways that are 
useful for thinking about violence after Generation X. First, reflecting 
the ethical indeterminacy that characterizes this generation’s approach 
to violence, fidelity (according to Badiou) is not a virtue or a quality 
possessed by a subject. There is no faithful subject that precedes an 
event. Fidelity is, instead, a way of thinking or processing, of organizing. 
Second, reflecting the epistemic uncertainty by which presence disap-
pears here, fidelity (according to Badiou) does not exist in and of itself; 
its presence or absence can’t be located. Rather, fidelity can be identified 
only in what it produces or programs: it names as event an organization 
of the situation’s multiplicity (Being 233). Finally: by organizing the sit-
uation, fidelity generates truths from within it; truth is the product, not 
the object of fidelity. Fidelity assembles or fashions truths, rather than 
mirroring or reflecting them: “a truth groups together all the terms of 
the situation which are positively connected to the event. [. . .] [It is the] 
result of a procedure of fidelity” (Being 335; emphasis in the original).
 In Ethics, which is intended for a general audience, Badiou employs 
rhetoric that invites us to consider the violence with which his notion 
of fidelity is inflected. He stresses compulsion (an event “compels us to 
decide a new way of being” and “compels the subject to invent a new 
way of being and acting in the situation” [41, 42; emphasis in the origi-
nal]) and, more importantly, force. “Truth forces knowledges,” writes 
Badiou, adding, “The verb to force indicates that since the power of a 
truth is that of a break,” it “violat[es] established and circulating knowl-
edges” (70; emphasis in the original).10 The subject is what emerges when 
someone is “riven,” “punctured,” and “broken” by truth (49, 46, 51). 
The prominence of this rhetoric in Badiou’s book on ethics invites us to 
 10. “Forcing” is a mathematical technique invented by the American mathematician 
Paul Cohen. Hallward describes Cohen’s concept of forcing and notes, “the term ‘forc-
ing’ is simply Cohen’s jargon for ‘satisfaction in the model’” (345). The rhetoric of 
violence seems to be Badiou’s contribution.
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think about the similarity of the subject founded by the event to the sub-
ject founded by trauma, bringing Badiou’s work closer to the kinds of 
discussions that have surrounded Foer’s: Badiou’s subject, though not a 
psychological subject, is founded by the event, and punctured and broken 
by truth, and is thus similar to the subject produced by the violence of 
trauma (specifically, trauma conceived as a literary critical term, that is, 
as an epistemological model for engagement with history). At the same 
time, Badiou offers a quite different view of the kind of subject produced 
by the event and of the nature of fidelity: fidelity is not, in itself, ethi-
cal; it is defined in terms not of its object but of its product; it produces 
truths, rather than mirroring or reflecting them.
 Badiou’s concept of fidelity enables us to unbind fiction about vio-
lence from the facts of history and from judgments about historical 
actors’ innocence or guilt. If the tradition of fidelity I described in the 
first part of this chapter—fidelity to the facts—is defined in terms of its 
object (be that object historical facts or their traumatic impact), Badiou’s 
work enables us to trouble not the object but the process by which this 
object presents as truth, and to see how fiction produces different, sub-
jective, and multiple truths. Badiou does not employ fidelity as a method 
of literary criticism (though the encounter with a literary work may 
occasion an event), and, though Badiou has elsewhere written on 9/11 
and on the word “Jew,” his role in my discussion is to complicate the 
tradition of fidelity I described in the earlier part of this chapter.11 The 
catch is that Badiou’s thinking does not replace this tradition but is coun-
terpoised with it so that, with true X ambivalence, rather than choosing 
one over the other, we may take the two together.
 Doing so enables us to revisit the relation of fidelity to history and 
to justice. Fidelity to the facts posits a subject who is situated after his-
tory, in the wake of events, the facts of which she must know in order to 
be true to them. Badiou’s conception of the event as that which precedes 
or founds the subject invites us to consider how a subject may create, 
rather than conform to, the conditions for an ethical response. Taking 
the two together means the subject is situated both before and after eth-
ics. Think of a palindrome—a word that can be read left-to-right and 
right-to-left (or a flip-book, that constructs or deconstructs causal rela-
tions, depending on the direction in which the pages are turned). Bring-
 11. In Handbook for Inaesthetics, Badiou emphasizes that fidelity does not describe 
the relationship of work to world; its articulation remains the province of the work, 
which Badiou describes as “a fact of art” (12). Badiou’s writings on 9/11 and “Jew” are 
included in Polemics.
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ing fidelity to the facts together with Badiou’s work also enables us to 
revisit the distinction between victim and nonvictim and the function of 
this distinction as arbiter of truth in fiction. In fidelity to the facts, the 
object of fidelity is bound up in knowledge; for scholars like LaCapra 
and Lang, ethics reside in being faithful not just to the facts but to their 
retrospective organization into right and wrong: the subject is true by 
being accurate, and ethical by being just. For Badiou, the object of fidel-
ity is fidelity itself, and ethics is the outcome of a subject’s maintaining 
the compulsion to live, and be, otherwise in relation to the event: “being 
faithful to a fidelity.” Taking the two together is to both affirm and dis-
avow the object of knowledge, to focus on trajectories of fidelity within 
fiction, and to consider fiction’s ethics of truth without disavowing fic-
tion’s status as fiction.12 Think of a parable: to return to Leys’s definition, 
“A fictitious narrative or allegory (usually something that might occur 
naturally), by which moral or spiritual relations are typically figured or 
set forth.”
 It is time now to turn to Foer’s novels and to trace the operations of 
fidelity that they solicit and resist.
“ I T  TOOK H I S  SAY ING  SO  TO  MAKE  I T  TRUE” :
Everything Is I l luminated
Everything Is Illuminated alternates between the chronicle of the fic-
tional shtetl of Trachimbrod from its founding to its destruction by the 
Nazis (narrated by Jonathan), and the picaresque journey that Jonathan 
undertook to the site of Trachimbrod in the company of Alex, Alex’s 
Grandfather, and their dog (narrated by Alex).13 Jonathan and Alex 
(both Xers) write their stories in the course of the novel, each mailing to 
the other the chapters as they are completed. Alex prefaces each chap-
ter he writes with a letter to Jonathan in which Alex comments on the 
 12. Fidelity to fiction thus defined is quite different from what Badiou describes, in 
Ethics, as fidelity to a simulacrum. For Badiou, in contrast to fidelity to fidelity (ethics), 
fidelity to a simulacrum is a condition of possibility not for ethics but for evil, which 
Badiou defines as an assertion of identity that forecloses engagement with otherness (his 
example, in Ethics, is Nazism). Though I cannot here offer an account of the role of fic-
tion in Badiou’s philosophy, Badiou generally uses “fiction” in its sense of fashioning and 
forming, as opposed to illusion or delusion.
 13. Through capitalization I distinguish between Jonathan’s grandfather and Alex’s 
Grandfather.
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story Jonathan is writing, reflects on his own story, and meditates on 
the nature of reading and writing. Jonathan sends Alex chapters of his 
chronicle, each also prefaced with a letter. Though Jonathan’s letters are 
not included in the novel, we can surmise, from Alex’s letters to Jona-
than, that Jonathan comments on Alex’s writing, corrects his English, 
and encloses some money.
 The double narrative of Everything Is Illuminated would seem to 
oppose the fictional (Jonathan’s magical-realist chronicle of the shtetl) 
with the factual (Alex’s relatively realistic account of their journey to 
Trachimbrod in post-Soviet Ukraine).14 But as the novel progresses, this 
distinction begins to blur. Writing to Jonathan, Alex expresses some 
reservations about Jonathan’s version of Trachimbrod, specifically the 
explicit descriptions of sex acts that the more prudish Alex deems inap-
propriate (179). He also refers to Jonathan’s comments on his, Alex’s, 
written account of their journey. Jonathan had shared with Alex a per-
sonal memory and Alex has included this memory in his own account. 
After reading Alex’s chapter, Jonathan asks Alex to revise his story to 
remove that anecdote, but Alex refuses. “I must tell you that this is not 
a possibility. I accept if because of my decision you choose not to pres-
ent me any more currency, or if you command for me to post back the 
currency you have given me in the previous months. It would be justi-
fying every dollar, I will inform you” (179). At this point Alex reflects, 
“We are being very nomadic with the truth, yes? The both of us? Do 
you think that this is acceptable when we are writing about things that 
occurred?” (179).
 On one level Alex’s phrasing is a version of the dictate that histori-
cal events—especially violent ones—should not be subjected to fiction-
alization. Ribbat, for example, reads Alex’s disingenuous question as “a 
dictum that sums up contemporary debates on mediated memory and 
popular culture and links them to earlier debates on Holocaust repre-
sentation” (214). But read in context, the “truth” Alex is referring to is 
not a stable entity, and it is not (or not merely) the Holocaust.15 The con-
text is this: reflecting on Jonathan’s chronicle, Alex complains that it is 
not “high-fidelity”; Jonathan’s request that Alex revise his own account 
 14. For a thoughtful discussion of the two narrative modes at work in the novel, see 
Francisco Collado-Rodríguez.
 15. Markovits points out that Everything Is Illuminated “works [because] it isn’t 
really about the Holocaust” (n. pag.). For Gessen, though, the one thing that “is treated 
with the utmost seriousness [in Everything Is Illuminated] is the Holocaust” (68). For 
Sicher, the Holocaust figures in Foer’s novel as “a postmodern sign of loss” (174).
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propels Alex to ask, “If we are to be such nomads with the truth, why 
do we not make the story more premium than life?” (179). Alex goes 
on to describe this possible, premium narrative. His account would 
involve Alex’s Grandfather playing the role of Augustine, the woman 
who saved Jonathan’s grandfather from the Nazis; if such an alterna-
tive is not acceptable, Alex offers to be, himself, the savior: “We could 
write Grandfather into the story. [. . .] He could be Augustine. August, 
perhaps. Or just Alex, if that is satisfactory to you” (180). The mul-
tiple possibilities Alex points to, some of which come true (the end of 
the novel will reveal that Grandfather’s name is, in fact, Alex), perme-
ate his prose, underscoring the nomadicity of reference: in the course of 
Everything Is Illuminated, Alex will become “just” in the adjectival, not 
merely the adverbial sense; not “just” in the sense of being limited, but 
“just” in the sense of making right.
 This fundamental instability of language, the perpetual movement 
of the signified behind or beneath the signifier that illuminates and 
obscures it, is familiar to Xers schooled, as Foer was, in poststructural-
ism and deconstruction. But the implications of being nomadic with the 
truth are weighty, too. Alex wishes to depart from the facts because he 
has reached that point in his own chronicle where he must recount the 
details of his Grandfather’s confession that he murdered his best friend, 
Herschel, betraying him to the Einsatzgruppen by pointing at him and 
saying, “he is a Jew.” As Alex puts it, to write an accurate account of 
his journey with Jonathan is to “point a finger at Grandfather point-
ing to Herschel” (178). “Herschel was a Jew,” Grandfather confesses, 
in the chapter narrated by Alex. “He was my best friend. [. . .] And I 
murdered him” (228). The confession identifies Grandfather as a per-
petrator: Alex’s reluctance to relate this part of the story stems from 
his conviction that a written account must be faithful to the facts. But 
as the account continues (and remember: Alex is its reluctant author 
who has already expressed his desire not to tell this story) “murder” 
moves, morphing into betrayal: Grandfather identifies Herschel to the 
soldiers who are separating the Jews from the other townspeople and 
shooting those who fail to cooperate. As Alex describes it, Grandfather, 
fearing for his life and for the lives of his wife and child (Alex’s father), 
points at Herschel and says, “he is a Jew this man is a Jew” (251). 
By exonerating Grandfather of the murder and providing him with a 
motive, Alex’s account reverses the trajectory of Grandfather’s initial 
confession. Even while Grandfather clarifies that “I murdered Herschel” 
means “I betrayed Herschel,” the distinction implicit in the clarification 
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is immediately crossed out: “what I did was as good as murdering him. 
[. . .] Herschel would have been murdered with or without me but it is 
still as if I murdered him” (247; emphasis mine).
 Alex is writing these chapters; by writing he is, in his own terms, also 
“pointing a finger.” His account of Grandfather’s confession flirts with 
the juridical injunction with which fidelity to the facts is aligned, and 
troubles the distinction between fact and fiction that fidelity is invoked 
to establish. The “good” in “as good as” invests morality with epis-
temic value; the “still as if” authorizes an account that is parallel to, 
and coextensive with, the facts: faithful to something other than his-
tory. Alex expands on this distinction between an account that is accu-
rate and an account that is right—a right characterized as fidelity not to 
fact but to fiction. “I would never command you to write a story that 
is as it occurred in the actual,” he says to Jonathan, “but I would com-
mand you to make your story faithful” (240; emphasis mine). “Faith-
ful” means not only a fiction that differs from history in the poetic sense 
(relating, as Aristotle puts it, not what has been but what could be); in 
Alex’s formulation, it assumes an ethical dimension—being true not to 
what has been but to what should be—and situates the object of fidelity 
within fiction. (This point is reiterated when Alex, disgusted by Jona-
than’s most recent chapter of the chronicle of Trachimbrod, shares the 
text not with Little Igor, his beloved brother, but with his dog, “who 
acted faithfully with it” [240; emphasis mine].)
 Despite its ethical inflection, writing what should be does not make 
you a good person, and in this novel, writing, in its dual work of estab-
lishing and revising, becomes both betrayal and fidelity. Meditating on 
the confession to Jonathan, Alex writes:
Jonathan where do we go from here what do we do with what we know 
Grandfather said that I am I but this could not be true the truth is that 
I also pointedatHerschel and I also said heisaJew and I will tell you 
that you also pointedatHerschel and you also said heisaJew and more 
than that Grandfather also pointedatme and said heisaJew and you also 
pointedathim and said heisaJew and your grandmother and Little Igor 
we all pointedateachother. (252)
 Within this explosion of complicity, “pointing a finger” combines 
writing, betraying, condemning, killing, and being true. It defies the jurid-
ical distinction between victim and perpetrator that traditionally lim-
its fiction about violence to the facts of history. This parabolic gesture 
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sets forth an ethics of complicity that forgoes the distinction between 
perpetrator and victim. Given that the title of the book is Everything Is 
Illuminated, and the finger-pointing chapter is titled “Illumination,” it 
is significant, I think, that the only “illumination” in this chapter refers 
to the light from the fire that consumes the synagogue and the Jews—
including Herschel—inside. This light “illuminated those who were not 
in the synagogue those who were not going to die” (251; emphasis mine). 
Illumination obscures the victims; it is the survivors, collaborators, and 
perpetrators who must continue in its bleak light. When everything is 
illuminated, distinguishing between those who murdered, those who 
betrayed, and those who survived fades in light of Alex’s urgent question, 
“What do we do with what we know?”
 In the novel’s concluding pages, Alex’s wistful vision of “being 
nomadic with the truth,” and his suggestion that he and Jonathan, in 
making their story “excellent,” could replace Grandfather with “just 
Alex” (180), is realized in the final (unfinished) letter from Grandfa-
ther to Jonathan, which Alex has presumably found and translated. 
Speaking of Alex (whom he had, up to this point, referred to as Sasha), 
Grandfather relates, “I said his name, Alex, which has also been my 
name for forty years” (275), and the letter presents, as fact, a passage 
from Jonathan’s diary which Alex, in the course of the journey with 
Jonathan to Trachimbrod, has read but which Grandfather (who speaks 
no English) could not have. The passage from the letter and from the 
diary is a fantasy of justice in which Alex expels his abusive father 
from the home he shares with his mother, his brother, and his Grand-
father. The novel’s reader first encounters this passage when Alex reads 
Jonathan’s diary (160) and again (the passage is repeated verbatim), 
in the letter from Grandfather to Jonathan that has been translated by 
Alex (274). It is unclear whether Jonathan, Alex, or Grandfather is its 
author.
He told his father that he could care for Mother and Little Igor. It took 
his saying so to make it true. Finally, he was ready. His father could not 
believe this thing. What? he asked. What? And Sasha told him again that 
he would take care of the family, that he would understand if his father 
had to leave and never return, and that it would not even make him 
less of a father. He told his father that he would forgive. Oh, his father 
became so angry, so full of wrath, and he told Sasha that he would kill 
him, and Sasha told his father that he would kill him, and they moved at 
each other with violence and his father said, Say it to my face, not to the 
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floor, and Sasha said, You are not my father. (160; the identical passage 
is repeated on page 274)
This passage is the epistemic crux of the novel, as it marks the spot 
where fact and fiction intersect. Jonathan had initially written this pas-
sage in the diary he kept on the journey to Trachimbrod after hearing 
Alex’s accounts of his father’s abusive behavior; Alex read this passage 
in Jonathan’s diary. Describing his initial encounter with the passage, 
Alex writes, “I understood what he was doing when he wrote like this. 
At first it made me angry, but then it made me sad, and then it made me 
so grateful, and then it made me angry again, and I went through these 
feelings hundreds of times, stopping on each for only a moment and then 
moving on to the next” (160). The passage’s reappearance at the end of 
the novel (it immediately precedes Grandfather’s suicide) puts this affec-
tive instability to rest. It identifies the distinction between fact and fan-
tasy as a question of fidelity, but leaves the object of fidelity undecidable. 
In translating, Alex may have been faithful to the letter’s literal contents, 
or he may have rendered them in such a way as to replicate the passage 
in Jonathan’s diary he had read months earlier, or he may have fabri-
cated the passage in his earlier account. In all these scenarios, the pas-
sage is both fiction and true. Further: like “pointing a finger,” “it took 
his saying so to make it true” posits truth as posterior, not anterior, to 
speech and to writing, the product not of telling but of retelling, and as a 
necessary break with a violent past. As this parable is written and rewrit-
ten, fiction comes to the fore: it is both the object of fidelity and the site 
of justice.16
“ I T  HAPPENED  TO  ME” : 
Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close
Jonathan and Alex are Xers but Oskar, the narrator of Extremely Loud 
and Incredibly Close, is not. If Everything Is Illuminated is structured 
by dual narratives that conflict, revise each other, and intersect, all in 
 16. Hungerford (“Jonathan Safran Foer”) discusses this passage as well, though she 
dismisses its epistemic instability as “postmodern cleverness” (616). Reflecting on the 
novel’s “aesthetics of complicity,” she concludes that Foer “steps back from this specific 
redistribution of pain to a humanistic reflection on pain as an element of life itself” 
(617). For Ardoin, in contrast, the scene represents the book’s larger project, described 
as “a kind of aesthetic unshackling” from “the rigid repetition of the past” (200).
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the shadow of the Holocaust, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
takes, as its point of departure, not one disaster but two: the firebomb-
ing of Dresden in February 1943 by U.S. and Allied forces, and the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001 by Al Qaeda. By bringing these 
together, Foer underscores, again, the limitations that the victim/perpe-
trator distinction imposes, limitations that had, in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, been firmly marked by silence. Keith Gessen has noted 
how Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close echoes, in its passage on the 
destruction of Dresden, W. G. Sebald’s A Natural History of Destruc-
tion, a literary and photographic meditation on the Allied destruction 
of German cities in World War II. Gessen’s concern has to do with how 
echoes of Sebald’s prose in Foer’s book raise questions of influence and 
originality. But there is another, more important connection: In A Natu-
ral History of Destruction, Sebald stresses the paucity of literary works 
about the Allied destruction of German cities. Meditating on this silence, 
he situates it firmly within the victim/perpetrator distinction: precisely 
because they were perpetrators of horrifying violence, writes Sebald, 
Germans could neither imagine themselves as victims, nor could they 
demand that they be so imagined.17 It falls, then, to the descendants, the 
inheritors of this history, to do so.
 Such a one is Oskar. He is the product of both Dresden and 9/11. His 
grandfather, Thomas Schell Sr., lost his first love, Anna, in the bombing; 
years later in New York he is drawn to Anna’s sister, Oskar’s grand-
mother, who writes Oskar letters throughout the novel. Their child is 
Oskar’s Dad: Thomas Schell Jr., who dies in the World Trade Center. 
The two lost figures—“Anna” and “Dad”—are palindromes: words that 
can be spelled backward and forward. The novel underscores this point: 
Oskar’s grandfather recalls “[writing] ‘Anna’ in the air—backward and 
right to left—and when I was on the phone I’d dial the numbers—2662” 
(16); Oskar, thinking of his father, imagines saying “‘Dad?’ backward, 
which would have sounded the same as ‘Dad’ forward” (236). Writing 
about narrative and history in a very different context, Peter Brooks 
describes the palindrome as “a repetitive text without variation or 
point of fixity, a return which leads to an unarrested shuttling back and 
forth” between “human plots” and “eternal orders which render human 
 17. Sebald writes: “As far as I know, the question of whether or how [the bombing] 
could be strategically or morally justified was never the subject of open debate in Ger-
many after 1945, no doubt mainly because a nation which had murdered and worked 
to death millions of people in its camps could hardly call on the victorious powers to 
explain the military and political logic that dictated the destruction of the German cities” 
(13–14).
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attempts to plot and to interpret plot not only futile, but ethically unac-
ceptable” (524–25). “We are condemned,” Brooks continues, “to repeti-
tion, rereading, in the knowledge that what we discover will always be 
that there was nothing to be discovered” (525).
 Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close is structured by precisely such 
shuttling back and forth, figured by the game of “Reconnaissance Expe-
dition.” This is a game that Oskar plays with his father in which Oskar 
must find and retrieve some object. Their last game took place in Cen-
tral Park on the weekend before his father’s death, and was never com-
pleted. After 9/11, Oskar continues to play the game, but instead of 
searching Central Park for buried objects, he searches the boroughs of 
New York City to find the lock that fits a key he finds in his father’s 
closet. Looking at all the people he met on those wanderings (they come 
to see him perform as Yorick’s skull in his school production of Hamlet) 
Oskar muses: “They didn’t know what they had in common, which was 
kind of like how I didn’t know what the thumbtack, the bent spoon, 
the square of aluminum foil, and all those other things I dug up in Cen-
tral Park had to do with each other” (143). Of course, Oskar is what 
they have in common, a point made clear at the conclusion of his quest, 
when Oskar meets William Black, the owner of the key, only to dis-
cover that the object of his quest is a mirror image of himself: another 
bereaved son.
 What he refers to as “the worst day” did not just happen to Oskar. 
He is the product of it, not only through the firebombing of Dresden 
(another “worst day”) but his “heavy boots” (as he describes his depres-
sion), his hypochondria, his fear of Arabs, elevators, smoke, and tall 
buildings (36), and especially his compulsive inventing. From the abrupt 
opening sentence (“What about a teakettle?”), the prose of the novel 
evokes invention run amok, a crisis characterized not by imagination’s 
limits but its excess, and centered on the image of the falling figure. 
“There’s one body that could be him [his father’s] [. . .] when I magnify 
it until the pixels are so big that it stops looking like a person, sometimes 
I can see glasses. Or I think I can. But I know I probably can’t. It’s just 
me wanting it to be him” because, Oskar continues, “I want to stop 
inventing. If I could know how he died, exactly how he died, I wouldn’t 
have to invent him dying inside an elevator that was stuck between 
floors [. . .] and I wouldn’t have to imagine him trying to crawl down the 
outside of the building [. . .] or trying to use a tablecloth as a parachute 
[. . .] There were so many different ways to die, and I just need to know 
which was his” (257; emphasis mine).
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 Because an event, for Badiou, is a break with established knowledge, 
it is unspeakable, external to the ordering processes of language. We 
may think of fidelity as a process of articulating the event or naming it 
(“that’s what happened”) that, by doing so, brings a subject into being 
(“it happened to me”). Oskar keeps the image of the falling figure in a 
scrapbook titled “Stuff That Happened to Me.” He found the image 
on a Portuguese website—such images are not available in the United 
States—and complains: “It makes me incredibly angry that people all 
over the world can know things that I can’t, because it happened here, 
and happened to me, so shouldn’t it be mine?” (256, emphasis in origi-
nal). At the end of the novel Oskar returns to the falling figure and won-
ders: “Was it Dad? Maybe. Whoever it was, it was somebody” (325). 
After relinquishing ownership, certainty, and specificity, Oskar rips 
the pages out of “Stuff That Happened to Me” and assembles them, in 
reverse order, to create the flip-book.
 This X ethic, that crosses out and marks the spot, affirming the 
happening of an event and opening it up, makes possible an exten-
sion beyond the victim/perpetrator distinction that locks fiction into 
a closed circuit. It demands certainty but underscores its unavailabil-
ity. This is the key, I think, to the novel’s title. At the culmination of 
his quest, Oskar is not meeting William Black for the first time; he is 
re-encountering a figure he had just missed at the start of his search 
because Black had, at that moment, been “extremely loud” (293) while 
Oskar had been “incredibly close” (394). Between “extremely loud” 
and “incredibly close” is another meditation on the falling man, a med-
itation that attends to the potential and limits of the digitized image: 
“I started thinking about the pixels in the image of the falling body, 
and how the closer you looked, the less you could see” (293). But this 
indeterminacy cannot be owned, affirmed, or (in the form of traumatic 
capital) safeguarded. If, as Badiou puts it in Ethics, “to enter into the 
composition of a subject of truth can only be something that happens 
to you” (51), such work, for Oskar, is predicated on abandoning the 
kind of thinking that had him complain that “it happened here, and 
happened to me, so shouldn’t it be mine?” By eschewing the logic of 
nation, subject, and trauma, and by ripping the pages out of “Stuff 
That Happened to Me” to create the flip-book, Oskar resurrects and 
affirms this deeper, harder truth: “It happened to everybody,” as Alex’s 
Grandfather, in Everything Is Illuminated, says of Herschel’s death. 
“Just because I was not a Jew, it does not mean that it did not happen 
to me” (245–46).
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FACT,  F ICT ION ,  F IDEL I TY:  NOT  YES  OR  NO
I wrote above that analogies of 9/11 and the Holocaust have little to 
say about the events themselves and much to tell us about the func-
tion of analogy. Attending to trajectories of fidelity, rather than their 
objects, underscores the artifices (analogy, parable, palindrome) by 
which this work is accomplished. I have described Xers as schooled in 
looking at and through what presents as given: their resolute superficial-
ity intersects with deep critique; they gaze at and through the veil. Like 
Oskar, whose quest is propelled by the word “Black” written in red pen 
(44–46), my approach to Foer’s work is informed by this double vision. 
Reading these very similar novels together, after (that is, according to) 
Generation X, illuminates the intersection, multiplicity, and negation 
that violence after X enacts.
 In Everything Is Illuminated the bifurcated narrative (there are two 
narrators and two plots) posits two trajectories of fidelity. These are dis-
tinguished by their objects: fidelity to the facts (Alex’s realistic account 
of the journey through post-Soviet Ukraine) and to fiction (Jonathan’s 
magical-realistic fable of the founding of the mythical shtetl). In the 
course of the novel, these trajectories intersect. Fact joins fiction as the 
object of fidelity, and the novel ends by positing fiction as the site not 
only of ethics but of justice—justice defined by departure from history, 
not fidelity to it. Alex denies his father; as Grandfather writes to Jona-
than, his generation can live without violence only on condition of that 
negation. “They must cut all the strings, yes? With you [. . .] with their 
father [. . .] with everything they have known” (275). Writing, rewrit-
ing, affirming, denying, pointing a finger: with these parables (following 
Leys’s definition of the term, as a fiction that figures moral or spiritual 
relations), fiction comes into focus as both the object of fidelity and the 
site of justice. Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close examines not fideli-
ty’s object but its origin, revising the assumption that fidelity’s trajectory 
mimics that of history at its very core: the relation of cause and effect. 
The image of this approach is a palindrome—the literary equivalent of 
control over the image, of rewinding and replaying, that defined Xers’ 
attitude toward visual culture. Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close 
relies on visual and textual palindromes to sketch trajectories of fidelity 
that lead away from history and toward different, subjective, and mul-
tiple truths.
 The flip-book, with which this chapter began, concretizes this X qual-
ity. We know the figure falls down, but we see it float up. And, Oskar 
continues, “if I’d had more pictures, he would’ve flown through a win-
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dow, back into the building, and the smoke would’ve poured into the 
hole that the plane was about to come out of” (325). His father would 
tell a story in reverse, from “‘I love you’ to ‘Once upon a time . . .’” and, 
Oskar concludes, “I’d have said ‘Dad?’ backward, which would have 
sounded the same as ‘Dad’ forward. [. . .] We would have been safe” 
(326). “Safe” is what Oskar and his Dad were and it is what they were 
not; in affirming both, Oskar is being faithful both to what did happen 
and to what he imagines would have happened if he had enough images 
to make it so. Lacking these, he echoes Alex’s call for fiction to join fact 
as the object of fidelity, and revises the temporal precedence of the object 
to fidelity.
 This attitude is not unique to members of Generation X. In fact, 
Grandfather’s statement “It happened to everybody,” like Oskar’s 
extraction of the image from “Stuff That Happened to Me,” refuses 
any identitarian ethos, proffering, instead, intersection, multiplicity, and 
negation. This work comes to the fore in Oskar’s grandmother’s dream, 
described in her last letter to him. “I had been dreaming about where I 
came from,” she writes, and proceeds to describe the bombing of Dres-
den in reverse. “In my dream, all the collapsed ceilings re-formed above 
us. The fire went back into the bombs, which rose up and into the bellies 
of planes whose propellers turned backward, like the second hands of 
the clocks across Dresden” (306–7). Like Oskar, who would have cre-
ated (or decreated) the events of 9/11 if he had additional images, his 
grandmother extends this description to infinity: “God put together the 
land and the water, the sky and the water, the water and the water, eve-
ning and morning, something and nothing. He said, Let there be light. 
And there was darkness” (131). “There was darkness” is a denuncia-
tion of language’s potential to bring a world into being, a refusal of the 
divine, a choice of the void over the terrible flames. But it is also faithful 
to the wishful conceit of painters separating green into yellow and blue, 
lovers dressing, and animals descending from the ark, a logical extension 
of this reversal of cause and effect to the expectant darkness before the 
first light. Oskar’s grandmother refuses to choose one over the other. She 
is writing this letter in an airport, a liminal space, one defined both by 
absence and presence, by being and disappearing. “Everyone was com-
ing or going,” she reflects, but “no one was staying.” This is where she 
chooses to remain: “Not coming or going. Not something or nothing. 
Not yes or no” (312).
 I took as my title to this chapter “Not Yes or No” to undercut one 
final trajectory of fidelity: the generational identity on which this book 
is premised. Both Oskar and Alex are, essentially, orphans; nurtured not 
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by their Boomer parents but by their grandparents, who were schooled 
not in Boomer idealism but by irredeemable disaster. “Not Yes or No” 
suggests that Badiou’s work on fidelity joins the tradition of fidelity to 
the facts of disaster. Taking the two together, I suggested, is to affirm 
and disavow the object of knowledge, to focus on trajectories of fidelity 
within fiction, and to consider fiction’s ethics of truth without disavow-
ing fiction’s status as fiction. It is not enough, of course, to rest within 
these paradoxes, and in the final lines of this chapter I want to address 
what it means to embrace and recognize fidelity without truth, to eschew 
the truth claims of competing, painful histories. After all, what’s to keep 
the ethics of complicity I’ve described here from serving as a rationale 
for irresponsible, dehumanizing depictions or simulations of violence?
 The answer, of course, is: nothing.
 I know I tread on uneasy ground. The impetus to accuracy in the face 
of violence is a formidable one. It aligns fidelity with ethics and sets as 
its stakes the dismaying implications of blurring the distinction between 
perpetrator and victim. But it also prohibits investigation into why, how, 
and at what cost the violence of reality and the reality of violence are 
produced, asserted, and maintained. If violence, itself real, renders real-
ity precarious, fiction that is untrue illuminates what infidelity makes 
possible in a world in which reality is created by violence (state-spon-
sored or not) and “fidelity to trauma” (LaCapra’s term) weds identity to 
its fantasy of subjection. In this world, truth is nomadic; the distinction 
between perpetrator and victim is fragile and contingent, the effect of 
ever-shifting fidelity rather than a manifestation of immediate verity. In 
the patterns of these wanderings the dictates of fidelity fade in light of 
the opportunities that fiction opens up.
 “With our writing, we are reminding each other of things,” writes 
Alex to Jonathan, “We are making one story, yes?” (144). Alex is wholly 
aware of what “one story” can do. It can enchain its tellers to a vitriolic 
past, according to which “everything is the way it is because everything 
was the way it was” (145). Or it can break free, and set the stage for 
revolution; infidelity as a means of salvation. “I beseech you,” Alex con-
cludes, “to forgive us, and to make us better than we are. Make us good” 
(145). Oskar would say: invent.
 I do not, of course, quarrel with the factual quality of violence and 
its very real impact on the bodies, minds, and lives of its objects. Nei-
ther does Foer. Nor do any of the Generation X authors discussed in 
this book. This chapter has pursued the implications of the nomadic 
quality of violence’s reality (which I articulated in the chapter on Bret 
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Easton Ellis, “The Game That Moves”) and the implications of the col-
lapse of violence’s object and its agent, in the context of fictionalizations 
of historic events—the Holocaust; the attacks of September 11, 2001—
that, as I demonstrated both here and in the previous chapter, “Some-
thing Empty in the Sky”—are events that are considered more real than 
real, most real of all real, the arbiter of fiction’s cessation. Foer’s novels 
refuse this limited and limiting approach. They affirm fiction in its pleni-
tude and figure truth as a matter governed by decision about what to be 
true to, and how. My readings of his novels in “Not Yes or No” aim to 
show what possibilities are opened up if we are willing to revisit the dic-
tate that fiction in the wake of historical violence must perforce be true 
to facts about that violence.
 We live in a world in which “the truth” is tied to the fact of its fabri-
cation and reality is produced by visual regimes, as the manifestations of 
religious extremism and patriotic fervor cause us to question the value of 
fidelity to an idea, an ideal, a country, or a god. In this world, to affirm 
and disavow the object of knowledge, to focus on trajectories of fidelity 
within fiction, and to consider fiction’s ethics of truth without disavow-
ing fiction’s status as fiction is to be, as Alex put it, “nomadic with the 
truth.” Being nomadic with the truth, refusing to choose, acknowledges 
and claims the fictions that form and fashion what we believe to be true, 
how we are true to it, and why.
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In early 2013, a hacker with the handle AnonGhost defaced a number of 
government websites across the world.1 AnonGhost’s profile picture is a 
skull in a Guy Fawkes mask, an image that signifies its association with 
Anonymous, the cyber collective that rose to prominence in 2008. So 
does the message, quoted below, which concludes with the slogan associ-
ated with the collective’s activities: “We are anonymous. . . . We do not 
forgive, we do not forget. Expect us.”
To the Governments of the world We are watching you. . We can see 
what you are doing, we control you. We are everywhere. . Remember 
this. The people you are trying to stop on, we are everyone you depend 
on. We are the people who do your laundry and cook you food and 
serve you dinner. We make bed. We guard you, while you are sleeping. 
We drive the ambulances We direct your calls. . We are cooks and taxi 
drivers. We are everyone you come into contact with on a daily bases. 
We know everything about you. We process your insurance claims and 
credit card charges. We control every part of your life . Together we 
 1. AnonGhost has also gone by the handle “The Mauritania Attacker Team.” The 
attacks were reported on Cyberwar News on January 18, 2013, on Hackread.com on 
January 27, 2013, and on Thehackerspost.com on February 12, 2013. 
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Fight Club, Hacking, Violence after X
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stand against Israel. We are anonymous We are legion. . United as ONE. 
Divided by Zero. . We do not forgive injustice. We do not forget oppres-
sion We are coming soon to release Gaza. . Expect Us. . We are Anon-
Ghost we are legion. We do not forgive, we do not forget. Expect us.2 
 AnonGhost’s defacement message pays obvious homage to Fight 
Club. “The people you are trying to step on, we are everyone you depend 
on” is Tyler Durden’s warning to the police commissioner in Chuck 
Palahniuk’s 1996 underground classic. In the popular film adaptation by 
David Fincher, Tyler (played by Brad Pitt) and his followers kidnap and 
threaten the commissioner, who is attempting to identify and arrest the 
members of Tyler’s anarchist group. The men are all working as wait-
ers at the banquet where the commissioner is scheduled to speak. They 
abduct the commissioner, drag him to a restroom, lock the door, wrestle 
him to the ground, duct-tape his mouth, and a hold a knife to his tes-
ticles. Then Tyler, speaking directly into the camera, issues this warning: 
“Look, the people you are after are the people you depend on. We cook 
your meals, we haul your trash, we connect your calls, we drive your 
ambulances. We guard you while you sleep. Do not fuck with us” (Fight 
Club 1999).
 This chapter probes the source of Fight Club’s attraction for cybercul-
ture, and with it, the impact of violence after Generation X on a global, 
networked new millennium. Fight Club is, in essence, a hacker text. Its 
presence in cyberspace signals a coming-to-being of violence that evolves 
from fiction and fantasy and image that can be endlessly replayed (espe-
cially on DVD) to the Anonymous phenomenon and to this recent mani-
festation, in AnonGhost’s warning, as a virtual call to arms in a visceral 
geopolitical context.
 Fight Club concretizes many of the issues surrounding violence and 
Generation X that I have touched on in this book. In both the 1996 
novel by Xer Palahniuk and the 1999 film adaptation by Xer Fincher 
(starring Edward Norton, Helena Bonham Carter, and Brad Pitt—all 
Generation Xers), men get together for bare-knuckle fistfights, an 
attempt, in the world of market capitalism and commodity fetish-
ism, to connect to a primal, sensual immediacy via violence. “Tyler 
Durden,” the manifestation of this anarchic force, emerges from the 
 2. The warning appeared on Israeli and other government websites in January 2013. 
Versions of the original vary slightly, but all contain misspellings and grammatical er-
rors. Ashraf (quoted here) and Lee quote the warning and supply links to mirrors of the 
defacements. 
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unnamed narrator’s GenX malaise to wreak havoc on his corporate, 
commoditized world, attesting to the reciprocal relation of reality and 
fiction, and the formative role of violence to this relation, that I under-
scored in this book’s opening chapters. The figuration of terrorism, its 
complicity with media, and—in the 1999 film version—the spectacular 
rewriting of the urban skyline tempted critics to read Fight Club as a 
9/11 pre-text.3 History is targeted, eradicated, and helplessly repeated, 
in a movement that scores in broad strokes the same ethical issues that 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s twenty-first-century fiction more delicately 
shades. Add to this Fight Club’s alignment with a punk or grunge aes-
thetic, the flurry of anxiety around violence in the media that accom-
panied the film’s release, and the persistent reports of copycat fight 
clubs, real-world violence inspired by the novel and the film, and we 
have an X phenomenon par excellence.
 I want to focus on one further move that Fight Club makes: its 
migration to the digital and to cyberspace, and its wielding online in 
the name of political causes. Fight Club’s musings on fantasy, violence, 
commodity fetishism, and revolution express the dis-ease with reality, 
the drive to revise and remake it, that McKenzie Wark, in his 2004 A 
Hacker Manifesto, says are fundamental to the hacker class. “To the 
hacker, what is represented as being real is always partial, limited, per-
haps even false,” writes Wark (074). In Wark’s crypto-Marxist vision, 
hackers, by virtue of their mastery and creativity, have access to the 
means of production that Marx, in the industrial age, exhorted workers 
of the world to lay claim to. Information-age hackers hold the power to 
form the real, re-form, revise, and transform it. “When the powers of 
the false conspire to produce the real,” writes Wark, “then hacking real-
ity is a matter of using the real powers of the false to produce the false 
as the real power” (209).
 To traverse the ground from the mid-1990s, when Palahniuk wrote 
the novel, to the first decades of the twenty-first century, I situate Fight 
Club in the context of 1990s hacker culture, antisecurity activism, and 
online communities, tracing its attraction to cyberculture from the 
1990s to 2013. “Fight Club” in this discussion means the 1996 novel 
and the 1999 film, including its DVD release in 2000.4 This multi-
 3. See Thompson (61), Kavaldo (“With Us or Against Us”), and Petersen.
 4. This chapter moves between three versions of Fight Club. I cite Palahniuk’s 1996 
novel as FC 1996, Fincher’s 1999 adaptation as FC 1999, and items specific to the 2000 
DVD release of Fincher’s adaptation as FC 2000. Phrases that appear in both the film 
and the novel are cited as FC 1996, 1999.
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plicity is deliberate: it attests to Fight Club’s X origins. For Genera-
tion Xers, heirs to the affirmative ethos of multiculturalism and the 
combative atmosphere of identity politics, identity often appears as 
unstable, insecure, and available to be marketed, co-opted, and com-
modified. Like the narrator, who is both himself and Tyler Durden, 
Fight Club is multiple and various (and in the final scene of Finch-
er’s adaptation the characters played by Edward Norton and Helena 
Bonham Carter face a pair of exploding skyscrapers, their silhouettes 
almost identical, a hint at further replication). True to X’s experience 
of widespread complicity with the violence of a globalized, commod-
itized world, Fight Club’s quest for self-certainty through violence (an 
answer to Tyler’s question, “how much do you know about yourself if 
you’ve never been in a fight?” [FC 1999]) morphs into the menace of 
organized religion, corporate culture, and terror—especially after Tyler 
disappears.
 Though X was conceived as a generational appellation, it is also, of 
course, a point of view. After X—that is, in the twenty-first century—
the form and function of X culture needs to be taken into consideration 
in our reflections on contemporary revolutionary phenomena. The 
ethos of radical freedom associated with the online collective Anony-
mous, the cyber watchdog group WikiLeaks, the Occupy movement, 
and the Arab Spring have generally been read in light of the prom-
ise offered by the social networking paradigm of Web 2.0. But these 
movements have X culture in their DNA. In contrast to, say, the Guy 
Fawkes mask in V for Vendetta (adapted in 2005 from Alan Moore’s 
1988 graphic novel by Xers Lana and Andy Wachowski), a mask that 
plays a visible role in activities associated with Anonymous, and to 
which I return in the final pages of this chapter, Fight Club’s presence 
in cyberspace is programmatic, structural; it works silently, invisibly, to 
program the revolution. Fight Club is also associated with Anonymous: 
it dictates the first and second “Rules of the Internet,” developed in 
discussions on /b/, the “Random” forum on 4chan (the online image-
board from which Anonymous emerged), but, again unlike V for Ven-
detta, which lost much of its moral ambiguity in the 2005 adaptation, 
Fight Club keeps its anarchic promise intact as it migrates from novel 
to film to cyberspace. As issues of class, consumerism, disease, and reli-
gion alternately come into view and disappear, the X premise retains its 
resilience. It all comes down to this: a violence that is mobile, mallea-
ble, viral, nomadic, that disregards historical precedent and dismisses 
distinctions of fantasy and fact.
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YOU DO NOT  TALK  ABOUT  F IGHT  CLUB
In both the novel and the film, Tyler Durden and the anonymous nar-
rator organize bare-knuckle fight clubs in the basement of a bar, and 
develop the rules, the most famous of which are the first two: “The 
first rule of fight club is you do not talk about fight club. The second 
rule of fight club is you do not talk about fight club” (FC 1996, 1999). 
Tyler coordinates the fight clubs into a militaristic operation, which he 
calls “Project Mayhem.” The goals of Project Mayhem are variously 
defined, but they are, at bottom, the destruction of civilization. Project 
Mayhem represents a radical revolution: blast the world free of history; 
eliminate the debt record; save humanity by destroying it. In the course 
of the story the narrator realizes that he is, in fact, Tyler Durden. Here 
the novel and the film part ways. The novel ends with the narrator in an 
insane asylum, possibly hallucinating the communications he is receiv-
ing from Tyler’s acolytes, who are eager to instigate his second coming. 
The film ends less equivocally, as the narrator witnesses the demolition 
of an urban cityscape orchestrated by Tyler; at the same time, the film 
(especially in these closing moments) identifies itself as having been 
hacked by Tyler, who has spliced images of pornography into the tape.
 Fincher’s film, released just six months after the massacre at Col-
umbine High School that rekindled early 1990s debates about violence 
in the media, was considered a box-office failure. It was released on 
DVD soon after, in 2000, in a two-disk special collector’s edition. On 
DVD, Fight Club established its cult following and earned its keep with 
its studio, 20th Century Fox. Fincher was actively involved in the DVD 
design, part of a movement by directors in this period to explore the new 
medium (DVDs had entered the market just a few years earlier, in 1997). 
In contrast to analog (the mere replication of the film on VHS), the digi-
tal medium can contain a vast amount of information. Consequently, 
DVDs represented an opportunity to repackage the film, correcting or 
controlling the real-world variables that impacted its reception in the-
atres. On DVD, the film proper could also be accompanied by addi-
tional material such as trailers (domestic and international), interviews, 
deleted scenes, behind-the-scenes spots, segments on production, and 
alternate video and audio tracks. This wealth of material complicates 
traditional notions of intentionality and authorship; the DVD, as Debo-
rah and Mark Parker write, “becomes another text, intimately related 
to the film, complicating the experience of the film, but nevertheless 
not quite the film” (13; they mention Fight Club specifically). The Fight 
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Club DVD was designed simultaneously to highlight and undercut the 
implications of film as a commodity. The collector’s edition included a 
faux merchandise catalog, trailers for the film that the studio had report-
edly refused to air, and was designed to look like pornography, in a 
plain brown wrapper tied with twine. The effect was a dual deconstruc-
tion of commodity fetishism and cinematic spectatorship, a point not 
lost on the reviewer for Entertainment Weekly: “every facet of the Fight 
Club DVD aims to vivisect the film itself. [. . .] This whole endeavor 
is designed to subvert the idea of movie watching as benign activity” 
(“Fight Club” Review).
 For Xers, raised on home media, accustomed to rewind, repeat, and 
re-view, and now firmly between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four 
(the most coveted marketing demographic), the home media availability 
of Fight Club was especially welcome. “The level of technical craft and 
artistry on display in Fight Club is awesome and becomes more impres-
sively evident on repeat viewings” (Crowdus 46). The film contains a 
number of splices of single-frame images of Tyler. Too brief to be seen 
by the naked eye, these splices were created specifically for “the DVD 
crowd,” a statement that presupposes an audience awake to what this 
particular medium has to offer.5 Xers’ fondness for Fight Club has to 
do less with the plot and more with those moments where, under and 
through Norton’s cool hypnotic voice-over and Fincher’s slick graphics, 
Tyler is there: the film, rewatched, is an exercise in re-cognition. Not 
readily visible in theatres, the subliminal images become available to the 
patient re-viewer, armed with a remote, who is inclined to look past the 
story and dwell on the image, its construction, and the ways it is decon-
structed or interfered with. Fight Club fans take great pleasure in iden-
tifying these moments in the film that essentially attest to Tyler’s control 
of it (these moments are also an extension of the conceit by which Tyler, 
a nighttime projectionist, splices images of pornography into the films 
he screens). Like the image of the penis that flickers immediately before 
the film’s final credits, and like the FBI legal disclaimer (on the DVD) 
that presents as an admonishment by Tyler to the viewer, the subliminal 
 5. Fight Club (2000), voice-over commentary. Thompson, critiquing Fight Club’s 
punk aesthetic, notes the film’s penchant for being re-viewed, but sees it as render-
ing the viewers complicit in the film’s commoditization of punk’s ethos of resistance. 
“Whatever desires Fight Club might awaken quickly become channeled into repeated 
viewings of the film. Rather than moving consumers to become producers, the film’s 
material effect seems to be not just consumption but repeated consumption of the same 
Hollywood commodity” (61–62). I turn to Fight Club’s engagement with complicity 
and resistance in the following section.
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images of Tyler all underscore how Tyler, the ghost in the machine, has 
hacked it, and turned the technology to his own purposes.
“DAMN K IDS .  THEY ’RE  ALL  AL IKE” : 
Fight Club ’s Hacker Logic
Palahniuk is no stranger to 1990s cyberculture. He utilized online bulle-
tin boards and chatrooms for research for his first novel Invisible Mon-
sters (the writing of which preceded Fight Club), posing as “Cherry” to 
obtain information about the possible effects of transgender hormone 
treatments (Kleinman). He registered chuckpalahniuk.net in 1999, 
shortly after the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998. Of course—and unlike the 
narrator, who is often seen at his terminal—Tyler does not use a com-
puter. But his attitude toward information infrastructure and technol-
ogy is nonetheless quite characteristic of the hacker underground. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, hacking required access to hardware, source 
code, and mainframes. These resources were controlled by universities 
and corporations, a situation that encouraged a codependent relation-
ship with institutions (though hacking has always included an anarchic 
strain). The development of the personal computer in the 1970s and its 
general availability in the 1980s freed hacking from its dependence on 
FIGURE 6. Fight Club (1999). Screen grab. Brad Pitt as Tyler Durden. This is one of several images of 
Pitt spliced into the film stock. © Fincher/Fox.
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institutional warrant. To members of Generation X, hacking (popular-
ized by the 1983 film WarGames) represented “a world of predomi-
nantly male authority into which they [young boys] could trespass with 
relative ease, where they could explore and play pranks, particularly 
with large institutional bodies. [. . .] It was a world of excitement that 
allowed them to escape the home and be precisely the ‘noise’ in the 
system that they had fantasized about” (Thomas xiii). In the 1990s, 
high-profile hacking groups like Cult of the Dead Cow and L0pht per-
petuated hackers’ historical grudge against Bill Gates and attacked 
Microsoft (a company explicitly named in Palahniuk’s novel), claiming 
their activities were done in the name of transparency, freedom, and 
human rights (Thomas 90–110).6
 Though many of these hackers would adhere to what Steven Levy, 
in his seminal Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution, describes 
as “the Hacker Ethic” (26–36), Levy’s positive, antiauthoritarian, col-
lectivist ideal, forged in the early 1950s, was losing purchase by the 
time his Hackers was published in 1984. Three studies of hacking pub-
lished around the turn of the century outline the contours of 1990s hack-
ing: Eric S. Raymond’s The Cathedral and the Bazaar (2001) describes 
the politics and ethics of open-source software and includes a chapter 
titled “How to Become a Hacker”; Paul A. Taylor’s Hackers (1999) 
and Thomas’s Hacking Culture (2002) are more attuned to hacking’s 
darker side. Tellingly, both Taylor and Thomas reference Generation X, 
though they differ on whether X represents a development or a depar-
ture from the history of hacking. Taylor sees a connection between the 
“generation-x anarchist hackers” of the 1990s and their predecessors 
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s: all distrust authority, embrace liberty, 
and eschew bourgeois norms and values (Hannemyr, qtd. in Taylor 24). 
Thomas stresses distinction, citing a source who states, “The GenXers 
are a ‘post-punk’ generation, hence the term, ‘cyberpunk.’ Their music 
has a little more edge and anger and a little less idealism. [. . .]Their 
world is a little more multicultural and complicated, and less black-and-
white” (Mizrach, qtd. in Thomas 31–32).
 Discussions about cyberpunk and hacking in the 1990s, when Fight 
Club was written and the film was released, indicate the utility of the 
 6. “The 1990s were a time when hacking moved away from individual practice 
toward notions of group identity and political action,” writes Thomas in 2002. “In the 
wake of the AT&T break up, with the rise of the Internet, and with the increasing global-
ization of technology, hackers have begun to engage in more concerted political action, 
at both local and global levels” (89).
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Generation X context for thinking about Fight Club. Thomas, Taylor, 
and Raymond all discuss the term. Unlike Thomas, for whom “cyber-
punk” is an appropriate designation for Generation X hackers, Tay-
lor and Raymond dissociate “hacking” from “cyberpunk,” with Taylor 
noting that the ethos of resistance that the cyberpunk genre borrows 
from punk is in some tension with hacking after the development of 
the personal computer, Microsoft’s market dominance, and the rise 
of white-hat security, and Raymond dismissing the term outright (his 
impatience seems to accord with his vision of hacking as an aesthetic, 
koanlike pursuit: he directs would-be hackers to transform their atti-
tudes, provides a number of mantras to repeat, and suggests the study 
of music and Zen [197–208]).7 My point is not to assess the correctness 
of the term “cyberpunk” for hacking and certainly not for Fight Club, 
but rather to note the utility of Generation X as a context through 
which to understand these conflicting proclamations. Cyberpunk rep-
resented an attitude of resistance to the system, an attitude that was 
useful only to the extent that the resistance it represented had not (yet) 
been co-opted by the system; once its complicity or corruption had 
been established, cyberpunk, as an ethos of resistance, was bankrupt, 
and had itself to be resisted—hence Raymond, in “How to Become a 
Hacker,” directs: “Don’t call yourself a ‘cyberpunk,’ and don’t waste 
your time on anybody who does” (208). In discussions about the rel-
evance of cyberpunk to hacking, the drive to both embrace an attitude 
and to eschew it represents a condition that, for Xers, was all too famil-
iar: Xers were well aware of their inextricability from a system that 
co-opts resistance, commodifies and recycles it, and repeats the process 
indefinitely. Fight Club describes this procedure precisely. Tyler seeds 
the country with fight club franchises, confirming the narrator’s bleak 
vision in which, “when deep space exploration ramps up, it’ll be the 
corporations that name everything, the IBM Stellar Sphere, the Micro-
 7. Reflecting on the dubious appropriateness of “cyberpunk” for 1990s hacker cul-
ture, Taylor writes: “Cyberpunk portrays the amalgamation of the technological knowl-
edge of hackers with the anti-establishment ethos of the punk rocker. The potential for 
this amalgamation to produce a source of opposition to the dominant social constituen-
cies is aided by the fact that technology is now more readily accessible and potentially 
manipulable than ever before. A complicating aspect of this potential for rebellion, how-
ever, is the degree to which hackers oppose dominant social forces within computing 
whilst at the same time containing their very traits. For example, whilst generally oppos-
ing trends towards the increasing commodification of information and by extension the 
ethics of the free market, some hackers at least almost personify market values, leading 
to the claim that they are not an alternative culture at all” (169).
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soft Galaxy, Planet Starbucks.” Project Mayhem—the gritty anarchist 
ethos of fight club gone cultlike and corporate—transforms the narra-
tor’s world into “Planet Tyler” (FC 1999).
 This co-presence of complicity and co-option is at the heart of 
Fight Club’s hacker logic, a logic that has more in common with “The 
Conscience of a Hacker,” published online in 1986 by Xer Lloyd Blan-
kenship (aka The Mentor), than with Levy’s Hacker Ethic. Under 
the title “The Hacker’s Manifesto,” and accompanied with a note 
about The Mentor’s arrest, the text was influential for 1990s hackers 
(it merits a guest appearance in Fincher’s 2010 The Social Network, 
about the rise of Facebook).8 A close look at “The Hacker’s Man-
ifesto” reveals similarities between hacker culture and Fight Club’s 
attitude toward institutions, power, and technology. Though much of 
“The Hacker’s Manifesto” rehearses familiar youth themes of alien-
ation, disgust, and the discovery of an alternate community (“This 
is it . . . this is where I belong . . .”), it is striking in its mastery of 
language, rhythm, and tone. “The Hacker’s Manifesto” is structured 
as a response to a dismissive adult culture, a culture represented by 
the phrase “Damn kids. They’re all alike,” which is repeated, with 
variations, in the course of the short piece. In the same manner that 
a hacker will take control over a system, The Mentor appropriates 
this denigration, essentially “hacking” language. He transforms the 
dismissive adult phrase into a call for arms, turning abasement into 
menace: “You bet your ass we’re all alike . . . [. . .] This is our world 
now . . . [. . .] You can’t stop us all . . . after all, we’re all alike.”9 Such 
a move is, as E. Gabriella Coleman writes, “the very nature of hack-
ing—turning a system against itself” (Coding Freedom 98).10
 8. The presence of this text in Fincher’s film is of a piece with Fincher’s depiction of 
Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, as a disaffected loner. Many reviewers of 
the film have noted that this depiction departs from Zuckerberg’s biography.
 9. See Thomas 71–80 for another detailed close reading of “The Hacker’s Mani-
festo.”
 10. Like Levy, Coleman repeatedly uses “hacking” to describe an attitude toward 
other media. Writing of free software advocate R. M. Stallman, for example, she de-
scribes him as one who “approached the law much like a hacker treats technology: as 
a system that by virtue of being systematic and logical, is hackable. In other words, 
[Stallman] relied on the hacker technical tactic of clever reuse to imaginatively hack the 
law” (Coding Freedom 69). Raymond, too, stresses that hacking is an attitude toward 
media. Both Raymond and Taylor cite Sherry Turkle who, in her seminal The Second 
Self: Computers and the Human Spirit, describes the hack as “a concept which exists 
independently of the computer and can best be presented through an example using 
another technology complex enough to support its own version of hacking—and hack-
ers” (Turkle 207).
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 At the center of “The Hacker’s Manifesto” is the encounter with the 
computer. What the hacker likes about the computer is the fantasy of 
control it promises. “I made a discovery today. I found a computer. Wait 
a second, this is cool. It does what I want it to. If it makes a mistake, it’s 
because I screwed it up.” This fantasy of control is Fight Club’s too, and 
“The Hacker’s Manifesto” shares with Fight Club an intermedial qual-
ity: it is not about computing or about technology but about the prom-
ise of control that hacking represents, a promise that is, importantly, 
free from technological constraints. Discussing this moment in “The 
Manifesto,” Thomas stresses that “the claim being made here is not a 
technological one. [. . .] In The Mentor’s discussion and description of 
the computer, we in no way are told what it is that a computer can do; 
nor are we told how he will use it. What we are given is a discussion of 
the newfound relationship to technology itself” (76). By detaching hack-
ing from computing, Thomas locates, in the “Manifesto,” an affirma-
tion of the definition of hacking that Taylor attributes to the computer 
underground for whom “hacking still refers, in the first instance, to the 
imaginative and unorthodox use of any artefact” (xi). On this point, 
adherents to Levy’s Hacker Ethic and The Mentor’s Manifesto concur: 
Raymond, too, locates the original sense of hacking in this attitude 
toward objects, stressing hacking’s “true and original sense of an enthu-
siast, an artist, a tinkerer, a problem solver, an expert” (xii). For some 
software hackers, he continues, “the hacker nature is really independent 
of the particular medium the hacker works in” (196). Coleman, discuss-
ing hackers’ relation to their computers, agrees: Hackers, she writes, are 
“attuned not simply to the workings of technology but also seek such an 
intimate understanding of technology’s capabilities and constraints that 
they are positioned to redirect it to some new, largely unforeseen plane” 
(Coding Freedom 98). Hacking exceeds computing; its aesthetics inhere 
in a creative, mobile attitude toward objects in the world: objects that 
are alternately recalcitrant, frustrating, and alternately pacific, symbi-
otic, partners.
 This attitude toward objects informs Fight Club on multiple levels, 
and is reflected in the book’s thematic issues as well as the film’s repre-
sentational ethos, an ethos underscored by Fincher’s stylish cinematog-
raphy.11 The narrator, who works as an automotive recall specialist, is 
 11. Crowdus notes what critics praised about the film: the “hyperkinetic camera 
movements, photo montages, subliminal imagery, freeze frames, terse editing rhythms, 
and some stunning, computer-generated visualizations of the Narrator’s thought pro-
cesses, including a bravura minute-and-a-half backward tracking short originating in the 
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keenly aware of the devaluation of human life compared with that of 
objects. His job is to apply this formula: “You take the population of 
vehicles in the field (A) and multiply it by the probable rate of failure 
(B), then multiply the result by the average cost of an out-of-court settle-
ment (C). A times B times C equals X. [. . .] If X is less than the cost of 
a recall, then we don’t recall” (FC 1996, 1999). He collects objects that 
blankly attest to the commodification of labor, “proof they were crafted 
by the honest, simple, hard-working indigenous aboriginal peoples of 
wherever” (FC 1996, 1999) and complains, “the things you used to 
own, now they own you” (FC 1996, 44).12 In the course of his acquain-
tance with Tyler, the narrator relearns the utility of objects. The first 
three pages of the book alone (narrated from his enlightened perspective) 
include instructions for homemade gun silencers, nitroglycerine, plastic 
explosive, and napalm (such anarchic recipes proliferated online; early 
issues of the hacker zine Phrack, where The Mentor’s “Manifesto” first 
appeared, also published directions for homemade bombs and explo-
sives). Fight Club thus presents its narrator according to the traditional 
definition of hacking as “an attempt to make use of any technology in an 
original, unorthodox and inventive way” (Taylor 14–15). Furthermore: 
the narrator’s directions for making these devices include accounts of his 
own frustrations and failures and reflect the collective nature of these 
endeavors. “A lot of folks mix their nitro with cotton and add Epsom 
salts as a sulfate. This works too. Some folks, they use paraffin mixed 
with nitro. Paraffin has never, ever worked for me” (FC 1996, 12). The 
“never, ever” (which attests to the frustration, grind, and glitches that 
characterize hackers’ work), and the evocation of community (“a lot of 
folks,” “some folks”) express the unique combination of individuality 
and collectivity that Levy, Raymond, and Coleman all identify as funda-
mental to hacker culture.
 The film’s bravura wielding of point of view reverberated strongly 
with issues pertinent to computer culture in the 1990s when the book 
was written and published and the film was developed, marketed, and 
released. Linux (featured on the front cover of Wired in August 1997) 
figured, for hackers, an important challenge to the growing, and increas-
ingly corporate, software industry (generally represented by Windows, 
Microsoft’s operating system; Microsoft rose to prominence in the 1990s 
protoplasmic fear cells of his brain, an IKEA catalog rendition of his trendy apartment 
furnishings, and a nightmarish plane crash” (46).
 12. The 1999 film attributes this phrase to Tyler.
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with Windows 3.1). Linux was an openly sourced version of Unix; it 
could replace Windows on Intel-based PCs, and for many hackers it was 
the epitome of Levy’s Hacker Ethic: a direct rebuttal to the corporati-
zation, privatization, and market control represented by the software 
industry and Microsoft. Leaked Microsoft memos that attested to the 
threat posed to the company by open-source software like Linux received 
widespread press coverage in late 1998, and 1999 saw a trend by soft-
ware companies to switch to Linux for their business applications and a 
notable rise in Linux IPOs (Fincher’s Fight Club was released at just this 
time, in October 1999).13
 But beyond the issues of free software production, the competing 
operating systems (Linux and Windows) speak directly to Fight Club’s 
critique of institutional power and the potential of liberation from 
it. Linux represented the ability to turn any PC into a Unix machine. 
Much software written under Unix is portable, that is, not dependent on 
machine type, and is thus adaptable to a range of environments. Unix is 
a far more versatile operating system than Windows, and one beloved by 
hackers. The difference between Windows (with its graphical user inter-
face or GUI) and Unix/Linux (with its command-line interface) is widely 
figured through terminology of transparency and opacity, and colored 
by hackers’ traditional distaste for large corporations. Writing almost a 
decade apart, Thomas and Coleman, describing hackers’ fondness for 
Unix/Linux, apply strikingly similar rhetoric, attributing exclusion and 
opacity to Windows, inclusion and transparency to Unix/Linux.14 For 
viewers of Fight Club who were versed in these issues, the computer-
generated penguin that represents the narrator’s “power animal” could 
 13. Raymond describes the leaked Microsoft memos (183) and the rise of Linux to 
market prominence (186–87). Coleman, reflecting on this period, describes the effect of 
the media attention to Linux as “turning Linux and open source into household names” 
(Coding Freedom 82).
 14. Thomas, writing in 2002: “For Linux, the user is an integral part of the operating 
system; in order to operate the machine, he or she must understand how the computer 
and software work. In contrast, Windows uses a graphical interface to hide the workings 
of the machine from the end-user and, as a result, virtually excludes the user from the 
operating system. While Linux renders the computer and its operating system transpar-
ent, Windows makes the computer and its operating system opaque” (85). Coleman, 
writing in 2012: “Unix offers a more interactive relationship between user and OS than 
Microsoft Windows does. Unix is architecturally transparent; every part of the system is 
a ‘file’ that can be seen, altered, and customized. It gives users the ability to ‘go behind 
the scenes,’ to individually configure the system for specific needs and operates along a 
similar logic to that of open source” (Coding Freedom 36). For an account of how the 
concept of transparency changed in the course of the Macintosh–Microsoft wars, see 
Turkle (2005) 9–10.
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not but evoke Tux, Linux’s official mascot (also a penguin), and the spe-
cial effects in which a virtual camera, unconstrained by infrastructure, 
moves along the brain stem, among synapses, and between walls, passes 
through ceilings and building stories, and zooms in for impossible close-
ups, tracking the potential for mayhem that devastates corporate culture, 
represented the perspective afforded by open-sourced Linux. In marked 
contrast to this mobile, creative, deindividualized perspective, the narra-
tor, prior to his liberation by Tyler, moves through an IKEA marketing 
catalog, in which products pop up, Windows-like, to furnish his unsatis-
factory, illusory environment.
 Writing of Linux and GUI in 1999, Xer Neal Stephenson articulates 
the conflict that the narrator-Tyler duo manifests. He describes GUI 
interfaces like Windows as “products, contrived by engineers in the ser-
vice of specific companies” (88); his image for GUI is Disneyland: “a 
product of seamless illusion—a magic mirror that reflects the world back 
better than it really is” (50). Unix, on the other hand, has “a kind of 
complexity and asymmetry that is organic, like the roots of a tree, or the 
branchings of a coronary artery” (89). Product not of corporate culture 
but hacker subculture, it represents a profound challenge to corporate 
dominance. “If you know what you are doing, you can buy a cheap PC 
from any computer store, throw away the Windows disks that come with 
it, turn it into a Linux system of mind-boggling complexity and power. 
You can configure it so that a hundred different people can be logged on 
to it at once. [. . .] You can hang half a dozen different monitors off of 
it and play Doom with someone in Australia while tracking communica-
tions satellites in orbit and controlling your house’s lights and thermo-
stats and streaming live video from your webcam and surfing the Net 
and designing circuit boards on the other screens” (128). This power, 
complexity, community, and slight sense of menace lures Stephenson but 
makes him hesitate. “Sometimes,” he concludes, “I just want to go to 
Disneyland” (129).
 The issue, not only for X hackers but for Xers in general, is the 
familiar trifecta: reality, media, violence. Tyler is explicitly connected to 
media—not despite but because of his hands-on attitude and his expertise 
with the inner workings of systems (as opposed to the narrator’s boss, 
who inquires about color-coordinating a Windows icon during a presen-
tation on the World Wide Web in what looks like Windows 3.1, ask-
ing, “Can I get that in cornflower blue?” [FC 1999]). Tyler works for a 
chain of movie houses splicing small reels into five-foot reels that run on 
a single self-threading projector. Tyler also works as a projectionist, and 
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the relationship between Tyler and the narrator is imaged as a change-
over from an earlier, two-projector system. The changeover underscores 
the constructed nature of perception. Reality is an illusion, the effect of 
technology—here, of multiple moving images—and is subject to being 
manipulated and disrupted. “Changeover. The movie goes on. Nobody 
in the audience has any idea” (FC 1996, 1999). This image of control 
extends from archaic, two-projector technology outwards. Relying on 
the logic of the changeover, Tyler splices single frames of pornography 
into family-friendly films. Like the changeover (when done properly), the 
splice is invisible: no one sees it. But the invisible image has an effect. 
“Tyler spliced a penis into everything. [. . .] Nobody complained. People 
ate and drank, but the evening wasn’t the same. People feel sick or start 
to cry and don’t know why” (FC 1996, 31).15
 Fight Club thus participates in the logic of remediation by which, as 
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin write, each new medium promises 
to present a more immediate or authentic experience of reality than the 
previous one. Reality is alternately transparent and opaque, accessed by 
faith or critique as each medium presents itself, as medium, to percep-
tion (19–21). On the surface, Fight Club seems an unlikely candidate 
for discussion of new media. The narrator and Tyler choose a Luddite 
existence, squatting in a house without reliable electricity or amenities, 
and the technology on which Tyler’s splicing relied was archaic even 
while Palahniuk was writing his book in the mid-1990s. But precisely 
because of its archaic quality, Fight Club underscores the technological 
revolution that Xers lived through in the 1980s and 1990s: the rise of 
home media, of digitization, and the personal computer. As the change-
over system is being phased out (it will disappear utterly with digitiza-
tion), Tyler’s labor, already invisible, becomes obsolete. Fincher’s DVD, 
the product of digitization, underscores this archaic aspect, as the chap-
ter titles flutter audibly like reel-to-reel film in movie-house projectors. 
Even as Tyler expresses contemporary media’s unique preoccupation 
with the real, “the transparent presentation of the real and the enjoy-
ment of the opacity of media themselves” (Bolter and Grusin 21), Gen-
eration Xers, poised between analog and digital, the window and the 
command line, gazing at and through visual interfaces, see it disappear 
 15. “A single frame in a movie is on the screen for one-sixtieth of a second. Divide a 
second into sixty equal parts. That’s how long the erection is. Towering four stories tall 
over the popcorn auditorium, slippery red and terrible, and no one sees it,” reports the 
narrator (FC 1996, 30). In the book, Tyler is an equal-opportunity offender, splicing both 
penises and vaginas into the films.
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here. Tyler’s expulsion from the medium catapults him into reality which 
he then reconfigures: reality becomes virtual—a medium, as Bolter and 
Grusin describe virtual reality, “whose purpose is to disappear” and, 
consequently, “to foster in the viewer a sense of presence” (21–22).
 But while Tyler emerges from technology, he is never confined to it. 
He represents the hacker principle that “information wants to be free” 
and the promise that always lurks in the virtual: that it and the real 
can exchange places, that the virtual can become real, that the virtual is 
the only real, and only the initiated know it. Like the recipes for home-
made explosives that the narrator recites, the effect is to reorder an alien, 
alienating environment, rendering it obedient, cooperative, and—like 
Unix, which can be implemented on any machine—replicable. In orga-
nizing the fight clubs into Project Mayhem, Tyler essentially assembles 
a gigantic organic computer that does, to paraphrase The Mentor, what 
he wants it to (Project Mayhem’s mechanistic quality is represented in 
its first and second rule: don’t ask questions). And again like Tyler, Fight 
Club moves through media. In a manner similar to the phrase “they’re 
all alike” in “The Hacker’s Manifesto,” Fight Club is appropriated and 
mobilized, its nomadic quality underscored as it wanders from book to 
film to DVD and outward: to copycat fight clubs in real life, to files that 
have been ripped, saved, and distributed on bootleg copies or posted to 
file-sharing websites, to calls for Projects Mayhem in 2002 and 2012, to 
the 4chan forum /b/, birthplace of Anonymous, and even to the Israel/
Palestine conflict in 2013.
PR0 J3KT  M4YH3M:
Fight Club  and Early Antisec
In 2002 the antisec hacking group el8 published a manifesto in which 
they adopt the term “project mayhem” and Tyler’s warning. Parmy 
Olson, writing of early antisec in We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker 
World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency, 
describes el8 as an extreme incarnation of the antisecurity movement that 
originated in 1999 (Olson 285), part of a resistance to “full disclosure” 
(a policy in cybersecurity by which cybersecurity experts, known as white 
hats, publicize the vulnerabilities they identify in systems and sites).16 
 16. According to anti.security.is (published in 2001), a manifesto of the antisec move-
ment, antisecurity aims to “encourage a new policy of anti-disclosure among the com-
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The association of el8’s “project mayhem” with Fight Club’s was noted 
immediately: Thor “Jumper” Larholm, a white-hat security researcher, 
described the group as “a copycat of the movie, only moved to the hacker 
scene” (qtd. in McWilliams). el8 published a number of manifestos in 
2001 and 2002. These manifestos were written in an orthography par-
ticular to hackers. In this system, known as “eleet,” “1337,” and “leet-
speak,” “a” is commonly replaced with 4, “o” with 0, in an effect to 
render language codelike and opaque.17 el8’s 2002 manifesto calls for 
“Pr0j3kt M4yh3m,” and channels Fight Club directly:
we r h4rdkore h4krz who clean your toilets, the h4rdkore k0derz who 
forcefully w1pe y0ur wind0wz @ st0pl1ghtz and intersekti0nz, the 
h4rdk0re phre4krZ who mow your l4wn, the h4rdk0re cr4krz who 
ste4l cl0thez from the salvati0n army, we take yor order at burger k1ng, 
we steal yor hubk4pz, we even put k4meraz in port ‘o pottiez. *_DO_* 
*_NOT_* *_FUCK_* *_WITH_* *_US_*.18
This is, of course, an adaptation of Tyler’s warning to the police com-
missioner with which this chapter began. Though the warning appears 
verbatim in both Palahniuk’s novel and Fincher’s adaptation, Larholm 
(and, later, Olson) is correct in identifying the film, not the book, as 
el8’s inspiration. Reflecting on the difference between the two mediums 
illuminates the film’s special attraction to hacker culture. In the novel, 
Tyler’s warning occurs after the narrator has begun to suspect that he 
and Tyler are the same person. Tyler’s epistemic stability is on the wane, 
a point underscored by several novelistic devices: the scene is presented 
puter and network security communities. The goal is not to ultimately discourage the 
publication of all security-related news and developments, but rather, to stop the disclo-
sure of all unknown or non-public exploits and vulnerabilities” (“Antisecurity”)
 17. Thomas, writing of hacker orthography, describes acts of translation that attest to 
language’s inherent infidelity, its vulnerability to technology, and technology’s necessary 
reliance on language. In a move that recalls Fight Club’s ethos, he writes that hacker 
language games do violence to reveal violence: “The more earnestly technology is hidden 
within the dynamics of language, the more violence it does to technology itself. Hackers 
recover, and make explicit, the ways in which language has relied on technology. It is a 
mode that reveals what has continually been concealed in language itself—technology” 
(58).
 18. Translation: “We are the hardcore hackers who clean your toilets, the hardcore 
coders who forcefully wipe your windows at stoplights and intersections, the hardcore 
phreakers who mow your lawn, the hardcore crackers who steal clothes from the salva-
tion army, we take your orders at burger king, we steal your hubcaps, we even put cam-
eras in port’o’potties. DO NOT FUCK WITH US!”
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as a flashback, as reported speech, and its violence is mitigated by time, 
perspective, and ressentiment: “The people you depend on” speech is 
separated from “don’t fuck with us” by the reflection “We are the mid-
dle children of history, raised by television to believe that someday we’ll 
be millionaires and movie stars and rock stars, but we won’t” (FC 1996, 
166; the film sets this sentence in another context). The film, in con-
trast, infuses Tyler’s warning with the menace of physical proximity and 
bodily threat. Tyler and his gang have physically overpowered the com-
missioner. He doesn’t bother to cover his face. He speaks directly to the 
camera, with his head inverted—visually underscoring the reversal of 
power relations. His followers are holding a knife to the commissioner’s 
testicles as he speaks (in the novel, the testicles were released before the 
warning is issued). “Do not fuck with us” is marked by a small jump cut 
that has Tyler speaking as if directly to the viewer (the effect of the jump 
cut is mimicked, by el8, with the last sentence appearing in all caps).
 By defining themselves as black-hat hackers, or “crackers,” el8 
affirms the negative stereotypes that began to surface around images 
of hackers in the media at the time—Fight Club resonates with people 
aligned more with The Mentor’s Manifesto than with Levy’s Hacker 
Ethic.19 But the paradigms of cyberspace, in which physical proximity 
must be simulated, require some revision to the original text. In the film, 
Tyler describes a service sector that cooks, hauls, connects, drives, and 
guards, and whose ability to cause mischief depends on their reliable 
access to physical infrastructure—the situation of hackers before the rise 
of the home computer and the personal modem. In el8’s adoption, this 
class identity falls away: el8 claims to be an outlaw culture, one defined 
as a collection of nouns rather than verbs (hackers, coders, phreakers, 
crackers), deliberately underemployed, working at the margins, treating 
industry as a point of entry for access to infrastructure and opportuni-
ties for mayhem. Schooled not by the Hacker Ethic but by The Mentor’s 
 19. Raymond elaborates on the hacker/cracker distinction: “There is [. . .] a group 
of people who loudly call themselves hackers, but aren’t. These are people (mainly ado-
lescent males) who get a kick out of breaking into computers and phreaking the phone 
system. Real hackers call these people ‘crackers’ and want nothing to do with them. Real 
hackers mostly think crackers are lazy, irresponsible, and not very bright, and object 
that being able to break security doesn’t make you a hacker any more than being able 
to hotwire cars makes you an automotive engineer. Unfortunately, many journalists and 
writers have been fooled into using the word ‘hacker’ to describe crackers; this irritates 
real hackers to no end” (196). In Raymond’s implication that crackers are less “real” than 
hackers we can see the stakes of this issue: the claiming of reality in cyberspace. I return 
to this point in my discussion of #OpIsrael 2.0, below.
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X attitude, the mainstreaming of the internet, and the globalization of 
technology (el8’s ezines claim to be “the definitive src for the Japan h/p 
scene,” or the “Haiti h/p scene,” or “the Afghan h/p scene” or “the 
Porno h/p scene”), and, again like The Mentor, who poetically claims 
and describes cyberspace (“This is our world now, the world of the elec-
tron and the switch”), el8 channels Fight Club as an assertion of owner-
ship and immediacy in its call for “Pr0j3kt M4yh3m”: “we k0me 2 t4ke 
b4ck wh4t iz r1ghtfully 0urz,—CYBERSPACE—. and eye’ll b d4mned 
iph we k0ntinue t0 let the c0rper4ti0nz c0ntr0l *OUR* *WORLD*. G3T 
0FF UR A$$, AND KAUZE S0ME MAAAAAAAAYH3M.”20
DO NOT  TALK  ABOUT  /B / : 
Fight Club  and Anonymous
In an afterword to the reissue of the novel, Chuck Palahniuk describes the 
origin of Fight Club as a formal experiment in a short story. “Instead of 
walking a character from scene to scene in a story, there had to be some 
way to just—cut, cut, cut. To jump. From scene to scene. Without losing 
the reader. To show every aspect of a story, but only the kernel of each 
aspect. The core moment. Then another core moment. Then, another” 
(213). To produce this effect of movement without space (“cut, cut, cut. 
To jump. From scene to scene”), intensity without context (“The core 
moment. Then another core moment. Then, another”), Palahniuk devel-
oped a set of rules. These would work as “a kind of glue” that would 
“act to signal a jump to a new angle or aspect” (213). It is these rules, 
Palahniuk insists, and not the fantasy of violence, that gave birth to the 
book. “The whole idea of a fight club wasn’t important. It was arbitrary. 
But the eight rules had to apply to something so why not a club where 
you could ask someone to fight? [. . .] The fighting wasn’t the important 
part of the story. What I needed were the rules” (213).
 Truth or myth, Palahniuk’s reflection on the function of rules in the 
formation of Fight Club is telling, given the centrality of Fight Club to 
the rules of that most anarchic, intense, and mobile of nonspaces, the 
internet. The “Rules of the Internet” were developed in discussion on /b/, 
the “random” forum on the image board 4chan (4chan was created by 
 20. Translation: “We come to take back what is rightfully ours—CYBERSPACE—and 
I’ll be damned if we continue to let the corporations control OUR WORLD. Get off your 
ass, and cause some mayhem!”
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Christopher Poole in 2003). No registration was required for 4chan, and 
it was not necessary to create an account in order to post. If users did 
not post with a handle or name (and most did not), 4chan would assign 
the name Anonymous to the default empty name field. This structure 
of 4chan was important for two reasons: its mobility (4chan was not 
archived: discussions existed in real time, not unlike fight club, “which 
only exists between the hours when fight club starts and fight club ends” 
[FC 1996, 1999]) and the reimagining of identity that this made possible. 
“Unlike other sites, where being anonymous means not using your ‘real’ 
name or identity, most posts on /b/ are disconnected from any identity” 
(Bernstein et al. 3). The freedom offered by this anonymity seemed to ful-
fill Fight Club’s promise of a radical erasure of identity: “Who you were 
in fight club is not who you were in the rest of the world” (FC 1996, 
1999). Ancillary sites and wikis like Encyclopedia Dramatica developed 
to document and parody (the distinction is not a stable one in the cyber 
community) the culture that developed on 4chan and /b/, “the obsessions 
of participants, the memes they created, and also the members unfortu-
nate enough to gain some notoriety within the community” (Auerbach). 
Echoing the first and second rules of Fight Club, the first rule of the inter-
net is, “do not talk about /b/,” and the second rule of the internet is: “do 
NOT talk about /b/.” Discussions on /b/ about the applicability of these 
rules indicate their origin in the need for secrecy in trolling and raids (so 
as not to indicate where a raid is originating from) and in retaining the 
quality of the forum (to keep noobs, or newbies, from crashing it), but, 
as Encyclopedia Dramatica puts it in its entry on the Rules, “/b/ is Fight 
Club, bitch” (“Rules 1 and 2”).21 Encyclopedia Dramatica also has an 
entry on the film, in which the rules for Fight Club are listed under this 
heading: “Rules of the internet Fight Club” (“Fight Club”).
 The third rule of the internet, “we are anonymous,” was adopted by 
the collective that emerged from /b/ and came to prominence in 2008 
with some high-profile DDoS attacks, defaces, leaks, raids, and street 
demonstrations in which people appeared in Guy Fawkes masks (I 
return to the masks at the end of this chapter). Project Chanology, insti-
gated by the Church of Scientology’s attempts to remove an interview 
 21. The origin of the rules of the internet is uncertain. They were probably devel-
oped around 2006, and certainly preceded Anonymous’s highly publicized attacks on 
Scientology in 2008. According to knowyourmeme.com, “The idea of making a set of 
rules, similar to Netiquette for 4chan users, was initially talked about on Anonymous-
related IRC channels before an entry was submitted to Encyclopedia Dramatica some-
time in late 2006 and archived on January 10th, 2007” (“Rules of the Internet”).
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with Tom Cruise from YouTube, was launched in the name of freedom 
of the internet and brought Anonymous to the news; the 2010 Opera-
tion Payback was initialized in response to Aiplex’s DDoS assault on the 
file-sharing site The Pirate Bay and, later, in support of WikiLeaks. Like 
Project Chanology, Operation Payback established Anonymous’s reputa-
tion as a faceless crusader for freedom of information worldwide.
 Anonymous, E. Gabriella Coleman writes, is “by nature and intent 
difficult to define: a name employed by various groups of hackers, tech-
nologists, activists, human rights advocates, and geeks; a cluster of ideas 
and ideals adopted by these people and centered around the concept of 
anonymity; a banner for collective actions online and in the real world 
that have ranged from fearsome but trivial pranks to technological sup-
port for Arab revolutionaries” (“Our Weirdness”). Like X, Anonymous’s 
resistance to easy definition is part of its attraction; again like X, Anon-
ymous refuses to be aligned with a coherent philosophy or platform. 
“Beyond a foundational commitment to anonymity and the free flow 
of information, Anonymous has no consistent philosophy or political 
program,” writes Coleman. “It has no definite trajectory. Sometimes coy 
and playful, sometimes macabre and sinister, often all at once, Anon-
ymous is still animated by a collective will toward mischief—toward 
‘lulz,’ a plural bastardization of the portmanteau LOL” (“Our Weird-
ness”). Coleman traces the “spirit of lulz” to the Dadaists and Yippies, 
the Situationists, Up Against the Wall Motherfuckers, and The Yes Men. 
But the anarchic, intermedial, affectless, disaffected X ethos of Fight 
Club needs to join this group.
 This is not to say that Anonymous is composed of members of Gen-
eration X. It is, rather, to use this X text to situate cultural aspects of 
this contemporary phenomenon, to have Palahniuk’s anarchic myth join 
Michel de Certeau, Gilles Deleuze, Ernst Bloch, Eric Hobsbawm, and 
other revered theorists (all cited by Coleman) in understanding action, 
tactics, politics, the subject, and violence after X. Like Palahniuk’s 
vision of anarchic disorder that emerged from rules, Tyler’s lulz, and 
those of Project Mayhem, are predicated on transparency and opacity, 
cooperation and co-option, the uncanny ability to disappear here, to 
reclaim selfhood by erasing it. Much of Anonymous’s attraction and 
mystique has to do with this menace of invisibility that, Thomas notes, 
has always been characteristic of the hacker underground. The Mentor’s 
promise, “you can’t stop us all, after all, we’re all alike,” is the menace 
of replication, the assembling of an anonymous army. Tyler does the 
same, promising to his acolytes: “You are not special. You are not a 
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beautiful or unique snowflake. You’re the same decaying organic mat-
ter as everything else” (FC 1996, 1999). This simultaneity of abjection 
and transcendence first attracts and then horrifies the narrator, but the 
final frames of the film, in which he and Marla are revealed to be mirror 
images, suggest that he has never been more than a replicant, “a copy of 
a copy of a copy” (FC 1996, 1999).
 For Coleman, anonymity represents a unique kind of freedom from 
the enforced hypersociality of Web 2.0. “In a world where we post the 
majority of our personal data online, and states and corporations wield 
invasive tools to collect and market the rest, there is something pro-
foundly hopeful in Anonymous’s effacement of the self” (“Our Weird-
ness”). The attraction of this hope, its magnetic quality, a promise not 
unlike the satori state she identifies, in Coding Freedom, as one of the 
aesthetic attractions of hacking, is the state sought by Fight Club’s nar-
rator: “look into the stars and you’re gone” (FC 1996, 1999). Both 
Anonymous and Fight Club draw the public’s attention by combining 
the philosophies of two seemingly incompatible traditions, existential-
ism and activism, lurking online and taking to the streets (the existential-
ist journal Stirrings Still devoted an entire issue to Palahniuk, who may 
have drawn inspiration for Fight Club from his experience in the anar-
chic activist group The Portland Cacophony Society). As Coleman, sum-
ming up the Anonymous phenomenon, puts it: “At the same time that 
Anonymous represents a shadowy lack—evasive, shifty, nomadic—they 
also represent at the same time an intense fullness. In contrast to criminal 
groups who go out of their way to remain hidden, Anonymous has man-
aged to be a media sensation, to be spectacularly present, to become total 
spectacle. They sit at the cusp of visibility and invisibility” (“Anonymous 
from Lulz to Activists”).22 Even as X’s tendency to cross out and mark 
the spot lines up well with Anonymous’s intersection of plenitude and 
erasure, Anonymous’s power, their attraction, and their menace reside in 
this X factor: the uncanny ability to disappear here.23
 22. She continues: “Their visibility is channeled via pranks and interventions (the lulz 
securing some of their most audacious and irreverent interventions) and their invisibility 
broadcast via semiotic messages of anonymity which inculcates and elevates [. . .] a dif-
ferent version of what it might mean to be an individual” (“Anonymous from Lulz to 
Activists”).
 23. During Operation Payback, AnonOpsIRC was established—a more stable forum 
than /b/ for discussions of future activities. The high-profile hacks of HBGary Federal 
and the real-time defacing of the Westboro Baptist Church website were planned and 
executed from that forum. LulzSec (Lulz Security) emerged from AnonOps in 2011, 
claiming for its purpose a combination of “mayhem and lulz.” Olson, who traces the 
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“WE  ARE  COMING TO  RELEASE  GAZA” : 
#OpIsrael 2.0
In the conclusion to his book about 1990s hacking, Thomas reflects on 
the media fascination with hacking and hackers, the association of hack-
ers with shadowy, threatening presence, and their demonization by gov-
ernments, corporations, and legal institutions. He concludes that much 
of this fascination and fear relies on the anxiety that traditionally accom-
panies technological developments. For many, Thomas writes, borrow-
ing a term from Freud, technology represents an “expectant anxiety,” 
one “aimed at the future” that “calls into question almost every aspect 
of daily human interaction” (217). “Expectant anxiety,” he continues, 
is predicated on technology’s ambivalence about the body.24 “The fear 
attached to the body that begins with the discourse of television reaches 
its zenith with discussions of ‘virtual reality’ and the actual disappearance 
of the body,” writes Thomas (218); the virtual makes the body disappear 
even as, by posing a threat to the body (disabling or altering it), technol-
ogy underscores the body’s presence. The body that can both vanish and 
appear is characterized by Thomas in terms of a ghost: “A virtual pres-
ence is a threat to the living precisely in terms of its incorporeal existence. 
The virtual ‘haunts’ the physical world. It is a dead presence, a ‘spirit’” 
(218). It is in the context of this reciprocal haunting that I want to return 
to my opening point: AnonGhost’s deface message and Anonymous’s 
#OpIsrael.
 In contrast to el8, AnonGhost quotes not the film Fight Club but the 
less well-known 1996 original. By doing so, AnonGhost resurrects the 
text’s reference to a service class with physical access to infrastructure. 
rise of LulzSec from Anonymous (she also notes the echoes of Fight Club in Anonymous 
culture [12]), notes the visual similarities between el8’s e-zine and LulzSec’s pastebin 
posts (285). Just as /b/’s interface appeared as a throwback to 1990s web design (Bern-
stein et al.), LulzSec’s own public statements affirm their alliance with the GenX decade. 
In a taunt directed to the FBI, LulzSec writes: “The Anonymous bitchslap rings through 
your ears like hacktivism movements of the 90s. We’re back—and we’re not going any-
where. Expect us” (“Joint Statement”). In a farewell communication to its followers, 
LulzSec reaffirms its allegiance to early Antisec. “Behind the mask, behind the insanity 
and mayhem, we truly believe in the AntiSec movement. We believe in it so strongly 
that we brought it back, much to the dismay of those looking for more anarchic lulz. 
We hope, wish, even beg, that the movement manifests itself into a revolution that can 
continue on without us” (“50 Days”).
 24. For Thomas, schooled in Foucault’s work on panopticism and discipline, much 
of the legal discourse surrounding hackers has to do with creating bodies that can be 
subjected to the law’s regulatory power (217–18).
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Also in contrast to el8, who channeled and adapted the 1999 Fight Club 
(or, more likely, the 2000 DVD, the means by which the film achieved 
its cult status), to elicit immediacy for the cyber realm, AnonGhost’s 
warning precisely replicates page 166 of Palahniuk’s book, with a single 
exception: the insertion of the sentence “We are everyone you come into 
contact with on a daily bases.” By virtue of both its fidelity to the origi-
nal and its departure from it, the deface warning resurrects Fight Club’s 
applicability to issues of class and labor in a globalized, corporatized 
economy; with “we are coming soon to release Gaza,” it puts Fight Club 
in service not of antisecurity (a relatively abstract concept with an ethos 
of transparency) but of a concrete place with a gritty, bloody history. 
Thomas writes that the virtual quality of expectant anxiety has to do 
with the body’s potential to disappear. AnonGhost’s wielding of Fight 
Club seems to resurrect this body, grant it flesh and, crucially, a voice: 
the text, while precisely quoted, has also been marked with small infidel-
ities so that it reads like an improperly recalled impression of the warn-
ing by a nonnative English speaker (none of the ESL markings in this 
warning appear on AnonGhost’s Twitter feed).
 AnonGhost (also known as The Mauritania Hacker Team) was a 
major player in #OpIsrael 2.0, Anonymous’s cyberattack on Israel in 
April 2013. A revival of #OpIsrael, the cyberattack of November 2012 
to protest Israeli actions in Gaza, #OpIsrael 2.0 was launched on April 
7, 2013, the day Israel commemorates the Holocaust, and was accom-
panied by a threat from Anonymous to “erase Israel from cyberspace” 
(“OpIsrael”). Though Israel is no stranger to cyberwarfare or cyberat-
tacks, the coincidence of symbolic and existential erasure has real rever-
berations for the population, and the threat was taken seriously in the 
media. Pro-Israeli hackers, responding to the threat, quickly defaced 
#OpIsrael’s website, and a group of hackers calling themselves Israeli 
Elite Force (iEF) fought back against Anonymous with a number of ini-
tial leaks and doxes, designed to cull supporters and media attention 
in the days leading up to the scheduled attack. On April 7 proper, iEF 
tweeted: “We dedicate this BLITZ to all holocaust survivors! We are 
proud to be your modern Bielski partisans!” Though both AnonGhost 
and iEF tweet primarily in English, iEF’s tweet included a link to a paste-
bin file with this message in Hebrew: “A personal message to all Israelis. 
In this attack we have chosen to act because we see that our folks are 
worried. We have come to prove that you have nothing to fear! Jewish 
hackers will always prevail. The ‘attacks’ from the Arabs are not serious, 
they are not professional. Therefore, till now, we have been silent. We see 
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that the public is beginning to fear this nonsense so we have decided to 
respond.”25
 At work here is the claiming of reality, of the immediacy of real vio-
lence, and of the power to be a “real” threat; the Holocaust plays a 
crucial role for these purposes. The timing of #OpIsrael 2.0 to coincide 
with Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance day, and the phrase “erase Israel 
from cyberspace,” evoked historical genocide—the erasure of a people—
to confer reality on an expectation of cyberviolence. Israel’s media noted 
that Yad Vashem, the center for documenting the Holocaust, was one 
of Anonymous’s targets, with one of the participants encouraging, “fire 
at the holocaust.”26 With the reference to “modern Bielski partisans,” 
iEF publically (i.e., in English) takes up the Holocaust rhetoric (though 
in private, with a pastebin message directed to Hebrew speakers only, 
they reinscribe this threat in terms of Jews’ and Arabs’ competing claims 
for land). By adapting and wielding the Holocaust, iEF resurrects the 
rhetorical power of an existential threat. For both sides of the conflict, 
the Holocaust functions as Tyler’s warning does: a model of immedi-
ate violence, available to be appropriated and utilized—in other words, 
hacked.
 The effects of #OpIsrael 2.0 indicated that AnonGhost and the 
other participants in the project were no more able than traditional 
do-gooders to navigate the complexities of the facts on the ground. Ill 
equipped to distinguish between Israeli, Israeli Arab, West-Bank and 
Gaza-based Palestinian institutions, and acting on misinformation fed 
to them by iEF hackers working undercover in IRC channels, Anony-
mous DDoSed Sakhnin Teacher’s College (an Arab institution in North-
ern Israel) and the Israeli Human Rights organization B’Tzelem.27 
The choice of the latter target—and iEF’s subsequent public bragging 
about it on Twitter—underscores the detachment of #OpIsrael from 
the specificities of the conflict and, indeed, from any national context 
or nationalist agenda. For its part, Anonymous hacked a number of 
Facebook pages, including that of GazaYouthBreakOut who, on April 
8, 2013, tweeted: “We love #Anonymous but we hate that they hacked 
 25. Translation mine. The message concludes with a reference to Proverbs 27:24, 
referring to the transience of power, and a quotation from Jeremiah 51:5 (“For Israel has 
not been forsaken, nor Judah of his God”), a verse that is generally interpreted as affirm-
ing the historical role of the Jews as God’s chosen people.
 26. The chat image appears in “The CyberAttack.”
 27. In private communication with the author iEF claimed responsibility for misdi-
recting Anonymous to Sakhnin Teacher’s College as part of an undercover operation.
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our FB page. Dudes, We’re palestinians, you got the wrong address. . 
COME ON.”
 Perhaps no other context underscores so clearly the imbrications of 
faith and fact, image and experience, history and fiction, this book has 
attempted to describe. Israel/Palestine has been hypermediated since its 
inception. Each side of the conflict (and there are more than two!) pro-
claims itself to be the real victim of real violence. Each offers compelling 
evidence to underwrite these claims. All identify as misrepresented and 
misunderstood, document demonization by the Western media, and claim 
to be silenced. All know, with faultless certainty, that violence is real, and 
witness the range of forms that real violence can assume. Torn, open bod-
ies do not call a halt to this work. They are its condition of possibility. 
In its very ineffectiveness, its epic fail, #OpIsrael 2.0 underscored how, 
after X, immediacy and immediate violence have become available to be 
claimed, disclaimed, appropriated, and mobilized, even—or especially—
here: a site politically vexed, historically fraught, ideologically volatile, 
and literally visceral.
F IND  SOME  CAUSE : 
Jack’s Revolution
Fight Club’s revolution is literally visceral, too. The narrator, squatting 
with Tyler in an abandoned house on Paper Street, discovers a series of 
articles in which human organs speak in the first person. Initially report-
ing information about functionality (“I am Jack’s medulla oblongata. 
Without me, Jack could not regulate his heart rate, blood pressure, or 
breathing” [FC 1999]), these organs accrue volition and menace: “I am 
Jack’s raging bile duct,” “I am Jack’s cold sweat” (FC 1999). As Marla 
interrupts the narrator’s symbiotic coexistence with Tyler, the conceit, 
with repetition, abandons the physical and becomes psychological (“I 
am Jack’s inflamed sense of rejection” [FC 1999]) and metaphorical: 
“I am Jack’s broken heart” (FC 1999). The DVD perpetuates this con-
ceit: it identifies itself as “Jack’s movie,” complete with “Jack’s Chap-
ter Selections” and “Jack’s Audio Commentary” (FC 2000). In the 
novel, the body housing the organs is named not Jack but Joe, and the 
narrator’s description of Project Mayhem resonates with an image of 
organs in revolt, a potential fifth column in the body politic: “The idea 
is to take some Joe on the street who’s never been in a fight and recruit 
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him. Let him experience winning for the first time in his life. Get him 
to explode” (FC 1996, 119–20). If the novel relied on a careful reader 
to make this connection, the film is more explicit. When the narrator 
recites “I am Jack’s colon,” Tyler replies immediately: “I get cancer. I 
kill Jack” (FC 1999).
 Fight Club’s vision of revolution is thus predicated on the expectation 
that the body will betray. It will unveil its unbridled multiplicity (imaged 
by cancer) and it will turn its own defense system against itself (imaged 
by AIDS). For Xer Palahniuk, writing in 1996, cancer and AIDS are 
explicitly linked (Palahniuk has been open about his homosexuality since 
2003). In the novel, the narrator, who has witnessed friends and fam-
ily die of cancer, recalls, while feeling a lump in Marla’s breast, his own 
experience as the object of intense medical scrutiny when a birthmark 
was mistaken for Kaposi’s sarcoma. The specter of acquired immune defi-
ciency is imaged, in the novel, by syntactic reversal (the narrator was 
told about “a new kind of cancer that was getting young men”) and 
ontic inversion: “the cancer that I don’t have is everywhere now” (FC 
1996, 105–6). Though this scene was not included in the film adaptation, 
Palahniuk has identified the AIDS epidemic as part of its generational 
appeal: “The ‘Fight Club’ generation is the first generation to whom sex 
and death seem synonymous” (qtd. in Lim). For Xers, schooled on the 
logic of AIDS, “That old saying, how you always kill the one you love, 
well, look, it works both ways” (FC 1996, 1999) reverberates with the 
general collapse of bodies that require fidelity in order to be sustained: 
family, corporation, religion, nation.
 Xers notoriously have no cause to fight for, nothing to believe in, 
and if the very nature of hacking is, as Coleman puts it, turning a system 
against itself, the image of the body as a system that can be invaded and 
appropriated, turned against itself, is not only powerful but uniquely 
useful for thinking about violence’s contemporary manifestations, after 
X. The hacked body reveals and conceals, articulating a coming into 
presence of a shadowy, unlocatable multiplicity. In Fight Club, this 
hacking is imaged by the figure of organs in revolt, by the metastasizing 
cells of cancer, capitalism, and terror, and by the subliminal images of 
Tyler on the DVD. All predicated on the body, they counter the somatic, 
tracing a movement away from perception. The subliminal images, not 
designed to be seen with a naked eye, explicitly reject the body’s claims 
for certainty and are viewable only through instruments and devices—
the remote, the slow-motion, the blood test, the microscope, the com-
puter screen.
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 Hence my choice of Fight Club, with its invisible, silent programming 
function, over V for Vendetta, the far more visible face—or mask—of 
contemporary revolution. No anarchist geek could fail to note that in 
Moore’s and Lloyd’s classic graphic novel, V excels, in addition to all 
else, at hacking: he appropriates “Fate,” the computer system adored by 
his nemesis, the fascist Adam Susan. Meditating on his love for Fate, 
Susan extolls this disembodied quality. “She has no eyes to flirt or prom-
ise, but she sees all. Sees and understands with a wisdom that is godlike 
in its scale. [. . .] Her soul is clean, untainted by the snares and ambigui-
ties of emotion. She does not hate. She does not yearn. She is untouched 
by joy or sorrow” (V 1988, 38).28 Like the narrator’s and Tyler’s rela-
tionship, in which “the gun, the anarchy, the explosion, is really about 
Marla Singer” (FC 1996, 1999), V’s philosophy is the product of a love 
triangle, according to which Susan stole Justice, V’s lover, driving V to 
the arms of Anarchy. V, apostrophizing Justice, scolds her for her infi-
delity with the fascist Susan (“Liar! Slut! Whore! Deny that you let him 
have his way with you, him and his armbands and jackboots!” [V 1988, 
40]). Susan has forgotten Justice, and is inappropriately attached to 
Fate, whom he describes as his “bride,” kissing and caressing the screen. 
Speaking of Susan to his protégé, Eve, V indicates his awareness of this 
misplaced affect: his hacking is a personal vendetta, as well as a meta-
phorical move.29 “My rival, though inclined to roam, possessed at home 
a wife that he adored. He’ll rue his promiscuity, the rogue who stole 
my only love, when he’s informed how many years it is”—at this point 
the sequential oblong frames are replaced by a single rectangular frame, 
revealing V seated at an immense computer—“since first I bedded his” (V 
1988, 201).
 Hacking Fate enables V to acquire and disseminate information, 
access and deploy infrastructure, and represents the final step of V’s plan, 
described admiringly by Eve as “purposeful,” “benign, almost like sur-
gery . . . Your foes assumed you sought revenge upon their flesh alone, 
but you did not stop there . . . you gored their ideology as well” (V 1988, 
260). This characterization of V’s violence as both visceral and philo-
sophical is striking, because Eve’s relation to V is characterized by her 
refusal of violence. She dissociates herself from V’s killing even as she 
affirms his mission. “I’ll not help them kill. The age of killers is no more. 
 28. Henceforth the graphic novel V for Vendetta is cited as V 1988, and the film 
adaptation as V 2005.
 29. V’s protégé, Evey Hammond, is rechristened “Eve” by V in part 3 of the graphic 
novel. In the film adaptation, she is “Evey” throughout.
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They have no place within our better world” (V 1988, 260). Eve—aptly 
named, as she will bring this new world into being—hesitates over V’s 
dead body, wondering whom she will see when she removes the mask. 
Various options appear and are discarded. Finally she recognizes her own 
face. “And at last I know. I know who V must be” (V 1988, 250). She 
then affirms his mask, takes his mission, and adopts her own protégé (a 
young man).
 V’s hacking feat vanishes from the 2005 adaptation, as does the com-
puter system Fate, the love triangle imagery, and—most crucially—Eve’s 
affirmation of V’s mask and mission. The film opens with Evey—diminu-
tized from Eve—proclaiming her fidelity to “the man” over and above 
the idea he represents. After reciting, “remember remember the fifth of 
November,” she asks: “But what of the man?” (V 2005). Evey’s attach-
ment to the man lies in her attention to his physical vulnerability.30 “We 
 30. Evey, unlike Eve, affirms an affiliation with the precariousness that, Judith Butler 
writes, defines political life. But Butler’s ethical theory seems somewhat limited by her 
reliance on notions of individuality, classical subjectivity, a desire to “return to a sense 
FIGURE 7. V For Vendetta © DC Comics. Fascist leader Adam Susan covers his face in despair as V’s 
defacement message appears on one of the terminals of his beloved computer system Fate, the first 
move in V’s final plan—as indicated by the tipping of the domino in the preceding panel. V’s hacking 
feat does not appear in the 2005 film adaptation. Note the Guy Fawkes mask in the lower right-hand 
corner of the panel. These appear periodically in the graphic novel, and serve a function similar to the 
subliminal images of Tyler in Fight Club.
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are told to remember the idea, not the man, because a man can fail. He 
can be caught, he can be killed and forgotten . . . but you cannot kiss 
an idea, cannot touch it, or hold it . . . ideas do not bleed, they do not 
feel pain, they do not love . . . And it is not an idea that I miss, it is a 
man” (V 2005). In the film’s concluding scenes, Evey completes V’s plan, 
and ignites the explosives V has set. Confirming imagery of multiplicity 
that had been building in the course of the film (raindrops; dominoes; 
computer screens), a vast crowd appears, all in full Guy Fawkes regalia, 
to witness the destruction of the Houses of Parliament. With the explo-
sion, as Evey intones “He’s Edmond Dantes, and he is my father, and 
my mother, my brother, my friend, he is you, and me, he is all of us” (V 
2005), the crowd members remove their masks and the faceless horde is 
revealed as individuals: unique, diverse, hopeful.31
 Anonymous, of course, retains the mask. By doing so, the hacker col-
lective resurrects both the graphic novel original with its masked hacker 
hero (and heroine) and the multitudinous imagery of the Wachowski 
adaptation. But they do so with a uniquely X attitude, one that is accus-
tomed to reverse or refuse temporal progression, construct causality 
and disavow it. Here, too, the Fight Club precedent is instructive. Tyler 
hacks and screens pornography. He seeds films with X-rated images 
and screens them to unsuspecting audiences. In other words: though 
the novel describes projectionists who assemble “epic” collections of 
pornographic images from single frames they clip and collect (Fincher 
recalls seeing such collections as a teenager [FC 2000]), Tyler reverses 
this process: rather than accumulating images, he disseminates them. In 
just such a manner Anonymous rewinds the final frames of the V for 
Vendetta film: not unmasking but masking, not refusing but assuming 
the Guy Fawkes symbol, a symbol that, as Lewis Call puts it, is mobile, 
nomadic, and “important precisely because it is never faithful to itself” 
(170). With the Anonymous phenomenon, hackers adopt the V for Ven-
detta program of revolution, adapt and export it, making it available to 
of ethical outrage that is, distinctively, for an Other, in the name of an Other” and her 
demand to “hear the agonized cry or be compelled or commanded by the face” (150).
 31. Call argues that the film is an improvement over the graphic novel original be-
cause of its radical employment of the mask: by multiplying it, rendering it mobile, the 
film affirms the anarchic history that the Guy Fawkes mask represents. “Moore’s Bil-
dungsroman may have been an inspirational story about one woman’s journey to political 
engagement, but the film is something more than that: a post modern narrative about a 
subversive political symbolism which can spread through a culture like a virus or meme, 
rewriting that culture as it goes” (170). This would be true only if the crowd members 
retained their masks. But they do not.
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an international market (Tunisia and, more recently, Istanbul), format-
ted in such a way as to enable its use by another application (Project 
Chanology; Occupy Wall Street).
 But just like Tyler, who spins out of control and drags the narrator 
kicking and screaming in his wake, mastery of the image does not ensure 
or safeguard intent. As the image migrates outward, from the page or the 
screen and into the world, it assumes a life of its own, one unfettered by 
affect, ideals, or even physical integrity. In both the film and novel ver-
sion of Fight Club, the narrator vainly attempts to apprehend Tyler and 
halt Project Mayhem. Eventually, he shoots himself in the head. The bul-
let does not kill him, but it leaves the narrator with a gaping wound in 
his jaw.
 In the novel, this wound is imaged as a scar that disfigures the narra-
tor: like the Joker in Moore’s classic Batman graphic novel, The Killing 
Joke (1988), the scar manifests as a smile, underscoring the ground-
lessness of affect. The V mask smiles as well, and, describing a Project 
Mayhem attack orchestrated by Tyler, Fight Club’s narrator evokes a 
similarly affectless, smiling mask: strategically placed fires transform an 
office building into “a grinning, five-story mask. [. . .] The face is an 
angry pumpkin, Japanese demon, dragon of avarice hanging in the sky” 
(FC 1996, 118). Slashed with Tyler’s bullet, the narrator’s face becomes 
a similar mask, a mask the reader is expected to recognize: “a jagged 
smile from ear to ear. Yeah, just like an angry Halloween pumpkin. Japa-
nese demon. Dragon of avarice” (FC 1996, 207). With these sentences, 
Project Mayhem manifests as written on the narrator’s body, though 
the body’s assumption of physical integrity is crossed out. He has, the 
concluding pages of Fight Club reveal, always been multiple, unreli-
able, hacked. He was always also Tyler, his rival, nemesis, lover, brother, 
father, and friend.
 In the film, the bullet leaves the narrator wounded, but he is still able 
to speak, though his voice is altered. One of Tyler’s acolytes approaches, 
and the narrator croaks, “find some gauze” (FC 1999). Or perhaps he 
says: “find some cause”—with a mouthful of blood and broken teeth, 
the plosives c and g are indistinguishable.32 This leaves open the ques-
tion of whether the wound is to be covered up or the organized poten-
tial of Project Mayhem is to be rechanneled, redirected. The answer, 
again, lies in the body: this time, not the narrator’s or Tyler’s but the 
viewer’s. She has witnessed how Tyler’s insertion of images, in films he 
 32. I am grateful to my student Boynton Allen for this observation. 
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hacks, has direct effect. People shudder and weep when they see them, 
even though, as the images flicker too quickly to be registered, they do 
not know why they are acting. Tyler’s hacks turn these spectators into 
zombies. Not merely an image for the posthuman that incites affect and 
thwarts it, eradicating and mobilizing the invaded, ruined body, the zom-
bie—that corpselike, spectral figure wherein violence, in all its problem-
atic potential, is revealed—is also a computer connected to the internet 
that has been hacked. Such a zombie or bot can be operated remotely 
without the owner’s knowledge. It can be mobilized, its power claimed 
for some goal or cause or purpose. As the image of a penis flickers over 
the final scenes, Fight Club announces that it, too, has been hacked: 
Tyler, by splicing pornography into the film, informs its viewers of their 
own appropriated agency. He is you, and me. He is all of us.
 Fight Club’s claim to hack its viewers, to turn them into zombies, 
linked and formed in an organic, human botnet even as it enjoins them to 
“find some cause,” affirms the force and efficacy of violence after X. Like 
the silent, masked, emptily smiling horde of V for Vendetta’s final scenes 
that inspired early Anonymous activists to don the mask, the mindless, 
apathetic consumers of popular culture, with no cause to fight for, noth-
ing to believe in, represent the full power and potential of Jack’s revo-
lution. But where will this force will be directed? By whom it will be 
channeled? And in what name?
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FIGURE 8. Expect Anonymous Fight Club Soap. Image by Mar Williams. This is one of several illustra-
tions that accompany Joshua Corman’s series on Anonymous. The soap’s hot pink color and the angle 
of the letters recall the promotional materials that accompanied Fight Club’s film adaptation. Note the 
Guy Fawkes mask, visible in the bubbles and froth.
All Rights Reserved. Copyright © The Ohio State University Press, 2015. Batch 1.
 X  O U T  /  2 1 1
X: The generation without a name. That is, literally, anonymous.
 EXPECT US: The slogan of Anonymous, the hacker collective that 
rose to prominence in 2008.
 EXPECT ANONYMOUS: One of Mar Williams’s illustrations for 
“Building a Better Anonymous,” an online essay series by Joshua Cor-
man and Brian Martin on the future of digital hacktivism, or “illegal 
hacking to achieve a political goal.”
 Hacking is commonly imaged as a malevolent act, the work of cruel 
youths or cynical criminals. But, Corman and Martin stress, hacking 
cannot be simply dismissed, demonized, or controlled. Reflecting on the 
Anonymous phenomenon they imagine a process by which the unruly 
anarchy of Anonymous is affirmed, and the phenomenon of digital 
hacktivism improved and mobilized. “It is an inevitable fact that Anon-
ymous, or similar groups, will become bigger, stronger, and more effec-
tive,” they write. “We seek to explore the ideas of making such a group 
truly better.” But “better,” the authors stress, does not conform to any 
traditional sense of virtue. It does not attest to an underlying or over-
arching morality or ism. “‘Better’ does not mean more criminal acts in 
the name of the greater good, it means a more efficient organization. 
[. . .] We envision a group with better defined goals, more accountabil-
ity, a healthy dose of humor and the legendary resolve of the sabertooth 
squirrel.” (The final image refers to Scrat, a character from the film Ice 
Age, who instigated the separation into continents of the landmass Pan-
gaea and other global cataclysms.)
 “We are Anonymous. We are legion. We do not forgive. We do not 
forget. Expect us,” intones a faceless silhouette. Anonymous rose to 
prominence with a series of online and in-person activities in which the 
participants wore masks, as if recreating, on the streets of major cities 
worldwide, the final scenes of the film V for Vendetta. But behind or 
through or under these intertexts—the bar of soap itself, its off-putting 
color, and the font, shape, and angle of the letters on it—is Fight Club, 
the 1999 cult film where disaffected, disillusioned, middle-class men 
meet for bare-knuckle fistfights because the experience of violence (both 
beating and being beaten) offers them a sense of community and existen-
tial affirmation otherwise denied them. It is denied them because they are 
members of Generation X.
 Disappear Here has probed Generation X’s attitude toward violence 
to determine violence’s forms and functions in the world that Xers grew 
up in. In this world, the line between fiction and fact is permeable, 
fungible; the relationship of violence to action is characterized by com-
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plicity, giving pause to ethics; “reality” is produced for television and 
marketed for consumption, and fiction—in the sense of fashioning and 
fabricating, as well as illusion and delusion—assumes an important role 
in the creation, construction, and preservation of “real violence.” After 
Generation X, in the twenty-first century, the nature of “real violence” 
is an open question—a point that Millennials or members of Genera-
tion Y, who live online, via avatars, on social networking sites, have 
already begun to sense. Overt revolutionary attempts of the Millen-
nial generation—such as the Occupy movement—emerge directly from 
X’s dyad of presence and absence, the visceral and the metaphysical. 
Formed in the wake of the global 2008 recession, Occupy articulated 
the wreckage wrought by dividend traders and bankers, violence invis-
ible to the naked eye.
 The novels of Bret Easton Ellis, Jay McInerney, Douglas Coupland, 
and Colson Whitehead have helped me describe Generation X’s unique 
attitude toward violence. As I recounted in “Why X Now? Crossing 
Out and Marking the Spot,” this attitude was formed by developments 
in politics, culture, and technology in the 1980s and 1990s, the years 
that Xers were coming of age. “Nevermind: An X Critique of Violence” 
articulated the specific questions that Generation X poses to repre-
sentation and critique, drawing on theories of media, the image, state 
power, and pain, as well as Richard Linklater’s seminal film Slacker, to 
articulate the shifting grounds of representation after (that is, accord-
ing to) Generation X. Turning to the work of Bret Easton Ellis (one of 
the authors most firmly associated with the “Nevermind” attitude and 
ethos), in “The Game That Moves: Bret Easton Ellis, 1985–2010,” I 
showed how Ellis’s novels trace the disappearance of the sign of the 
real and document a subtraction of reality from representation in the 
quarter century between 1985 (when his first novel, Less Than Zero, 
was published) and 2010 (when he published Imperial Bedrooms, 
which revisits the characters from Less Than Zero). “Disappear Here” 
is Ellis’s phrase, and it returns and reappears in four of his six novels (as 
well as in music and film inspired by his work).1
 1. Disappear Here is the title of a 2010 music album by the British electronica 
group Hybrid and a 2012 album by the U.S. punk band Callow. British indie rock 
group Bloc Party’s 2007 album A Weekend in the City includes a track titled “Song for 
Clay (Disappear Here),” which quotes a number of lines from Less Than Zero. At the 
time of this writing, a Kickstarter campaign is underway to raise funds for a film to be 
directed by Matthew Mishory titled Disappear Here (expected release date was 2014). 
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 “Something Empty in the Sky: 9/11 after X” studied the literary 
response to the spectacular terror attacks of September 11, 2001, by 
Xers Frédéric Beigbeder, Claire Messud, and Jess Walter, as well as by 
Ken Kalfus, McInerney, and Don DeLillo. These novels show how 9/11, 
still widely described as a “return of the real,” attests repeatedly to 
the inextricability of the real from mass media; what “returns” takes 
the form of a familiar spectacle of disaster inscribed and televisually 
marked as real; not violence but its reality is re-cognized. With the help 
of Jonathan Safran Foer’s fiction about cataclysmic historical events 
(the Holocaust, the firebombing of Dresden, and the terror attacks of 
September 11, 2001), “Not Yes or No: Fact, Fiction, Fidelity in Jon-
athan Safran Foer” described how, for Xers, the distinction between 
perpetrator and victim is fragile and contingent, the effect of an ever-
shifting-object of fidelity rather than a brute manifestation of historical 
fact. Finally, tracing the online presence of the X phenomenon Fight 
Club (both Chuck Palahniuk’s novel and David Fincher’s film adapta-
tion), “I Am Jack’s Revolution: Fight Club, Hacking, Violence after X” 
reflected on the implications of Generation X’s thinking on violence for 
our globalized, networked, new millennium, as information is mobile, 
contagious, and subject to leaks, and fiction—fashioning and fabricat-
ing, assembling and making, programming and hacking—creates, con-
structs, and preserves “real violence,” and dictates action in its wake.
 Now I want to reflect on some of the broader issues raised by this 
book, issues that revolve around Disappear Here’s situation on the cusp 
of the twenty-first century, and that emerge from my call for a new 
approach to violence and fiction today.
 “Today,” of course, changes daily. I wrote earlier that Generation X’s 
association with movement, with acceleration, with time running out at 
the millennium’s edge, is also the question of certainty’s shifting terrain 
under the spell of velocity. X’s avowed dislike of certainties, its associa-
tion with youth, newness, and movement, concretizes the challenge that 
contemporaneity poses to study. As Timothy Bewes puts it in “Temporal-
izing the Present,” “since understanding can only be achieved by turning 
one’s head backward, any entity is frozen into stasis by the analytical 
gaze” (159). Or, as Crasher complains in 13thGen, “it’s like trying to 
read the song title on a record that’s spinning” (Howe and Strauss 23). 
A number of transient magazines and websites, too many to list, are also named “Dis-
appear Here.”
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As presentation and representation increasingly, swiftly, interpenetrate, 
and the title or text is a moving target, how we read, what we read, and 
to what purpose is an open and urgent question.
 The idea that texts simultaneously affirm and deny the power struc-
tures that dictated their production, reception, and resilience domi-
nated literary criticism in the 1980s and 1990s. For scholars and 
teachers schooled in poststructuralism, deconstruction, and ideol-
ogy critique, delving into the text, penetrating its surface, reveals hid-
den, ossified hegemonies, melts them into air, and soberly puts readers 
face to face with the real. This depth model was, of course, driven by 
dialectic, the thesis-antithesis-synthesis engine by which Hegel imaged 
history and Marx revolution; even after Francis Fukuyama, follow-
ing Hegel, declared an end of history, dialectical thought continued to 
propel Marx’s postmodernist, poststructuralist, and deconstructionist 
heirs who, despite having witnessed communism’s horrific costs, shared 
Marx’s distrust of fixed relations, his commitment to undoing ancient 
prejudices and opinions, and his intolerance of oppression. This depth 
model was also informed by psychoanalysis, a field driven by faith in 
the underlying, unexpressed, and inexpressible forces beneath the sur-
face of things, and in the centrality of interpretation in co-creating truth: 
the critic, like the analyst, elicits from the opaque image an account of 
what the surface disavows. Hence the ambiguity, complexity, and the 
much-derided opacity associated with Judith Butler’s and Jacques Der-
rida’s early work: these are hard to read for a reason. A difficult text 
reveals and conceals, points to what it cannot confess, and affirms, again 
and again, that truth is not a simple fact. Acclaimed X authors like Mark 
Z. Danielewski and Ben Marcus rely on their readers’ affinity with this 
important tradition, as well as their faith in its value.
 The X authors discussed in this book, in contrast, are notoriously 
easy to read. Their work has been dismissed as cultlike and cartoonish 
(especially in its portrayal of violence), without intrinsic value or liter-
ary heft, their popularity nothing but a passing phase. Precisely because 
of their presumed superficiality, though, these texts offer insight into 
debates about the value and limits of the depth model. In recent years 
these debates have occupied literary scholars who are reflecting on the 
ethical and political potential of what they do. Stephen Best and Sha-
ron Marcus describe a recent turn from the depth model (what they 
call “symptomatic reading”) to “modes of reading that attend to the 
surfaces of texts rather than plumb their depths” (1–2). In advocating 
surface reading, Best and Marcus suggest that much is to be gained by 
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“relinquishing the freedom dream that accompanies the work of demys-
tification” (17) and attending to the text’s “assembly”—what I have 
called, in Disappear Here, its fictive quality, its forming or fashioning. 
This tendency toward surface reading, Best and Marcus claim, emerged 
with images of violence that ushered in the new millennium: the Abu 
Ghraib torture photographs, the Hurricane Katrina coverage, and the 
orchestrated theatre of the Bush administration all “hammered home 
the point that not all situations require the subtle ingenuity” associated 
with late-twentieth-century deconstruction and ideology critique (2). Of 
course, as Disappear Here has demonstrated, this resolute superficiality 
is hardly new. “Surface surface surface was all that anyone found mean-
ing in,” wrote Ellis in American Psycho (375).
 “Surface reading” does have its discontents. Carolyn Lesjak, for 
example, condemns it as politically quietist. The drive to surface read-
ing, she argues, disavows history; it is reactionary, and proscribes rev-
olution and progressive action. Lesjak advocates opacity, “reading 
surfaces as perverse rather than as obvious, as never identical to them-
selves in their ‘thereness,’ and always found within and constitutive 
of complex spatial relations, both seen and not seen, deep and lateral, 
material and figural” (251). Though she describes this approach as a 
lost cause, she nonetheless urges fidelity to it: “fidelity to the lost cause 
of reading dialectically [. . .] is the only way to keep faith with his-
tory” (264). Taking a middle ground in these debates, Timothy Bewes 
imagines an approach to fiction that consistently attends to that which 
“escapes ethical reflection [or] succeeds in abolishing perspective” 
(“Reading” 21). Bewes eschews reading for ethical or political purpose, 
preferring “the potentiality that inheres in those aspects of the text that 
are not exhausted by the referential function” (28). Seeking to set the 
reader in an immanent relation to the text, so that the act of reading 
illuminates reader and text simultaneously, underscoring their mutual 
complicity, Bewes imagines abolishing the oppositional relation between 
reader and text: “the object is no longer an object” (28).
 Like the tattoo of a scar that looks like a gash, X reveals and obscures 
what’s under erasure, marks a moving spot on the surface of things, and 
sets these debates in a broader perspective. Best and Marcus’s affirma-
tion of surface, their disavowal of grand ideals, and their willingness 
to relinquish the fantasy of the critic-as-hero (a willingness that Bewes 
shares) evince an X dislike and distrust of Boomer-centered isms. But 
so does Lesjak’s affirmation of ambiguity, her attention to the uneasy 
quality of presence, and her stubborn fidelity to a lost cause. If Best and 
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Marcus’s aesthetic credo was captured, decades earlier, by Ellis, both 
Lesjak and Bewes, for all their differences, seek what Xer Donna Tartt, 
in the final pages of her novel The Goldfinch, describes as the “middle 
zone” between the catastrophe of human existence and the work of art: 
“between ‘reality’ on the one hand, and the point where the mind strikes 
reality [. . .] where two very different surfaces mingle and blur to provide 
what life does not” (770).
 That blurring, of course, is Disappear Here’s point of departure, and 
the wager of this book is that it extends to violence—itself commonly 
posed as a point of departure that both representation and interpreta-
tion reflect, traumatically repeat, neurotically obscure, or, in the name of 
Ethics, disavow. The underlying assumption of this project—its crux—is 
that violence, like any other aspect of reality, is subject to representa-
tion, and hence to misrepresentation, distortion, and denial—in short, 
to fiction. And yet, as I have maintained throughout this book: violence 
is real, though its reality is hard to find, and is ultimately indistinguish-
able from fiction. Consequently, after Generation X, we are called upon 
to navigate what is real, determine what is true, and act accordingly.
 Or not; given Xers’ notorious apathy and detachment, action does 
not come easily. For many Xers, “Resistance is Futile,” the Borg’s men-
acing mantra in Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987–94) rings true, 
and political engagement is most likely to be evinced by the ironic dis-
avowal of ideological fervor that drove the “Rally to Restore Sanity and/
or Fear” led by Xers Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert on the National 
Mall in Washington, DC (October 30, 2010). But Xers could never be 
scolded into caring. The rise of trauma theory in the 1980s and 1990s 
was affect-laden, ethically invested, urgent in its invocations of justice, 
and sometimes shrill in its warnings about the potential of damage that 
irresponsible representation can do to victims, to history, to truth, and 
to reality itself. Many Xers tuned these warnings out, and grew attuned 
to the limits of ethics, the exhaustion of critique, the evacuation of 
affect, the emptying out of revolutionary promise. After X, the complic-
ity of all these isms with faith-based structures comes to the fore, laying 
bare the fictive quality of faith—even, or especially, in secular, ideologi-
cal, or political pursuits.
 When fidelity—what you are compelled, by conviction, attitude, mar-
keting, and imagery, to believe—dictates what presents as real, phenom-
ena as diverse as the Arab Spring, the 2014 Israel–Hamas War, and the 
prevalence, in the United States, of “truther” movements (around Presi-
dent Barack Obama, 9/11, or Sandy Hook) begin to coalesce under a 
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general revision of the value traditionally ascribed to epistemic valid-
ity, even—or especially—in the context of violence. Xer Stephen Col-
bert coined the term “truthiness” to capture this phenomenon. But this 
deep complicity with the image-driven discourse of commodity culture 
(a point that the Brat Pack authors of the early 1980s knew well, and 
which blank fiction practitioners in the 1990s demonstrated over and 
over) sutures X into contemporary aesthetic production, for which com-
plicity, as Johanna Drucker has pointed out, needs to replace the para-
digm of radical critique on which the ideological potential of art was 
premised by modernism.2 Disappear Here has traced the implications of 
this complicity for reality, for violence, and for action today.
 “Complicity” is a formidable term because of its association with a 
criminal charge. Charges elicit judgments of innocence or guilt. But in 
his meditations on complicity in ghettos and in Auschwitz, Primo Levi 
articulated a more nuanced approach. Complicity is different, Levi notes, 
from collaboration and culpability. Collaboration is a charge; culpability 
is a verdict. Both are well within judgment’s sphere. But to be complicit, 
Levi stressed, is to stand in a relation to this sphere on which judgment 
has yet to fall. Levi’s seminal articulation of this “gray zone” situates 
the subject in relation to violence without condemning or exonerating 
her. By distinguishing questions about complicity from the judgment that 
condemns, and clarifying that complicit actions within an evil system do 
not endorse or support the system and its evil, Levi poses complicity as a 
starting point for questions about ethics.3 Precisely because it is not itself 
 2. Drucker’s study of contemporary fine art suggests the term “complicit formalism” 
to articulate how artists in the 1990s and early 2000s articulated, within the formal 
properties of their works, “embedded conditions of meaning” (xvi). Drucker chooses 
“complicity” (a term she acknowledges is “deliberately provocative, since it implies a 
knowing compromise between motives of opportunism and circumstantial conditions—
whether on the plane of production, or reference, or within institutional and social 
situations” [xvi]) in part to signal a departure from the oppositional model that defined 
the art of the avant-garde and that still (she writes in 2006) characterizes the theoretical 
bent of most academic work (xiv), and in part to exit the critical impasse of judgment 
that designates art objects “good” or “bad,” and renders toothless art’s potential for 
enacting change: “Criticism’s prescriptive effect paralyzes the inventive impulse of mak-
ing and locks artists into an impoverished ‘poststudio’ position in which art making is 
conceived largely as a conceptual or symbolic act. But this simply isn’t true. For all the 
critical significance of conceptualism, art is never only an idea” (xv).
 3. I am building, here, on the conclusion to my 2006 book Against the Unspeak-
able. That book discussed how, in the wake of events like the Holocaust, slavery, and 
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, complicity is generally posited as a 
problem, an irritant, or an ethical inconsistency that must be identified and abolished 
in the quest for moral clarity. Such a quest, I maintain, is a fool’s errand. It misses the 
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a judgment (though it invites and expects it), complicity dwells in the ten-
sion between the particular and the paradigmatic, the demographic and 
as the point of view, a tension that has pervaded studies of Generation X 
from its inception.
 This does not mean that complicity is, itself, ethical. In the seminal 
formulations of postmodernism by Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Jameson, 
complicity was an inevitable paradox with which postmodernism must 
wrestle and fail to resolve—fail, because a resolution will affirm a total-
ity and certainty that is antithetical to the ethical and political projects 
with which postmodernism is aligned. For some scholars and theorists 
of postmodernism, complicity was a productive point from which dif-
ference can be investigated and embraced (Linda Hutcheon posits “com-
plicitous critique” as a starting point for postmodern ethics). For others 
(like Christopher Norris), it was lamented: a sign of postmodernism’s 
political inefficacy. But the simultaneity of affirmation and negation, of 
documentation and hypothesis, of refusal and co-option, of presence 
and representation that “X” captures has uniquely equipped Genera-
tion X to dwell in, or to occupy, complicity’s domain. Studies of com-
plicity by Mark Sanders and Christopher Kutz, like Levi’s, conceive of 
complicity spatially, a temporary ground: complicity is a zone (Levi), a 
domain (Kutz), or a “footing” from which, as Sanders writes, “opposi-
tion takes its first steps” (9). Today, in our virtual, networked reality, 
“domain” names not just dwelling place but a system that offers access 
to the internet. Think of complicity as such a domain, governed, as web 
domains are, by protocols that offer network access, opening us to the 
being of other beings.4 Complicity aligns and binds us to those whose 
suffering affects us even as “real violence” increasingly eludes our grasp, 
moving between the world and the screen, manifesting as an ever-shift-
ing object of fidelity, migrating in and out of fiction.
 This migration has informed my methodology, which draws on U.S. 
popular culture to articulate and address issues that reverberate in a 
global postcolonial contemporary. I know that the export of U.S. culture 
fundamental value of complicity in a world where violence—on the page, screen, couch, 
or battlefield—leaves no one untouched.
 4. Kutz proffers what he calls a “complicity principle,” in which “I am account-
able for what others do when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or harm 
they cause” (122), suggesting that complicity is a logical precedent for accountability: 
first you are complicit, only then can you be accountable for evil, or to others. Sanders 
extends this logic by describing complicity as “the very basis for responsibly entering 
into, maintaining, or breaking off a given affiliation or attachment” (x).
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was a crucial tool in the Cold War, a kind of cultural armament. But 
tools can be used to build and dismantle, and arms find their way into 
unexpected hands. As I arm and aim, I am driven by the conviction that 
much like French poststructuralism, with its inarguable and transforma-
tive contribution to feminism, Critical Race Theory, and cultural stud-
ies, U.S. popular culture is an enabling paradigm; it cannot be discarded 
merely because of its complicity with global hegemony.5 Indeed, as 
Mark LeVine notes, the development, in the 1980s, of satellite TV that 
exposed Xers to “everything from MTV’s ‘Headbangers Ball’ and Dal-
las to Spanish-language telenovelas and German pornography” (301), 
makes such a paradigm absolutely necessary. Like Henseler (a Hispani-
cist), Tara Brabazon (Australia), LeVine (who specializes in the Middle 
East), and Lisa Parks and Shanti Kumar, the editors of Planet TV (who 
write from a South Asian perspective), I see in U.S. popular culture use-
ful tools for critical work in a global context. The idea is not to assert 
 5. In my insistence on X’s global bent, I am guided by Christine Henseler, perhaps 
the most prolific scholar of Generation X today. Her edited volume and digital proj-
ect, Generation X Goes Global, instantiates her earlier observation in Spanish Fiction 
in the Digital Age: Generation X Remixed: Generation X, writes Henseler, “unsettled 
critics’ traditional, nationalist, and purely word-oriented critical perspectives; its ‘X’ 
factor simultaneously allowed them to acknowledge and discredit the moniker’s North 
American and popular cultural alliances” (Spanish Fiction 5). The X Factor—a global 
television music competition franchise that originated from Pop Idol in the United 
Kingdom and spawned American Idol in the United States—marks the spot from which 
Generation X, heirs to unprecedented technological and telecommunications develop-
ments, may offer a timely critique of power and agency in contemporary media stud-
ies, one that creatively, even playfully, engages U.S. popular culture from a variety of 
national and post-national sites. Writing of global television studies, Parks and Kumar 
assert that blanket assumptions of cultural imperialism fatally discount the significance 
of audience agency: “One of the ways that television scholars have approached the de-
bates over globalization is through cultural imperialism, which forcefully foregrounds 
the inequities of media resources and flows in international communication. However, 
in recent years, cultural imperialism has come under heavy criticism for its inability to 
adequately theorize the power of audiences to creatively subvert the power of global 
television. As a result, it has become a less fashionable academic position in the 1990s 
than it was during the 1970s and 1980s” (11). For Generation X, as Henseler writes 
in Spanish Fiction, “globalization both universalizes and individualizes culture” (16); 
hence her conviction of the need to shift focus from “traditionally ‘passive’ or ‘victim-
ized’ notions centered on the influence of North American corporate culture to more 
dynamic, active exchanges and innovations” (Spanish Fiction 121). But even as Hensel-
er’s subsequent edited volume and digital project, Generation X Goes Global, claimed 
for this cohort the mantle of “the first fully global generation” (Global 15), its contrib-
utors (with characteristic ambivalence and suspicion) questioned the very basis for the 
project. “Generation X does not necessarily go global for everybody,” admits Henseler; 
“[the project’s] central premise may quake as it crosses tectonic plates” (Global 17). 
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the value of U.S. culture over and above that of others. Indeed, most of 
the GenX novels and authors discussed in this book have widely been 
derided for their lack of value and values, or for an (unearned) excess of 
value placed on them at certain moments in their careers.
 My previous work on large-scale global violence (slavery, the Holo-
caust, and Hiroshima, all commonly imaged, especially in the 1980s and 
1990s, as unspeakable) examined the implications of representation’s 
limits for those who define themselves by and through them. That work 
was attuned to what is at risk when the reality of violence is questioned 
or denied; it also propelled me toward Disappear Here by giving me a 
clear sense of how the absolute empirical validity of these events legis-
lates their interpretation and dictates the political configurations of iden-
tities that define themselves by a history of suffering. Disappear Here 
has pursued that argument, taking as its object not the representation 
of events that historically occurred but works of fiction that explore the 
assumption of validity that commonly attach to them. It is this invest-
ment with validity that unites the many different types of violence (phys-
ical, psychological, empirical, epistemic) that I bring together in this 
book. Rather than adjudicating among these types (labeling some as dan-
gerous, others as benign; identifying some as causes, others as effects) 
and rather than discriminating between contexts in which violence 
occurs (the family, the state, the institution, the environment), I have 
argued that the underlying stakes of such work have to do with claims 
on the real. Precisely because of the association of violence with reality, 
identifying the presence or traces of violence works to claim empirical 
validity in an increasingly virtual world—one in which “reality” is as 
urgent as it is elusive.
 For the generation that witnessed a receding of the real, its assump-
tion into the image, and its subsequent retrieval from the image and con-
cretization in experience—experience often described as mediated by 
television, or “just like a movie”—fiction is crucial. Since his seminal 
1994 film Pulp Fiction, Xer Quentin Tarantino’s work has underscored 
the role that fiction plays in forming our relation to violence. In strik-
ing contrast to Boomer Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993) and 
Amistad (1997), which were purported to be based on precise historical 
facts (though scholars do quibble) about the Holocaust and the Ameri-
can slave trade, Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds (2009) and Django 
Unchained (2012) revisit the history of Nazi Germany and U.S. slav-
ery, respectively, but embrace an antihistoricist bent, pursuing the logic 
of revenge and genre over and above fidelity to historical fact. Unlikely 
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to heed the atavistic call to fidelity, to enlist in the name of a nation, a 
people, a history, a god, Xers are uniquely poised to create, rather than 
destroy. After Generation X, these creations (think of Amazon.com and 
Google, both a brainchild of Xers) are, like Shelley’s poets, the unac-
knowledged legislators of our world.
 Violence in this world moves in and out of fiction, from the con-
tent of the text to the context of its reception, from image to disaster 
and back. This movement is evident in fiction and film by Xers from 
many nations. Victor Pelevin’s Homo Zapiens (Russia, 1999) echoes the 
conceit of the Wachowskis’ global hit The Matrix (1999), positing local 
politics and the Chechen war as the products of simulation by advertis-
ing agencies; the protagonist himself is finally scanned, replicated, and 
disseminated digitally. Tom McCarthy’s Remainder (UK and France, 
2005) traces this process in reverse: the protagonist, a survivor of a crip-
pling disaster, generates a concrete reality from a sense of déjà vu. Sayed 
Kashua, a Palestinian Israeli who writes in Hebrew, traces permutations 
of fidelity in each of his books: his Second Person Singular (2010) com-
bines the trope of passing (a Palestinian assumes an Israeli man’s iden-
tity) with the specter of marital infidelity to articulate the vicissitudes 
of identity against a background of occupation, terror, and war. Park 
Chan-wook’s popular 2003 South Korean revenge flick Oldboy is rife 
with images of torture, mutilation, and murder (inflicted mostly with a 
hammer); the image of a hammer-wielding figure in the video diary of 
mentally disturbed Virginia Tech student Cho Seung-Hui (released after 
the murders of spring 2007) further testifies to violence’s potential to 
burst the bounds of fiction, and to its terrible cost.
 Like Oldboy, Koushun Takami’s novel Battle Royale (Japan, 1999), 
a controversial hit when it was published, pushed the envelope with 
extreme and graphic violence. Takami’s account of young people bat-
tling to the death developed from his experience growing up in a Japan 
haunted by memories of U.S. air raids during World War II. Suzanne 
Collins’s young adult series The Hunger Games (U.S., 2008; the 2012 
film adaptation was a worldwide hit) bears striking similarities to Battle 
Royale. But Collins claims not to know of Takami’s novel; her dysto-
pian vision was defined by the prevalence of media she observed in the 
lives of young people (she added a live TV element, an echo of the 1987 
film Running Man). Unlike Takami’s novel, in which characters’ alle-
giances prove sincere and reliable, Collins’s protagonist, Katniss Ever-
deen, never ascertains the extent to which her affections are genuine, 
simulated, or performed for the necessity of survival. Katniss’s inability 
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to determine or pin down her own affect, her attempt to locate herself 
in the stylized images produced around her, locates her within a tra-
dition of X authors for whom the stakes are, as for Katniss, life and 
death. Such an author is Québécoise Nelly Arcan. In her Whore (2001), 
violence, in the form of the deep systemic dictates of gender, functions 
as a source of attraction and fascination and, ultimately, destruction. 
Arcan is the pen name of Isabelle Fortier, whose background is remark-
ably similar to that of her unnamed narrator: a student of literature 
who prostitutes herself out of a dependency on male desire. Whore elic-
ited much speculation as to whether the book was autobiographical, 
encouraged by Arcan herself in essays and interviews and, especially, 
in her second novel, Folle, narrated by an ex-prostitute turned writer 
named Nelly Arcan. As if heeding her protagonist’s repeated assertions 
about the inevitability of suicide, the author hanged herself in 2009.
 Despite its life-or-death stakes (or, more likely, because of them), 
violence in fiction has been treated as an exception from reality, rather 
than a sadly inevitable part of it. But to dismiss violence as a fiction is 
often to perform a violence of a different order, though such epistemic 
or discursive violence is itself often countered (and even dismissed) 
by gestures back to “the real.” The outrage generated by phenomena 
like Xer James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces and JT LeRoy’s unmask-
ing as Xer Laura Albert focuses on the fictionalization of the violence 
supposedly inflicted on the authors, and evidence the truism that vio-
lence demands accuracy, though the object of that accuracy continually 
eludes.6 In the second half of the twentieth century, this wedding of 
violence to its reality extended from fiction and its limits to the fact- 
and truth-making work of history, philosophy, and aesthetics. For phi-
losopher Jean-François Lyotard, who frames his extensive meditation 
on The Differend as a response to Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson, 
the reality of violence poses special demands on the historian and the 
 6. Frey’s A Million Little Pieces was marketed as a memoir and lauded by Oprah 
Winfrey. Subsequent to investigative reporting in The Smoking Gun and a public apol-
ogy by Frey, the book has been recategorized and its reader instructed, on the copyright 
page, to consider it a work of fiction. LeRoy was a cult figure whose searing novel 
Sarah and short-story collection The Heart Is Deceitful Above All Things encouraged 
readers to believe his persona’s backstory of child prostitution, drug abuse, abandon-
ment, and addiction. Writing of the rash of faux memoirs published in 1990 and the 
early twenty-first century, Mihaela P. Harper wonders whether the phenomenon “is due 
to a need for reassurance that the external reality of the past, solid and immutable, is 
still ‘out there,’ in spite of or maybe because of its terrifying brutality; or, on the con-
trary, this interest is incited by a desire to question the need for such a reality, and is 
symptomatic of a contemporary confusion about what is real and what is not” (228).
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philosopher: Auschwitz is “the most real of realities” (58). This tra-
dition has proved resilient: after 9/11, Jean Baudrillard’s and Slavoj 
Žižek’s treatments of the terror attacks as an opportunity to rethink 
the nature of the real were countered by vehement assertions of these 
events’ unquestionable facticity: “most real of all real” (as Versluys puts 
it), “a bedrock of fact” (Frow).
 These assumptions and premises were precisely what the opening 
chapters of this book attempted to X out, and my own work, in this pro-
cess, was always guided by this axiom: violence is real. It is real, or it is 
not “really” violent. Violence is also everywhere: from the brutal positive 
manifestations of violent actions on bodies, buildings, and ecosystems, to 
hidden, structural, systemic relations between institutions, ideas, and dis-
courses. In the 1970s and the 1980s, scholarship in feminism and Criti-
cal Race Theory underscored this invisible, pervasive, insidious quality. 
These fields were definitive in demonstrating how, even if the fact of vio-
lence is subjected to skepticism and doubt (by silencing or disqualifying 
the victim or the witness), or if the nature of its effects are disputed or 
dismissed (the conspiracy, the cover-up), violence has occurred, but on 
another register. The effect of this work (which was informed by post-
structuralism and deconstruction) was a simultaneous acknowledgment 
and disavowal of violence’s availability to knowledge. Coming, as I do, 
at the end of these traditions, distinguishing violence from fiction seems 
like a pointless exercise. Like Saussure’s sign, memorably imaged by two 
sides of a sheet of paper, violence and fiction are inextricable. In the 
face of this deep complicity of art and life, I offer an X critique of vio-
lence, suggesting that we tarry in the noncommittal, withhold judgment, 
pause, and abide in the flickering light of the unmoored image, the image 
that orients without reference. I foresee a new economy of representa-
tion, one with no room for the time-honored labor of determining the 
presence or absence of a causal link between violent images and violent 
behavior, or the critical work of condemning some representations of 
violence and exonerating others.
 To X out these distinctions is perilous, of course. But risk is intrinsic 
to creative thought. I have, in this book, attempted to outline the possi-
bilities and perils that X-ing out opens up. X out means, also, to have the 
final word: one last call-out before dropping the mic. As I X out here, I 
offer a reckoning of my own X origins, the intersection from which Dis-
appear Here emerges or erupts.
 I hail from multiple countries and continents, none or all of which 
I can claim as my own. My grandparents, robbed of their homes in 
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Austria and Transylvania, built lives in Puerto Rico and the United 
States; my parents abandoned those lives to create yet another new life 
in Israel. To build a life in a new country and a foreign language is not 
easy. It takes a toll on bodies, minds, and bank accounts. My child-
hood was defined by movement: departures: disruptions: all in the bleak 
light of the Holocaust. For my parents, Zionism promised a refuge in 
a world in which homes and lives can be stolen or abandoned, nothing 
can be trusted, and no one is ever truly safe. But the Israel I came of 
age in saw that promise disappear. Palestine emerged from silence and 
denial, threat and fear, to political position and partisan pursuit, mani-
festing in our lives as inexorable fact. Israeli Xers who, like me, were 
schooled in the heroic narratives of our young country’s history and 
drafted into the army at the age of eighteen lived a very different story 
than our parents’: not the just war, the struggle to survive, the phoenix 
emerging from Auschwitz, ours was the story of invasion, occupation, 
terror, Intifada (the 1987 Intifada coincided with my own army service), 
and the self-directed violence, a kind of national psychic suicide, of the 
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Coming of age in Israel 
in those decades attuned me to the fragility of all ideals, the cultural 
reverberations of trauma, the solace of silence, and its deadly price; gen-
erations of migration schooled me in the contingencies of life without 
a safety net. I am not unfamiliar with war and terror. I have seen what 
violence can do. I have witnessed its capacity to turn bodies and build-
ings and minds and lives inside out, as well as the reverberations of 
this inversion that extend beyond the physical to the ways we make 
sense of the world. But the deadly debris of discrimination, occupation, 
and infrastructure, like the collateral damage of construction and cri-
tique, are inextricable from the stories we tell, the images we make, 
the maps we draw, the dreams we dream. Traditional and comfortable 
distinctions between victim and perpetrator, oppressor and oppressed, 
past and present, presence and absence are no refuge as past violence 
stalks us, as faraway atrocities reverberate at home, and even homes are 
haunted by the stolen land on which they rest.
 I have described Disappear Here as a form of theft: one that acknowl-
edges and erases origin, affirms and disavows or denies it. X captures the 
existential ambivalence of “disappear here,” prompting me to affirm and 
disavow the historical specificity of my own perspective. Personal expe-
rience, like the historical events, political issues, technological develop-
ments, and cultural concerns that this book documents, and the images 
from 1980s and 1990s U.S. fiction, film, and popular culture that ground 
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this work and define its scope, are the contested ground (because all 
ground is contested) from which I arm and aim at this: my target: vio-
lence, the real, and “real violence” today. To that end I export X from 
its generational source, its specific temporal, cultural, and experiential 
context. I hack it, pwn it (to pwn is a hacker term meaning to own or 
control), and wield it to execute Disappear Here’s program of opposi-
tion, multiplicity, intersection, variability, precision, erasure, and, maybe, 
revolution.
 And I am not alone. The changes that X has witnessed and wrought 
have now become mainstream. As Xers negotiate local and global crises, 
and battle disasters the self-evidence of which are, increasingly, a matter 
of interpretation, conflicting evidence, image analysis, and faith, what 
violence is, where and how it occurs, and what kind of action, if any, 
can be brought to bear on this complex phenomenon is not only an open 
question but a moving target. For this challenge X is uniquely equipped. 
Born of change, formed from disaffection, the generation with no cause 
or credo crosses out and marks the spot. It’s where it’s at when “it” is 
on the move. Xers are artists, critics, teachers, scholars, and leaders; they 
are the arbiters of culture and society. Their affectless, apathetic ethos is 
no longer a problem to be corrected (if it ever was) but a beacon, a guide 
to be followed as, turning to the future, after X, we consider our chil-
dren, our students, our victims, our executors, who will inherit the world 
that X has made.
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